A COMPARISON OF THE BELIEF SYSTEMS OF THREE INDUSTRIAL GROUPS.

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INTRODUCTION.

The research on which this thesis is based began as a study of group behaviour patterns in the printing industry. The aim of this printing research was to study how far the ideology of the printing trade unions, that is their system of beliefs, interests and values, affects the actual behaviour of printing workers within their place of work. Particular attention was paid to the behaviour of informal groups with a view to studying how far the values of the trade unions were modified in practice by other values and norms of behaviour arising from within the informal groups.

It was hoped that this study of informal group behaviour would be useful in evaluating the theories of informal group behaviour in industry put forward by Professor Elton Mayo and his colleagues of the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration. *

~~That~~ it would in particular help to prove or disprove criticisms made of the Harvard researches, on the grounds that Mayo and his colleagues ignored completely the existence of trade unions and the effect that these bodies have upon the behaviour of industrial workers,** and that Mayo and his colleagues ignore the fact that many workers believe that they have interests which conflict with those of the employer, and the effect that this has upon informal groups in industry.*** These two criticisms go together, for the belief that workers have interests opposed to those of the employer is a prerequisite of trade unionism. It was felt that research into printing which is, from the trade union point of view, the most highly organised of British industries, would show whether Mayo's theories would be applicable to a situation where trade union influence was strong: the trade unions being in themselves common interest/

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* Footnote: These theories are set out in the following books:

Elton Mayo, "The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilisation": "The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilisation".

F.J.Roethlisberger & W.J.Dickson, "Management and the Worker", 1939.

F.J.Roethlisberger, "Management and Morale".

T.N.Whitehead, "Leadership in a Free Society", 1936, and "The Industrial Worker", 1938.

All published by the Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

** Footnote: See Mary B. Gilson's review of "Management and the Worker", in the "American Journal of Sociology", July 1940, p. 101 and

C.W.M.Hart, "Industrial Relations Research and Social Theory" in the "Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science", February 1949, pp.72-73

*** Footnote: Mary B. Gilson, op.cit., and D.C.Miller & W.H.Form, "Industrial Sociology", Harper & Brothers, New York, 1951, p. 79.

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interest groups (of workers) with interests opposed to those of the employer.

The research was carried out by making a study of the ideologies of the trade unions by means of an analysis of trade union rulebooks, histories, and journals. This was followed by research in a printing works in order to study the actual behaviour of printers while at work. This study revealed features of informal group behaviour which seemed to contradict certain of the theories of Mayo and his associates and upheld the criticisms mentioned earlier. (It was found that the interests of the workers as embodied in their trade unions were extremely important). Thus Mayo and his colleagues hold that informal groups are created spontaneously as a result of the "social sentiments" arising out of the social interaction between workers who are in face to face contact, and that within those informal groups are created systems of ideas and beliefs from which are derived the norms which regulate their behaviour. But in the printing research it was found that informal groups were based upon common interest, and that differences of interest - such as membership of different trades or trade unions - between men in face to face contact caused them to form different informal groups. It was also found that the dominant norms of behaviour of the printers were those of the trade union and were derived from trade union rules and traditions, not from spontaneous growth within the group.

It seemed then that the ideas of informal group behaviour put forward by the Mayo school must be modified in a situation where strong trade unions exist and where workers accept the values and norms of behaviour sanctioned by the trade unions. But, in order to make certain that these differences from the theories of Mayo and his colleagues were indeed due to trade unionism, it was decided to do a similar study among workers as different as possible from the printers - and in particular having no strong trade union traditions. The most suitable workers for this purpose appeared to be those in the civil engineering industry because of the contrast they made with the printing workers.

The printing industry is highly skilled and tradesmen greatly outnumber non-tradesmen in it; printing workers are highly paid and have a relatively high social status among workers generally; the labour force is remarkably stable, few men leave the trade except on death or retirement, and men tend to stay with one employer. In addition the printing workers have a long trade union tradition: the printing trade unions are the oldest of British trade unions while the unit of workshop organisation - the Chapel - is even older, and has existed for over 300 years.

The civil engineering industry is very different. The workers are mainly unskilled labourers, and the tradesmen, mostly joiners, are not very highly skilled. There is little trade union tradition except among the joiners, conditions of work are bad, and the social status of civil engineering workers is low. The turnover of labour is exceptionally high for British industry and most of the workers drift from job to job never staying long with the same employer.

But once again the findings of the research seemed to contradict the findings of the Mayo school. It was found that the men on the site studied did not form coherent informal groups, in Mayo's sense, at all. This in spite of the fact that conditions seemed to be perfect for the creation of such groups: the men worked together in dangerous/

dangerous conditions and lived together after work. The reason why they did not develop coherent informal groups was found to lie in the ideology accepted by the men on the site and which seemed to be common to men in that industry. In this ideology extreme individualism is valued, and great stress is laid upon preserving one's individuality and avoiding ties to other individual or to groups. This effectively limits the growth of informal groups.

As a final check and to afford a comparative study it was decided to study workers in a third occupation, one as different as possible from both printing and civil engineering. The occupation chosen was clerical work, and research was done on workers in a large Glasgow office. The clerks, like the printers, had good working conditions, security, high social status, and had a very low turnover of labour - tending to stay with the one employer. Unlike the printers, however, they had no strong trade union traditions; they tended to identify themselves with the employer and to be opposed to trade unionism.

The findings from the clerical research bore out the findings of the two previous researches. The clerks did form informal groups, but these were weak and had little cohesion. Once again the explanation seemed to lie in the ideology of the men studied. The clerks had strong traditions of promotion through individual enterprise and valued both promotion and freedom of enterprise. This caused competition for promotion among the individual clerks and inhibited cooperation among them as members of informal groups. Once again the research findings appeared to contradict the theories of the Mayo school.

Research had thus been conducted into the informal group behaviour patterns of workers in three very different occupations. The informal group behaviour patterns had been different in each occupation but in all three occupations they seemed to contradict the theories of the Mayo school. The method used to solve the problems set by these findings was, first to make a comparative study of the three researches in order to discover the reasons for these different informal group behaviour patterns. Having done this, and arrived at some conclusions, these were compared with a detailed analysis of the theories of Mayo and his colleagues in order to see whether the conclusions from the research supported or contradicted those theories, and on whose side the balance of evidence lay.

Thus the thesis is laid out as follows: first, a description of the findings from each of the three researches; second, a comparison of the findings of these researches and conclusions drawn from this comparison; third, an analysis of the theories of Elton Mayo and his colleagues at the Harvard Business School, and a comparison of these theories with the conclusions from the three researches; fourth, conclusions as to the light these researches throw on the Mayo theories - how far they support these theories, how far they contradict them; fifth, and last, what modifications, if any, of Mayo's theories need to be made in view of the evidence from the three researches.

DEFINITIONS.

I define below the way in which I use certain terms in this thesis.

Ideology.

This term is a somewhat loose one and there are many differing definitions of it. Thus:

Barbu sayd of ideologies:- "The current use of the term ideology shows that it implies not only an abstract intellectual, but also a practical order, a body of ideas which determines in the mind of the individual a particular type of social action and a particular way of life." *

Mannheim writes:- "By ideologies we understand those interpretations of situations which are not the outcome of concrete experience but are a kind of distorted knowledge of them, and which serve to cover up the real situation and work upon the individual like a compulsion."**

Miller and Form state of man:- "He mixes freely and unconsciously his factual knowledge, ideas, opinions, beliefs, and mythology into a system of thought(ideology) which guides his perception of all social situations. In order to understand and predict his behaviour, then, the observer should be aware of this system of thought. An exploration of the content and function of folklore and mythology is especially useful because it discloses the basic ideals and sentiments which motivate and make meaningful daily behavior." ***

Mukerjee writes of ideology:- "Stereotypes, myths, legends, slogans and other verbal-symbolic devices organise themselves into a harmonious pattern known as an ideology which functions as a tool in man's endeavours to achieve value fulfilment." **** He goes on to add of ideologies that they "rather than pure motives determine behaviour." ****

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* Footnote: Z.Barbu, "Democracy And Dictatorship", Routledge and Kegan Paul,London,1956,p.53

** Footnote: Karl Mannheim, "Diagnosis of Our Time", Kegan Paul,Trench, Trubner & Co,, London, 1943, p.89.

*** Footnote: W.H.Miller and D.C.Form, "Industrial Sociology". Harper & Brothers, New York, 1951. p. 295.

**** Footnote: R. Mukerjee, "The Social Structure of Values", MacMillan, London, p. 310.

Parmelee defines ideology as:- "The aggregate of the ideas, beliefs, and modes of thinking characteristic of a group, such as a nation, class, caste, profession or occupation, religious sect, political party, etc." *

Finally, Nadel has defined it as follows:- "When we speak of the 'ideology' of a society we seem to mean precisely this, namely, ideas and values, more or less widely diffused and logically spun out, which express and buttress the principles of acting implicit in the rational requirements." **

It will be seen from this that all agree that an ideology is a system of ideas and beliefs. All, except Parmelee, state explicitly that an ideology exercises an effect upon social behaviour: "guides" and "motivates", Miller and Form: "determines", Barbu: "compel", Mannheim.

Nadel specifically includes values in his definition of ideology. I shall follow him in this as I hold that interests and values are a part of beliefs; interests and values being what people <u>believe</u> to be their interests and values. I shall thus use the term ideology to mean a system of beliefs, myths, interests, and values.

<u>Myth</u>.

I define a myth as being the expression in concrete terms of an abstract belief. As a story which may be true or false, but which is believed to be true by those who hold the myth, and which has embodied in it a belief of social significance to those who believe in it.

This definition is in line with the accepted usage of the term. The only point on which there is controversy is on the question of whether a myth must, by its very nature, be false. On this question I agree entirely with Gotesky who writes on this question: "Myth, like any other belief, can be false, but it is not false because it is myth. It is false for the same reasons that other beliefs are false." ***

On the function of myth there is a general consensus of opinion. The best known definition, that of Malinowski, states of myth that is: "serves principally to establish a sociological charter, or a retrospective moral pattern of behaviour." **** Malinowski goes on to add: "Myth is, therefore, an indispensable ingredient of all cultures. It is, as we have seen, constantly regenerated/

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* <u>Footnote</u>: Maurice Parmelee in "Dictionary of Sociology", ed.H.P.Fairchild. Vision, London, 1958.

** <u>Footnote</u>: S.F.Nadel, "The Foundations of Social Anthropology", Cohen and West, London, 1951. p.398.

*** <u>Footnote</u>: Rubin Gotesky. "The Nature of Myth and Society" in the "American Anthropologist", December, 1952. Vol.54, No. 4, p.530.

**** <u>Footnote</u>: B.Malinowski, "Myth in Primitive Psychology" in "Magic, Science & Religion". The Free Press, Glencoe, Illinois, 1948. p. 120.

regenerated; every historical change creates its mythology, which is, however, but indirectly related to historical fact. Myth is a constant by-product of living faith which is in need of miracles: of sociological status which demands precedent: of moral rule which requires sanction." *

MacIver says of myths: "By myths we mean the value-impregnated beliefs and notions that men hold, that they live by or live for. Every society is held together by a myth-system, a complex of dominating thought forms that determines and sustains all its activities. All social relations, they very texture of human society are myth-born and myth sustained." **

Gotesky writes: "Every culture will create and value its own myths, not because it may not be able to distinguish between truth and falsity, but because their function is to maintain and preserve a culture against disruption and destruction. They serve to keep men going against defeat, frustration, disappointment; and they preserve institutions and institutional process."***

The social uses of myths in society as a whole is clear from the above, in my thesis I shall be speaking of myth as serving similar uses in industry.

Values.

This is a term whose general meaning is agreed on but which different people use more, or less, broadly. Some using it to cover what others speak of as "norms", "Folkways", "Mores" and "values". Thus Mannheim defines values: "To us values express themselves first in terms of choices made by individuals; by preferring this to that I evaluate things. But values do not only exist in the subjective setting as choices made by individuals; they occur also as objective norms, i.e. as advice: do this rather than that. In that case they are mostly set up by society to serve as traffic lights in the regulation of human behaviour and conduct. The main function of these objective norms is to make the members of a society act and behave in a way which somehow fits into the pattern of an existing order." **** MacIver, on the other hand, divides these functions between folkways and mores, thus: "If we consider the folkways not merely as norms of behaviour but as regulators, we are viewing/

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* Footnote: Malinowski, op.cit. p. 122.

** Footnote: R.M.MacIver, "The Web of Government". MacMillan, New York, 1947. p.4.

*** Footnote: Gotesky, op. cit. p. 523.

**** Footnote: Mannheim, op.cit. p. 16.

viewing them as mores." *

In this thesis I use the term "value" in the broad sense in which Mannheim uses it, that it is including what MacIver calls folkways, norms, and mores.

Attitudes and Interests.

I wish to make it clear that I use these terms in the sociological sense, since they are used in a very different way by some psychologists. Even among sociologists there are differences in the breadth of meaning put on these terms. MacIver defines them as follows: "Put in one list such terms as "fear", "love", "surprise", "pride", "sympathy", and "veneration"; and in another list such terms as "enemy", "friend", "discovery", "family", "victim of accident", and "God". Terms of the first group denote attitudes; those of the second, interests. The former signify subjective reactions, states of consciousness within the individual human being with relation to objects. The latter signify the objects themselves. When we mention love or fear we depict an attitude; when we mention friend or enemy we indicate an interest." **

MacIver's definition of an attitude is sometimes considered too narrow, and a broader interpretation is used; for example, Smith's definition in the Dictionary of Sociology is as follows: "Attitude. An acquired, or learned, and established tendency to react towards or against something or somebody." *** Smith uses the term more broadly than MacIver as being towards "something or somebody". I accept this use of the term attitude and use it in Smith's sense, a reaction towards something or somebody, in this thesis.

There are, however, differences over the use of the term "interest". Miss Lumpkin in the Dictionary of Sociology defines it as follows: "The relations between a person and anything which he believes will satisfy one of his desires. An objectified desire. The object of an interest may be a material thing, another person, an act, an experience, or a physical or mental state. The purposeful and voluntary acts of human beings are always in pursuit of interests." **** Thus while MacIver defines an interest as being an object Miss Lumpkin defines it as the relation between a person and that object. I shall use the term "interest" in the sense defined by Miss Lumpkin.

Thus I use the term "attitude" as being a tendency to react towards something or somebody. The term "interest" as being the relation between a person and anything he believes will satisfy one of his desires.

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* Footnote:R.M.MacIver and C.H.Page. "Society", MacMillan, London, 1953, p.19.

** Footnote:MacIver and Page, "Society", p.16.

*** Footnote:E.Smith, "Dictionary of Sociology".

**** Footnote: Katharine Du Pre Lumpkin in "Dictionary of Sociology".

As stated earlier some psychologists use the term attitude very differently. What MacIver and Smith call an attitude McDougall has defined as a sentiment. * But in this thesis we shall be concerned only with these terms as used in accordance with the definitions given above.

Status and Prestige.

These are terms about whose general meaning there is a consensus of opinion but about which there are some differences over the detailed meaning. I shall not concern myself with these differences here. In this thesis I shall use the terms as defined by Paterson in his book "Morale in War and Work". He writes: "The various functions in a group may have different values ascribed to them - a high value if the function is considered to be of major service in the attainment of the group desires, and a low value if of minor service. So functions tend to be judged on a superiority-inferiority scale, and position on this scale is status. The persons given these functions to perform will be granted the status of their functions." ** Of prestige he writes: "Accordingly as a person performs a function and so fills his role, well or badly, as judged in terms of service to the group, so he will be given high prestige or low." ***

Workers and Employees.

I go on to define some common, everyday terms which are often confusing. The first of these are "workers" and "employees". I use these terms to mean people in a works below the rank of foreman. I also refer to clerks as employees, when I wish to make a distinction between clerks and employees on the actual works floor, I speak of "clerks" and of "manual workers", or "workers".

At the present day some people say "we are all employees", or "we are all workers", including in this everyone in a company from the directors to the labourers. This renders the words meaningless, like the Victorian divine who argued that the word servant did not imply a low status since all, even the Queen, were "servants of God". In this thesis the terms "worker" and "employee" only in the sense defined above.

Managers and Employers.

I shall refer to as a "manager" any person who holds the rank of manager in the hierarchy of his firm.

I use the term "employer" loosely as the workers and/

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* Footnote: W.McDougall, "The Energies of Men". Methven, London, 1932.

** Footnote: T.T.Paterson, "Morale in War and Work". Max Parrish, London, 1955, p.76.

*** Footnote: Paterson, op. cit., p.76.

and clerks themselves use it, that is to mean both the employer, and those who act directly for or on behalf of the employer - that is the management. There may seem to be some confusion here so I will define the use still further. When a worker or clerk speaks of a specific manager he calls him "a manager"; when he speaks of managers as distinct from the employer he calls them "the management". However, when he speaks in terms of a conflict between the workers or clerks "side" and the "other side" - meaning those opposed to the workers "side" - he will often refer to this "other side" as "the employer", "the employers", or "the employers side". Since this is accepted usage I follow the workers' example and use these terms.

I cannot define these terms further as the position is a very confused one. The employer who is a person and not a group of persons or a corporation is becoming a rarity. However, managements who act for employers, in many cases are employers in all but name, hence there is good reason for the confusion between employer and manager.

THE PRINTING WORKS.

PREFACE.

I began my research by studying union rule-books and magazines, from which I discovered the "ideal" values of the industry. Having thus acquired a frame-work of information on which I could base questions, I arranged interviews with the various printing union secretaries in Glasgow and, on explaining to them my intentions, was allowed to question them about the printing trade and its practices.

The next step was to acquire field experience in a printing works. The Glasgow Branch of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. * union gave me a temporary union card and the Managing Director of a large Glasgow printing works found me employment in his works. My job consisted of taking glue round to the various departments which needed it. This gave me the opportunity to circulate freely and "legitimately" through the works. It also brought me into close contact with other workers engaged on similar work who, because of their mobility, were able to pick up a considerable amount of information in the course of their work. Owing to the strict trade unionism of printers there was no possibility of keeping my activities a complete secret. I would not have been able to get a job until I had a union card, and before I could move about freely within those sections of the work belonging to unions other than my own it was necessary for me to secure the permission of the Father of the Chapel. **

It may be asked, what was the use of working as a labourer when the workers knew what I was doing in the works anyway; would it not have been just as well to come in openly as a research worker, openly making notes and interviewing people? The answer is no. Printers tend to be very secretive and suspicious of outsiders and if I had moved about the factory without actually doing a normal job I would inevitably have been looked upon as being in some way connected with the management. The fact that I was working normally made it obvious to all that I had a union card, which in turn showed that I had official trade union approval and this was in itself a guarantee of my not being a "boss's man".

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* Footnote: National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paperworkers.

** Footnote: The Father of the Chapel, usually abbreviated to F.O.C., is an unpaid union official. He is the "President" of the workshop section of a printing union which is known among printers as the "Chapel". He is roughly equivalent to a Shop Steward in other unions. In the event such permission was never refused.

The fact that I was working also allowed people to get used to the sight of me and so allayed suspicion. I felt it gave me freedom of movement and allowed me to enter into situations where my presence would otherwise have caused restraint. As a worker I had no exceptional status. I was under the same factory rules as the other workers, and concealed from the management, as they did, breaches of these rules by other people, and in fact committed similar breaches myself. I shared the men's interest in sport, gambling and so on, and by living up to the norms of the workers gained acceptance as a member of the "in-group". It was desirable to gain, if possible, the full confidence of the other workers and I felt that to do this it was necessary to share fully in their life in the works. I could have asked questions on the normal interview pattern, and got answers to them without this, but, as I will show later, I have reason to suspect that they would not have been the same answers.

After I had been in the works a short time I was able to discover which persons were regarded by the workers as being the most intelligent and knowledgeable among them and thereafter I concentrated my attention particularly on these persons, though I naturally interviewed as many other people as possible. When interviewing I first explained what I was doing and why I was doing it. This I felt to be absolutely essential as people naturally want to know what you are going to do with any information they may entrust you with, and if not told are likely to suspect the worst and be correspondingly reticent. I conducted all interviews quite informally and did not use a notebook during them, instead I slipped away after each interview to enter up my notes. The reason I did not use a notebook was that I found every time I openly made notes the person I was talking to, though not objecting, became obviously wary, particularly on controversial topics. There was no doubt that the sight of a notebook made people uneasy, so I stopped using one openly. Asking a series of pointed questions had a similar effect, so, as I had plenty of time at my disposal, I let the person interviewed ramble on quite freely, keeping it as much like an ordinary conversation as possible and directing the conversation only when it was becoming hopelessly irrelevant. This meant that I wasted a good deal of time listening to personal complaints and fancies but it gave people confidence and it was noticeable that men allowed to talk freely along the line of their own interests soon lost their initial reserve, and, after a beginning in which they carefully avoided controversial issues, or gave only stereotyped answers to controversial questions, would later voluntarily return to such issues themselves and talk quite freely about them. In all interviews I found this tendency to give stereotyped answers at first. Men and women would pretend to hold the "ideal" values of their trade or trade unions and would answer questions with the arguments commonly used in the trade for external consumption - the kind of arguments used to employers or management. If allowed to run on freely and gain confidence other and more important reasons based on a different set of values would emerge.

Let me clarify this with an example. Whenever I found a work group for which an incentive scheme had been proposed/

proposed I made a point of asking the workers in it what objections they had to the proposed scheme. The stereotyped answers I usually got ran like this: "It will ruin craftsmanship, good work can't be done in a hurry" or "We are working as fast as possible now, if we go any faster the standard of work must suffer". But if the persons concerned were left to run on freely the issue that turned up sooner or later was the possible effect of the incentive scheme upon the unity of the work-group; the fear that it would cause jealousies and dissension within the work-group. The fear of the danger to craftsmanship was based upon the "ideal" value of the preservation of craft skill. This is a value openly accepted by the trade and used in public arguments to justify certain practices. The fear of disunity in the work-group is based upon another value - unity within the work-group - this is not a value used openly in public discussion but it seemed to me it was more important to the people I interviewed than the value placed on craftsmanship.

This is only one of the many examples which I shall use in the course of this thesis. I quote it here to show that there is an covert ideal value-system which the men all know and pay lip-service to in public - and other covert value systems of equal or even greater importance. If a written questionnaire were set before a number of printing workers it would produce answers couched in terms of the ideal values, but it would not reveal, in fact in many cases it would conceal, the covert values held. Thus although spending time in long conversations limited the number of people I could interview, it ensured a greater degree of accuracy in the conclusions I was able to draw from these conversations. In addition, hearing all the gossip of the works, I was able to find the general estimate of a man's character and to hear of his behaviour in the past and this was useful as a check upon the information I might obtain from that man.

In addition to these interviews I was able to attend Chapel meetings, join canteen and tea-break groups and circulate around the discussion groups which exist in the various men's lavatories where men congregate to smoke and to discuss current affairs of all kinds.

I spent three months in this works and for three years after leaving I remained in close contact with it, making regular visits in which I saw my old work-group and went round my more knowledgeable informants to hear what was going on. Since the workers were used to me and had accepted me they talked freely although I was no longer a worker.

The information which I have recorded from all these sources has been shown to various active printing trade unionists, including trade union officials, in the Glasgow area and has been accepted by them as accurate. I may add, as a point of interest, that it has also been shown to various active members of the printing trade, and trade unions, in London and has been accepted by them as accurate and as being equally true of conditions in the printing industry in London.

Note on the Printing Trade Unions.

The unions active in the printing trade in Scotland are as follows:

(i) The Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers and Process Workers. Henceforth referred to as the S.L.A.D.E.P.W.
Membership in 1950, 10,822: in Scotland, 545.

(ii) The Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers. The A.S.L.P.
Membership in 1950, 7,863; in Scotland 949.

(iii) The Scottish Typographical Association. The S.T.A.
Membership in 1950, 7,094 made up of tradesmen 5,466.
Auxiliaries 1,539
Females 89.

(iv) The National Union of Printing Bookbinding and Paperworkers. The N.U.P.B.& P.W.
Membership in 1950, 124,542; in Scotland 17,301.

(v) The National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants. Natsopa, sometimes also called N.S.O.P.& A.
Membership in 1950, 34,333; in Scotland 1,481.

(vi) The National Society of Electrotypers and Stereotypers. The N.S.E.S.
Membership in 1950, 4,300; in Scotland 368.

The S.T.A. is a Scottish Union, the others cover the whole of Great Britain.

The figures for total membership are taken from the Annual Report of the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation. The P.K.T.F. All the printing trade unions belong to this Federation. The figures for Scotland are from the Annual Report of the Scottish Trades Union Congress, April 1951.

The figures are for the period when the research was conducted but in actual fact they apply also to the present day. Because of restrictions on apprenticeship the figures of membership in printing unions change little.

DIAGRAM I


LITHO.
LETTERPRESS
LITHO ARTISTS
QUIRE STOCK
CASE ROOM
S. & P.P.
FOUNDRY
LITHO MACHINE-ROOM
LETTERPRESS MACHINE-ROOM
BINDERY

DIAGRAM III

Department	Job	Craft	Chapel	Trade Union
Lithographic Artists	Lithographic Artist & Engraver	Lithographic Artist & Engraver	Lithographic Artists	S.L.A.D.E.P.W.
Transferring	(Transferrer	Lithographer	Litho Chapel	A.S.L.P.
	(Stone & Plate Preparer	Stone & Plate Preparer		
Lithographic Machine Room	(Lithographic Machine-man	Lithographer		
	(General Assistant	Unskilled	Men's Chapel	N.U.P.B. & P.W.
Caseroom	(Hand Compositor (Proof Reader (Monotype Operator (Monotype Caster	Compositor	Case Chapel	S.T.A.

DIAGRAM III

Department	Job	Craft	Chapel	Trade Union
Letterpress Machine Room	(Letterpress Machineman (Auxiliary	Letterpress Machine Man Unskilled	Machine Chapel) Auxiliary Chapel)	S.T.A.
Foundry	Electrotyper & Stereotyper	Electrotyper & Stereotyper	Stereo Chapel	N.S.E.S.
Bindery	Binder Binder-Cutter Gilder	Binder		
Machine Ruling	Machine Ruler	Machine Ruler	Men's Chapel	N.U.P.B. & P.W.
Quire Stock	(Cutter ((Porter	Guillotine Cutter (semi-skilled) Unskilled		
Machine Folding	General Assistant	Unskilled		

DIAGRAM III (Continued)

WOMEN

Department	Job	Craft	Chapel	Trade Union
Machine Folding	(Machine Folder (Hand Folder	Book Folders	Women's Chapel	N.U.P.B. & P.W.
Bindery	Sewers Collaters Machine Feeders Case Makers Gluers			
Quire Stock	Cutters Assistants			

THE LAYOUT OF A PRINTING WORKS AS ORGANISED FOR PRODUCTION, AND AS ORGANISED FOR TRADE UNION PURPOSES.

Before discussing the printing trade unions I intend to describe the layout of a printing works with brief descriptions of the production process and of trade union organisation within it. The purpose of this is to give the reader information which will help him to understand references to technical details which come up when the trade union rules are discussed.

In this Chapter I intend to describe the various departments and trade union organisations within a printing works which I shall refer to as Works "A". Diagram I shows this works with the various departments into which it is organised for the purpose of production. The diagram is intended to show the course of production rather than to be a plan of the geographical layout of the works. The layout of the works does not correspond closely to the course of production, as a matter of fact this particular works has a layout which is little short of chaotic owing to the great age of the building and the lack of room for expansion, and for this reason a plan of the works would be of little help and I do not attempt to give one. I hope to be able to illustrate my case by verbal description and the aid of Diagrams I, II, and III.

Diagram II shows the same works divided into the formal interest groups of the workers, that is, the trade union organisations at the works level. In the printing trade these are known as "Chapels". * Diagram III shows what/

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* Footnote: All the printing unions have a strict rule that, to quote the rules of the N.U.P.B.& P.W.: "At every firm where two or more members of the Union are employed they shall form a chapel, and appoint one of their number to act as father or clerk of the Chapel".(General Rules of the N.U. P.B.& P.W.,1948,Rule 45). All other printing unions have a similar rule which may vary in minor details - in the A.S.L.P. the number is five not two - but the basic principle is always the same. Every man must belong to the chapel of his particular union, every chapel has a president known as the Father of the Chapel or F.O.C., and a secretary, known as the Clerk of the Chapel. These officials are elected by the members of the chapel. The resemblance to the Shop Stewards organisation in other unions is obvious but there is one point that needs to be emphasised; the chapel includes all the members of the union, or a section of a union (different trades in a union may have different chapels and I shall deal with this point later) within the works. It is not an individual or a committee, and its decisions are the decisions of a majority of all its members. I am stressing this point because I do not want the reader to get the impression that the F.O.C. is the key to all union happenings in the works, the F.O.C. may be an influential man, but he may just as easily be a complete nonentity. In either case he is always subject to the chapel. The chapel as a body decides all union matters within the works.

what trade or trades belong to each Chapel, what jobs they do, and what unions they belong to. If Diagram II is superimposed on Diagram I the relationship between departments and chapels can be seen.

I will first describe the flow of production outlined in Diagram I. First of all we have the Quire Stock which is distinct department; its members store the raw material of printing - paper - and distribute it to the machine rooms as required. It will be seen that between the Quire Stock and the Bindery there are two distinct "streams" which work as follow: the Lithographic stream and the Letterpress stream. The printing of music and of the better class of coloured illustrations is done by the Lithographic process, cheaper illustrations and all the letter text is done by the Letterpress process. The technical differences do not concern us here, but the essential difference is this, letterpress printing is printing by relief, the paper touching only the raised parts of the type; in lithography a flat plate of metal is treated chemically so that the parts of the plates that are to print attract greasy ink, while the parts intended to remain blank repel it. In printing by the litho process the ink is transferred from the plate to an offset blanket and thence to the paper.

If work is to be done by the lithographic process a drawing or picture will first be obtained from an outside artist. This picture will then go to the Lithographic Artists Department where the artists will take the original picture and prepare a key plate, or tracing plate, from it. Though small, the Lithographic Artists Department is a distinct department having nothing to do with other departments. From this department the key plates go to the Transferring Department where the outlines of the picture are transferred from the key plate to other plates. From the Transferring Department the plates go to the Lithographic Machine-Room where the actual printing from the plates takes place.

On the letterpress side work begins in the Caseroom which forms a single and separate department, its members all work on the setting of type. Proof readers are also members of this department, since the corrections they make in the proofs must also be made in the type before printing can begin. Once the type has been set and corrected it goes to the Foundry, another separate department where the workers produce electro-type and stereo-type plates which are copies of the forms of type. These plates then go to the Letterpress Machine-Room where they are mounted on the printing machines and where the actual printing is done.

If the paper is intended to be made into stationery, ledgers, diaries, notebooks and so on, it may not need to be printed at all but it may need to have lines drawn upon it. If so it will go to the Machine Ruling Department where lines will be ruled on the paper. There is a Machine Ruling Department in Works "A", but such a department is only found in printing works which produce stationery. It is a process which is less common, and far less important in the trade, than either lithographic or letterpress printing. In the flow of production the Machine Ruling is parallel to the two printing departments, but because it is small, and is not found in most printing works, I have not included it in my diagram in case I should give the impression it is of an equivalent importance to letterpress and lithographic printing.

Printed/

Printed paper from the Letterpress, Lithographic or Machine Ruling departments passes into the Bindery. In this department are concentrated all the remaining processes which are necessary to produce the finished book. Owing to the type of work turned out by Works "A" - largely bound books - the Bindery is very large for a printing works, not only absolutely, but also relatively in proportion to the other departments. Size has led to specialisation, so that work which is carried out in one department in most other works is here divided between many sub-departments within the Bindery.

Work in the Bindery falls into two sections - women's work and men's work. The women's work covers all the preparatory work necessary before binding can take place. Starting from when the printed paper comes in from the machine-rooms, the paper must first be folded. Usually this is done by machine in the machine-folding section, but sometimes hand-folding is necessary. After folding, the folded sheets must be gathered and collated - that is gathered in numerical order as they will stand in the finished book. The gathered sheets must then be sewn together, and this is done in the machine sewing department. Women also make cases for books and may, when the book is a small one - a diary, for example - put the case on the book and so finish it.

All trimming of a book in a guillotine, lining and casing-in of books proper (excepting the small type of book, like diaries etc.) binding, gilding the edges of pages, and blocking in titles, is the work of men, who must be tradesmen-binders. In the normal small jobbing-printer's all these processes would be carried out in one room and all the women's work would be done by the same team of women, who would be expected to be able to do any of the different kinds of women's work. In Works "A" the women are specialists, and folding, gathering and collating, sewing, casemaking, and covering, are each done in a separate sub-department or departments.

The men's work has also been affected by specialisation, and to some extent by mechanisation. Some men work at the old fashioned type of hand binding in a sub-department in one separate room. In another room there are all the men working as gilders *, which is also done by hand, some men in charge of guillotines to cut the edges of books, and one man in charge of a machine which lines the backs of books as a preparation for the backing of the book (this is known as a flexiback machine). There are men with other flexiback machines, and also with machines which place the back or cover onto the book, scattered throughout some of the women's sections, wherever the management thinks it convenient to have them. There are also men working blocking machines, which block the title onto the back of the book, and these too are scattered among various other sections. Whereas other departments are pretty well self-contained, any one part of the Bindery several different processes may be going on in the same room.

I have shown the Bindery divided into two types of work, men's and women's, but the two sexes are not separated physically,/

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* Footnote: Gilding is putting gold leaf on the edges of pages; this is done normally only with Bibles. Works "A" produces approximately two million Bibles each year.

physically, since, as I have said, some men are working machines in women's sections. In addition the flexiback machines and the machines which case books are each in charge of a man though they are fed by a crew of women.* Works "A" has some women who work blocking machines, though this is normally looked on as a man's job. This is a "house custom" which dates back to an agreement between employer and trade union in 1913. Such house customs - local variations on the recognised lines of demarcation or other union practices - are not uncommon in the printing trade.

Another point where the rigid line between men's work and women's work breaks down is in the machine-folding. Here the folding machines are manned by women (this is a Scottish custom, in England such machines are manned by men) but the adjusting and maintaining of the machines is done by men. These men are classed as unskilled, "general assistants".

So much for the plan of production. I will now describe the most important characteristics of the physical layout of the works. The works as it concerns us (leaving out offices etc. which I did not include in this study) consists of a main building all in one block, and a smaller building just across the road from it. Taking the departments in the order of production, as shown in Diagram I, there is first the Quire Stock. This department occupies part of the basement of the main building, it is contained in a separate room but it has part of the machine-room and part of the machine-folding in adjacent rooms. Since the work of this department consists of taking paper to the machine-rooms the men who work in it spend a lot of their time outside the department.

On the Lithographic side there is first the Litho-graphic/

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* Footnote: The men who do these various jobs in the Bindery, with the exception of the men who maintain folding machines, are all tradesmen and classed as Binders, whatever branch of binding they may be working on. The union rule is that any man who works on and finishes a book must be a binder to trade. Hence the cutter in charge of a guillotine which cuts the edges of books in the Bindery is a binder-cutter who has served his apprenticeship as a binder. The cutter in charge of a guillotine in the Quire Stock who cuts flat paper - but would not be allowed to cut books - is usually a semi-skilled man who has undergone some training as a guillotine operator. The line of demarcation is the book. Only a binder may work in the finishing of a book and this is the reason why the flexiback and casing-in machines must be under the charge of a binder even though they are manned by a crew of women.

graphic Artists Department. This occupies a separate room. It is cut off physically from other departments though to get to it one must pass through part of the Bindery.

The Transferring Department also occupies a separate room. As in the case of the Artists Department one must pass through part of the Bindery to get to it, and it is, like the Artists Department, a cul-de-sac. A man could not just pass through it, he would have to be going there of deliberate purpose. It is not near the Artists Room, and it is on a floor above, and rather a long way from the Lithographic Machine-Room.

The Lithographic Machine-Room occupies one leg of an L shaped room, with the colour printing section of the letterpress machine-room occupying the other leg. There is no physical barrier of any kind between the two parts of the room, and the men of both sections share the same lavatory. Access to the room is directly from a stairway and there is no need to pass through other departments to get there.

On the letterpress side the Caseroom and the Foundry occupy the small building across the road from the main building which I mentioned earlier. The Foundry occupies the two bottom floors, having one room on each floor. On the bottom floor is done all the electrotyping and part of the stereotyping, and on the floor above the rest of the stereotyping. To get from one room to the other one simply goes up a staircase. The Caseroom occupies one room on each of the three floors above the Foundry. In the first toom there are all the monotype operators and casters and some hand compositors, in the room above are the main body of hand compositors, and on the floor above them are the proof readers. Each department has its own lavatory, a fact of some significance in communications as I will explain later.

The Letterpress Machine-Room is in the main building where it occupies three rooms one on each of three different floors. In the basement are the large rotary machines - it is normal practice in the printing trade to put the large rotary machines in the basement because of their weight. These occupy a large separate room and there are two adjacent rooms, one occupied by the Quire Stock and the other by the Machine Ruling. One can pass easily from one room to the other, and in fact the normal route in and out of the machine-room passes through the Quire Stock. The only other route into the machine-room is less convenient and little used, it is a staircase which leads to the second machine-room immediately above it; on this staircase are situated the lavatories shared by the men of both machine-rooms and the men of the Quire Stock and Machine-Folding. The second Machine-Room is immediately above the Rotary Machine-Room; in it are the smaller and lighter machines. This room is shared between the Machine-Room and another section of the Machine-Folding. The Machine-Folding occupies one half of the room, the Machine-Room the other, the two meeting in the middle. There is no physical barrier of any kind between the two sections. The third Machine-Room is the colour section which is on the next floor above, in a room which it shares with the Lithographic Machine-Room. I have already described the layout of this room when describing the Lithographic Machine-Room.

Finally/

Finally the Bindery. This department is, as I have said, very large and extremely complicated as different sections are mixed together. The department as a whole occupies the major part of the main building of the works. To describe the exact layout of the whole would be a difficult and involved process and is, in fact, not necessary. The section of the Bindery relevant to my arguments will be described as and when required in later chapters.

We now go on to study Diagram II which shows the formal interest groups in Works "A", that is the various union chapels. We will start on the lithographic side with the Artists. The members of the Lithographic Artists Department are all tradesmen and apprentices, members of the S.L.A.D.E.P.W. The Lithographic Artists Chapel is made up of the members of this department and contains no one from outside the department.

The Transferring Department is made up entirely of members of the A.S.L.P. union, some of the men are lithographers who have served an apprenticeship but three men are semi-skilled "Auxiliaries" who prepare the plates for the "transferrers".*

All the members of the Transferring Department join with the lithographic machinemen in the Lithographic Chapel, more commonly termed the "Litho Chapel". As I have said, all the lithographic machinemen are members of the Litho. Chapel which is the chapel for all members of the A.S.L.P. union. The unskilled men who act as labourers to the machinemen and do such work as feeding the machines are known as "assistants". These men are not members of the A.S.L.P. union but are members of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. in which union they are classed as "general assistants". The assistants belongs in Works "A" to the Men's Chapel of the N.U.P.B.& P.W.

On the letterpress side we have first of all the Case Chapel./

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* Footnote: When working at transferring a lithographer is known as a transferrer, when working as minder of a lithographic printing machine he is known as a "Litho" machineman. There is no difference in trade between the two, both have served the same apprenticeship and any lithographer is capable of doing both jobs. The auxiliaries are Stone and Plate Preparers; they prepare the plates for the transferrers, and are sometimes known in the trade as "plate polishers" but this is a colloquial term, their official titles are "Auxiliaries" and "Stone and Plate Preparers". These men are members of the Stone and Plate Preparing section of the A.S.L.P. In the works they are members of the Lithographic Chapel.

Chapel. All members of the Caseroom, and only members of the Caseroom, belong to this chapel which belongs to the S.T.A. All the men in the Caseroom are compositors or apprentice compositors: there are no non-tradesmen in the Caseroom. Most of the men work at the basic trade of hand-compositing but some work at branches of this trade, some as operators of monotype machines, some as monotype casters, and some as proof readers - usually called "readers".

In the Foundry all men are tradesmen or apprentices and have the trade of electrotyper and stereotyper; they are usually known as stereotypers for short because making stereotypes is the more common work of the two. All men must be members of the N.S.E.S. and all belong to the "Stereo Chapel". No one outside the Foundry belongs to this chapel. There are no non-tradesmen in the Foundry.

In the Letterpress Machine-Room the machine-minders are tradesmen members of the S.T.A., the unskilled labourers who assist them and feed the machines are known as "auxiliaries" and belong to the Auxiliary Section of the S.T.A. The machine-men have one chapel which is known as the Machine Chapel, the Auxiliaries have their own chapel which is known as the Auxiliaries' Chapel.

In the Bindery we have a straightforward division on the basis of sex, all men belong to the Men's Chapel and all women to the Women's Chapel. The men in the Quire Stock, the Machine Ruling, and those who work as assistants in the lithographic machine-room also belong to the men's Chapel. The women in the Quire Stock belong to the Women's Chapel. Both chapels belong to the N.U.P.B.& P.W.*

From the Diagram and the above description it will have been noted that in only three departments, the Lithographic Machine-Room, the Letterpress Machine-Room, and the Bindery, do the workers belong to more than one chapel, and in only one case - the Lithographic Machine-Room - do they belong to different trade unions.

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* Footnote: I must point out here that the custom regarding N.U.P.B.& P.W. chapels varies quite considerably. I have given the chapels as found in Works "A", but other works may be different. In some cases all the binders may form one chapel, the Binders Chapel, and all the other workers form another chapel, the Print Section Chapel or Print Chapel. These are men's chapels. The women also may have two chapels, those who work in the Bindery, a Bindery Chapel, and the others a Print Chapel. The workers themselves decide what they want. In my experience there is always a men's and a women's chapel, one or both of these may be divided into a Binder's and a Print Chapel.

THE GENERAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRINTING TRADE UNIONS.

Printing is an old and highly skilled industry, which, although mechanised to a large extent, has never been completely revolutionised by machinery; it can trace its development back, with no break in continuity, to before the industrial revolution. Printers have long had a very high status, one might call it almost an intermediate level between the skilled trades on the one hand, and the professions on the other. The history of the trade is comparatively peaceful and this is reflected in their mythology which is considerably less "radical" than that of many unions. Although printers have had their hard times, which have left their mark on printing mythology, they have not had a violent past and have not developed myths which place any value on violent or strike action. The value placed upon conservation is high in the printers' system of values and this can be seen in the large friendly society benefits paid by their unions. These include sickness, accident, superannuation, unemployment, death, convalescent benefits. And in their long term industrial policies of the unions. For example at the moment the printing unions are working under a five year wage stabilisation scheme.

The high status of the printer derives from the fact that his basic wages are and have always been among the highest in the country, and his conditions of work are comparably high. This high status is justified, among printers, by a myth which centres on the apprenticeship system, and which emphasises the high degree of skill needed, and the long and unremunerative period of apprenticeship which must be served in order to attain such skill. Apprenticeship is looked upon as a form of ordeal the reward for which is high status. Whenever the subject of lessening the differential between tradesman and non-tradesman comes up the tradesman's reaction is always: "You soon won't be able to get lads to serve an apprenticeship: it won't be worth their while". The sacrifices of apprenticeship are an essential part of the myth of high status and are quite meaningless without it. Apprenticeship has also raised status in another way. Most printing unions refuse to recognise as tradesmen any persons who have not served an apprenticeship, and so, by limiting the intake of apprentices, they are able to limit the skilled labour force of the industry. Since printing is an industry where most of the labour is skilled, this limitation of the labour force gives the printing workers a high bargaining power and is thus partly responsible for the high status they maintain.

Apprenticeship sets a gap between the skilled and unskilled and one might reasonably expect to find that the unskilled man in the printing industry does not approve of the craft values which relegate the unskilled to a permanently lower status. However, with one important exception which I will discuss later, this does not happen. The reason why unskilled men in printing/

do not resent the myth of skill to any considerable extent seems to be due to the fact that they benefit considerably, if indirectly, from this myth. The unskilled man in printing has a higher relative rate of pay than unskilled men in most other trades, an advantage gained, not by his own bargaining power, which is small, but by the bargaining power of the skilled printer. Thus if the unskilled men were to repudiate the myth of skill based on apprenticeship they would be reducing the very power that gains their own relative advantages and so, instead of attacking it, they try to bring themselves into line with it by claiming that they themselves are at least semi-skilled.

In order to deal briefly with the background of the six unions engaged in the printing trade in Scotland it will be necessary to simplify and generalise considerably.

Of the six unions concerned, four, the N.S.E.S., the A.S.L.P., the S.L.A.D.E.P.W., and the N.S.E.S. are small and exclusive craft unions, having nothing at all to do with non-tradesmen. The A.S.L.P. refuses even to organise the labourers who work as assistants to their members. The N.S.E.S. will not allow unskilled men into their department at all, in one instance I met not even to sweep the floor. The S.T.A. is very similar to these unions in outlook even though it is a much larger union within Scotland. It consists of two types of tradesmen, compositors and letterpress machinemen, in the approximate ratio of two compositors to one machineman. It also includes, however, in a special Auxiliary section of the Union, the labourers who assist the machinemen, and who are known as "auxiliaries". According to all the machinemen I have spoken to, the reason given to me for this - not the official version for public consumption - is to keep the labourers under the control of the tradesmen so as to ensure that they do not become a force competing with the tradesmen for skilled jobs. It is feared that if they were organised into a labourers' union they might possibly be tempted to compete with the tradesmen. This actually happens in the case of these machinemen's assistants who belong to Natsopa. Control of the S.T.A. is firmly in the hands of the tradesmen, nevertheless the Auxiliaries' interests are well catered for and they seem content to leave control to the tradesmen. The Auxiliaries have little effect upon the strictly craft "outlook" of the union as a whole.

All the four unions noted regard themselves as having a high status, based on the myth of craftsmanship through apprenticeship, and their members tend to look down upon non-tradesmen as inferior. They believe that their status rests upon their monopoly of a skill of a very high order, and it is this which makes them very exclusive and leads them to equate themselves with professional bodies rather than with other trade unions. It is surprising how often printers, when discussing their trade position, will compare themselves with the British Medical Association. The rank and file of these unions, other than officials and active members, take little interest in the wider aspects of the trade union movement except in such periods of stress as strikes or depressions. Although all four unions belong/

belong to the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation (the P.K.T.F.), each has a distinct, independent policy of its own. Officials of the P.K.T.F. put out articles which favour an amalgamation into one big union for the printing industry and these articles are sometimes published in union journals, but one should not be misled by them. The craft unions set a very high value on their independence and seem determined to ensure that their craft interests will never fall into the control of persons outside that craft. When it comes to issues involving the interests of a particular craft then each union goes its own way.

These four unions being small, with small Branches and Chapels, can bring their members together fairly easily. As a result they have, and in fact enforce, a relatively high attendance at Branch Meetings. The A.S.L.P. and N.S.E.S. enforce attendance at Branch Meetings with fines; all who are not sick or out of town must attend. The S.T.A., a larger * union does not enforce attendance by all its members but does insist that every Chapel in the Branch sends representatives, members other than Chapel representatives may attend Branch Meetings voluntarily if they wish. The members and officials of these unions are proud of the fact that they are small enough to maintain a fairly close relationship between Branch officials and members and have relatively good attendances at Branch Meetings. They set a high value on their small size and the closer relations it involves, and both members and officials tend to speak contemptuously of the larger trade unions. These they accuse of being undemocratic, unduly centralised, and controlled by the paid officials and not by the members. They also point out that the larger unions cannot possibly represent the interests of so many members with so many different classes of interest among them. To sum up then, these small craft unions set a value on being small, select and specialised; on keeping entirely to one or two crafts and representing the interests of those crafts alone, and on being highly democratic.

The next union to be considered is the N.U.P.B.& P.W. This is a much larger union and contains a large number of unskilled workers and women. But it does contain many skilled workers and many of its women members are tradeswomen who have served an apprenticeship. This union was built up by a series of amalgamations among smaller unions, the most important of which was the Binders' union. Owing to the influence of the craftsmen and the continuance of craft myths, particularly those of the Binders, craft values, including that of the desirability of apprenticeship, are generally accepted by all members. In its wage negotiations the union recognises the higher status of the tradesman and safeguards his craft interests. On the other hand the N.U.P.B.& P.W. non-tradesmen have equal rights and voting power with their tradesmen, and many

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* Footnote: Larger, that is, in Scotland. It does not cover England, as do the other two.

I have spoken to among both its tradesmen and officials are critical of the craft exclusiveness of the purely craft unions discussed earlier, accusing them of being undemocratic for maintaining a strictly craft outlook. One may say that while the outlook of the purely craft unions is very like that of professional bodies, that of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. is more akin to the orthodox British Trade Union outlook. It is willing to organise any printing workers irrespective of their trade qualifications, or lack of them, and seeks to improve conditions by raising the bargaining power of the workers as a whole rather than through a monopoly of craft skill. In spite of this the N.U.P.B.& P.W. does retain through its tradesmen members many craft myths, and this gives it a common background with the craft unions. Though it sets a lower value on apprenticeship and craft skill than do the purely craft unions it values them. Its values are not opposed to those of the craft unions, but differ only in degree.

Owing to its size the N.U.P.B.& P.W. is necessarily more centralised than the craft unions and it tends to have Branches much larger than theirs. Because of this many of the members and officials of the craft unions say it is too large for democracy to work and claim that its Branches are so large that a representative Branch Meeting is impossible. Craftsmen in other printing unions sometimes compare it to the Transport and General Workers Union and say it is "top heavy" and controlled by the officials. Such criticism sheds more light on the outlook of the craft unions than it does on the N.U.P.B.& P.W. for that union is not exceptionally large among British unions. It is large only in comparison with the other printing unions.

Lastly we come to Natsopa which, in Scotland, is operative only in newspaper offices though it has a wider scope in England. This union differs from the other five unions so far considered in that it is now and always has been an entirely non-craft union.

The five unions noted, including the N.U.P.B.& P.W., have grown up from craft unions; they are made up of workers who have always had a comparatively high status among working men, who have had regular and steady work and whose history has been comparatively quiet and considerably longer than that of Natsopa. Natsopa on the other hand is more recent (founded 1889) than the other printing unions. It was founded to raise the standards of the printer's labourer, a class of workers the printing tradesmen refused to organise or combine with in any way. The labourers, unlike the tradesmen, were very badly paid and had to put up with bad conditions. Many of them were, and still are/

Footnote: There may be members of Natsopa who can claim to do skilled work and say they are craftsmen. However I am using apprenticeship as the criterion by which to classify men as craftsmen, this criterion is widely accepted among British trade unions and by all the printing trade unions except Natsopa, and by this measure we can safely say that Natsopa contains only non-tradesmen.

are in the newspaper offices, jobbing hands not in regular employment, that is, they might get a few hours work in each of several different firms when the firm needed extra labour. These labourers were looked down on by the printers and were excluded from all the craft unions. The labourers in turn resented the inferior status accorded to them and felt, and still feel, that in attempting to raise their status they have to fight the tradesmen as well as the employer.

The labourers' outlook can be seen in the following extract from the official union history.* Speaking of the decade 1910-1919 the author says: "The outstanding feature in this decade was not the advance in numbers and affluence. It was the raising of the status of the Printer's Assistant in the printing trade world and in the sphere of citizenship from that of serfdom and nonentity to that of self-respect, dignity, and democratic equality. No longer an outcast, the Printer's Assistant was now a power in the world at large. No longer apologising for his existence, he accepted the responsibility of his new-won status, and performed the duties demanded by it faithfully and efficiently." ** This question of their relative status crops up time and again in the union's history. The reason for this is that the skilled printers look down upon the Natsopa men as being distinctly inferior, not only in terms of craftsmanship but also socially - I have often heard Natsopa members generally referred to by skilled men as "scruff". There is no doubt Natsopa men know this and it affects their attitude to tradesmen and their unions. The early history of Natsopa, judging from the official history, was stormy and violent. Strikes were commonplace, in contrast with the comparatively peaceful history of the craft unions, and this has affected the outlook of Natsopa, which is more aggressive than the other printing unions. All these factors make for certain differences between Natsopa and the other printing unions.

The most important difference is the fact that Natsopa does not accept the value of craft skill based on apprenticeship. The unions which do accept this value are able to work together with comparatively little friction. Each craft union acknowledges the craft status of tradesmen in the other unions and recognises the fact that each craft has a certain "territory", an area of skill, exclusively to itself. Demarcation disputes occur over the definition of the boundaries of each craft's territory, but only over the boundaries: the right of each craft to a monopoly in a certain area of skill is recognised by the other crafts.

The Natsopa outlook is different, it will recruit any kind of unorganised printing labour irrespective of their craft and once the men are in the union it will try to keep them - despite the claims of other unions - on/

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* Footnote: "The Story of Natsopa: 1889-1929" by R.B. Suthers, published by the National Society of Operative Printers & Assistants, 1929.

** Footnote. op.cit., p. 67.

on the grounds that Natsopa recruited them. Having no belief in the tradesmen's values the union will support its members in any advances in status which they may gain, even when such advances are at the expense of the craftsman's status. In newspaper offices Natsopa assistants have the right to promotion to the skilled job of machine minder on parity with tradesmen who have served an apprenticeship. The craft unions agreed to this on condition that men promoted transfer to the appropriate craft union on their promotion, thus ensuring that the craft unions will retain their craft monopolies. However, the craft unions claim that Natsopa often fails to carry out the terms of this agreement. Thus it can be seen that demarcation disputes between Natsopa and craft unions are not trivial quarrels over where the boundaries of each craft shall be drawn but are disputes over which union has the right to supply skilled craftsmen. Taking a long term view, if the craft unions allow Natsopa to control the supply of skilled men they will become extinct themselves. The craft unions know this and look upon Natsopa as a menace to their existence.

On the surface relations between Natsopa and the craft unions are friendly, Natsopa belongs to the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation and works with the other unions in wage negotiations with the employers and other matters of general trade interest. But disputes between Natsopa and the other unions on demarcation issues are frequent. In a trade dispute with an employer, as in the D.C.Thomson dispute, other printing unions will help Natsopa by giving it grants of money for the strike fund, but even in such cases opinions in the craft unions may be divided. During the D.C. Thomson dispute I heard many craftsmen grumble because their union was helping Natsopa, they called it "cutting their own throats" to help Natsopa.

Finally Natsopa shares many of the normal characteristics of other printing unions: its members are organised into work's Chapels, it has very wide friendly society benefits, and it elects its officials for only short terms of office and makes great use of the ballot vote. In these ways its constitution is obviously modelled on those of the other printing unions. In its attitude to recruitment, however, and in the way in which it will recruit any kind of printing labour, Natsopa has a characteristic alien to that of the craft unions but very similar to that of general workers' unions in other industries.

So much for the general character of the printing unions. We will now turn to their myths and values as revealed in the union rule-books.

Footnote: The craft unions who supply machine minders are the following: in London, the London Typographical Society; in the rest of England, the Typographical Association; in Scotland, the Scottish Typographical Association.

Trade Union Myths as Expressed in Union Rule-Books.

Some of the printing unions have an introductory statement in the rules which gives a mythical justification for the existence of that particular union - or of trade unions generally. Such statements are couched in terms of the usual British trade union myth and justify the existence of trade unions in terms of the needs of the workers and their struggle to extract their "rights" from the employers.

S.T.A.

First let us examine the S.T.A. Rule-book. This rule-book has a short introduction in which it devotes a page to what it calls "Trade Union Beginnings" and a little over half a page to "Our Beginnings", "Our", of course, referring to the S.T.A. The short histories are, in both cases, strictly factual and give little beyond the outline and chief dates in Trade Union and S.T.A. history. The section on "Trade Union Beginnings", however, does make some statements of a mythical nature pointing out for example that the industrial revolution caused a "growing gap between employer and employed", so I will quote this section in full.

"Trade Union Beginnings".

"Trade Unionism began in a relatively insignificant way in the latter part of the eighteenth century, the basis of the unions of that time being the older trades such as tailoring, shoemaking, and our own printing craft, and were mainly local in their extent. As the impact of the Industrial Revolution expanded and made more apparent the growing gap between employer and employed, the unions, over a period of many years, gradually extended both in scope and character, some of them at an early date taking the form which is familiar to us today.

"Until 1824 workers' associations were prohibited, but the repeal of the Combination Acts that year at last made it possible for working men to meet as such, and discuss industrial and political problems. Much of their early activity was directed in support of the Chartist agitation of the early nineteenth century, but the disillusionment arising from the results of the first Reform Acts and the effects of the period known as the "Hungry Forties" drove the unions to think along less political and revolutionary lines towards the more restricted field of immediate betterment of their working standards and conditions. This made the unions more acceptable in the eyes of many workers.

"Many of the unions that we know today have had a continuous existence from about the middle of last century when this tendency was taking place. It was not, however, until 1875 that their position was legally defined. This was the subject of further legislation in 1913 when an advance was made;/

Footnote: S.T.A. Rule-Book, 1946, pp.9 and 10.

made; again in 1927 when, as an aftermath of the General Strike, their field of activity was once more restricted; and finally in 1946 when the vicious 1927 Act was repealed and the unions given a status and freedom worthy of them".

Normal trade union myth can be seen in the references to the struggle for legal recognition and in particular to the "vicious 1927 Act". The particular printing craft union outlook is seen in the reference to the change in trade union outlook which led them away from political action and made "more acceptable in the eyes of many workers". The fact that trade unions developed as associations of workers in opposition to the employers comes out very clearly.

A.S.L.P.

The preface to the Rule-book of the A.S.L.P. provides an excellent example of how a union justifies its existence through the use of myth. Being a conservative craft union the A.S.L.P. does not seek to justify itself entirely in terms of the "workers' struggle" but shows that the trade union is not essentially different from the professional organisations of doctors and lawyers which are an accepted part of our society. In this way it seeks to show that trade unions are not opposed to the accepted values of our society but are in fact already included in our system of values. Since this is an almost perfect example I will quote in full in spite of its length.

"Preface".

"The Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers has for its primary object the elevation of the social and economic status of its members and the promotion and advancement of their interests.

"Trade Unions are now acknowledged by employers in general and by writers on political economy in particular, as important factors in industrial life, they are a living reality, which strengthen and purify the lives of those comprised within their membership, and who avail themselves of the opportunities offered to reach a higher scale of life.

"Objections were at one time raised against trade unions, and charges were made that they were monopolies, and exercised restrictions both harsh and unjust. This idea existed mainly among certain members of the community, in higher and middle class life, but this habit of condemning trade unions on the ground that they sought to advance the interests of a class rather than that of the nation as a whole, no longer prevails except in ill-informed minds which are swayed by prejudice rather than reason. By people of goodwill and normal intelligence trade unions are now looked upon as instruments of social order and progress. Trade unionism has been practised for centuries by the Church, by the Law, and the Medical Profession, and a stricter body of trade unionists cannot/

cannot be conceived than is to be found in the governing bodies of the legal and medical professions, but a murmur against their operations was rarely, if ever, heard. In the bad old days it was only in regard to trade unionism amongst the industrial portion of the community that exception was taken, criticism passed, and repression at law demanded by political partisans.

"The experience of the past has proved that membership in a trade union is beneficial to the individual, and that it is essential for the progress of the worker that he should combine with his fellows if he desires to improve his condition either socially or morally. The funds are available for support of the unemployed, sick, disabled, or infirm members, and for the purpose of helping to amend the laws of the country in the direction of ameliorating the lives of those who live by labour.

"The rapid and inevitable march of scientific invention in respect to machinery used in lithography renders it absolutely necessary for those employed in the trade to unite, and with solid front demand that they receive a fair share of profits resulting from the rapid expansion and immensely increased production of our section of the industry.

"Were it necessary much more might be stated beyond that of showing benefits of a pecuniary character. Members are taught business qualities and the important principles of independence, self-reliance, and when necessary, self-denial. They are also taught to recognise that true liberty consists in the enjoyment of rights, and that our rights to enjoyment are only limited by the similar rights of those who live at the same time as ourselves. The aim of this society has always been to encourage friendly relations between employers and employed, and to have any misunderstanding that may arise dealt with on lines conducive to the maintenance of peace and orderly progress in industry.

"We do not waste time by envying those who are better off than ourselves, neither are we content to rest and benthankful because there are those to be found in the world whose condition is not equal to our own. We recognise and appreciate the axiom that we must be content to live a day at a time, but whilst recognising that, we must not neglect to take advantage of every opportunity that may present itself of bringing about an improvement in our position, either by social or political action. We simply ask to be permitted to proceed on our peaceful way without undue interference, and we are confident of being able to continue to secure advantages for our fellow-workers and the many that are dependent upon them by reasonable and equitable means".

While this is less radical than the statement in the S.T.A's rule-book, the fact that the union is basically an association of workers to further their trade interests/

interests is shown clearly in the opening sentence and in the phrase "to unite, and with solid front demand that they receive a fair share of profits".

S.L.A.D.E.P.W.

This union has no declaration of union beliefs in its rule-book.

N.S.E.S.

The rule-book of the N.S.E.S. contains no declaration of union beliefs but the rule-book of the Glasgow Branch of this union contains the following preamble.

"Preamble".

"To cherish, protect and promulgate our interests and rights as working men; to cultivate the social ties existing between members of the craft; to abolish injurious privileges and existing evils, and bring all under the constraint of wholesome duty; to assist our employers in every honourable way we can, consistent with the duties we owe ourselves, to maintain fair prices for our work; to create and maintain the kindliest feelings between employers and employees, and to encourage the principles of arbitration wherever practicable, we the undersigned Journeymen Electrotypers and Stereotypers of Glasgow, enact, declare, and establish the following as our Constitution and Rules of Government".

Once again an example of the use of beliefs to justify the union and its rules in terms of the workers' interests, they exist to "protect and promulgate our interests and rights as working men".

N.U.P.B.& P.W.

The rule-book of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. begins with the following Foreword.

"Foreword".

"This Union is composed entirely of working men and women who are united for the purpose of protecting and advancing their interest and that of their class.

"If unity be important to any order of the community it must be pre-eminently so to working men and women, whose only property, their labour, is in constant danger of being depreciated in value by the present competitive system. Under such circumstances workers require to combine for mutual assistance/

Footnote: Rules of the Glasgow Branch of the N.S.E.S. 1952.

assistance for trade purposes. They must do this intelligently, as well as in a spirit of goodwill and comradeship, and for that purpose it is necessary that members should be regular in their payments and attendance at the union meetings.

"Workers exist by labour, and are, after all, dependent upon what the merest breath of adversity may in a moment dispel. The time will arrive when a worker may be suffering through unemployment. Trade unionism ensures that by small contributions regularly paid, relief during unemployment is provided for, facilities given to obtain employment, assistance rendered in old age, and the happiness of all increased by improved conditions, which can be obtained only by collective efforts.

"It is your duty to aid, by all means in your power, a cause so important to yourself and your class. Remember that in aiding others you are helping yourself. Our meetings should be conducted with a spirit of mutual friendship and goodwill, and each one should be ready at all times to yield to the united opinion of their fellow members.

"If these rules are strictly adhered to, and the principles of trade unionism carried out with proper spirit, earnestness, and goodwill, members will elevate themselves and be enabled to secure and enjoy a fairer share of the fruits of their labour".

The beliefs here are plain enough, in this case the union is justified in terms of the needs of the working class under "the present competitive system". The union rules are justified by the fact that they are designed to secure the interests of the workers under such a "system".

Natsopa.

The rule-book of Natsopa contains nothing that can be called a mythical justification for the rules. It begins with a straightforward warning to members to keep the rules which are made in the members' own interest, nothing more. But the official history of the union issued in 1929 embodies the union's myth. For example on page 11 conditions in 1889, when the union was founded, are described: "The conditions in which printers' labourers worked were wretched in the extreme. The manifesto asserts that their employers 'would not put their pet cats and dogs in the styes where they condemn us to pass our best working years..... in heated cellars where gaslight replaces daylight, midst perpetual din, breathing a stifling filthy atmosphere.... We have to keep hand and eye ever on the alert to keep stroke with the machines we tend'. What the union did for its members is stated in a passage on page 67 which I have quoted before as an example of the union's myth. "The outstanding feature in this decade was not the advance in numbers and affluence. It was the raising of the status of the Printer's Assistant in the printing trade world and in the sphere of citizenship from that of serfdom and nonentity to that of self-respect, dignity and democratic/

democratic equality. No longer an outcast, the Printer's Assistant was now a power in the world of printing and in the world at large".

Another example of myth can be seen in the reference to the General Strike given on page 103. "The long drawn-out dispute in the coal industry culminated at last in the inevitable General Strike, the wonderful nine days in which the whole Trade Union Movement manifested its solidarity with a single-mindedness which astonished foes and friends alike". There are numerous other examples of myth to be found in the history but these should suffice. A myth has been created to justify the union's existence in terms of the benefits the union has brought to its members. At the same time the need for the union is emphasised by pointing out the struggle against the employers which still continues and necessitates the continued existence of the union and the support of its members.

In these examples I have shown the myths created by the unions to justify their existence in the eyes of their members and of the outside world, and to provide a mythical "charter" which supports the rules of the union.

Aims and Objects as Stated in Trade Union Rule-books.

Union rule-books generally begin with a statement of the union's objects and, in the case of the S.T.A., these are as follows:-

1. The objects of the Association shall be to -

Unite and protect members;
Regulate and maintain rates of wages, hours and working conditions;
Restrict number of apprentices, and insist on their proper training;
Render assistance to members removing or emigrating;
Provide sick, permanent disablement, out-of-work, superannuation, and funeral allowances;
Provide legal assistance to all members in claiming compensation for illegal dismissal;
Provide legal assistance to all members in claiming compensation for injury or disease, fatal or temporary, sustained in course of employment;
Adjust differences by conference, arbitration or otherwise;
Promote the cause of Trades Unionism by encouraging the establishment of Branches (affiliating where practicable, with International Secretariat, National and General Trades Union Federations, and National Council of Labour Colleges);
Exercise a supervision of all matters affecting the printing trade; and administer National Health Insurance and National Unemployment Insurance Acts".

The objects explain themselves but there are two which require comment, the third one - to restrict the number of apprentices - is intended to reduce the competition for available work, and the fourth one - to assist emigrants - is intended to encourage emigration in bad times and so again to reduce the competition for work.

On page 14 there are claimed as members "All Compositors, Costing Clerks or Designers of Lay-out (who have served seven years' apprenticeship) Readers, Composing Machine Operators, Composing Minders, Process Provers, Foremen and Forewomen". These categories in fact constitute the branches of the two basic trades of Compositor and Machine Minder, and since members are not allowed to work with non-members this is really a claim to have as members all the people in these trades.

Footnote: The last section referring to National Insurance and Unemployment Acts has been rendered unnecessary by changes in the Acts and will be omitted from the next issue of the Rule-book.

Footnote: Rules of the S.T.A., pp. 13 and 14.

A.S.L.P. The rules of the A.S.L.P. list the following objects:-

> "The objects of the society are to raise by contributions amongst the members thereof, funds for the assistance of its members when out of work, or when in distressed circumstances; for the purpose of mutual support in case of sickness, accident, and superannuation; for the burial of deceased members and their wives; to prevent as far as possible any undue increase of apprentices; secure compensation for members who may suffer through accident or disease in the course of their employment; to strive for the abolition of bronze powders from all lithographic establishments where its members are employed, and otherwise maintain the rights and interests of the trade; and to these ends it shall adopt the following methods;-"

The methods are six in number and I will summarise them briefly.

(a) The establishment of a fund.
(b) The giving of legal assistance in connection with the above objects.
(c) The securing of legislation for the protection of trade interests.
(d) The securing of closer union or amalgamation with other unions whose members work with members of the Society.
(e) The provision of adequate office accommodation.
(f) The provision of educational facilities for the members.

The objects are much the same as in the S.T.A. and it will be noted that they include the prevention of "any undue increase of apprentices". *

Membership of the Union is defined as follows: "The society shall consist of members working at all processes and methods of printing based on lithographic and offset methods" (page 5) and the branches of lithographic printing which are included in this definition are then enumerated. Since members are not allowed to work with non-members (Rule 54) this constitutes a claim to have as members all persons who do lithographic printing.

S.L.A.D.E.P.W. Rule I, Cl.4:

> "The objects of the Society shall be to raise the status of its members; to safeguard and advance their interests; to regulate and improve their wages and working hours, to assist them when sick or unemployed, or when in dispute with their employers; to make provision for their old age and permanent disability; to make provision for compensation for loss of tools by fire; to make collective bargains with employers or federations, or groups thereof, relating to wages or conditions of employment; to secure closer union or amalgamation with any Societies or Unions whose members are associated with members of this Society in their/

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* Footnote: Rule-book of the A.S.L.P. pp. 5 and 6.

their daily employment and to work for International Co-operation; to support the progressive Labour movement; and by every means possible, technical and art education and keep members informed of all latest craft developments." *

N.S.E.S.

The rule-book of the N.S.E.S. lists the following objects:-

"The object of the Society shall be to promote the interests of the members, to assist members of the Trade in various districts to form Branches and to maintain their establishments, to regulate the relations between employers and employed, and for the protection of the rights and privileges of the Trade. To establish a centralised system of finance whereby provision is made for general management and of payment through the various Branches of such benefits as are herein fixed by rule and as may from time to time be added, extended, or amended, and to make provisions for Sickness, Superannuation, and a Death Fund, and to these ends it adopts the following methods:-"

Of the four methods adopted the first three are an exact repetition of those of the A.S.L.P. summarised above and the fourth is the adoption of "any other legal method" as decided by the members either through a majority vote at a Delegate Conference or as decided by the ballot vote of the whole membership. **

Membership of the union is open to all journeymen and apprentices working at the trade of electrotyping and stereotyping. Once again this is in effect a claim for all workers at this trade since Rule 29 forbids members to work with non-members.

N.U.P.N.& P.W.

The rule-book of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. lists the following objects:-

"The objects for which this union is established are to provide funds for the protection of the trade, the rights and privileges of its members, the safeguarding of their interests in respect to hours of labour, the settlement of disputes by any lawful means, to maintain the Trade Union wages of the district, to provide assistance to its members in search of work, to provide legal aid and to assist members in distress, to provide them with a pension in old age, and the payment at death of a free member, or his wife, or her husband, of the amount provided by these rules, and to/

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* Footnote: Rules of the S.L.A.D.E.P.W. Page 1.

** Footnote: Rule-book of N.S.E.S. pp. 5 and 6.

to promote the general welfare of members".

I will not quote the other objects in full but they are to provide a Political Fund; to permit the Union to enter any business for the furtherance of the welfare of its members and to issue a Trade Journal "which shall be the official organ of the Union".*

Rule 16 gives a long list of trades and occupations eligible for membership but members are not specifically forbidden to work with non-unionists.

Natsopa.

Finally, Natsopa Rule 2 states:

"The objects of the Society shall be -

(a) To endeavour to improve the condition and protect the interests of its members.

(b) To endeavour to obtain and to maintain reasonable hours of work and fair rates of wages.

(c) To promote a good understanding between employers and employed, the better regulation of their relations, and the settlement of disputes between them by arbitration or other lawful means.

(d) To provide unemployment benefit to members when out of employment through causes over which they have no control".

The other objects are too long to be quoted in full but I will summarise them briefly.

(e) To provide money for members permanently disabled or having retired due to old age.

(f) To provide funds to assist members when sick or temporarily disabled and to pay for their funerals.

(g) To provide legal advice for members and their wives and their children under the age of 21, and to lend money to members in necessitous circumstances.

(h) To provide superannuation for the Union's members and staff.

(i) To provide a sanatorium and convalescent home for members.

(j) "To provide the means of advancing the educational standard and technical qualifications of its members".

(k) "To provide such other benefits as the membership may from time to time determine and generally do all things which a Trade Union may lawfully do". **

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* Footnote: Rules of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. pp. 7 and 8.

** Footnote: Rule-book of National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants, pp. 7,8, & 9.

It will be seen that the provision of friendly society benefits, sick and unemployment benefits, etc. form a substantial part of each union's objects and these objects are achieved by the setting up of a fund or funds for these purposes. The other objects, to safeguard the interests of members and protect their rights and privileges, are achieved by a series of rules and agreements which will be discussed in the next section.

Values as indicated by official Trade Union Sanctions
The Value of Unity - Unity against the Employer.

Unity is essential to the existence of any Trade Union. This is particularly true of unity against the employer, though, to a lesser degree, unity against other workers outside the Union is also necessary.

For this reason Trade Unions generally set a very high value on preserving unity among their members. That this applies to the printing trade unions is clear from an examination of the numerous sanctions contained in their Rule-book which are aimed at preserving unity.

Rules aimed at preserving unity can be divided into two main categories:-

(i) Rules which enforce unity directly. These are rules which establish sanctions against members who break the unity of the Trade Union by working with non-members or for less than Union conditions.

(ii) Rules which enforce unity indirectly by maintaining equality among the union members. The direct aim of these rules is the maintenance of equality but this is only a means to an end - the maintenance of unity. Inequality among members is the most important potential source of disunity and by maintaining equality these rules indirectly enforce unity.

We will first examine the rules which enforce unity directly. These can be listed under three sub-headings:-

a) Rules against working with non-members of the Union.

b) Rules against working for non-union employers.

c) Rules against working for rates of pay or under conditions which are lower than the minimum laid down by the Union.

Rules listed under sub-headings (a) and (b) strengthen unity in the following way:

Since each Union claims the sole right to fill certain jobs, this claim would be weakened if individual members of the Union acknowledged the right of non-members to fill these jobs. The Unions, therefore, enforce unity by making definite rules against working with non-trade unionists.

The enforcement of unity by rules under sub-heading (c) is clearly brought out by the title under which they appear in the Rule-book of the Glasgow Typographical Society. This reads: "Rule 36 - Inducements to Undue Competition". They are then rules aimed at preventing "undue competition" among the members of the Union.

We will examine the three categories in turn and will see that some rules of each of the six Unions can be classified under them.

A. Rules against working with non-members of the Trade Union.

S.T.A. Rule 3 "Members shall not be allowed to work with non-members".

A.S.L.P. "54 - Working with non-Union men".

> "No member of this Society shall work in any shop where there is also employed a non-union lithographic photo-litho offset, aluminium, metallic, glass, cellotype or photogravure printer, or A.C.T. operator, or stone and plate preparer or shifter eligible for membership in this Society. This rule shall apply whether they be foremen or journeymen".

Rule 36 serves a similar purpose. It states "Any member recommending, or in any way assisting, a non-society man into work, unless with the consent of the Branch Committee shall, upon the same being clearly proved, be fined the sum of forty shillings".

S.L.A.D.E.P.W. "Rule 29 - Non-Society Men".

> "Members shall not work with non-society men. Fathers of Chapels or deputies shall at once acquaint the Branch Secretary of any non-society man who is working inside the shop. Only the National Council shall have power to suspend this Rule temporarily for purpose of organisation".

N.S.E.S. "Rule 29 - Non-Unionists".

> "No member of this Society shall be allowed to work with a non-society man".

N.U.P.B.& P.W. "Rule 14 - Disputes and Grievances", paragraph 8.

> "The Executive Council shall be emppwered to grant permission to or instruct any Branch to withdraw their members from any firm who employ non-union workers".

Natsopa. While there is no specific rule against working with non-trade unionists - probably because the Union has always done a good deal of work in organising non-trade unionists, and such a rule would make this impossible - there is however a rule which shows the attempt to enforce unity in another way. This is Rule 20 paragraph 7 which reads as follows:-

> "7. It being the object of this Society to maintain and improve the position of its members, it will be an offence punishable by a fine or expulsion, as the Branch Committee may determine, for any member to assist any employer whose work people may be on strike, even though the full wage be offered, and the persons on strike do not belong to the Society".

B. Rules against working for Non-Union Employers.

S.T.A. Rule 33 "Members shall not assist in any capacity a non-Union employer".

N.S.E.S. There is no specific rule against working for non-union employers.

S.L.A.D.E.P.W. Rule 24 "Arrears and Exclusion", clause 3 begins:-

"Cl.3 Without prejudice to any other grounds of expulsion herein contained, any member of the Society who in the opinion of the Executive Committee shall have committed any of the following offences shall be liable to be expelled from the Society".

Section (c) of this clause reads -

"(c) A member of the Society who shall remain in employment or accept employment with any firm temporarily or permanently closed to members of the Society or with any firm with whom the Society or any members of the Society are in dispute or with any firm with whom employment of members of the Society is forbidden by the Executive Committee".

N.S.E.S. There is no rule against working for a non-Union employer but paragraph 13 of the section on "Wages and Conditions in Scottish Jobbing Offices" given in the Rule-book of the Glasgow Branch states -

" 13 - Assistance to non-Union Offices".

" No matter to be borrowed from or lent to a non-Union Office under any circumstances".

N.U.P.B.& P.W. Working for non-Union employers is covered by the same rule - Rule 14 para.8 - as that which forbids working with non- unionists. "The Executive Council shall be empowered to grant permission to or instruct any Branch to withdraw their members from any firm who employ non-Union workers".

Natsopa. There is no specific rule against working for non-union employers.

C. Rules against working for Rates of Pay or under conditions which are lower than the minimum laid down by the Union.

S.T.A. Two rules cover these points - rules 46 and 47.

"46 - Engagements".
"Members signing or entering into engagements contrary to Rules shall be expelled".

"47 - Violation of Rules or Mutual Agreements".
"Members who have violated any of the Rules or Mutual Agreements, or who have accepted work at less wages than those of Branch, shall be fined, suspended, or expelled. Members who accept situations in any capacity in a printing office not recognised shall be immediately expelled".

A.S.L.P. The rule-book of the A.S.L.P. contains no general rule forbidding members to work for less than union rates or under conditions other than those approved by the union. But the practice and conditions of work of which the union does not approve are described and the members are forbidden to work under these.

For example, Rule 34 "Duties of Members. Piece or Task Work; Rule 35 "Overtime";
Rule/

Rule 36 "Imposition, etc."; Rule 57 "Spoiled Work"; all describe practices which are forbidden to members.

Thus the approach of the A.S.L.P. differs from that of the S.T.A. in that it describes the forbidden practices and permits all those not expressly prohibited while the S.T.A. describes approved practices and forbids all those not expressly approved.

S.L.A.D.E.P.W. Rule 19 is intended to prevent breaches of rules or agreements, it is stated in this rule: "A member of this Society shall not enter into any agreement with his employer without first submitting before signature the terms of such agreement to, and obtaining the consent of, the Executive Committee. Members failing to observe this rule shall be fined £5 or may be liable to expulsion".

N.S.E.S. Rule 34 of the Glasgow Branch entitled "Inducements to Undue Competition" states: "No member shall accept work under any other conditions than those stated in these Rules and Agreements". Rule 33 states: "Any member charged under Rule 34 for wilful violation of the Rules, or for assisting any unfair employer or other person against the declared interests of this Society, and failing to make terms with the Committee of Management, shall be liable to be expelled, and to forfeit all claims on the funds of this Society".

N.U.P.B.& P.W. Rule 25 paragraph 2 states: "Any member shall be liable to exclusion from the Union (or such lesser penalty as the Branch Committee may determine).... (e) For accepting a situation or any work for less than the Union scale or under conditions which are in contravention of the instruction of the Executive Council or Branch Committee. (f) If having acted to the detriment of the interests of the Union".

Natsopa. This union, like the A.S.L.P., does not expressly forbid its members to work for rates of pay or under conditions not approved by the union. It describes certain prohibited practices under Rule 20 "General Offences, Penalties and Appeals". Clause 10 of this rule aimed at acts "directly or indirectly detrimental to the interests, welfare, or reputation of the Society" provides a general rule which can be used to cover any action not covered by more specific prohibitions.

Rules which enforce unity indirectly by maintaining equality among members of the union.

In order to preserve unity the unions try to establish uniformity of behaviour among their members so that a solid front is presented to the employers. If inequality exists in opportunities to work, or in the wages and conditions/

conditions of workers, then it soon becomes impossible to maintain unity, and for that reason union sanctions aim at cutting down such inequalities to a minimum. Thus the rules contain sanctions against a union member being given more than his share of the available work, against working with non-unionists and against working for less than the full wages and conditions laid down by the Union.

S.T.A. Certain rules and agreements are intended to ensure that everyone is given a fair share of the available work.

Rule 25 and paragraph 18 of the National Agreements are intended to check the amount of overtime done and to ensure that no one works overtime while other workers are idle for lack of work.

Paragraph 20 of the National Agreements prohibits any new introduction of piecework.

Rule 34 prohibits working for more than one employer. Penalty - suspension. *

Paragraph 16 of the National Agreements limits the number of machines which a machine minder may look after.

Clearly the aim of these rules is to share out as equally as possible the available work among the members of the union.

In order that each member may have an equal opportunity to obtain work each Branch has a "Call House". Here each man signs his name in a book as he comes out of work, and when vacancies are notified to the Branch, members are sent to the employer in strict rotation in the order in which their names appear in the book. An employer of course has the right to refuse to accept any man offered to him, but applicants are always sent to him in this order.**

The reason behind these rules is shown in a rule of the Glasgow Typographical Society entitled: "Rule 36 - Inducements to Undue Competition" which states: "No member shall accept work under any other conditions than those stated in the Rules, and in Wages Agreement, November, 1949". All these rules are intended, as the heading implies, to prevent competition for jobs among the workers by ensuring that all of them demand equal pay and conditions.

A.S.L.P. Rule 34, paragraph 1 "No member of this society shall be allowed to work more than one machine at a time, and no member shall be permitted to work by piece or task, but must be paid by the day".

Paragraph 5 "No premium or bonus shall be accepted by any member of this society for an excess of work/

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* Footnote: This rule has been changed recently to allow men to work for more than one employer, so long as only one job is at the printing trade. A man may not work at two jobs in two printing offices but he may now do a full-time job in a printing office and do another non-printing job in his spare time.

** Footnote: S.T.A.Rules No.31, Rules of Glasgow Typographical Society 1950 (the Glasgow Branch of the S.T.A.) Rule 50.

work done, nor shall he work where such bonus is paid to apprentices. Neither shall any member be allowed to take work home".

Paragraph 6 "No member of this Society shall be permitted to work under the personal supervision of anyone using a stop watch, or any kind of timing device. Any device for the timing or checking the speed of lithographic printing machines and accepted by the society shall not be used in any way prejudicial to the interests of members".

Rule 36 clause 4 reads: "Should any member of this society in regular employment go to any shop for the purpose of rendering assistance in case of emergency, or undertake to attend regularly at stated periods, or otherwise work to the prejudice of men out of employment, shall, upon such conduct being proved to the society be fined forty shillings for each offence".

Rule 35 says: "When more than 5 per cent of the members of a branch are unemployed no overtime shall be permitted in any establishment without the sanction of the branch officers".

In order to prevent competition for vacancies the A.S.L.P. has rules similar to those of the S.T.A. Members unemployed must sign an unemployment book and jobs can only be taken through the branch office. Any man changing his job or, if unemployed, starting in a new job must inform the branch office and receive permission to do so. (Rules 20 and 44) As with the S.T.A. no member may answer advertisements for lithographers without informing the branch Secretary (A.S.L.P. Rule 44. S.T.A. Rule 31). Rule 44 states: "Any member answering an advertisement for a situation, either under ordinary conditions or by written or printed agreement, shall at once notify in writing, the B.S. of the town where the offer or advertisement emanated from, giving his register number, the name of the branch of which he is a member, and the source of his information. The B.S. shall ignore all inquiries from members not confirming to all the requirements of this rule, and no situation must be accepted until information respecting the office has been received from the B.S."*

Paragraph 2 states: "Under no condition shall any member apply for a situation where there is no vacancy notified, neither shall he reply to any advertisement after seven days from the last date of issue; should he do so he shall be fined the sum of ten shillings and not be allowed to start in the shop, and no plea of oversight, being acquainted with the rules, or any form of excuse shall be accepted. Shoudl a vacancy occur in any firm where members are working, the shop delegate must at once notify the secretary".

The reason for these somewhat elaborate precautions is to ensure that an employer will advertise for a man only when there is a genuine vacancy, and to prevent his advertising merely when he is dissatisfied with one of his men and/

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* Footnote: B.S. Branch Secretary.

and is trying to obtain a replacement prior to sacking him. The practice of acting through the branch secretary allows the secretary to check that there is a genuine vacancy and to ensure that the members do not compete for jobs since he will allow only one man at a time to apply for a vacancy. While there is no specific rule forbidding a man to work for more than one employer, Rule 36 paragraph 4 days: "Should any member of this society in regular employment go to any shop for the purpose of rendering assistance in case of emergency, or undertake to attend regularly at stated periods, or otherwise work to the prejudice of men out of employment, shall, upon such conduct being proved to the society, be fined forty shillings for each offence".

S.L.A.D.E.P.W. Rule 40 "Responsibilities of Officers and Members". Clause 24 reads: "Members shall not undertake home work within the trade, neither shall they execute work for any firm other than the one by whom they are regularly employed under a penalty of £5". This clause is printed in heavy type for emphasis.

Rule 24 "Arrears and Exclusion" states that members committing certain offences are liable to expulsion. Among these is the following:-"(d) Any member who shall receive a bonus or premium on output unless the payment of bonus on output is general for other members employed by the firm employing such member".

This last rule shows very strongly the emphasis laid on equality among members.

Under Rule 32 "Members Changing their places of Employment" members applying for jobs are warned that they must inform the Branch Secretary of the area in which they have applied. Those leaving a job must inform the Branch Secretary in order that he will know of all possible vacancies.

N.S.E.S. Rules to ensure that everyone gets a fair share of available work include:- Rule 25 of the Glasgow Branch which states that men must not work for more than one employer; Section V of the Agreements paragraph 25 which says "While the above provisions are made for overtime, it is mutually agreed that overtime shall be discouraged"; paragraph 26 which says: "Should it be considered that undue overtime is being systematically worked, or that suitable labour could otherwise be procured, the matter shall be reported by the Union Branch Secretary to Secretary of the Branch of the Scottish Alliance";* while paragraph 12 of the Union's agreements permits the working of incentive schemes, the principle of permitting such schemes is kept under review, so that if a shortage of work should/

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* Footnote: The "Scottish Alliance" referred to is the Scottish Alliance of Employers.

should occur in the future the union may change its attitude to these incentive schemes.

N.U.P.B. Rule 14 paragraph 8 states: ".... Should any member or members remain in a shop when they are called out, they shall be expelled from the Union. The same penalty to apply to members going into such a shop when warned not to do so by the Branch Secretary".

Rules intended to ensure "fair share for all" include the following:-

Rule 24 paragraph 7 states: "No member who is in regular employment shall do any work whatever for another employer without the consent of the Branch Secretary. Where permission has been given, all such cases to be reported to the Branch Committee at the following meeting".

Paragraph 8 limits the amount of overtime which a member may work to eight hours in one week "unless provided for in trade agreements".

Paragraph 9 states that no member shall be permitted to pay for spoiled work. The union is not opposed to piecework as such, and it is not forbidden in the rules.

The union has the usual printing union system of a "call book" which members sign as they become unemployed. When vacancies occur these members are sent out in strict rotation according to their position in the book.

Rule 37 paragraph 5 says: "Notification of vacancies must be made to the Branch Secretary, who shall give his sanction before the member starts work. Any member breaking this rule shall be dealt with by the Branch Committee, who shall have power to impose a fine not exceeding 20s., and for the second offence shall be reported to the National Executive Council to be dealt with at their discretion".

Paragraph 6 says: "Whenever members know of a vacancy or leave one situation to go to another, or give or receive notice to leave their employment, they shall give information thereof to the Branch Secretary within three days, or be dealt with by the Branch Committee, who shall have power to impose a fine not exceeding 40s."

Paragraph 7 states "Any member making an application for a member's situation before such member has actually left, without the sanction of the Branch Secretary, shall be dealt with by the Branch Committee, who shall have the power to impose a fine not exceeding 100s."

N.A.T.S.O.P.A. Rule 35 limits the amount of overtime that a man may do to 9 hours per week for men on night/

night work and 12 hours per week for men on day work, but paragraph 14 permits individual Branches to set a lower limit if they wish to.

Paragraph 13 forbids men in regular work to "accept engagement of any kind outside the office where he is employed". Men on casual work are limited not to the number of jobs which they may undertake but to the number of hours during which they may work, the maximum being 52 hours per week.

Rule 34 lays down that each Branch shall have a "call book" which must be signed by all men out of employment. As in the other examples of this system given above men are sent out to vacancies in strict rotation, the aim being that those longest unemployed should obtain employment first. Any member knowing of a vacancy or vacancies must inform the Branch Secretary immediately, and any man "sent for men" shall not engage men without first obtaining the Secretary's sanction (paragraph 5). Man must inform the Secretary of the Branch when giving up or taking up a job (paragraph 7) and no man may apply for "a member's job before such member has actually left" (paragraph 8).

The similarity between many of these rules can clearly be seen, and in some cases it is obvious that one union has copied directly the rules of another. All show the high value placed upon preserving the unity of the members against the employer and giving him no opportunity to create dissension by treating some individuals more favourably than others. We will now go on to study the methods used by unions to preserve the unity of their members against other workers.

Unity against workers outside the Trade and Trade Union.

In addition to the value set on unity against the employer the workers have a value of lesser moment - that of unity against other workers outside the trade or trade union. This value is indicated in the union rule-books by the rules against working with people outside the union, and in the inter-union agreements on lines of demarcation. The value is strictly observed by the workers in normal circumstances; workers react strongly if members of other unions "trespass" across the line of demarcation, and even when members of different trades in the same union cross the line of demarcation. Among examples I can cite are compositors of the N.T.A. objecting to machinemen of the same union doing corrections to type; machinemen objecting to compositors pulling "good" proofs; stereotypers objecting about machinemen fixing stereotype plates in position. These are all common examples which occur often.

Preserving Unity against other workers in the printing industry.

Unity against other workers is maintained in order to ensure that certain jobs remain the exclusive "property" of members of a particular union and there are sanctions and agreements to ensure that members of the union do not permit outsiders to do work which is looked upon as belonging to the union and its members. The rules I have set out above stating that men are not to work with non-unionists and punishing men for breaches of union rules and agreements maintain unity against workers who are members of other unions as well as against the employer. In addition each union rule-book contains a list of trades whose members are eligible for membership of the union; and, since the members are forbidden to work with non-members at these trades, this constitutes, in effect, the union's claim to "property rights" in these trades.* Such lists are included in N.U.P.B.& P.W. Rules, No.16; Natsopa Rules, No.1; S.T.A. Rules, No.3; A.SL.P.Rules, No.1; N.S.E.S. Rules, No.1; S.L.A.D.E.P.W. Rules, No.1.

Where the ideas of unions on the subject of property rights tend to clash, agreements are entered into laying down lines of demarcation which the members of each union are expected to defend against members of other unions, just as they are expected not to work for less than union rates. There are many such agreements in existence and in order to give an idea of how they operate I will give extracts from two of them.

In the agreement between Natsopa and the S.T.A. drawn up in 1929 and still in operation, Clause 9 states "Members of the S.T.A. shall decline to work any machine until it is fully manned, and shall not do assistants' work, and the members of the N.S.O.P.& A. shall decline to work unless a qualified machine-man or machine-men be in charge, and shall/

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* Footnote: Natsopa does not forbid its members to work with people outside the union since Natsopa includes in its list many jobs "belonging" to other printing unions. If Natsopa were to claim exclusive rights to these jobs this would virtually be a declaration of war on many of the other printing unions.

shall not do machinemen's work, except in cases of emergency in both instances."

Clause 10 says "Copyholders and Linotype Assistants in newspaper offices shall be members of Natsopa. Readers and Revisers must be journeyman compositors, and members of the S.T.A." *

The reader can see how the agreement is an attempt to lay down each union's "territory".

The second example can be seen in the agreement between the Glasgow Branch of the N.S.E.S. and the Glasgow Typographical Society regarding shutter impositions, drawn up in 1938. I quote the agreement in full from the rules and agreements of the Glasgow Branch of the N.S.E.S. of 1952, leaving out only the signatures. "It is agreed that laying down stereotype plates on Shutters is the work of Compositors. It is agreed that the nailing or fixing down said plates on Shutters is the work of Stereotypers, and also that of nailing down or fixing down of all plates on single blocks whether for, or on, machine. It is further agreed that from the date on which this agreement is signed, workers in either of the societies will not interfere with the work of the other. Any breach of Agreement to be reported to the societies, who will take joint steps to rectify same."

When there is more than one trade in a union, it is recognised that one trade will not do the work of the other, e.g. the Rules of the S.T.A. No.3 clause 5 states: "Compositors must not do any Press or Machine work, and Press or Machine-men must not do any Case work." ** So far as I am aware the other unions have no written rules on the subject, but lines of demarcation between trades, or between tradesmen and non-tradesmen in the same union exist and are recognised by the unions concerned as customs of the trade. For example Stone and Plate Preparers in the A.S.L.P. are not allowed to pull proofs from lithographic machines; 'printers' cutters of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. may not cut books but only flat paper, the cutting of books being reserved for binder-cutters, who are tradesmen-binders. Members of a trade are expected to enforce these lines of demarcation against men in all other trades even though in the same union. Disputes within a union are internal matters which do not involve any outsiders, either employers or unions, and they are, as a result, far more easily settled.

The effect of these lines of demarcation upon social behaviour will be shown later and it will be seen that lines of demarcation tend to restrict communication between/

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* Footnote: From the S.T.A. handbook on agreements 1950, p.64. N.S.O.P.& A. and Natsopa are of course the same union. I can offer no explanation of why two abbreviations are used in the same agreement.

** Footnote: Rule 14, clause 9 of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. gives the Executive Council of the Union the power to permit any breach to withdraw all labour from firms which "employ female labour on work recognised by the Branch as men's legitimate work."

between different departments in a works. However, the value of unity against members of other trades or trade unions may be affected by two factors (a) social relationships and (b) common interest relationships.

(a) Social Relationships.

In the very small works - where specialisation of duties is not always possible - lines of demarcation are often relaxed to meet the needs of the work. The reason why workers relax the rules in these cases seems to be not only the physical impossibility of strict specialisation but also the fact that the men form only one work group and are all in face-to-face contact. Because of their physical closeness in the work group social bonds grow up, and men are less suspicious of each other than in larger workers where social contacts are less close. This is natural enough, people are rarely so afraid of the known as they are of the unknown, it is "it" and "they" that are feared, not "Joe" or "Charlie". In the same way I have been told by labourers in Works "A" that the lines of demarcation between themselves and tradesmen are relaxed on night shift because the work group is smaller and the tradesmen are closer to the non-tradesmen and are less afraid of being seen and reported by other tradesmen that they are on day shift. In Works "B" there are only three cutters, one a binder-cutter and the others printers' cutters. As I have explained above there is a strict line of demarcation between the two which is observed in larger works - in Works "A" for example - but in Works "B" the line of demarcation is not observed and all three do the same kind of work. In small country newspaper offices the compositors often act as journalists. Mr. Lean, then Secretary of the S.T.A., said in 1950 "Even in these days of specialisation it is still a very common practice for the compositor on the small country newspaper to leave his copy, pick up his notebook and pencil, and go forth to write up his own copy." * Now journalists have a union of their own, the National Union of Journalists, which is a member of the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation and such practices would not be allowed in the city. But in the small country office even a union secretary condones them. It is widely known that in small offices lines of demarcation are not strictly kept and even the union officials do not bother themselves unduly about this.

The reason why men are lax on lines of demarcation in small offices would seem to be a combination of things, the physical difficulties of running a small office if such lines were strictly kept, the fact that men are in close social relationships and do not want to disturb these relationships by quarrelling over lines of demarcation, and lastly the fact that in the small shop the men know the situation well and see that their workmates in different trades do not constitute a threat to their job. The effect of social relationships is important but it would be ineffective if the men still felt their workmates constituted a threat to their job.

When I speak of a "threat to their job" I do not necessarily mean a threat to the specific jobs they have in that particular works - although this may well come into/

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* Footnote: From a statement by Mr. Lean in the 114th.Annual Report of the S.T.A., December, 1950.

into it. What I refer to is the general threat of the outside to the trade union's, or the craft's, monopoly of that kind of job. Unity is necessary against this threat and lines of demarcation are used against the outsider in order to preserve the monopoly. But in the small office the man in another trade is known personally, is not felt to be an outsider, and is not felt to be a threat to the craft monopoly of that particular job. Hence there is no need for unity against him and lines of demarcation can be relaxed.

(b) Common Interest Relationships.

There are indications that the lines of demarcation are less rigidly kept between different trades in the same union than they are between different trades in different unions. I have already noted that compositors and machine-men, both members of the S.T.A., often dispute over the pulling of proofs. Nevertheless the machine-men do allow compositors to pull proofs for their own use, it is only "good" proofs that they do not permit them to pull.* On the other hand they do not permit stereotypers as much scope in pulling proofs as they do to the compositors. Disputes between machine-men and stereotypers over proofs and the fixing of stereotype plates are more common and more bitter than disputes between compositors and machine-men. The reason would seem to be that the compositors and machine-men are less suspicious of each other because they belong to the same union. They do not feel that men in the same union threaten their interests as much as men in other unions do and they relax the lines of demarcation accordingly.

The same principle can be seen at work in the attitude printers show to dilutees. Tradesmen do not like accepting dilutees at all, but when they are forced to accept a dilutee for a job preference is always given to an unskilled man from the same union, preferably from the same works. This is an accepted principle in all the printing unions. In some cases it is written into agreements with the employer. For example the S.T.A. agreements states that any vacancy for a monotype caster must first be offered to a tradesman compositor, if no compositor will take it it may then be offered to an auxiliary of the S.T.A., only if an auxiliary cannot be found to accept it may outsiders be brought in.**

Another example is to be seen in the Bindery of Works "A". There, as a result of a strike in 1913, some of the "blocking" was taken over by women who became auxiliary members of the S.T.A. Blocking is considered a man's job which should be done by tradesmen Binders who are members of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. That union did claim the blockers and during the war the S.T.A. gave them back to the N.U.P.B.& P.W., but since getting the women back the binders have made no attempt to replace them by men. Though,/

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* Footnote: "Good" proofs are those intended for use outside the department, perhaps to go to the firm which gave the order. The machine-men insist on pulling these proofs because a badly done proof would reflect on them rather than on the compositor.

** Footnote: Agreements of the S.T.A.in 1953. "Agreement between the Scottish Alliance of Employers in the Printing and Kindred Trades and the Scottish Typographical Assocn., dated 7th.March,1952." Clause 21, section 7.

Though, in the past, they objected as strongly to women, as such, doing the work as they did to the fact that these women were members of the S.T.A., now they have the job back under the control of their union they do not seem to worry about women doing it, in fact the binders said that now the women are in their union they feel that they can prevent their ever becoming a threat to the binders' trade prerogatives. It is worth noting that the assistants in the Lithographic Machine-Room of Works "A" - members of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. - gave their reasons for wanting to be members of the A.S.L.P. the fact that they believed the line of demarcation would be less rigidly held if they were members of the same union as the lithographers with whom they worked.

It would seem then that common interest as members of the same common interest association also affects the attitude of men to lines of demarcation. Thus it can be said that the official values concerning unity against other workers are affected by both social and interest factors in their practical expression on the shop floor. Close social relations as in the small works, and community of interests as when two trades share the same union both mitigate the severity with which lines of demarcation are kept, because in both cases the threat of the outsider to the craft monopoly is lessened and consequently the need for unity is also lessened.

<u>The Contradiction between the value of Unity against workers outside the trade and trade union, and the Value set on Unity among workers generally.</u>

As we have seen from the rule-books, at the official level the printing unions set a high value on unity among all working men and women and on the political expression of their unity in the form of the Labour Party. However, there is evidence to indicate that these official values are not entirely accepted by all the rank and file members of the printing unions.

A split in values between the officials and many of the rank and file could be seen during the D.C.Thomson dispute. This dispute occurred because since the General Strike of 1926 Mr. Thomson had refused to allow any of his workers to belong to a trade union. A great deal of skirmishing had gone on between the printing unions and the firm of Thomson since then and in 1953 Thomson's discharged two men, one in Manchester, one in Glasgow, who were found to belong to trade unions. The dismissal of the man in Glasgow caused 74 men in Thomson's office there, who were secretly members of Natsopa, to go on strike. Because of Thomson's policy of dismissing any known trade unionists the dispute was looked upon as a test case by active trade unionists throughout the country and the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation, the T.U.C., and the Scottish T.U.C. all pledged support to the strikers and Natsopa. The N.U.P.B.& P.W. became involved in the strike when its members in the paper mills refused to supply paper to the firm of Thomson. Glasgow was the centre of the dispute and consequently one might reasonably have expected that the feeling of solidarity among trade unionists would have been strongest there. Certainly at the official level support for the strikers was strong and the union branches collected money to support Natsopa. But I found that many of the rank and file members of the printing unions did not support the strikers and indeed objected/

objected to their own unions getting involved in the dispute. Many S.T.A. members told me they objected to their union supporting a rival union which would be * greatly strengthened if it won the dispute with Thomson. Even members of the N.U.P.B.& P.W., a union directly involved in the strike, objected to their union wasting its funds in a dispute which they felt was no concern of theirs. I talked to many active members and officials of the unions and all had noted with concern the existence of these opinions so greatly in contrast with their own values. The number who felt this way were apparently in a minority, yet they seemed quite a strong minority and they placed no value on upholding the wider issues of trade union policy which were involved in the D.C. Thomson dispute. **

In addition to this example of the feeling at the time of the D.C.Thomson dispute, I found during my research that many printers spoke unfavourably of the official interest in the broader aspects of trade unionism and declared that the union should look after the interests of its own members first. Many of them expressed the idea that a craft union "should be something like the B.M.A." (British Medical Association). I cannot say how many printers do hold such views but they are certainly not uncommon in the industry. It is when the question of co-operation between skilled men and unskilled men is under discussion that this attitude is most clearly seen. Members of the craft unions are determined to uphold their interests as skilled men against the unskilled and indeed against skilled men in other unions. There have been plans for many years to amalgamate all printing trade unions into one large union but they always fail on the sectional interests of the craft unions. The members of each craft union want to retain control over their own affairs and in this matter even the active members and officials tend to put sectional interests before the value of interests of the movement as a whole.

On the political side of the question it can be shown that the value set on the Labour Party as the political expression of workers' unity is not held by a large number/

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* Footnote: The S.T.A. are continually conflicting with Natsopa over the manning of machines.

** Footnote: All the printing unions supported action against the firm of D.C.Thomson and sent gifts of money to the Dispute Fund of the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation. Of the unions which concern us the N.S.E.S. sent £1,218; the S.L.A.D.E.P.W. £2,111; the A.S.L.P. £1,802; and the S.T.A. £604. The Secretary of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. claims that the dispute cost his union £50,000. The sums of money sent by these unions indicate the official support given by them to the unions directly involved.

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number of printers. Of the six unions we are considering, two, the A.S.L.P. and the S.T.A., are not affiliated to the Labour Party. The case of the S.T.A. is extremely interesting as an example of the difference in values between the officials and active members and the rank and file. On several occasions the Delegate Meeting of the union, composed only of the interested and active members, has decided in favour of affiliation to the Labour Party and, in accordance with the union rules, the matter has been put to a ballot vote of the whole union. Ballot votes on this question have occurred in 1920, 1928, 1932, 1937, 1947, and 1954. On each occasion the vote of the members has been against affiliation, at the last election in 1954 there were 1,907 votes for and 3,193 against. The interesting feature of all this is the fact that the Delegate Meeting, composed as I have said of active members, has decided time after time by large majorities, sometimes even unanimously, for affiliation and time after time the rank and file have rejected affiliation.

Before the 1954 ballot a series of articles on the question was put in the monthly journal of the union, every article supported affiliation. When the result of the election was declared an editorial in the journel carried the following statement: "The result of the vote has, to the many active members in the Branches, been one of keen disappointment, yet it is to be hoped that the day may not be far distant when a more enlightened attitude will prevail to give a unity of allegiance worthy of the cause for which the Association exists." * The article describes how the executive, by circulars to Branches and articles in the union, tried to get the affiliation through and states regretfully that only three of the unions thirty-two branches had a majority for affiliation.

A letter to the Editor in the same edition of the journal, after regretting the fact that the members decided against affiliation, goes on to point out the opinions of the active members expressed at meetings are often mistakenly believed to be those of the whole union, says "While respecting the wishes of the majority of our members that politics are not for us, I am more than ever convinced that we do not know the mind of that majority in, quite probably, more things than politics. To think of all the time and money wasted in pursuing a matter which could have, but for pure apathy, been defeated before the Delegate Meeting concerned, leads me to that conclusion."** What the writer is referring to is the fact that the subjects on the agenda of the Delegate Meeting must be first passed by Branch Meetings. If the rank and file members had turned up and voted at Branch Meetings the question of affiliation to the Labour Party would have been defeated before it could come before the Delegate Meeting at all.

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* Footnote: Scottish Typographical Journal, July 1954, p.797.

** Footnote: Scottish Typographical Journal. op.cit. p.811.

On such evidence there can be little doubt that there is a difference between the value put on political action by the active members and that put on it by the rank and file of the S.T.A.

The four remaining unions of our study are affiliated to the Labour Party. The proportions paying the political levy are shown below.

Union.	Total Membership 1952.	Number affiliated to Labour Party. 1952.	1946.
N.U.P.B.& P.W.	134,000	25,000	
Natsopa	38,841	33,156	22,201
S.L.A.D.E.P.W.	11,874	7,397	2,800
N.S.E.S.	4,557	2,541	2,088

I give the 1946 figures as a contrast. Until 1946, under the terms of the Trade Union Act of 1927, members of a union affiliated to the Labour Party, who wished to pay a contribution to that Party had to sign a form stating their willingness to do so, this was known as "contracting in". The Trade Union Act of 1946 changed this and now all members of trade unions affiliated to the Labour Party automatically pay to the fund of that party unless they sign a form expressing their unwillingness to contribute. This is known as "contracting out", and the result of this change has been a large increase in the number of persons who pay to the political funds of their trade unions.*

I came across several apparent reason for this increase in the course of my research. Many people were too lazy to "contract out", or did not like to do so in face of the known leaning towards the Labour Party at the official level, others do not even know they are paying to the Political Fund. In Works "A" for example, there was a Conservative who collected the union dues; she made a point of explaining to all the girls in her section that they need not pay to the Political Fund - and none did so. In other sections there were Labour collectors who collected it automatically and never mentioned the Political Fund, as a result, among the women, few knew they were paying it. It is perhaps an interesting commentary on the official attitude that in the 1940 Rule-book of the N.U.P.B.& P.W., in the days of "contracting in", the form to "contract in" was put on the very first page of the Rule-book. In the 1948 Rule-book, after the change in the Act there is no form to "contract out" but members are told on page 53 how they can "contract out" of the Political Fund. It is difficult to believe that this change is just coincidence.

Under these circumstances it seems probable that the figures for 1952 represent a somewhat inflated view of the number of Labour supporters in the trade unions. Even on the 1952 figures a large majority in the N.U.P.B. & P.W. do not pay to the Political Fund, while in the N.S.E.S. and the S.L.A.D.E.P.W. there are very strong minorities who do not pay to it. It would seem from this that the rank and file members do not value the Labour Party as the political expression of their interest in the/

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* Footnote: For figures of this increase since the Trade Union Act I advise the reader to see "An Introduction to Trade Unionism" by G.D.G.Cole, published by Allen and Unwin,London, 1953.

the same way that the active members do. From my own experience I have found that many skilled men in the printing trade are in fact Conservative in politics, many experienced officials and active members of the printing unions in Glasgow have told me that they think a majority of the skilled men are in fact Conservative. I have no evidence to support such a conclusion but it would certainly seem that in Glasgow at least a substantial minority are not Labour.

In addition I met a large number of men who were confirmed Labour supporters but who were bitterly opposed to their union being affiliated to any political party as they believed that politics and trade unionism should be kept separate. This in itself is in direct contrast with the official value put on the Labour Party as the representative of the trade unions.

In conclusion then, while we have no statistics to show the proportions in the trade holding various opinions, it can be seen from the figures relating to political affiliation that a substantial number do not share the official values in this matter. On the question of value set on the wider aspects of trade unionism I can only speak on the evidence of my experience in Glasgow and the opinions of the officials I met there. On this experience it does seem that a considerable number of printers, in the Glasgow area at least, do not support the official value set on unity among workers generally. The reason being that differences of interest between unions - e.g. between Natsopa and craft unions - outweigh the common interest in, and value of, unity against the employer.

The effect of the Trade Union beliefs about the employer, and values of unity against the employer, upon values and behaviour in the work group.

As beliefs justify values it follows that if the values at work group level differ from those of the interest group then the beliefs that justify them will be different also.

Beliefs about the Employer.

The first and most important belief, that about the workers' struggle against the employers, with the connected belief that workers and employers have interests which are in direct opposition to each other, was widely accepted. However there was considerable variation in the strength of these beliefs, some men were violently opposed to the employer, others quite amiably disposed towards him, but almost all felt that their interests are opposed. Sometimes the strength of belief varied from one works to another; sometimes from one department to another within a works; according to works experience with the employer in the past. But in every case behind all local variations there was a common belief that the interests of employer and worker are opposed and that workers must be united against the employers in defence of their interests.

However, other beliefs found in the rule-books are not so widely believed in, the beliefs relating to "class" and those referring to politics being the most important of these. Because of the high pay and security printers enjoy many of them do not think of themselves as "workers" in the class sense at all, except when in the stress of a conflict with the employers when they may temporarily talk in terms of class. It is mainly those with strong Labour convictions who speak in terms of "class" under normal conditions. Class and political beliefs seem to go together; I always found that the class-conscious were those who held the political belief that the Labour Party was the party of the workers while the other political parties were controlled by the employers.

At the same time there did not seem to be any connection between the political and class beliefs on the one hand and the belief about opposition to the employer on the other. I talked to many men and women who openly supported the Conservative Party and who did not accept the beliefs about "class" and "class war". Nevertheless with very few exceptions these people believed that the employers' interests were opposed to their own and that workers must stand united and oppose the employers through their trade unions. In fact some of these workers were active trade unionists, one being a Branch Secretary. These men were often very critical of the political activities and leanings of their trade unions but were solidly behind its industrial activities. In one union many Conservative members were very critical of their Branch Secretary for being too friendly with the employers, while the behaviour of the Secretary in question was strongly supported by many Labour members, so it is clear that political convictions are no indication of attitude to the employer.

Briefly then, it can be said that the printing workers I met in the course of the research seem to share the belief that/

that workers ~~may~~ have common interests which are opposed to the interests of employers but this is not necessarily linked to the political and class beliefs which are shared by various sections among the workers. Nevertheless there is no serious difference between the beliefs described in the union rule-books and these found among workers in the printing industry.

The Value of Unity.

The beliefs about the employer stress to the printers the need for unity among themselves. Unity being essential if they are to oppose the employer effectively. As stated earlier unity is maintained in two ways:- (a) directly, by imposing sanctions on those who break unity; and (b) indirectly, by maintaining equality among members of the trade.

Inequality among members of the same trade leads to disunity, hence rules or practices which maintain equality help to preserve unity. Most of the practices described below are clearly intended to maintain equality but it must be remembered that this is only a means to an end - the end being the preservation of unity.

Certain practices* have been developed to encourage unity and prevent disunity in both work group and trade union, and these practices have a very important effect upon production and other matters. The principle upon which these practices work is this. Anything which permits the employer to discriminate between individual workers in any way is likely to destroy unity. For example, under unrestricted working conditions the employer would be able to pick out the skilled from the less skilled; the fast from the slow workers. If he is allowed to do this and to pay each one individually on merit then status divisions will grow up between workers. Competition between men will arise and this may well lead to strife and dissension in the work group. Certain practices have been developed to prevent this, and to maintain equality of status vis-a-vis the employer.

(i)
Piecework.

In order to protect the slower worker it is necessary to conceal from the employer that different individuals work at different speeds. But under a piecework system of wage payment such differences in speed are soon apparent to the employer. The simplest safeguard against thit is to ban piece work entirely. Some unions do this.

Where/

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* Footnote:

These practices are sometimes known as "restrictive practices" meaning that their intention is to restrict output. The use of this term has to be handled with care. Certain activities which, from the employers' point of view, appear to be restrictive, and which indeed may have restrictive effects upon output, are not restrictive in intent. There are undoubtedly many practices designed to restrict output and which may be termed "restrictive practices" but these do not concern me here. What I am dealing with is practices primarily designed to preserve unity, any restrictive effect of these practices is merely secondary, and it is necessary to make this clear if one wishes to understand the workers system of values.

Where piecework is not banned, other means of avoiding disunity exist. In Works "A" piecework has been the rule in the Bindery for many years and as a result some Bindery work groups have developed methods of preventing the employer from learning of any differences in speed and skill. Inorder to prevent "showing up" the slower workers and to stop quarrels over good and bad jobs* four work groups, each doing a particular type of work, have developed a "pool system", as they call it. Under this system of working each man fills in an individual work sheet with the work he has done but this is not sent directly to the works office in order to calculate his pay, instead two members of the pool take the sheets and enter them all up into one book, the total pay is divided by the number of man-hours worked, each individual being paid the average rate per hour for the total number of hours he has worked.

In this way all men who work a full week claim the same rate from the firm. If an exceptional job, good or bad, turns up the men draw lots for it but they remain on the pool rate so that they neither gain nor lose by it. This system was instituted unknown to the management but today the management know of it and accept it, though they do not approve of it. The men themselves think it is a good system of working and claim, as one of its best features, that is ensures that the whole work group is united when there is any dispute over piece rates with the employer.

About thirty years ago, so I was told, it was customary for the workers themselves to fix a certain sum as a reasonable week's pay and to work to that target but not to exceed it. When necessary the fast ones who had made their week's pay would help the slower ones.

Another practice among men on piecework which I have heard of from men in different works is that of not starting work in the morning until the last man is in. This is to ensure that no one works longer than the others. In parts of Works "A" this practice went on for some time but the men stopped it eventually as with some men habitually coming in late it wasted several hours of working time each week. In one department of Works "B" where the men are on piecework, this practice is still maintained, and I have heard of similar practices in several other works.

Yet another type of practice exists in Works "B". Here some of the linotype operators are on piecework and some/

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* Footnote: It is very difficult to fix piece rates when many different jobs are involved so that often some jobs are overpaid while others are underpaid. In order to make up his wage the worker has to get a proper balance of good and bad jobs and the foreman often has a difficult task in seeing every man gets his fair share of each. Some men get more than their fair share of the good jobs, the others start to try to "wangle" the good jobs, and relations in the work group deteriorate. The employer can discriminate in giving out jobs and cause dissension in the work group for his own ends.

some are not, some do a type of work in which periods of intensive activity alternate with slack periods and in order to induce them to work at the necessary speed during rush hours they are put on piece rate. The operators on normal steady work are paid on time rate. When the system was instituted it was found that those on piece rate made more than those on time rate, consequently the operators asked for an extra sum to be paid to those on time rate in order to prevent any ill-feeling between those on piece and those on time rates. The operators say this arrangement was made because they were all in the linotype section at the time and any of them might have been chosen to go onto piecework, therefore any difference in wages would be an injustice to those left on time rate. The operators said that they would not claim the extra payment for any new men who came to work there as it concerned only men who were in the group at the time the piece rate was instituted.

(ii) Incentive Schemes.

With the introduction of incentive schemes at the present day we find men taking precautions against disunity being caused by them. Some work groups reject incentive schemes completely, others demand certain precautions in their schemes. In Works "A" the Lithographic Machine Room rejected an individual incentive scheme but many of its members and their union officials expressed willingness to try a group incentive scheme whereby pay would be calculated, not individually, but on the output of the whole Machine Room. The reason I was given as to why they rejected an individual incentive scheme was that it would cause dissension in the work group and set the men spying on each other and quarrelling over the good and bad jobs. The men thought that such a situation would be highly favourable to the management and that it was one of the reasons why the management wanted an incentive scheme. One member of the Lithographic Machine Room said to me: "the management think they are going to have us all competing against each other and cutting each other's throats, but it won't work, it just isn't the British worker." Another machineman said: "It would be a hell of a way to live, it would be like cat and dog, some would get good jobs and some bad, and there is nothing worse than one man making more money than another."

The Letterpress Machine Room in the same works also refused an individual incentive scheme; the men in this department claimed that they would have tried a group incentive scheme but were afraid of the effect of an individual scheme upon the unity of the work group.*

This fear that incentive schemes would lead to disunity was widespread in the works. In the Caseroom of Works "A" an incentive scheme was being tride out when I/

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* Footnote: There were some workers in the Letterpress Machine Room who said they would prefer an individual scheme on the grounds that under a collective scheme some men would be inclined to slack and that this in turn would lead to bad-feeling in the work group. The intention behind both preferences is the same - to prevent disunity. The difference is only over which type of scheme best serves this purpose.

was there. Because of this scheme relations within the Caseroom were rather strained. One of the leaders of the Caseroom said to me in front of the other members: "The incentive scheme has only been going for a few weeks and we are at each other's throats already; it shows you what it can do." The other men present strongly agreed with this. Throughout the works there was a strong feeling that workers should not compete against each other, as one man put it: "The employers have their federations and try to keep down competition between each other, why should we be such bloody fools as to compete with each other just to suit them."*

Even on ordinary time rate work, apart from piecework and incentive schemes, some men are likely to be faster, or harder workers than others, and this also may give the employer an excuse for discrimination thereby causing disunity in the work group. Practices exist to avoid any trouble on this account. In many work groups, in fact one may say in many departments, there is an unofficial rate of output recognised by the group. I do not mean by this that there is a fixed rate of work which is clearly recognised and rigidly adhered to, it is much more vague. A work group or department comes to recognise a certain speed of working or quantity of output as constituting a fair day's work, the speed or quantity is not exactly defined and there is scope for a reasonable degree of variation on it. What is recognised as a fair day's work varies from one works to another and seems to be traditional, being based upon what has been accepted as a fair day's work in that particular firm in the past. Since the concept is vague there is scope for variation, but there is always a "fair" or "reasonable" level of work, and any one who goes far below it will be looked on as slacking, while anyone who greatly exceeds it will be looked upon as doing more than a fair day's work and "showing up" the others. If a man goes too far below the level his workmates will begin to comment on it and try to shame him into working harder. On the other hand if a man exceeds the level he will be warned by his mates to ease up, and, if he persists, sanctions will be brought into use against him. As one worker put it, speaking of a new man: "He was working too hard and the rest of the blokes didn't like it so they gave him the life of a scabby cat until he chucked it up."

Many printers told me that it is usual when going to a new works to find the accepted rate of work and to conform to it. The usual way of doing this seems to be by observation rather than by asking directly what the usual rate of output is. Several managers with varied experience/

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* Footnote: It is worth noting that the feature of current incentive schemes which has gained them acceptance by many workers in the printing industry is the fact that every man is guaranteed the minimum time rate wage of the trade, irrespective of how low output may be. This has removed the fear that to accept an incentive scheme would be to penalise the older and slower workers.

experience confirmed that the output on the same type of machine varies considerably from one works to another - and some say from one part of the country to another.*

(iii) Merit Money.

There is one form of extra payment given to workers which can quickly disrupt work group unit. This is "merit money", a payment ostensibly paid in recognition of merit in high quality of work, or in exceptional output, or in long service with the firm. These merit money payments are not large, often only a few shillings, but they can cause trouble out of all proportion to their monetary value because the idea of status in the works is closely bound up with the pay received and even a little extra seems to single a man out as being of higher status. The trouble it can cause is shown by the following letter written/

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* Footnote: There are many examples known of such restriction of output, and not from Britain alone. For example there is an account by Donald Roy in the American Journal of Sociology Vol.LVII, 1951-52, entitled "Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop". Roy describes the way in which the men in an American machine-shop established limits on output - "quota restriction" - and piecework earnings and made it clear to all newcomers that they must not exceed these.

Perhaps the most famous example of recent years in Britain was the "Bonus Joe" strike at the Rolls Royce plant at Blantyre near Glasgow. In an article in the Socialist weekly "Forward" of November 19th. 1955, John Harris in giving the reasons for the strike made it quite clear that quota restriction was practised. He said: "The basic facts are not in dispute. In July of this year a polisher at the Blantyre factory, Joe McLernon was reprimanded by his union the General Ironfitters' Association, for failing to keep to a shop agreement to limit bonus earnings to 127 per cent. It is claimed that he gave an assurance along these lines to a union meeting.

"Later McLernon again violated this agreement by earning £5 more than he should have done. He was then expelled from his union".

The reason for the limit on bonus earnings in this case was shortage of work.

Several works on industry have references to similar practices, among them:-

Roethlisberger and Dickson, "Management and the Worker", Chapter XXIII: Harvard University Press 1939.
"Restriction of Output among unorganised Workers". S.B.Matthewson: New York Viking Press, 1931.
"Full Up and Fed Up: The worker's Mind in Crowded Britain", W.Williams: London, Allan & Unwin, 1921.
"Levels of Expectation in Productivity" R.G.Stansfield, "Occupational Psychology" 25 (1) (Jan.1951) 25-34.
L.R.Cooh and J.R.P.French "Overcoming Resistance to Change". "Human Relations" 1: 512-522 (1948).
Gordon Rattray Taylor "Are Workers Human".(London - The Falcon Press, 1950).
"The Changing Culture of a Factory", E.Jaques (London - Tavistock Publications, 1951)

written by a member of the London Bookbinders Branch of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. and printed in the "Paperworker", the official journal of that union.

"Merit money is a subject causing much argument and, in some cases, resentment in our industry. Why should this be? The governing principle is that it is something over and above and entirely at the discretion of the management who decide how much and to whom it shall be given. Now obviously this is where the rub comes. We have to try to appreciate that there are people who have a better knowledge of their own particular branch of the trade than others, but how about the people who are carrying out the same job day after day and perhaps year in and year out, and to all appearances there may be little to choose between them. What method should be adopted in this instance?

Personalities come into view, and overseers often have a thankless task to perform, but one of the great snags of the system is when people in charge have their likes and dislikes, and use this method to demonstrate it in no uncertain manner. Then feeling creeps in and before you know where you are there is dissatisfaction all over theplace. As many of you know this happens in numerous concerns all over the United Kingdom. Now, I was brought up in a firm where merit money was unknown and minimum rates paid, also there was no overtime done. In the ordinary way several men did remain forty years or more, and it was generally a happy shop. ----- I shall always remember what one of our works managers said to me some years ago: 'What I desire above all things is a happy and contented staff'. He was aiming high, wasn't he? We hear a great deal these days about production targets and incentives. Every fair-minded person wants to do his best to achieve a decent standard, but from my own experience of the merit money idea, this is most certainly not the case".*

Everything said in this letter bears out my own experience of the general attitude to the merit money system. As can be seen from this there is a very strong feeling against merit money based on the fact that merit money provides a means whereby the employer or the management can discriminate between members of the work group. Merit money can thus be used as a bribe, a means of putting pressure on those who receive it, and a means of creating differences in status between individuals.

(iv) Overtime.

If some men get consistently more overtime than others it can cause a considerable difference between their weekly earnings, and employers can use overtime in order to introduce inequalities of pay into a work group. In order to prevent this some printing unions set a limit on the amount of overtime that may be worked in a month and permission to exceed this may only be granted by the Branch Secretary, who will make sure that there has been a degree of equality in the amount of overtime each man has worked before/

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* Footnote: Letter in the "Paperworker", June 1952, p.18.

before granting permission.* This practice serves a twofold purpose for in times of unemployment it will prevent undue overtime while men are out of work; while in times of full employment it equalises out overtime within a works.

The situations which are caused by overtime working may be very difficult since a section of a department may be on a type of work which necessitates a lot of overtime while the rest of the department are on a different job for which little overtime is needed. This will lead to ill-feeling within a department and in some works it is a serious cause of conflict between work groups in a department and sometimes even within a work group. In the Caseroom of Works "B" there has been conflict of this kind for some time and the Case Chapel has introduced various rules in an attempt to preserve equality in regard to overtime. For example, if a section of the department is on a particular job and it is necessary for overtime to be worked on that job, then the whole of the section concerned must be asked to work overtime; the management are not allowed to ask only some of the members of the section to work overtime. Another rule lays down that the members of the Chapel be limited to a total of nine hours overtime a month, and that no one can be allowed to exceed that limit until all the memgers of the Chapel have had the opportunity to work nine hours overtime. Exceptions are made to this rule when it is clear that a strict interpretation of it would cause a definite hardship to the firm.

In Works "A" there is less overtime but the foreman there told me that they had a lot of trouble sharing out the overtime with strict equality, as any apparent favouritism led to trouble with the men.

When there is a night shift in a works, as in the Lithographic and Letterpress Machine Rooms of Works "A", the firm is not allowed to select which men shall go on night shift; instead the Chapel draws up a rota and all men have a strictly equal turn on it.

A recent example from Works "A" shows how the principle of strict equality as a means of preserving unity is adapted to any circumstances. In the Bindery of this firm it was necessary to put the men onto short time working owing to a shortage of work. On hearing this the men decided that if it were left to the firm some men would be kept on full time work while others got none. The firm would pick which individuals got work and which did not; the men claimed that the firm had done this in the past. The F.O.C. and members of the Men's Chapel were determined that all work available should be shared equally and they insisted/

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* Footnote: The following is a typical example.

"Overtime Refused - Perth Branch Secretary had refused an extension of overtime for a member engaged on colour work whose overtime hours had been worked up, and the Branch committee requested a ruling on this point. It transpired that other machinemen who had equal qualifications had worked no overtime and the General Secretary had replied backing up the Secretary and the Board of Management. The Council homologated the action of the General Secretary".
From "Scottish Typographic Journal","Jottings", p. 695, January, 1954.

insisted that the management do this so a scheme was drawn up whereby every man got three days work a week.

Printers are always very reluctant to do anything contrary to the accepted customs or union agreements of the trade. The reason rarely seems to be personal: it is based rather upon the fear of establishing a precedent and breaking their union's united front on some issue. I have known men refuse to make any concession beyond the strict union agreement - even when it was in their interest to do so - because they might create a precedent. One worker who had refused to do extra overtime said to me: "I don't mind myself, but if I start doing it then the boss will come to expect it. The bloke who gets the job after me may not want to do it but he will be expected to do it because I did. I shall have started something." There is a strong feeling that a man who breaks union agreements, whatever the reason, is "letting the side down". He may easily create a precedent which will destroy the work of his union in establishing certain conditions of work.*

This fear of establishing precedents also made men very reluctant to do any part of another man's job while that man is off work. There is a fear that if the employer sees they can do his work he may sack the absent man and put his work on to the other workers, they would thus have "done a man out of a job", a most serious offence in the eyes of the worker. The man who takes on another person's job is regarded as having betrayed his workmates and because of this men are afraid to touch anything which may be considered another man's job.

This causes difficulty when labour-saving machinery is introduced. When a trade union negotiates with employers concerning how many men shall man a new machine it claims to be motivated solely by the need to find the number of men required to work the machine efficiently. Nevertheless, it seems to me that they are strongly influenced by the number of men required to do the same amount of work with the old machinery and the need to find employment for those who may be thrown out of work by the new machine. For example, in Works "A" a new machine was bought which is operated by one machineman in England. The union concerned asked that two men should work it, later reducing this to a claim of three men for two machines and finally agreeing to one machineman and one auxiliary for each machine. I have no claims to be a technical expert but I feel that in this case the claims of the union were/

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* Footnote: I noticed many examples of this outlook among trade unionists in the army. In one case a man who was an engineer in civilian life and a keen, though not an active, trade unionist, was very interested in a new wireless set and offered to work it on several occasions when he was off duty. But he always made it a condition that someone else's name be put on the duty roster so that no one in authority should know of his extra duty and use it as a precedent for cutting down off-duty periods. In such circumstances men made it a "sacred duty" not to do, or be seen to do, more than they should in order not to create precedents.

were affected by the high output of the machine and the number of men it could put out of work rather than by the actual number of men needed to work it. When I spoke to the men concerned they claimed that the work would be too hard for one man but they seemed much less concerned about this than about the high output of the machine and the effect it would have on unemployment if there should be a shortage of work. In fact the main theme of their conversation was the possibility of unemployment and they were clearly worried about this while the complaint about the work was made once, without heat, and never repeated.

In a previous chapter I have given the rules which the unions made to guard against unemployment, there seems to be no doubt that such rules have the full approval of the members. During the depression many of the printing unions levied dues on their members in order to keep up the payment of unemployment pay, the S.T.A. men for example paid 2/10d. a week on top of their normal dues for the unemployment levy. There can be no doubt that the men were behind these levies for they could only be imposed after a majority of the members had declared their assent in a ballot vote.

The effect of this value of unity can best be seen when it is contrasted with the values accepted in other countries. Many Glasgow printers have worked in the U.S.A. and Canada and returned to Glasgow. They tell of men having two different jobs at the trade and working sixteen hours a day; of men in works which are on a bonus system spying on their workmates and reporting them when their production is not up to standard. I have often heard Glasgow printers discussing these reports and all were genuinely horrified by them, such conduct was looked upon as immoral, the high pay and conditions of the American printer could not excuse such behaviour in their eyes. The man who wants to get on and is prepared to work sixteen hours a day to do so is no hero to the Glasgow printer but a traitor to his workmates - a man prepared to sacrifice his fellow workers to his own greed. Constant fear of unemployment has made "fair shares for all" the motto of the printer, unity is a value, individual competition is a crime.*

It will be noted that, though the need for unity is sometimes motivated by social reasons - e.g. the fear that incentive schemes will cause the social disruption of the work group - the main reason for the value set on unity is that of common interest, the common interest of opposition to the employer. This is shown very clearly in the next chapter in which the trade union organisation in the workshop - the Chapel - is described.

1. THE PRINTING TRADE CHAPEL.

In this chapter I want to describe the Chapel - which is the name given in the printing trade to the unit of trade union organisation at workshop level.* The name is used for this unit of organisation by all the printing trade unions and by them alone. If the Chapel were but an ordinary form of workshop organisation with an unusual name it would be of little interest. In fact it is a distinct form of organisation, all printing Chapels, no matter what trade union they belong to, having essentially the same basic structure and pattern of organisation. In the early days of printing the Chapel consisted of all the printers in a workshop. But with increased specialisation in printing and the growth of separate trade unions to cover each specialism the Chapel divided and multiplied, so that today each trade union has its own Chapel or Chapels in every workshop where it has members.

The Chapel organisation of the six unions in Scotland is as follows: The S.T.A. includes members of two distinct trades, compositors and letterpress machinemen. In addition there are the unskilled assistants to the letterpress machinemen - the "Auxiliaries" mentioned above - these may be either male or female. The two groups of tradesmen each have their own separate Chapel in every works; the compositors' being known as the Case Chapel, the letterpress machinemen's as the Machine Chapel. The auxiliary members have a separate Chapel of their own, this is the theory at least, in practice the Auxiliary Chapel is usually weak and sometimes non-existent. The reason is that the auxiliaries are, as stated, the assistants of the letterpress machinemen and are thus bound by any working arrangements that the machinemen make for themselves. Thus the Machine Chapel when negotiating conditions for the machinemen in fact decides those of the auxiliaries as well and there is little left for the Auxiliary Chapel to do.

In England the situation is similar. The Typographical Association covers all compositors and letterpress machinemen in England and Wales outside London. The London Typographical Society covers those in London. Both unions have the same organisation of their members into Case and Machine Chapels but as they include no auxiliaries in their unions they have no Auxiliary Chapels.

The N.S.E.S., A.S.L.P., S.L.A.D.E.P.W., and Natsopa have/

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* Footnote: The term Chapel is used for their workshop unit by all unions in the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation, though some of these - for example the National Union of Journalists and the National Union of Press Telegraphists - are not concerned in the actual production side of printing. The term is also used by the British Actors Equity Association, which borrowed it directly from the printing trade unions, the first organiswe of Equity having been a compositor. So far as is known it is not used by any other trade unions.

In this paper we are concerned only with the Chapels of those trade unions directly engaged in the production side of the industry.

have only one Chapel in each works. The first three are small unions and the number of members they have in each works is usually far too small for subdivision, although the A.S.L.P. includes a section of semi-skilled stone and plate polishers, and the S.L.A.D.E.P.W. includes more than one kind of tradesman. Natsopa is a much larger union though, as I have said, in Scotland it is confined to Newspaper Offices. It is a strictly non-craft union and has no members who become tradesmen in the conventional way through apprenticeship though it has members who do skilled jobs.

The N.U.P.B.& P.W. is much the largest union and it includes the most varied range of jobs, covering skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled workers of both sexes. The union was formed by the amalgamation of various unions, the basic one being the Bookbinders Union. Bookbinders, though now only a minority in the union, are still the biggest single class of tradesmen in it. The N.U.P.B. & P.W. normally has at least two Chapels in each works; a men's Chapel and a women's Chapel. Usually the men who have served their apprenticeship as binders, and the Print Chapel which covers all other men both skilled and unskilled.

The women may also have two Chapels, a Bindery Chapel for all those women who work to the binders; these are usually bookfolders which is a skilled trade with an apprenticeship, and a Print Chapel which covers all the other women. The women's Chapels are usually much less strongly organised than those of the men and often there is only one for all the women.

As most printing works are small the Chapels of all the trade unions, even the largest, have only a small membership. The largest Chapel known to the writer is a Men's Chapel of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. which has 120 members. This is a combined Print and Bindery Chapel and even so it is unusually large.* A large Chapel does not normally exceed a membership of forty and the great majority are much smaller than this.

Since the number of members in a Chapel is small, and in most cases they belong to the same trade or do the same kind of work, they usually work in close physical proximity - often in the same or adjacent rooms. Even in the largest works they are rarely far apart. This means that Chapel members can have frequent face to face communication with each other - in short, that the Chapel is a face to face group.

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* Footnote: There are Women's Chapels of the N.U.P.B. & P.W. which are much larger than this but they are few in number. In Scotland, at least, only this union has Women's Chapels and these are generally so weak in organisation that I have not considered them at all. When I speak of Chapels it can be taken that I refer to Chapels which consist only of men or in which men are dominant. Women's Chapels are modelled on those of men and follow the same pattern, they differ only in being very much weaker.

2. HISTORY.

In order to understand the Chapel it is necessary to know a little of its history, as the reasons for its unique character are largely historical. Most British trade unions were built up as trade unions or as local associations, with central organisation being developed first and workshop organisation evolving later. In the printing trade, however, the Chapel form of workshop organisation is very old and long preceded any attempts at trade union organisation. Thus one may say that, whereas in most trade unions the workshop organisation is a later development of trade unionism, in the printing trade the unions themselves are but developments from the workshop organisation - the Chapel. In other words the Chapels preceded and created the trade unions unlike the workshop organisations in most industries which were created by already well established unions.

The Chapel as a form of organisation existed in its own right long before the days of trade unionism. Our earliest account of it dates from 1683 and even then it was regarded as being of some antiquity, it was said even then that "Every Printing-house is by the custom of time out of mind, called a Chappel; and all the workmen that belong to it are members of the Chappel; and the Oldest Freeman is Father of the Chappel." *

This is not a case of the name of some archaic institution being applied misleadingly to a totally different modern body, for the Chapel shows clear continuity of function from its earliest recorded days to the present time. Howe, speaking of the Chapel in the 17th.century, says: "The Chapel, or organisation of journeymen in a printing office, enforced the recognised customs of the trade, was a mutual benefit society, and in cases of dispute negotiated with the employer." Speaking of the Chapel rules of 1683 he says: "The Chapel rules, as given by Moxon, show that it was both a disciplinary and benevolent institution, run on severely practical financial lines. There were the fines inflicted upon the untidy and unruly, entrance fees for new members and levies on certain occasions." **

In a later work Howe says: "The Chapel Rules given by Moxon indicate that its function was both for the maintenance of discipline in the printing office and for the promotion of good fellowship." He goes on to quote Moxon as saying: "There have been formerly Customs and By-Laws made and intended for the well and good Government of the Chappel, and for the more Civil/

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* Footnote: Moxon, "Mechanick Exercises" London 1683, quoted by Ellic Howe "The London Compositor", p. 23, Oxford University Press, London 1947.

** Footnote: Howe, p.22.

Civil and orderly deportment of all its Members while in the Chappel; and the Penalty for the breach of any of these laws and Customs is in Printer Language called a Solace.

And the Judges of these Solaces, and other controversies relating to the Chappel, or any of its Members, was plurality of votes in the Chappel. It being asserted as a Maxim, that the Chappel cannot err. But when any controversie is thus decided, it always ends in the good of the Chappel."*

In 1785 - over a hundred years later - at the foundation of a Chapel in an Edinburgh printing shop, its functions, as described in the preamble to the minute book, closely resemble those described by Moxon: "Experience has fully evinced that without Laws and Regulations order never can be observed in any community. The observance of order and regularity is not more necessary in society than in a printing office, and the strict observance of rules becomes more necessary when the members are somewhat numerous: therefore the journeymen and apprentices in Messrs. Neill's, observing with regret the little regard paid to order in the execution of the work in the house, and the train of evil consequences attendant thereon, both to masters and servants, with a view to prevent said consequences in future, resolved to erect themselves into a Chapel..... and they also agreed to sign, support and enforce the following rules and regulations."**

In the above quotations it will be noticed that the word Chapel is used with two meanings - as the collective term for all the printers in the office, the occupational group, and as the name of the voluntary association formed by these men.*** Printers still use the word Chapel with both meanings but at the present day it is primarily used as the name of the association.

The quotations show clearly that the common interest of the association lay in providing a means whereby the "observance of order and regularity" among themselves could be maintained and enforced. It must be stressed that at this time the Chapel was a common interest association <u>within</u> a workshop; it was a completely self-contained unit and was not part of any wider association; its scope was restricted to matters arising within the workshop and the only employer with which it dealt was the employer of that particular workshop.

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* <u>Footnote</u>: "The London Society of Compositors" Ellic Howe & Harold E. Waite, Cassell & Company, London, 1948, p. 32.

** <u>Footnote</u>: "A Hundred Years of Progress", Sarah C. Gillespie, Maclehose, Glasgow, 1953, p.16.

*** <u>Footnote</u>: I am using the term "association" in the sense used by MacIver who defines it "as a group organised for the pursuit of an interest or group of interests in common". R.M.MacIver & Charles H.Page, "Society", MacMillan, London, 1953.

The Industrial Revolution brought changes to the printing trade, not by mechanisation, for this did not come until the middle of the 19th.century, but in the growth in size of printing shops and in the changed relations between employer and worker that it caused. As Townsend Warner put it "The factory owner found that he was little interested in his relations with his individual workmen, but very much interested in his relations with his workmen as a body. And the workmen found that, when they attempted to negotiate with their employer, they were dealing with a man who was himself a member of a group and loyal to the policy of that group."*

By the beginning of the 19th.century printers were coming to realise that they were a group with a common interest, that of workers - as opposed to employers - in the printing trade. Their realisation of this was marked by the fact that they began to combine together to put pressure upon printing employers generally. For example, in 1805 the compositors of London and Edinburgh - working quite independently of each other - succeeded in getting a general rise in the rates for compositors in these cities.*** In both cases this was the result of a campaign waged over some years by the compositors against the masterprinters in London and Edinburgh.

Once the printers had recognised the existence of a common interest the growth of associations to further this interest followed as a matter of course. The first step was the development of local societies, and in the first quarter of the 19th.century societies of compositors were founded in London, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Manchester, while societies of bookbinders were established in London. These societies were in most cases founded by meetings of representatives from various Chapels and grew by other Chapels affiliating to them. The origins of all these societies is still not fully documented but it is clear that though some, like the London societies of bookbinders, were founded by individuals who represented only themselves, and while all accepted individual affiliation, in the main the societies were founded by Chapels acting as such.

The next stage was the fusion of the local societies into trade unions. In 1847 the various London societies of compositors combined to form the London Society of Compositors; in 1849 some of the northern English societies formed the Typographical Association; and in 1853 the Scottish societies founded the Scottish Typographical Association. When this happened the various local societies became branches of the/

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* Footnote: "Landmarks in English Industrial History". G. Townsend Warner, Blackie, London, 1925, p. 321.

*** Footnote: See Gillespie, p. 21, and Howe & Waite. For information on the founding of the printing trade unions the reader should see these two works and also:
"The Society of London Bookbinders 1780-1951" Ellic Howe & John Child, Sylvan Press, London, 1952.
"The Typographical Association", A.E.Musson, Oxford University Press, London, 1954.

the trade union, for example the Glasgow branch of the S.T.A. is still known as the Glasgow Typographical Society.

The development of trade unions caused changes in the position of the Chapel. From being an entirely independent body it became first the branch of a local society, and later the workshop unit of a trade union. As a result the Chapel acquired new functions. As an independent body the Chapel had been responsible for order and regulation within a workshop only to its members within that workshop. As the representative organ of an association external to the workshop - the trade union - it was now responsible to that association for seeing that its members within the workshop obeyed the association rules and carried out its decisions.

This did not mean that the Chapel had changed its functions and had lost the old ones while acquiring the new. The original functions were not displaced, the new ones were simply added to them so that the Chapel now had two separate, if sometimes overlapping, sets of functions:

(a) It remained a self-governing association whereby the members of the Chapel enforced the "observance of order and regularity" among themselves.

(b) It became in addition a unit of a wider association - the trade union - whose object was the furtherance of the interests of printing workers generally vis à vis their employers. As such it was subordinate to the decisions made by the association as a whole.

Thus the Chapel retained a reason for its existence quite independent of trade unionism, its original one as self-governing association within the workshop. This is what makes the Chapel different from mose other forms of workshop organisation whose sole reason for existence lies in being part of the wider association of a trade union.

3. FUNCTIONS.

The fact that the Chapel serves the purposes of two different associations means that it has two sets of functions to perform.

1. In the interests of printing trade workers the Chapel is the official unit of trade union structure at workshop level. As such it carries out the duties laid on it by the trade union enforcing trade union rules and agreements and carrying out trade union functions within the workshop.

2. The Chapel is, as it has been since its origin, the body through which the members reach and enforce collective decisions on all matters within the works which are of interest to them - the "observance of order and regularity".

1. The Chapel as an official part of trade union structure.

The functions and constitution of the Chapel in this respect are fundamentally the same in all the six printing trade unions under consideration.* For convenience they will be studied under the following headings:-

A. Constitution of the Chapel.

B. Duties of the Chapel.

C. Relationship of the Chapel to the trade union.

A. Constitution.

The constitution of the Chapel is much the same in all the trade unions under consideration and the/

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* Footnote:

The account of the constitution and functions of Chapels in these trade unions is drawn from the following rule books:

"General Rules for the government of the National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers", 1948.

"Rules of the Scottish Typographical Association", 1953.

"Rules of the Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers and auxiliaries thereto", 1948.

"Rules of the National Society of Electrotypers and Stereotypers".

"Rules of the Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers and Process Workers," 1948.

"Rules of the National Society of Operative Printers & Assistants", 1945.

The rule books of the Glasgow branches of the S.T.A., the N.S.E.S., and the A.S.L.P. have also been referred to.

the following general outline is applicable to all six of them.

(i) The members of the trade union in each works must form a Chapel or Chapels, and all members of the union in the works must join the appropriate Chapel. Foremen who retain membership of the trade union are normally granted exemption from this rule.

(ii) Chapels must meet at least once every quarter, and provision must be made for calling extraordinary meetings whenever the officials or members wish to bring any matter before the Chapel as a whole.

(iii) Every Chapel must elect a Chairman, known as the Father of the Chapel - usually abbreviated to F.O.C. - and a Secretary known as the Clerk of the Chapel - the Clerk. These are the administrative officers of the Chapel and are responsible to the local Branch of their union for trade union affairs within the workshop. In many cases the Clerk - and less frequently the F.O.C. - receive an honorarium from the Chapel fund. To cite an example, one Chapel known to the writer gives £2 p.a. to the F.O.C. and £8 p.a. to the Clerk.

The method of election is left to the Chapel but is subject to the approval of the local branch. The usual method is for the two officers to be elected at the Annual General Meeting of the Chapel and to hold office for one year, after which they may be, and often are, re-elected. But some Chapels insist that every member shall take a turn at one or both of these duties, a rota is made up and each member in turn takes office for a set period - usually six months or a year. This is quite common for the office of F.O.C. but less common for that of Clerk which is often held by one man semi-permanently. Methods of election vary from Chapel to Chapel, and even within a Chapel from time to time. A Chapel where the office of F.O.C. is elective may resort to a rota system when no one offers himself as a candidate for election. On the other hand one which works on the rota system may change in order to allow an outstanding F.O.C. to remain in office.

(iv) The members of the Chapel must draw up a set of rules to govern themselves and these must be submitted to the local Branch of the trade union for approval before they can become operative. These rules are usually few in number and cover the following points:

(a) The method of electing Chapel officials and the definition of their duties.

(b) The frequency of Chapel meetings and the methods of calling them.

(c) The powers to establish a Chapel Fund and to levy contributions to it. Each Chapel is permitted by union rule to have its own fund. The Chapel fixes the weekly sum each member should pay and if the Branch approves this it becomes a Chapel rule. The Chapel normally has complete freedom to spend from this fund as it wishes.

(d)

(d) The powers to discipline Chapel members for breaches of rules. These consist of small fixed fines for minor offences like non-attendance at Chapel meetings, falling behind in contributions to the Chapel Fund, or leaving the Chapel meeting without permission.

Some Chapels do not have such powers entered in their rules and presumably have not sought them.

B. Duties.

The duties of the Chapel, so far as the union is concerned, are clearly laid down in the rule-books of all six unions. Two of them, the rule-book of the Glasgow Branch of the S.T.A. and the general rule-book of the N.U.P.B.& P.W., give definitions worth quoting here. The rules of the Glasgow Branch of the S.T.A. state: "It shall be the duty of each Chapel to take a careful supervision of the interests of the Trade (Auxiliary Section included) in the office with which it is connected. The Father shall immediately report in writing to the Society any breach of its regulations or encroachments upon its rights and privileges, or the conduct of any individual member who may act in such a manner as to give cause for complaint. In the event of alteration in working conditions or any dispute with employers the Chapel shall submit a written statement to Secretary-Treasurer or Board of Management. All members of Society including apprentices (except Foreman and Sub-Foreman) must be members of the Chapels of the offices in which they are regularly employed".*

The Rules of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. give a similar list of duties but lay them specifically on the Father of the Chapel. "The duties of the father or clerk of the Chapel shall be as follows: to preside at all Chapel meetings, maintain the principles of the Union and Branch, to receive complaints in reference to all shop grievances, to carry out the instructions of the meetings (subject to an appeal to the Branch Committee), to collect the Union and Branch contributions weekly, and pay the same to the Branch Secretary on the usual cash night, as required by Branch rule. He shall report any infringement of the Union and Branch rules, or any member refusing to join the shop organisation, arrange for a meeting of same at least once a quarter, and make out the annual shop returns or special ones when required, which he shall see are returned by the time/

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* Footnote:

Rules of the Glasgow Typographical Society, 1950, Rule 14, "Duties of Chapels".

The "Rules and Agreements", 1952, of the Glasgow Branch of the National Society of Electrotypers Stereotypers give the same statement under their Rule 12, "Duties of Chapels". The only differences being that they use the word "profession" instead of "trade", and leave out"(Auxiliary Section included)" - this union has no Auxiliary Section.

time stated thereon."*

The duties laid on Chapels by the trade unions can be divided into two categories: Regulations; and Communication. The rule-books of the six trade unions show agreement on the following points:

Regulation.

The Chapel through its officials is held responsible for seeing that all trade union rules and agreements are carried out. It must see that:

(i) All men entering any employment which comes under that union have union cards which are up to date; have the Branch Secretary's permission to seek employment there; and join the Chapel.

(ii) The agreements relating to apprenticeship are carried out and the quota of apprentices is not exceeded.

(iii) The lines of demarcation between the union and other unions are not infringed.

(iv) The regulations concerning pay and conditions contained in trade union agreements are kept by both the employer and the members of the Chapel.

(v) All developments in the works which affect the trade union and its members in any way are kept under strict observation and any action necessary to defend their interests is taken.

C. Relationship to the Trade Union.

As will have been seen from its constitution, the Chapel is a subordinate section of the trade union. This becomes very obvious if we examine its official relationship to the trade union.

(i) The duties of the Chapel and its officials are strictly defined by the trade union. Both Chapel and officials are responsible to the union for their actions and can be punished for failing in or exceeding their official duties. For example, the Chapel is not empowered to go on strike without the permission of the trade union and on two occasions in 1952 when Glasgow Chapels of the S.T.A. - those of the Scottish Co-operative Society's Printing Works and the Newspaper Chapel at Kemsley House - went on strike they were censured by the Executive Council of the S.T.A. In the case of the Kemsley House strike: "Council agreed to inform the/

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* Footnote: "General Rules of the National Union of Printing Bookbinding and Paper Works", 1948, Rule 45, "Chapels or Shop Associations", Clause 7.

> the Glasgow Board of Management that the action of the Chapel members is deplored, that the Council insists on the sanctity of Agreements, and asks that the members concerned be summoned before the Glasgow Board of Management and warned as to their future conduct."*
>
> As a follow up to this in the next month's issue of the union journal we find: "A report from the Glasgow Board of Management was also read stating that the members had been summoned before the Board, and that the members had forwarded a letter of apology to the management with guarantees as to their future conduct."

Communication.

The Chapel through its officials acts as the link between the trade union Branch and the individual members in the works. The Chapel officials are responsible for:-

(i) Collecting the union contributions of the members of the Chapel and conveying these to the Branch Secretary.

(ii) Collecting all ballot forms from the Branch Secretary, distributing them to the Chapel members, and later returning the completed forms to the Branch Secretary.

(iii) Conveying literature, e.g. trade union journals and circulars, and official information of all kinds from the Branch Secretary to the Chapel members.

(iv) Keeping the Branch Secretary informed of the numbers in the Chapel, telling him of all new starts and vacancies, and letting him know when boys begin their apprenticeship.

(v) Submitting to the Branch Secretary a return of all overtime worked by members of the Chapel.

(vi) Keeping the Branch Secretary informed of any new machinery brought into the works, of any new methods of working introduced, and of all developments in the works which have a bearing on the trade union agreements.

That Chapel officials are in fact union officials is emphasised by union rules which aim at protecting them against victimisation incurred while carrying out their duties. These rules state that if any Chapel official be dismissed the Branch Secretary must be informed and the case investigated before notice of dismissal expires.

(ii) The rules made by the Chapel have no authority until they are approved by the local trade union branch. When/

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* Footnote: The "Scottish Typographical Journal", "Jottings", "A Summary of Business transacted by the Executive Council of the S.T.A.", January and February, 1952.

When this has been done, they become in effect union rules enforceable by union sanctions. The same applies to the Chapel Funds. The Chapel cannot levy contributions for these funds without the permission of the Branch though it may spend the fund as it wishes.

(iii) The local Branch of the union acts as a court of appeal in Chapel matters and members can appeal to the Branch against Chapel decisions. The member cannot appeal direct but must put his appeal through the proper channels - the Chapel officials - nevertheless he can appeal and can get Chapel decisions reversed.

(iv) As stated above, the sanctions which uphold Chapel rules are union sanctions and the use that the Chapel can make of these is very limited. The Chapel may be empowered to impose small fines for petty offences but in all serious matters it is dependent on sanctions imposed by the union branch. For example, in one case known to the writer certain men refused to join their Shop Chapel. The Chapel found it could do nothing to force them and had to take the matter to the local Branch of its union which levied a fine on the men - made payable to the Chapel - and ordered the men to join the Chapel on pain of expulsion.

To sum up the position of the Chapel as an official part of the trade union structure, it is clear that the Chapel is but a minor and subordinate part of the trade union. Its duties are narrowly defined by the trade union and consist of enforcing union rules and looking after union interests within the workshop with which it is connected. The Chapel has no power or authority save that derived from the union, and this it can use only in the execution of its union duties.

2. The Chapel as a self-governing association within the workshop.

The functions and rules of the Chapel when acting in this capacity are for the most part unwritten and exist as customs embodied in oral tradition. One may compare them to Common Law as opposed to Statute Law. These customs are indeed common in the sense that they are not merely local but apply to Chapels generally. Although these customs are not set out in trade union, Branch, or even Chapel rule-books they are known to and accepted by the officers of the printing trade unions - who have been Chapel members themselves and in this sense can be said to have official trade union recognition.

The written accounts of Chapel rules and functions described in the previous section apply only to the Chapel as a part of the trade union, the exceptions being the rules about the organisation of the Chapel. The Chapel is a single organism with two different rôles and the rules applying to the organism itself are the same in both rôles. Thus the trade union rules about Chapel meetings, the officials and their election, and the raising of Chapel Funds apply to the Chapel in its rôle as a self-governing workshop association.

In addition the Chapel rule-books may contain what has at one time been merely an unwritten custom which the members wish to emphasise by putting it into print. The case of the Chapel which suffered from bad attendance at meetings and entered a rule - with union approval - that members would be fined for non-attendance has been orferred to before. Another Chapel whose members are mainly on piecework has a written rule that "Any alteration of existing piecework prices, or introduction of new piecework prices, to be mutually agreed upon by the individual member concerned, the Shop Chapel, and the Management." Rules of this kind in the Chapel rule-book are few in number. They stand on the borderline between the two rôles of the Chapel and one can never be certain whether they are trade union rules for a trade union purpose, or customs of the workshop association which the Chapel has tried to strengthen by obtaining trade union sanctions for them. There is an obvious overlapping between the two rôles of the Chapel here and exact definition is not possible.

There is another way in which Chapel customs may appear in writing and that is when circumstances require the making of a new rule. In such cases a motion embodying the new rule will be passed at a Chapel meeting and duly recorded in the minute book. From then on it will be applied as a rule and will become an accepted Chapel custom. In fact it may soon be forgotten that it was ever minuted but will be treated as simply another of the oral traditions of that Chapel. Such rules only apply to the circumstances of that particular Chapel and do not affect the general pattern of custom.

Apart from these two cases, rules applying to the Chapel as an organism and new rules, Chapel rules exist only as oral traditions, customs binding upon the members of the Chapel. Naturally there are variations in custom from one Chapel to another but these are of a minor nature and there is general agreement throughout/

throughout the industry on the customary functions and rules of Chapels in their rôle as workshop associations. In consequence the Chapel is basically the same institution throughout the industry and those printers who move from one works to another have little difficulty in adapting themselves to the customs of each new Shop Chapel.

In describing the external relations of the Chapel it is often difficult to differentiate between the functions which belong to the Chapel as a part of the trade union and those which belong to it as a workshop association. Nevertheless, the two are quite distinct. The trade union functions are those concerning the interests of printers generally; the Chapel functions those concerning the interests of the printers in that particular workshop only. Thus when the Chapel is enforcing the payment of official trade union wage rates it is exercising one of its functions as part of the trade union; when it is enforcing the payment of rates over and above the trade union rate which may be customary in that particular works it is exercising one of its functions as a workshop association. In the description of the external relations of the Chapel given below the functions described are those belonging to the Chapel in its rôle as a workshop association.

Relations with the Employer.

Relations between employer and Chapel arise mainly over matters concerning pay and conditions of work. As indicated all such matters not already covered by union rules and agreements are part of the Chapel's functions. All negotiations on such matters must go through the Chapel and individual members are not allowed to deal with the employer direct. The main items which give rise to negotiation are four in number: House Rates; Piece Rates; Incentive Schemes; and Working Conditions.

House Rates.

These are the extra payments, over and above the trade union rates, given by particular firms. These may be given for doing exceptionally good or difficult work - hence the term often used for them: "merit money" - or, with the present shortage of skilled labour in the industry, to attract men from other firms. By custom Chapel officials should be present at all negotiations between individual members and representatives of management over House rates, and the permission of the Chapel is required before such rates can be accepted. The reason the printers give for this custom is that only in this way can the Chapel ensure that all its members get a fair deal and that no particular individual or individuals are paid in excess of what the printers think to be a fair differential. The printers argue that if this occurred there would be jealousy which would weaken the Chapel in its dealings with the employer - in fact that the employer could, by paying excessively high rates, "buy" the support of some members.

The position as regards House rates may best be clarified by means of an example. In one Case Chapel a particular section negotiated a House rate of 12/6 over the basic rate without informing the officials or other/

other members, thus breaking the above custom. Some time later the rest of the Chapel found out about this, much ill-feeling was aroused and it was decided to raise the question at a Chapel meeting - at which the writer was present. At this meeting the offending section were strongly criticised for not asking the F.O.C. to attend their negotiations with management. The members present asserted that anything to do with pay was a Chapel, not an individual matter, and said that it was an established principle that the F.O.C. should be present at all negotiations between members and the management. In order to emphasise this the principle was put in the form of a resolution and passed by the meeting with aim of asking permission from the Branch to put it into the written list of Chapel rules.

The interesting point was that the principle that Chapel officials should be present at meetings existed only as an oral tradition and was not even implied in any written union or Chapel rule. Yet it was known to all, and even those at fault agreed that it was binding and made no attempt to question its validity though they put forward excuses for their action.

In talking to the members of the Chapel concerned it was clear that their indignation was due to the fact that they believed the offending action had secured an unfair advantage over them in pay. They said that by obtaining this extra rate the offenders had increased the accepted differential between their rate and that paid to the other sections of the Chapel. The members generally said they had no right to do this of their own initiative but should have informed the Chapel officials who would have called a Chapel meeting. The Chapel would then have decided whether to permit such an increase in the differential or whether the members generally should put in for an increase in their rates - thus maintaining the existing differential between themselves and the offenders. The insistence that all future negotiations should go through the Chapel officials was intended to ensure that no section or individual should again secure such an advantage.

The offending section said that they kept the matter secret in the first instance because they knew it would lead to demands for increases by the rest of the Chapel and this might have spoilt their own chances of an increase. Afterwards it was kept secret because they knew it would arouse ill-feeling among the other members of the Chapel if it got out - as in the event it did.

Piece Rates.

It is accepted that if any individual member or section of the Chapel negotiates a piece rate with the management the Chapel officials must be present at the negotiations and approve any rate decided on. In one Chapel where piece rates are common this actually appears in the written Chapel rules. "Piece Workers - Any alteration of existing piecework prices, or introduction of new piecework prices, to be mutually agreed upon by the individual member concerned, the Shop Chapel, and the Management".

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In other Chapels there are no written rules on the subject but the principle is generally accepted, though sometimes individuals try to avoid it when it is to their personal advantage. For example, in one Chapel known to the writer certain pieceworkers have negotiated a very favourable rate unknown to the rest of the Chapel. These men admitted privately that they are at fault and in fairness to the other members they should have negotiated it through the Chapel. They gave as their reason for not doing so, that it would have led to demands for higher rates by the rest of the Chapel which might well have caused the employer to change his mind about increasing their piecerate.

It will be noted that with both House and Piece rates the object of the Chapel is to prevent the growth of unfair pay differentials between the members. By an "unfair differential" is meant one which the members believe to be greater than is justified by the circumstances.

Incentive Schemes.

The trade union has the right to decide whether its members may or may not work an incentive scheme, but the Chapel has the final right to reject a scheme even though it has the approval of the trade union. Thus if a firm wishes to institute an incentive scheme of a type approved by the trade union it must approach the Chapel or Chapels concerned and put the matter to them. These discuss the proposed scheme and hold a vote on the question of whether or not to try it. Where there is no objection to the scheme in general but only to particular parts of it, the Chapel negotiates with the employer and tries to get the scheme amended to meet their objections. When a scheme is under trial the Chapel meets frequently in order to discuss points which arise and put them to the employer.

In all the cases known to the writer one of the most important points raised by the Chapel when discussing incentive schemes is how they will affect the older and slower workers, and the schemes were accepted only after modifications designed to protect the slower workers. In one case the Chapel rejected an individual incentive scheme on the grounds that it would have led to discrimination against the slower workers but said they were willing to accept a group scheme which would have made such discrimination inpossible.

Working Conditions.

These are matters concerning conditions within a particular works - things outside the scope of the trade union agreements. As these vary according to the situation within each works it is impossible to lay down any standards. The only thing to be done is to give an example of the kind of thing which is covered. Two examples chosen from the same works are given below.

The first occurred when, owing to electricity cuts, the management decided to stagger the hours of working. A plan was drawn up and each Chapel informed what the new hours of work would be. With one exception the Chapels decided to work these hours but one Chapel did decide that it would not depart from the normal hours of work. The decision whether or not to accept the/

the rearranged hours of work was recognised as being a matter entirely for Chapel decision, and the decision was made by a vote of the members at a Chapel meeting.

One case occurred in a works when there was a temporary shortage of work for one department. The management decided that as there was not enough work for all some men would have to be laid off temporarily. The Chapel concerned were informed of this and held a meeting to discuss the matter. At the meeting the Chapel members decided that it was unfair that some men should get a full week's work and some none at all and they proposed instead that the available work should be spread evenly among all the members. The management agreed to this and it was decided that each man should get three days work per week until more work was available.

Relations with the trade union to which the Chapel belongs.

In its actual relations with the trade union the Chapel presents a very different picture from the subordinate rôle indicated in trade union rules. When acting on non-union matters as a workshop association the Chapel is independent of the union, and that independence is strongly defended. Even when acting in trade union matters as a part of the trade union it is the supreme authority on union matters within the workshop and expects to be treated as such. It is generally understood - though it is not specifically stated in union or Chapel rules - that any dealings which individuals may have with their trade union on works matters must go through the Chapel officials. In purely individual matters not connected with the works - union benefits, sickness allowances and so on - he may deal with the local Branch of the union direct. But in anything which concerns the work and workplace the individual member must deal through the Chapel officials, and it is accepted that Branch officials should not give a hearing to individuals who approach them personally on these matters.

This Chapel privilege is an accepted part of the printers' tradition and is strongly defended against any encroachments by trade union officials or others. To give an example one Chapel has a rule that "Each member shall be duty bound to keep Chapel business from all non-members. Any person violating this rule shall be dealt with as the Chapel thinks fit".

In this Chapel one member was suspected of carrying tales direct to the trade union Branch and at a Chapel meeting at which the writer was present great indignation was expressed by members about this. A motion to censure him only fell through from lack of any concrete evidence.

In another Chapel a similar case occurred. The Chapel fined a member for an offence against its rules. The man concerned appealed direct to the local Branch Committee of the trade union and they overruled the Chapel and rescinded his fine. The Chapel then took the matter to a Branch Meeting and claimed that: (a) The individual had no right to appeal except through the/

the Chapel, and hence the Branch Committee had no right to take cognisance of his appeal; (b) In any case the Branch Committee had no right to make such a decision without consulting the Chapel. The Branch Meeting upheld the Chapel's claims and the order of the Branch Committee was rescinded.

In yet another Chapel certain members were found to be committing a breach of the works rules and the works manager complained to the trade union Branch secretary about their behaviour. The Branch Committee investigated the case and fined the men concerned a pound each. The Chapel concerned disagreed with this judgment, however, and its members attended the next Branch Meeting in a body and raised the matter again. As the meeting was badly attended they were able to secure a majority vote against the Committee's action and had its decision rescinded.

Thus the Chapel, as a part of the trade union, is subject to union rules and to the higher authority of the Branch officials and committee, but as a workshop association, it can act as a pressure group within the Branch and, if its members feel strongly enough on any issue to go and vote as a block at Branch Meetings, they can exert considerable pressure. If the Branch Meeting is badly attended or if they can get the support of members from other Chapels they can even reverse decisions of the officials and Committee.

Just as the individual Chapel members are not expected to go to Branch officials on works matters without Chapel permission, trade union officials entering a works on business are expected to ask the permission of the F.O.C. Instances are known of trade union officials being reprimanded by F.O.C's for not doing so.

Thus while the Chapel, when acting in its trade union role, is subordinate to the trade union Branch it has certain customary rights as well as duties and these are upheld against any encroachment by the Branch. The most important of these rights is that the Chapel, as the authority within the workshop, must be informed and consulted - by both individual members of the Chapel and trade union officials - on all matters which concern that workshop. Acting as a workshop common interest association the Chapel can organise its members into a pressure group to defend their interests at Branch Meetings.

Relations with other Chapels in the same works.

All such relations on official business are carried out through the medium of the Chapel officials. There are two main reasons why Chapels wish to contact each other; one is for combined action; the other when disputes, usually demarcation disputes, arise between them.

For purposes of combined action there exist in some printing works what are known as "Combined" or "Federation" Chapels - the term Federation being taken from the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation to which all the printing trade unions belong. This Federated/

ated Chapel is in fact a committee on which sit the representatives - usually the officials - of all the Chapels in the works, and before which any Chapel may bring up matters of common interest. It must be emphasised that individual printers are not represented on the Federation Chapel except through their trade union Chapel and they can bring matters before the Federation Chapel only through its agency. The Federation Chapel has no power over its members, it is in fact only a consultative committee and no trade union Chapel can be committed to any line of action by a decision of the Federation Chapel. In all cases known to the writer the Federation Chapels are weak bodies, weak because each of its constituent trade union Chapels jealously guards its own independence and autonomy. In works where there is no Federation Chapel, meetings between the officials of various Chapels are arranged by them as required.

When disputes arise between members of different Chapels the persons concerned are expected to deal with each other through their Chapel officials. To take an example of a demarcation case in a Glasgow works, a stereotyper of the N.S.E.S. found that certain compositors of the S.T.A. were doing work which is recognised as being that of a stereotyper. He complained to his F.O.C. who in turn complained to the compositors' F.O.C., the latter investigated the case and, finding his men to be in the wrong, ordered them to stop.

Another incident was one of simple misconduct. Some compositors while on overtime had been entering the Foundry - the name of the stereotypers' department - in order to borrow tools. The stereotypers complained through their F.O.C. to the compositors F.O.C., he investigated the matter and send a note round the Chapel telling the members to stop this practice.

These were clear cut cases which the F.O.C's concerned could deal with without difficulty. If the cases had been more involved, for example if the men concerned had believed themselves to be in the right and challenged the F.O.C's decision, then a Chapel meeting would have been held to judge the case. If two Chapels belonging to the same union have a dispute the procedure is still the same. Demarcation disputes between Case and Machine Chapels of the S.T.A. are not uncommon - usually over the question of the pulling of proofs - and these are settled in the same way through the officials of the two Chapels concerned.

The Internal Relations of the Chapel.

The Chapel controls the relations between individuals or sections of its membership and adjudicates in any disputes which may arise between them. There are certain standard situations which arise frequently and in which the Chapel must adjudicate. These are: (a) Nightshift; (b) Overtime; (c) Voluntary Contributions. In addition the Chapel adjudicates in: (d) various disputes which do not fall into any standard category; and (e) organises certain social and benevolent activities for its members.

(a) Nightshift. When nightshift is worked it is often not very important what time the shift begins and ends so long as all the men on the shift begin and end together. Hence, in many cases, the employer leaves the/

the men concerned to fix the time of the shift. In such cases the Chapel is the final authority in deciding the particular hours to be worked. If the men on a shift agree, the Chapel will normally confirm their decision but if they disagree the Chapel is left to adjudicate between them.

To take an example. In one Chapel a nightshift of two men was established, the hour at which they should start being left for them to decide. The two men concerned were unable to agree, one - the younger man - wished to start very late in order to have the evening free for social activities; the other wished to start early. The matter was taken to the Chapel which decided they should start early in the evening. The younger man then took the matter up with his trade union Branch Secretary, but the latter, though sympathetic and prepared to use personal influence on his behalf, refused to interfere in his official capacity saying that the decision was entirely outside the functions of the trade union and he had no right to interfere. The employer also refused to interfere in the matter and the young man found he had to accept the Chapel decision or leave the works so he left.

(b) Overtime. Overtime can be a source of much ill-feeling among workers for if some men get more than others it can make a considerable difference to their weekly earnings. The position is very difficult in many printing works for some men may be on a job which necessitates a good deal of overtime while others are on jobs where no overtime is needed. Most Chapels try to ensure that overtime is shared out as fairly as possible. One Chapel has tried various devices to do this. At one time it had a rule that if any member of a section which was on a particular job was asked to work overtime then the rest of the section must be asked as well. When this did not work too well they tried another method. A rule was passed which stated that the members of the Chapel should be limited to nine hours overtime per month, and that no member should be allowed to exceed this quota until every member had been given the opportunity of doing nine hours overtime. Exceptions are made to this rule when it is clear that to enforce it rigidly will raise insuperable difficulties for the management.

(c) Voluntary Contributions. In most works voluntary collections are made for various objects, sometimes for a worker who is retiring or getting married, sometimes for a local Charity, sometimes for the Strike Fund of a union which is engaged in a dispute. There is a standard procedure for doing this. A "sheet" is sent round and people put their names on the sheet with the amount they wish to contribute. In many Chapels this is subject to certain restrictions. Sometimes a "sheet" cannot be circulated unless it has been approved by the F.O.C. In other cases a meeting may be held and the Chapels may decide to make a joint contribution from Chapel Funds, or it may refuse to make any contribution. In some cases the Chapel may decide the amount each man may give to it.

Many Chapels in Glasgow do this but in order to show how widespread this practice is the experience of a printer in the London area will be quoted. "We of the 'Evening News' Outside Staff Chapel give freely to every appeal launched, regardless of the sections of the trade to which the unfortunate member belongs, and we shall/

shall continue to do so. A list is worked by our Chapel collectors and every member is approached individually which means that a good sum is collected instead of a small sum allocated from Chapel funds as seems to be the practice of a number of Chapels."*

This letter referred to purely charitable contributions. Here is an example of how a request for aid to a strike fund was treated. In 1952 there occurred in Glasgow a dispute between Natsopa and the firm of D.C. Thomson. Since the subject at issue - the right of men to belong to a trade union - was of common interest to all unions many of them made contributions to the strike fund. Another union, in addition to giving to the fund sent a note round its Chapels asking for voluntary contributions. One of the Chapels, on receiving this note held a meeting to discuss the matter, decided that they did not approve of supporting Natsopa, which is in many ways a rival union, and decided not to make a contribution. The question of voluntary contributions did not arise, the whole matter being decided by the Chapel on a Chapel basis.

The question arises: What is the reason for this practice of the Chapel fixing the limits of voluntary contributions? Most of the printers I have met can give no reason but put it down simply to custom, but some have given me the following reasons. Firstly, this practice safeguards them against excessive demands for contributions by "filtering" those which are put to it. Secondly, men like to give a standard amount, neither more nor less than their workmates, and this practice allows them to do so with ease, safeguarding them against individuals upsetting the balance by setting a standard which is too high or too low.

(d) Non-standard cases involving relations between members of the Chapel.

During the course of the work many varied situations arise which involve relations between members of the Chapel but which cannot be standardised. The only way in which these can be treated is to give examples of what happens and how the Chapel judges and arbitrates disputes between its individual members.

In one case a firm had no work for a tradesman, a member of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. As there is a distinct shortage of tradesmen of all kinds in the Industry the firm did not wish to dismiss the man in case they could not get a replacement when work became available. Therefore they decided to dismiss a non-tradesman member of the same trade union and put the tradesman in his job - at tradesman's rate of pay - until work at his trade did become available for him. This was brought to the attention of the Chapel officials and at a meeting it was decided that this procedure was unfair to the non-tradesman who had a right to be protected in his job. The Chapel raised the matter with the employer and it was decided to find other work within the works for the tradesman being left as he was. The Chapel officials stated that they had refused to permit the first arrangement because they felt that all members of the Chapel should be entitled to equal treatment regardless of their trade or lack of it. It is worth noting that in this Chapel/

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* Footnote: Extract from a letter by the F.O.C. of the "Evening News"(London) Outside Staff Chapel in the "Paperworker" Vol.xv.no.5 of September, 1954.

Chapel the tradesmen were in a distinct majority over the non-tradesmen.

In another department of the same works a printer was brought in by the foreman who was a friend of his, This man was given an initial rate of pay higher than that of any other man in the department. Some time later the other men found out about his higher rate of pay, a Chapel meeting was held, and the Chapel officials were sent to protest to the management and to ask that they should all be brought up to the new man's level of pay. The management refused this and pointed out that the trade union laid down minimum rates but did not try to impose maximum rates, so that the management were free to pay any rate they chose. The men admitted this was so but claimed that the management were being very unfair to the other men. They argued that men were given extra pay for taking responsibility for doing exceptionally good work, or work that required special care, for working particular machines which carried a special rate because they entailed extra responsibility and attention, and even for long service with the Company. But in this case none of these recognised reasons for giving extra pay was applicable, and if extra pay was to be given without cause the whole balance of pay in the Chapel would be upset. They therefore asked that their pay be increased, or the newcomer's reduced, until equality was restored.

The trade union could take no action in this matter as they lay down minimum rates only. Thus the Chapel could not strike or apply any official trade union sanctions. The men admitted that the only way in which they could put pressure on the employer was to put in their notice en masse, and they claimed they were prepared to do this. However, the man who had caused the trouble was "promoted" out of the ddpartment and peace was thus restored.

The case which I quoted above as an example of Chapel relations with the employer is also an example of regulating the relations of men within the Chapel. It will be remembered that in this case the Chapel believed that the work available should be shared equally among the members of the Chapel without discriminiation.

Another case that is worth quoting occurred in a works when a foreman promoted his brother into what was regarded as a particularly good job though he had less seniority than many other workers. The Chapel complained to the management and pressed the case of the man who had most seniority, and eventually the management agreed to give the senior man the job. The Chapel officials concerned told me that in fairness to all they had to insist that the best jobs go on seniority so that the peace and unity of the Chapel was not disturbed by the favouritism of the management.

It will have been noticed that in describing how the Chapel adjudicates in these matters the terms "fair" and "unfair" have been used time and again. The aim of the Chapel it appears is to see that every member has a "fair share" or gets a "fair deal". What the printers mean by the terms"fair" and "unfair" will be discussed later.

(e) Social Activities.

In its pre-union days the Chapel had a very strong social side, as we know from the existing records of Chapel activities at that time, and it organised many social and benevolent activities. These fell away somewhat with industrialisation and the development of trade unionism but even today the Chapel has its social and benevolent side.

On the benevolent side all Chapels have some system of grants to members who are sick. These are no haphazard matters of passing round the hat but an organised system of grants from Chapel funds with a scale of payments over a set period. The Chapel may also organise many social activities, such things as bus runs, theatre visits, golf matches and other social outings. Inter-works golf or bowls tournaments too may be organised at Chapel level. Such social activities are found in many industries but it is significant that in the printing industry they are organised by Chapels rather than at works or departmental level.

One interesting social activity still organised by many Chapels is the "G.I." usually translated as "General Indulgence" or "General Intoxication". This is a "rite de passage" on the occasion of apprentices reaching journeyman status. In the Chapels which still hold it what usually happens is that when a few apprentices have recently finished their time and become journeymen the Chapel will decide to hold a "G.I." The new journeymen will be expected to pay over a sum of money which will be supplemented by a grant from the Chapel fund. With this the Chapel will have a "night out", usually a meal, a few drinks and a visit to the theatre. It should be noted that this is a Chapel ritual only. Although the termination of apprenticeship marks the attainment of a new status - that of journeyman - in the works and the trade union as well as in the Chapel, it is the Chapel alone which marks the event by a rite de passage.

In some of the larger Chapels such social activities have died out almost entirely but in many of the smaller ones they still survive. It is interesting that even the organisation of social activities should be accepted as a function of the Chapel and should be organised on a Chapel basis.

PRINCIPLES OF ASSOCIATION.

Having described the way in which the Chapel operates we must now examine the principles on which it operates. In talking to printers I have found none who rationalised its customs and deduced principles of action from them; the Chapel operates on custom and precedent rather than on abstract principles. Nevertheless, it is clear that such principles exist and are understood by the printers even though they do not think of them as such and cannot give them articulate verbal expression. The proof of this lies in the fact that cases constantly arise - as in the examples given above - where there are noval circumstances in which custom and precedent can give no guidance. The fact that these circumstances are dealt with easily and consistently shows that guiding principles are recognised, however vaguely, by the printers concerned. These principles are two in number, they are:
(i) That the right to make final decisions on all matters concerning the work lies with the Chapel and the Chapel alone. As Moxon put it the judge in every case is "plurality of Votes in the Chapel. It being asserted as a Maxim that the Chappel cannot Err".
(ii) That, with certain limitations, equality between all members of the Chapel must be maintained.

If the examples given above are examined it will be seen that in every case one or both of these principles can be detected behind the printers' behaviour.

The principle that the Chapel has the sole right to make decisions on all matters concerning the work comes out clearly in most of the examples. It is seen in the Chapel's right to make decisions for its individual members on House rates, piece rates, incentive schemes, hours of work, nightshift, and overtime; in its power to regulate relations between Chapel members and their employer, their trade union, and the members of other trade unions; in its right to judge all questions brought to it by members of the Chapel; and to regulate even voluntary contributions.

Every Chapel may not normally exercise all these powers but all Chapels possess and exercise most of them.

It can be seen that these powers require from the individual member a complete subordination of his rights of individual decision and action in work matters to the collective will of the Chapel. Joining any association involves subordination of individuality, but rarely so complete as this.

The other principle, that of equality between members of the Chapel is, as already said, subject to certain limitations so far as pay is concerned. The printers do not insist on absolute equality of wages between all members of the Chapel. For example, in a letter press or lithographic Machine Chapels certain machines often carry an extra rate because of the extra responsibility entailed, and any men who operate these machines are paid this extra rate. In Case Chapels all the men are compositors, but some may work as readers, some as monotype operators, some as linotype operators. Each of these jobs carries an extra rate above that for hand/

hand compositors, which is their basic trade. In some N.U.P.B.& P.W. Chapels there are skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled workers, each grade having a different rate from the others. In any kind of Chapel we may find men who are paid extra for long services or exceptional work.

Thus there are certain economic irregularities. But these are occupational and in no way personal differentiations. For example, the extra rate for a machine is paid to any man who operates that machine, and the extra rate for readers or linotype operators is paid to any man who does these jobs. Even the extra payments for long service or good work are applicable to every man who has these qualifications. These differences, once accepted by the men, are strictly maintained and alterations either up or down are not permitted.

The printers accept differential rates for these jobs where they believe circumstances justify them. The printers resist strongly any attempts to create new inequalities unless these also can be justified, and they do not permit either employers or individual printers to make differences other than those accepted, or to change the accepted differences in any way.

In this way the printers maintain equality between all members of the Chapel though the system is flexible enough to permit what they believe to be justifiable economic differentials. Apart from pay rates the principle of equal treatment for all members of the Chapel is strictly maintained.

The principle of equality is to be seen in the equal sharing of nightshift and overtime, and of what work is available when short time working is necessary. It is to be seen in the supervision exercised by the Chapel over piece-rates and House rates, and in the fear that any individual or section of the Chapel should upset the existing balance by increasing the differential without justification and without the consent of the rest of the Chapel.

It is also to be seen in the decisions made by the Chapel on many of the cases brought before it; in the decision that a non-tradesman member of the Chapel has a right to be protected in his job against a tradesman member; in the objection made to one man being paid more than others without due reason; and in the objection to the promotion of a man by favouritism instead of seniority. It also comes out very clearly in the fixing of voluntary contributions by the Chapel instead of leaving the amount to the individual.

THE CHAPEL AS A UNIT AND A UNITY.

That the printers do guide their behaviour by these two principles is clear, but the question arises: why? What purpose do these principles serve? The answer is that they promote unity among the members of the Chapel. By giving up the right to make individual decisions or take individual action on matters concerning the work, and by insisting that all such decisions and actions require the collective sanction of the Chapel and printers

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go a long way towards preserving unity.

Disputes do occur within Chapels - but so long as all accept the arbitration by "plurality of Votes in the Chappel" the danger of any dispute leading to disruption is small. The second principle, that of equality, acts in the same way. Nothing causes more dissension in a group that inequality, one getting more than another without due reason. By insisting that all members have equal rights and that extra payments be given only for approved reasons, jealousy within the Chapel is largely prevented and a source of dissension removed.

It would seem then that the printers set a high value on unity and that their adherence to these two principles arises from this fact. This was confirmed by the stress the printers set on preserving unity at all times, and is a constant theme among the men whose first concern on hearing of new developments was often to wonder what the effect on unity would be.

Some degree of unity is essential to al associations for without it they would be only aggregations of individuals. In order to have unity the individualism of members must be subordinated to the authority of the association as a whole, and to the rules through which the authority is exercised.

In the case of a voluntary association the members must freely subordinate themselves to its authority and give up their right to individual action in those matters which lie within the scope of the association. As a condition of subordination the members demand equality of rights and treatment from that authority. This may not apply in all societies, but in ours, where equality before the law is axiomatic, individuals joining an association do normally require that equality before the authority and rules of the association should apply. Nothing creates dissension within a voluntary association more quickly than a suspicion that its rules are applied inequitably.

Thus the two principles go together. The subordination of the individual to the authority of the association is vital for its unity of action; equality before the authority is an essential condition for accepting subordination. In this way both principles are essential to the unity of a voluntary association.

The degree of unity found in different associations varies considerably according to the strength with which the members uphold these principles. Printers are by no means unique in having such principles but they are unusual in keeping them so strictly and in the degree of unity they attain by so doing.

The reasons why the printers hold to these principles so strictly merit closer examination. There is one factor which appears to be involved in these principles being so upheld. It is:

The Trade union's or worker's feeling of unity, or "solidarity", as against the employer.

The feeling of "solidarity" against the employer.

In the trade union movement generally there is a feeling that the workers must - in their own defence - stand united against the employer, for disunity among workers helps the employer to exploit them. In fact one may say that this feeling is the basis of the trade union movement.

Printers, as workers, naturally share this feeling that unity against the employer is vital for them. The foreword to the rule-book of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. says:

> "This union is composed entirely of working men and women who are united for the purpose of protecting and advancing their interest and that of their class.
>
> If unity be important to any order of the community it must be pre-eminently so to working men and women, whose only property, their labour, is in constant danger of being depreciated in value of the present competitive system. Under such circumstances workers require to combine for mutual assistance for trade purposes".

The strength of this feeling can best be shown by citing examples of the behaviour it occasions among printers.

In six Chapels in which incentive schemes had recently been introduced, or in which an attempt had been made to introduce them, it seemed to the writer that the chief objection to an incentive scheme was that it would cause disunity, by introducing competition into the group and setting one man against another. As the men themselves put it: "It will get us all at each other's throats." They feared that working under an incentive scheme would enable the employer to pick out the slow from the fast workers and would lead to discrimination between them, and, should unemployment come, would lead to the dismissal of the slower ones. This they argued would destroy the unity of the Chapel, and with this unity its effectiveness.

Much the same attitude was shown towards pieceworkers. Men feared that if piecework revealed that some men were faster workers than others it would lead to discrimination against the slow workers by the employer. This would lead to dissension in the Chapel, and, ultimately, to disunity.

In order to avoid these consequences, the men took steps in many cases to see that they appeared to produce much the same output, so that the employer could not easily pick out the fast from the slow, the norm being set at what the men considered a fair day's work.

Footnote: Rules of the National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers". 1948 - Foreword.

This was done in several ways. In some cases men did not exceed a certain output, in others all the work done was "pooled" on a group basis, so that it was impossible for the employer to know what any individual's output was. It does not mean that this kind of thing goes on in every Chapel, but it does happen in some, and its object in the cases encountered was not to restrict production but to conceal individual differences in ability in order to preserve unity.

The same fear of disunity in face of the employer is at the root of the dislike that many of the men show towards "merit money" payments, which I have discussed above but will repeat briefly what I have said. "Merit money" is a payment for extra merit which may be in high quality or quantity of work or in long service with a particular firm. Such payments are disliked because of the fear that employers may not use them solely to reward original merit but may use them as a means of discriminating between individual workers.

Many cases may be cited of this but the point is perhaps best illustrated by quoting a letter which appeared in a trade union magazine. This has been quoted above, but bears repetition here. In this letter a bookbinder is complaining of merit money. "Merit money is a subject causing much argument and, in some cases, resentment in our industry. Why should this be? The governing principle is that it is something over and above and entirely at the discretion of the management who decide how much and to whom it shall be given. Now obviously this is where the rub comes. We have to try to appreciate that there are people who have a better knowledge of their own particular branch of the trade than others, but how about the people who are carrying out the same job day after day and perhaps year in and year out, and to all appearances out, and to all appearances there may be little to choose between them. What method should be adopted in this instance?

Personalities come into view and overseers often have a thankless task to perform, but one of the great snags of the system is when people in charge have their likes and dislikes, and use this method to demonstrate it in no uncertain manner. Then the feeling creeps in and before you know where you are there is dissatisfaction all over the place. As many of you know this happens in numerous concerns all over the United Kingdom".*

Such examples show how strongly the need for unity against the employer is felt by printers. This is of considerable importance in creating willingness to uphold the two basic principles outlined above. For, if printers feel that unity is vital to them in face of the conflict with the employer, and that adherence to these principles is the way to achieve unity, then they have a powerful incentive to uphold the principles.

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* Footnote: Letter in the "Paperworker", June, 1952, p.18. The "Paperworker" is the monthly magazine of the N.U.P.B.& P.W.

It is a well-known social phenomenon that external pressure, real or imagined, is a unifying factor in any social group or association. It is a commonplace among trade union officials that in time of dispute with the employer the interest men show in their union increases enormously, only to fall away when times become normal again.

Thus it is clear that the unity of the Chapel arises out of the opposition of the Chapel to the employer. Unity being essential to the Chapel in its conflict with the employer.

THE EFFECT OF DIFFERENCES OF INTEREST UPON THE FORMATION OF INFORMAL GROUPS IN WORKS "A".

In this chapter the connection between interests and informal groupings in Works "A" will be discussed. First we will study how the different Chapels affect informal grouping within departments; and, secondly, how different groups form within the Chapels.

Departments where members belong to more than one Chapel.

In some cases trade union Chapels and works departments are coterminous but there are three departments in Works "A" in which the members of a department belong to more than one Chapel. They are the Letterpress Machine-Room, the Lithographic Machine-Room, and the Bindery.

In the Letterpress Machine-Room the tradesmen belong to one Chapel, the Machine Chapel, their unskilled assistants belong to another, the Auxiliary Chapel. Both Chapels belong to the same union - the S.T.A. The Machine Chapel is strong and well organised and settles all the departmental disputes with the employer. The Auxiliary Chapel, on the other hand, is weak and badly organised: the Auxiliaries depend upon the Machine Chapel rather than their own Chapel for the settling of grievances and the improvement of conditions. It is significant that in many works the Machine-Room Auxiliaries do not even bother to organise a Chapel.

The position in the Letterpress Machine-Room of Works "A" is that the machinemen - that is the skilled tradesmen - control the machines; the Auxiliaries merely assist them by bringing paper and feeding it to the machines and by cleaning up. The position in the Lithographic Machine-Room is similar: the machinemen, members of the A.S.L.P., control the machines; their assistants, members of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. classed as general assistants, carry out duties similar to those of the Auxiliaries in the Letterpress section.

Since these auxiliaries and assistants merely assist at the machines, they must work when the machinemen do and stop when they stop. At a pinch the machinemen could do without assistants or auxiliaries, but the reverse is not true. As a result the bargaining power of the tradesmen is high, that of their unskilled assistants is low. Any decisions that the tradesmen make through their union or chapel concerning the conditions of work - for example piecework or timework, incentive schemes, overtime, night shift - will affect the assistants, but the latter have no part in the making of these decisions. Consequently the assistants, since they know it is the tradesmen not they who have the bargaining power, tend to rely on the tradesmen to look after their interests, making little or no attempt to look after them for themselves. It can safely be said that in the printing industry the relatively high rate of wages is due to the high bargaining power of the skilled men, the bargaining power of the unskilled is necessarily much less important.

Members of both skilled and unskilled Chapels mingle freely with each other in the course of their work, there are no obvious signs of status difference and skilled and unskilled alike call each other by their Christian names. But,/

But, at the same time, when talking to tradesmen and non-tradesmen it is plain that both are conscious that there exist differences of status and interests between them. In the Works "A" Machine-Room, since both Chapels belong to the same union, the cleavage in the department is one of status interest rather than one of trade union interest. As a result there is no secrecy on trade union matters and tradesmen and non-tradesmen alike freely discuss such matters. However, the tradesmen are always the ones in charge, the non-tradesmen are always in a subordinate position; technical matters concerning the work are discussed by the tradesmen among themselves, never with the non-tradesmen. Because they are conscious of a difference in status tradesmen are more at ease with other tradesmen, and non-tradesmen with other non-tradesmen. When informal groups form, as when men sit about in the tea break, this division between skilled and unskilled men can be seen in the way the tradesmen and the non-tradesmen form separate groups. * Some of the auxiliaries in Works "A", and all those in Works "B" are women, and these tend to keep to themselves and form informal groups of their own. Women isolate themselves from the men, both tradesmen and non-tradesmen, by forming female groups.

The fact that both skilled and unskilled men in the Machine-Room are in the same union does mitigate the difference in status between them and so saves a more distinct split in the department. All belong to the S.T.A. which is a craft union. The myth system of this union upholds a belief that higher status for the craftsman is a necessary value in industry; the auxiliaries as well as the tradesmen absorb such myths and come to accept the craftsman's/

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* Footnote: The attitude of the tradesman to the non-tradesman in the Machine-Room is summed up by the following statement made to me by a tradesman in conversation: "We are the union, we organise the labourers so that there is no danger of them joining another union and setting themselves up to be tradesmen like the Natsopa men do. We look after their wages and conditions and it is our bargaining power that gets them good wages. But we are the union, the auxiliaries don't really count in union matters. That's the way it should be, we have the skill, it is our bargaining power that gives us all good conditions. These boys are just labourers, they haven't served an apprenticeship, they have no responsibilities, nothing to lose. It would be madness to give them any power. They don't understand it's the tradesman's skill that gives us our bargaining power, they would let in dilutees or increase the number of apprentices and ruin the trade for a couple of bob a week. The tradesmen must run things, it's only right." This is typical of the tradesmen's outlook and as one can easily imagine it does set a restraint between tradesmen and non-tradesmen.

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man's superior status as his right. The potential line of cleavage between skilled and unskilled is always there, but it is bridged by the common myths and interests of their union. Thus, instead of finding two completely opposed groups in the Machine-Room, we find one group predominant and the other passively accepting an inferior position. Differences of status are differences of interest, and as such they tend to limit social relations between skilled and unskilled to some extent, but the fact that they are contained within the one wider interest group - the S.T.A. - prevents the differences from becoming too strong. *

In parts of the Bindery we find a similar state of affairs; the men in charge of Flexiback and other binding machines are tradesmen and members of the Men's Chapel, the girls who assist them and feed the machines are members of the Women's Chapel. Both chapels belong to the same union, the N.U.P.B.& P.W. The Men's Chapel is old, strong, and well established; the Women's Chapel is new and weak. The women tend to leave the men to take the initiative in all union matters and they take little interest in their own chapel. As a result the position is very similar to that in the Machine-Room, one chapel is strong the other is weak and accepts a subordinate position.

Men and women form separate informal groups; when a man is working a machine with a crew of women he will walk to the other end of the room if necessary in order to have his tea break with another man. Men and women do not mix in informal groups, and it appears that the difference in interests which causes this is mainly one of sex and age. The tradesmen are men of mature age, the women mostly girls in their teens. Their interests are entirely different and the men cannot talk to them as they would even to unskilled/

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* Footnote: The tradesmen themselves would actively deny any charges of snobbery and there are few obvious signs of status differences between skilled and unskilled. Yet there is a great gulf dividing skilled from unskilled, I shall go into this in a later chapter, here I will merely state that such a gap exists and that it does affect social relations. Tradesmen will talk and joke with non-tradesmen and discuss sport and other matters with them but there is a distinct difference in the quality of the relations tradesmen have with non-tradesmen as compared with the quality of the relations they have with other tradesmen. There is a degree of intimacy between tradesmen, they are members of an "in group": the non-tradesmen are "outsiders", and relations with them tend to be merely superficial. The tradesman discusses serious matters concerning the work or pay and conditions only with other tradesmen, never with non-tradesmen.

unskilled men. The factor of status also comes into it since the men have the higher trade status and in addition they tend to come from what they look upon as a higher social class than that to which the women belong. However, the basic difference which causes the men and women to form different informal groups in the Bindery seems to me to be that of sex and age, the interest differences between chapels are relatively unimportant.

A third example of a division in a department caused by its members belonging to more than one chapel is seen in the Lithographic Machine-Room, where the situation is very similar to that in the Letterpress Machine-Room. The tradesmen belong to one chapel, their unskilled assistants to another. In this case, however, the situation is complicated by the fact the two chapels belong to different trade unions. The Litho machine tradesmen share a chapel - the Litho Chapel of the A.S.L.P. - with the men from the Transferring Department; the assistants, on the other hand, are members of the Men's Chapel of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. in which they form only about a tenth of the total membership. In some works the assistants are women, in whibh case they belong to the Women's Chapel. Where there is both a Print and a Bindery Chapel they will belong to the Print Chapel.

This creates a peculiar situation in this department. The tradesmen, through their chapel of the A.S.L.P., control working conditions for the whole department. The N.U.P.B. & P.W. can do little to control pay and conditions in the Litho Machine-Room since the tradesmen have the real control. The pay of the assistants in the Litho Machine-Room is linked - through common union membership - with that of all other general assistants of the same union throughout the works, no matter what department these men belong to. The tradesmen in the Litho Machine-Room may throw their assistants out of work by going on strike over their own trade wages and conditions. Their assistants, on the other hand, may be called out on strike in furtherance of some dispute not connected with the Litho Machine-Room, thus leaving the machinemen without assistants. The Litho tradesmen are members of a specific interest group, the A.S.L.P. chapel and union, whose major interests lie within the Litho Department; the assistants are members of a chapel and union whose major interests lie outside the Litho Machine-Room. Thus there is a greater superficial difference of interest here between tradesmen and non-tradesmen in the Litho Machine-Room than there is in the Letterpress Machine-Room.

In practice, however, this rarely leads to trouble in the Litho Machine-Room. There are two differences of interest dividing the skilled and the unskilled; difference of status and difference of trade union. As in the Letterpress Machine-Room, the Lithographic assistants, though in this case belonging to a different union from the tradesmen, nevertheless belong to a union with a myth system which also emphasises the need for higher status for tradesmen, and as a result they do not seek to dispute the superior status of the tradesmen. The difference in trade union does not cause trouble mainly because the two unions rarely come into conflict. The N.U.P.B.& P.W. has little interest in the Lithographic assistants since their numbers are small, and it can do very little for them beyond guaranteeing their basic wage. For all else the Litho assistants are bound by the decisions of the Lithographers Chapel; their interests lie with this Chapel and the/

the A.S.L.P. union rather than with their own chapel and union, thus disputes in the department caused by difference in interest group rarely arise. The assistants stated to me that they were more interested in the doings of the A.S.L.P. than in those of their own union, and at one time they asked to be taken into that union but were refused as the A.S.L.P. is a purely craft union which does not cater for unskilled men.

There is a form of status differentiation between skilled and unskilled men in this department just as in the Letterpress Machine-Room. Though there are again few open marks of different status, and the men call each other by their Christian names and talk and play games together in the lavatories irrespective of trade status, nevertheless there is a distinct reserve in relations between tradesman and non-tradesman. The assistants told me that it varies in strength from individual to individual but there is always a gap between tradesman and non-tradesman. The tradesmen are never as free with the non-tradesmen as they are with each other, they never tell them anything of union affairs or discuss union or trade matters with them. The assistant is always the inferior; the strength with which the line of demarcation is maintained may vary from one man to another but the tradesman always watches the non-tradesman and tells him what he can and cannot do. The assistants say that on the night shift, some, but not all, of the machinemen do allow the assistants to do more work on the machine in order to lighten their own work in the night, adding that on the night shift relations between tradesman and non-tradesman are often friendlier. But even here the tradesmen will only go so far, and soon become suspicious of any assistant who wants to know, or to do, too much. With this difference of interest between men, the tradesmen looking on assistants as inferior and afraid of their learning too much about the trade, it is only natural that the assistants tend to keep together in one informal group while the tradesmen form another. Members of both informal groups may appear to interact freely but there is a difference in the quality of their interactions. The tradesmen definitely feel that they are members of one "in-group" and the fact that the tradesmen do not accept them as equals forces the assistants to form into another "in-group".

In these three examples we find that the department may be divided into two separate interest groups because its members belong to two different chapels. In all three cases the division of interest remains potential rather than actual because one of the two interest groups is dominant and the other accepts inferior status. In all three cases the inferior group belongs to a union which recognises differential status based on craftsmanship and which has a mythology which sets a value on the superior status of craftsmen. This is a very important point, membership of another union, so long as it is a union of equal status and similar outlook, i.e. another craft union, does not affect the outlook on status. And the unskilled do not challenge the superior status of the skilled. As a result although the difference in interest between skilled men and labourers is sufficient to cause two informal groups to form, it is not so strong as to prevent the two informal groups from mixing freely together to such a degree that, to the superficial observer, there seems to be only one informal group.

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To emphasise the importance of this point I feel it is necessary to include an example of what happens when one of two such inter-acting unions has a different attitude towards craft status. Such examples occur in the Letterpress Machine-Rooms of newspaper offices - and only in newspaper offices. In these offices some of the machine-minders in charge of machines have served an apprenticeship and are members of the S.T.A. - a craft union. The rest of the machine-minders and all the unskilled assistants are members of Natsopa, a non-craft union with no craft traditions. Each union has its own chapel in the Letterpress Machine-Room. The Natsopa machine-minders serve no recognised apprenticeship but are promoted from the ranks of the assistants. On the other hand the S.T.A. members wish to reserve the skilled jobs for men who have served a recognised apprenticeship. The S.T.A. members resent the promotion of unskilled assistants, fearing that it will undermine craft status. On the other hand the Natsopa men fear that reserving the skilled jobs for tradesmen will take away their chances of promotion. Because of this division of attitudes towards craft status there is a very distinct split in the department and much bad feeling between the two chapel groups, a bad feeling which extends outside to the relations between the two unions generally. *

Apart from the difference in the status outlook of the inter-acting unions, the situation in the Letterpress Machine-Room of a newspaper office is very similar to that in the Letterpress and Lithographic Machine-Rooms of Works "A" described above. The two chapel groups have all interests except that of status in common. But in newspaper offices the unskilled workers, instead of sharing the craftsman's union, interests, and mythology, are in a different union, a union of non-craftsmen, which has its own interests, values, and mythology. They are thus opposed to the craftsmen on the question of relative status. Whenever a vacancy occurs for a machine-minder there is competition between chapel groups to fill the vacancy with a member of their own union. In this way the two chapel groups exert pressure on each other and keep open the split between them. Common pressure exerted on both by the employer may unite them temporarily, but as soon as this pressure decreases they will spring apart again. Until one or other of the unions changes its myth and value system the split between them will remain fundamental. **

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* Footnote: In the recent dispute between the firm of D.C. Thomson and Natsopa the other unions gave money to Natsopa in order to help them in their dispute. I heard many S.T.A. members refer to this as "cutting their own throats", they claimed that Natsopa was the enemy of the tradesman and it was madness to help them in any way. This gives some indication of the attitude that many printing tradesmen adopt to Natsopa.

** Footnote: An agreement exists between the two unions upon the filling of vacancies for machine-minders, but it is a compromise agreement allowing each in turn to fill a vacancy. This satisfies neither side for both unions want the absolute right to fill all vacancies and the agreement is frequently broken.

Such a strong division of interests between the two unions and their chapels is naturally reflected in the formation of informal groups. Each department has two informal groups formed on a basis of chapel membership and although members of both informal groups mix freely together there is a distinct restraint upon the quality of their social interaction, they are rarely intimate. The degree of restraint increases substantially during the frequent disputes that occur over the manning of machines.

To summarise what has been said above. It is clear that differences of interest within a department affect the formation of informal groups within that department. The fact that men belong to different common interest groups - different Chapels - affects informal grouping in the following ways:- (a) Membership of different Chapels divides men in a department and prevents them from forming one informal group; (b) Informal groups are formed on the basis of Chapel membership and members of the same Chapel belong to the same informal group.

Informal Groups within Chapels and Departments.

We have seen how membership of different Chapels affects informal grouping within departments. We will now study how differences of interest and of locality affect informal grouping when a Chapel and a department are coterminous.

The Lithographic Artists Chapel and the Lithographic Artists Department are coextensive; it is a small department and has developed no distinct sub-groups of any kind. On the other hand the Transferring Department, which is also small and compact, does have a small interest sub-group, - the Stone and Plate Preparers. These men are semi-skilled workers and are looked down upon by the Lithographers for that reason, as a result although they are members of the same union and chapel and they associate quite freely with the Lithographers, they do tend to form a separate informal sub-group within the department, interacting more with each other than they do with the Lithographers.

The Lithographic Machine-Room has four distinct informal groups, machine-men on day-shift and night-shift, and assistants on day-shift and night-shift. Day-shift and night-shift are separated in "time-space" to such a degree that they must inevitably form different informal groups. As I have said before, the assistants, because of the difference in trade status, also form a separate informal group. On the night-shift, according to the assistants, some of the barriers between tradesmen and assistants are lowered; some of the tradesmen allow the assistants to do work which they would not let them do on the day shift, and relations between tradesmen and assistants are generally closer than on the day-shift. But even so tradesmen and assistants never fuse completely into one group, and two distinct informal groups remain in existence. I have dealt with the Lithographic Chapel above and can only repeat that there are no distinct sub-groups within it. On the Letterpress side, each of the three Chapels is contained within a single department, no Chapel extending beyond one department.

We will first look at the Caseroom, where we have one Department and one Chapel. As I have said earlier this department occupies three floors of a building outside the main building of the works. The monotype operators and casters and some hand compositors are together on one floor, the rest of the hand compositors are on another floor, and the readers are on yet another floor. All the men have basically the same trade - that of compositor; most of the men work as hand compositors, but others work as monotype operators, monotype casters, and readers. The different types of work set up different interests among the men who do them and this sometimes sets up conflicts in the Chapel.

The physical distances between the monotype operators, the hand compositors, and the readers, though slight, are perhaps sufficient in themselves to account for the fact that these three sections form different informal groups within the Chapel. However, it does not account for the strength of feeling that exists between them at times and which seems to be due entirely to their differing interests in pay. The Caseroom has had a long tradition of internal disputes and ill-feeling caused by differences/

differences in pay, and during the time I was doing research in Works "A" another such dispute arose -a dispute that I have referred to earlier. The monotype operators had received an extra payment of "merit money" * from the firm, a few shillings a week on their pay. They had negotiated with the management and obtained a few shillings a week extra without informing the rest of the Chapel, as they were bound to do under the customs of the printing trade.** The reason why they avoided telling the rest of the Chapel seems to have been that they were afraid it would lead to the other members of the department demanding a similar increase and that, as a result, the management would take fright and give no one an increase. It was a clear-cut case of the interests of a section being put before those of the Chapel as a whole.

When the monotype operators went on to a new bonus scheme the rest of the department found out about the extra payment and this caused general indignation against the operators. At the Chapel meeting at which this was discussed, and at which I was present, it became clear that the Caseroom members thought of each other in terms of their various Caseroom sub-groups. Remarks like, "The operators think they are the Chapel", and "The operators dominate the Chapel" were made. Accusations were levelled against the operators as a group, not as individuals, and they replied as a group, throwing up what they obviously felt to be their group rights as operators.

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* Footnote: The term "merit money" is used in the printing trade for any extra payment made by the employer for any work which is regarded as being of special merit, having a high output, or doing exceptionally difficult work. This is always the ostensible reason for such payments, but often "merit money" is paid for less respectable reasons, e.g. because a man, or a group, are in a strong enough position to demand extra money, or because the management have favourites among the men. Payments of this kind cause a great deal of ill-feeling among printers.

** Footnote: I speak about the customs of the printing trade, there are many practices which are not included in trade union, branch, or chapel rules, but which are widely recognised customs and which are maintained as rigidly as any rules. One of these customs is that the chapel must know and approve of any changes in pay or conditions of any of its members. I shall have more to say about these customs later.

I found later that this habit of distinguishing sub-groups within the chapel is continued in ordinary conversation. The men use such phrases as "the operators think", or "the readers say". The distinction is, however, only internal. Although within the Caseroom they always speak of themselves as "readers", or "operators", or "comps", in contact with outside bodies they speak of themselves as one unit - the Caseroom. * This is found in all the departments of Works "A". Whatever their internal sub-divisions, they confront the rest of the works as one solid group, and few workers in other departments know of their internal differences.

It is interesting to compare the Case Chapel of Works "A" with that of another works which I will call Works "B". In this work there are two caserooms, one working mainly on the production of a weekly paper, the other on jobbing work. Each caseroom consists mainly of hand compositors but there are in addition monotype operators and casters, and linotype operators. Among the linotype operators there is a further division of interest since some are on piecework and some are not. The physical separation in space is slight, one passes through a door straight from one section to the other, but there are strong jealousies between the sections, mainly over the subject of overtime, and this restricts social relationships so that each caseroom and the linotype and monotype men form separate informal groups. Such behaviour is typical of all the printers I have met. They guard their affairs - especially where pay is concerned - from all outsiders, and theman of the same trade working next to them may be an outsider if he happens to be working on a different job, with a different rate, or different merit money.

The next Chapel on the Letterpress side of Works "A" is the Foundry; it is a small compact department and has no distinct sub-groups either. The Letterpress Machine Chapel, however, does have sub-groups which are based mainly on locality, though there is an interest difference between tradesmen and auxiliaries. This Machine-Room is divided between three different rooms, one on each of three different floors of the main building. Each room forms a single informal group as there are closer face-to-face relations between the members of each room than there are between the members of the department as a whole. Each sub-group has developed certain characteristics of its own within the traditional outlook and pattern of values of the department as a whole. For example, an objective characteristic attributed to the Machine Chapel by other departments/

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* Footnote: A typical example of the attitude of one group to another is seen in a conversation I had one day with members of the operators group. The operators told me that they did the most difficult work in the Caseroom and were its most intelligent members, saying that the rest of the Caseroom should try to raise themselves to their level instead of being jealous of their pre-eminence. They claimed this not as individuals but as members of a group which, according to them, had always been the most active and intelligent group in the Chapel.

departments is an abnormal suspicion of the employer. All the sub-groups within the Machine-Room show this characteristic but they show it in different degrees. Members of the different sub-groups have remarked to me on the different strength of feeling towards the employer in the other sub-groups.

In discussing a proposed incentive scheme which the members of the machine-room had rejected I found the attitude varied not so much from individual to individual but from room to room. Although access between the rooms is easy they have different patterns of behaviour. For example, many of the members of one particular room go to the canteen together for dinner, while in another room all those not going home eat their dinner in the machine-room. Yet, in spite of all this, when viewed in relation to the rest of the works, the Machine Chapel present a united front to the rest of the works, workers and management alike.

Since there are no important differences of interest between the three rooms there are no interest differences in the chapel. The men tend to follow their sub-group in chapel arguments, but the over-riding chapel interest ensures that there are no important clashes between sub-groups as such. The auxiliaries in each room share most of the behaviour patterns of the tradesmen. It is significant, however, that though they interact with the tradesmen in their room, both formally and informally, more than these tradesmen interact with tradesmen from other rooms, they are still to a large extent a group apart. The quality of their relationships with tradesmen is always less than that between tradesmen, even when the latter belong to different rooms.

The last Departments and Chapels to be considered are the Bindery and its Chapels. I have already shown that there is one big division in the Bindery, the one of sex between men and women, and this division cuts across all Bindery groups. If we take first the women's groups and theWomen's Chapel we find that many of the women work on different processes, each in a different room, and these processes form the basis of work groups. Usually each work group shares a particular economic interest, since the members are on the same type of work. Nevertheless it is space rather than interest which separates one group from another, for the women are less interested in rates and conditions than are the men and have little interest in the relative pay and conditions of other work groups. As far as pay goes there seemed to be no rivalry between different groups and I could find no women who wished to transfer to another work-group.

In some rooms, where women work at hand case-making or at covering, the women sit facing inwards towards a conveyor belt. In this position they can talk to each other across the belt but not to women working on other belts, and as a result, each conveyor belt team becomes a separate group. The women stay in their groups during tea breaks and can be seen going about with members of their work-group at works trips and other works social events.

Even where there are such "conveyor-belts" groups there/

there is still enough interaction between the members of a room to establish a distinct group character for all the women in that room, and many rooms, or sub-departments of the Bindery have very distinct characters of their own. Some sub-departments, the Machine Sewing Department, for example, are distinctly "bad" trade unionists in the sense that they are always falling into arrears with their dues, take little interest in the union and have anti-union opinions. Others, like the Machine-Folding Department are "good" trade unionists. Some groups are distinctly "tough", others are not. Each sub-department or room, as the case may be, tends to develop a distinctive group character ot ist own and space rather than interest seems to be the deciding factor in this case, since there are no important contrasting interests. As I have said before, since so very few women have any interest in union affairs, the different groups do not affect the chapel in any way except that from the "good" union groups some women do attend the chapel meetings, and from the "bad" ones none.

Lastly we have to consider the men's side of the Bindery and the Men's Chapel. On this side there is one major difference of interests, that between tradesmen and non-tradesmen. As in the other departments the tradesmen look down upon the non-tradesmen as being distinctly inferior to themselves. As they do not work together - the tradesmen getting their unskilled assistance from women when they require it - this difference of status has little effect upon the formation of informal groups in the department. It does have an effect upon the chapel, however, since both the Father and the Clerk of the Chapel are tradesmen, and the tradesmen who have a majority in the Chapel, intend to keep it that way. I have often spoken to tradesmen about the prospects of a non-tradesman becoming F.O.C. The tradesmen always stated quite emphatically that a non-tradesman could never be permitted to become F.O.C. They feel that their interests as tradesmen would not be properly safeguarded if a non-tradesman was F.O.C. *

Since writing this the F.O.C. has become Branch Secretary/

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* Footnote: When the men gave me this answer they were not giving a vague answer to a question regarding circumstances which are unlikely to arise and which they have never thought about. The fact is there is a distinct possibility that the present F.O.C. who has been F.OC. for many years, may become Branch Secretary of the Union, in which case they will need a new F.O.C. This is a possibility which the men know of and which I have heard them discuss. There is no obvious successor to the present F.OC. among the tradesmen but among the non-tradesmen there is an outstandingly active trade unionist who has been F.O.C. in the Print Chapel of another Glasgow works. The tradesmen know all this and admit the man concerned is a good man for the job, if it becomes vacant, but he is a non-tradesman and they are quite determined they must have a tradesman for the job.

Secretary and has been succeeded by another tradesman. This despite the fact that the tradesman elected is inexperienced in union work, and despite the fact that the non-tradesman with long experience in trade union work - the non-tradesman mentioned above - also stood as a candidate for the office of F.O.C.

Among the Bindery non-tradesmen there are different work groups formed according to locality, but except among the general assistants in the Litho Machine-Room sectional interests are not important. Among the tradesmen, on the other hand, there are various sectional interests. Although all the men are binders by trade some work as gilders, some as finishers, some in the half-binding, some are in charge of guillotines, some in charge of flexiback machines, and some in charge of machines which case-in books. All these jobs are on piece rate and every type of job has to have a piece rate set for it. As a result the men on each particular type of work form an interest group since they have a common interest in the pay and conditions for that job.

There is a good deal of jealousy between the interest groups, each trying to keep its own affairs secret and wondering how much the other sections are making. The gilders in particular come in for a lot of jealousy since one of the gilders is F.O.C. and it is presumed that because of this they learn of the other sections rates and that they themselves have been able to fix an exceptionally good rate. Men in other groups make such statements as: "The gilders want to know everybody else's business but they keep everything to themselves."

There is also some grumbling about piece rates mixed with beliefs, apparently unfounded, that other groups have more favourable rates. The interest groups are unaffected by locality, the half binders and finishers who share a room are the only groups which are clearly marked off by locality. The gilders share a room with other binders, some on guillotines, one on a flexiback machine and some on other jobs, nevertheless they form a distinct informal group and the other binders in the department, although they use the same lavatory and mix quite freely with them, feel rather "out of it" and are jealous and critical of the gilders.

These differences of interest among the Binders have little open effect upon the chapel, for the chapel does not discuss piece-rates but normally approves them automatically if the men concerned are prepared to accept them. Unless the men concerned want to discuss them they will not be discussed and it is extremely unlikely that any of the men will want to discuss their pay and conditions publicly. As a result controversial issues of this kind rarely disturb the chapel, and chapel affairs run pretty smoothly.

The only strongly dissident group within the men's Chapel is that of the Machine Rulers. The Rulers take little interest in the affairs of the rest of the Chapel and like to keep their own affairs to themselves as much as possible. Some time ago when the Men's Chapel was reorganising itself and trying to establish itself on a firm/

firm basis they demanded that the Rulers should join the Men's Chapel, as they are bound to do under union rules. * The Rulers refused to do so and claimed that they should have a Chapel for themselves alone. In the end the dispute was taken to the Glasgow Branch of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. and it was decided that the Rulers must join the Men's Chapel.

The Ruling Department has a distinct character of its own; it is what may be called a "right wing group"; its members are what the other workers call "not good trade unionists". The Department tend to look to the management and employer rather than to to the trade union for improvements in conditions, and are afraid that the union and the rest of the Men's Chapel may drag them into disputes which may jeopardise their good relations with the employer and management. Because of this the Rulers have an isolationist attitude, preferring to keep out of Chapel affairs as much as possible and concentrating on their own affairs. They complain that the Chapel takes no note of their interests and they try as much as possible to deal direct with the employer if they think it possible to keep such dealings a secret from the Chapel.

To summarise the findings of this Chapter. Whether a department contains men who belong to different Chapels, or Chapel and department ~~or~~ coterminous the important differences in informal grouping are caused by differences of common interest. Differences in locality, where a department is spread over several rooms or floors, also cause informal groups to form based upon each room; but these are neither strong nor exclusive. Strong and exclusive informal groups tend to be formed only when there is a common interest among some men which sets them apart from other members of their Chapel or department. In the next Chapter we will see how common interest affects communications in the works.

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* Footnote: Until after the late war the N.U.P.B.& P.W. in Works "A" was badly organised, most of the women, and even some of the men, were not in the union. The only chapel in existence was that of the Binders. The labourers were not all in the union and those who were had no chapel. After the war the men in the union made a drive and got those outside the union to join it, they also managed to get all the women into the union. It was decided that it was not worth while establishing a completely new Print Section Chapel for the men, so all the men joined the old Binders Chapel which then became the Men's Chapel. On the women's side too it was decided not to start two chapels and so all the women are in one chapel. All men must belong to the Men's Chapel.

Communications between Chapels and Departments in Works "A".

I found in Works "A" that the different departments knew very little about each other. This was all the more surprising as the works had a low turnover of labour * and most of the people in it had been there a considerable time. Naturally, after a time many workers know some of the outstanding members of other departments by sight but that is the normal limit of their acquaintanceship. Some of the members of each department meet on Works Welfare and Joint Consultation Committees, but such meetings are few and offer little opportunity to get together. I found in conversation with workers in Works "A" (and also with workers in other works, particularly Works "B") that they knew very little of what was going on in other departments of the same works. This was contrary to the general opinion of the management who seemed to think that rumours spread throughout the works with great rapidity. They probably arrived at this opinion because the wilder and more "juicy" scandals and rumours do tend to spread fairly rapidly but serious information concerning the activities of other departments definitely does not. Because of factory rules, and even more, because of the fear of trespassing across the very strict lines of demarcation between trade unions, workers rarely visit other departments. There is no doubt, as I will show later, that members of different chapels deliberately keep their affairs secret from each other, and this secrecy has grown into feelings of suspicion which render any social relationships between members of different unions extremely difficult.

I will give some examples of this. I have already stated that the Caseroom and the Foundry share a small building apart from the main building; the Foundry occupies two, and the Caseroom three rooms each one on a different floor one above the other. To move from one room to another is simply a matter of going up or down stairs, and it is as easy to move from one of the caserooms to one of the foundry rooms as it is to go from one caseroom to another, and vice versa. **

The workers in the Foundry and Caseroom have the same/

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* Footnote: In Works "A" in the period January 1951 to July 1952 the figures of labour turnover were as follows: Male Workers 11% ; Female Workers 25%

** Footnote: The reader may be somewhat confused by the fact that I speak of several rooms collectively in the singular, the caseroom, and the machine room, the fact is I am simply using the names in use in the trade. All the machine rooms in the letterpress department, no matter how many, are known as the machine room, and the same practice is followed in the caseroom and all other departments.

same dinner-hour, a little earlier than that of the rest of the works. This means that they travel home together if they live in the same area, or, if they have dinner in the canteen, they use the canteen at the same time. In spite of this the workers in these two departments have practically nothing to do with each other, and no one seemed to know the names of more than one or two in the other department although both are small departments, neither having more than fifty members and the turnover of labour in both departments is very low. At the time of my research both were experimenting with production bonus schemes and time and motion study. The scheme in the foundry had been going on about six months and that in part of the Caseroom - the monotype section, and the proof readers - had just begun. Neither department had any previous experience of bonus work, being used to straight time rate, and quite naturally those working the schemes in both departments were very eager to hear of the experiences of others; yet they knew absolutely nothing of how the other department was getting on with its scheme. This was certainly not lack of curiosity as men in both departments were eager to question me on what the others thought of their scheme, yet they had not contacted each other directly.

One of the sections of the Caseroom trying bonus work was immediately above one of the Foundry rooms. Physical contact is easy, but the barriers between them is one of different interests - membership of different trade unions. Both unions, S.T.A. and N.S.E.S., are very strict, and the men in the Foundry will not even let a labourer in from outside to sweep the floor in case he picks up something of the trade. In order to enter the two departments I had to get the consent of the local Branch Secretaries of both unions and even after that I had also to get the permission of both chapels. It can be imagined that under such circumstances social relationships between men from different departments do not thrive. Men are afraid to make advances to people in other departments for fear of a rebuff. There is one other reason, it is only recently that all tradesmen in the printing industry got equality in pay and there has always been a certain amount of rivalry between tradesmen on this score. If men in one trade secure a few shillings extra they try to keep it secret in case another set of tradesmen should find out and demand equality. This helps to keep down communication on works matters. In order to ask for information one must be prepared to give information in return, and men are afraid that in any such exchange of information the other department might find out they were earning a few shillings more. Thus economic interest stands as a barrier between departments.

It may be argued that the workers have fare more in common than they have against each other and that in fact at the official level the different unions freely exchange information. This is true enough, but it is what the workers feel that counts, and there in no doubt that there is feeling of suspicion towards members of other unions, a feeling which is rarely expressed openly but which is strong nevertheless for that.

Another example of a department where men are in close physical contact with men in other departments occurs in the Letterpress Machine Room. The colour section of this/

this department shares a room with the Lithographic Machine Room, they also share the same lavatory where the men retire for a smoke and a gossip, and this is an important source of social contact. Nevertheless the two departments keep apart from each other, men meet in the lavatory and discuss football, racing, and so on, but they keep off subjects concerning their work and do not discuss them in front of each other. Men from one department do not stray into the other department, during the tea breaks and in the dinner hour (some men carry a "piece" and eat it in the room) the men form separate groups within their own departments. The men themselves when asked, do not, apparently cannot, give an explanation for their behaviour. But from my own observation I would say that the men do not feel completely at ease when with men from the other department, they are conscious of a difference of interests and are noticeably careful in keeping the conversation on "harmless" topics, steering clear of anything concerning the work, and union and chapel affairs.

In the Machine-room below the colour room, the room is shared between the machine folding and the letterpress machines. The folding machines are manned by women. Here social relationships between the two departments seem to be practically nil; the difference in sex being added to the difference in interest group. The men and women have no more than a nodding acquaintanceship with each other, do not know each other's names, and never mix during tea breaks. The difference in sex means, of course, that they do not share the same lavatories and so they have not even this point of enforced contact.

The last machine room, the rotary, is on the ground floor, adjacent to another room with folding machines in it, and to the Quire Stock. Once again there seems to be little social intercourse between different departments. The women in the machine folding do not know the names of the men in the machine room or anything about them, they never at any time go into the machine room. The men in the Quire Stock and machine folding do know a little about the men in the machine room, mainly because they share the same lavatories, and they often meet and gossip there. They usually know the names of some men in the other departments but when asked about a particular man they had to think for some time and often had difficulty in attaching the right name to the right man. The men in the Quire Stock and machine-folding know more about each other than they know about the machine-men, the reason being that they share the same union chapel and meet each other at chapel meetings. There is also the fact that they can go into each other's departments without arousing any suspicion that they are "trespassing". Any excursions by them into the machine room, or vice versa, would arouse such suspicion.

There is a fear, even among the unskilled, that men from other unions represent a threat to their economic interests. I will cite an example in this particular part of Works "A". In Scotland the labourers who feed letterpress printing machines (except in newspaper offices where Natsopa provides the unskilled assistants in the Letterpress Machine Department) must be members of the Auxiliary Section/

Section of the S.T.A., and the labourers who feed folding machines must be members of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. In England the N.U.P.B.& P.W. provides the feeders for both types of machine. A new manager from England finding himself a little shorthanded in the folding department put some S.T.A. auxiliaries onto feeding folding machines. The N.U.P.B.& P.W. men immediately protested and forced him to take them off. The men objected because they were afraid that this might establish a precedent and that S.T.A. men might start to take over their work. Whether such a danger was real or not is beside the point, the important thing is that the men genuinely felt there was such a danger and as long as they feel that men who belong to different unions represent a threat to their livelihood, membership of different unions will restrict social relations between departments whose members belong to different unions.

Finally, we come to the Bindery. Here everyone belongs to the same union, there are differences of interest between men and women, and between tradesmen and non-tradesmen, but these are sub-divisions of interest and will be studied later when I discuss divisions of interest within departments and chapels.

There was one particularly glaring example of the inability of members of different interest groups to co-operate and that was the case of the "Combined Chapel" * A Combined Chapel was started in Works "A", all chapels being represented. But it soon failed as individual chapels were suspicious of each other and continued to take individual action in all matters, thus making the work of the Combined Chapel impossible. The Women's Chapel of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. is by far the largest chapel, and the Men's Chapel of the same union the second largest. The F.O.C. of the Men's Chapel complained to me that certain of the smaller chapels would only co-operate with the Combined Chapel when it suited them, and went their own way when it did not. The smaller chapels in turn told me that the N.U.P.B.& P.W. chapels had the numbers and wanted to dominate the smaller chapels. Mutual suspicion was such that the Combined Chapel soon proved unworkable./

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* Footnote: A "Combined" or "Federated" Chapel is one formed of representatives from all the other chapels in the works. It operates as a means of representing and negotiating for the workers generally in matters that affect them as workers in a particular works, not in matters which affect them as members of a particular trade, trade union, or department. It does not supplant the various unions chapels in any way, and does not interfere in their affairs. It is intended to operate as a means of bringing men from different chapels together in order to co-ordinate their activities in matters which affect them all, as, e.g. decisions concerning staggering hours of work when there are liable to be electricity cuts, or proposed changes in the date on which the works will close for the summer holiday.

unworkable. When the emphasis placed upon the interests of each individual chapel is so strong it is obvious that differing interests do constitute a barrier to social interaction.

Evidence of the lack of adequate inter-communication between departments can also be seen in the stereotyped opinions held by all departments about other departments. The Lithographic Machine Room are "greedy", the Letterpress Machine Room are "anti-management" or "always out of step", the Bindery are "pee-hees". * The conduct of a department in any given situation is usually assessed in the light of its associated group stereotype, since it is unlikely that the actual facts will be known, or if known, believed.

For example, in Works "A" the Lithographic Machine Room after some negotiation with the management on the subject of a bonus incentive scheme eventually decided not to accept the scheme. Their reason for refusing it, as given to me by the members of the department individually, was that the proposed scheme was to be an individual incentive scheme and they were opposed to individual incentives as such and wanted a group incentive scheme. This seemed to me to be the true reason, the men were afraid that an individual scheme would cause disparity of earnings and lead to ill-feeling in the department. I had previously interviewed the Branch Secretary of the union concerned and knew he held the opinion that an individual scheme was a bad thing; the Secretary also seemed convinced that the reason for rejecting the scheme was that it was an individual incentive scheme. The other departments in the works knew little about the negotiations but readily assumed, in view of their stereotype of the Lithographers, that they had been too greedy and asked for too high a rate.

When I explained the lithographers' reasons to members of other departments they invariably adopted the attitude "that's what they tell you, but from long experience of them we know the real reason is they are too greedy". At the same time it was obvious that their "long experience" of them meant nothing. No one knew any more than that a scheme had been proposed by the management and refused by the Lithographers. They could cite no example of the lithographers being too greedy in the past, the case was simply adapted to fit the stereotype.

In another case the Letterpress Machine-Room was asked to work staggered hours (as part of a general scheme for the whole works). Their reasons for refusing as given to me were: firstly, that the staggered hours represented a breach of the trade union agreement for the industry, and they felt strongly that breaking an agreement intended to guarantee them reasonable working hours was a very serious matter; secondly, that they had not been properly consulted and given the opportunity of putting forward their own views, if they were to be asked to break an agreement then they should have been consulted properly; thirdly, they felt that there was no real need to stagger the hours and that if the management had gone into the matter properly they would have seen this. The men felt very strongly about it and certainly believed in the justice of their case. The other departments - with the exception of/

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* Footnote: "Pee-hee" is a common Scottish term denoting a sycophant.

of the Caseroom which is in the same union the S.T.A. - had not heard of these arguments, and when told were completely disinclined to accept them.

The Letterpress Machine Room is stereotyped as anti-management (with, I must admit, some reason) and the sole cause of their behaviour was assumed to be the fact that the machine men saw an opportunity to "put one over" on the management and took it. As a matter of fact many people, especially in the Bindery were quite indignant at the behaviour of the machine men. This of course was accepted by the machine men I talked to as another piece of evidence that their own stereotype of the Bindery - that they are a lot of "pee-hees" - is correct.

The men in the Bindery have found that they are able to remain on good terms with the management without having to give way to them on any point. In fact, they claim (with, the management tell me, some truth) that the management and employer will concede much more to them than to other departments rather than embarrass their good relationship. There is plenty of concrete evidence to support this, for example in the way the firm has helped the union to recruit those workers who were not in the union. Nevertheless such evidence has little effect on the other departments, the Bindery are "pee-hees" and their good relations are based on the subservience of the Binders. That is the stereotype and they stick to it.

This tendency to judge behaviour in the light of stereotypes is clearly a very important part of inter-departmental communications. There can be few social relationships between departments who hold such rigid stereotypes, for these stereotypes are caused by, and themselves cause, bad communications.

Inter-communication between Departments and Chapels in different works.

I have shown that communications between people in different interest groups may be bad even when they are in close physical proximity. It can be shown that communications between people in the same interest group but not in close physical proximity can be good, often much better than between people from different interest groups who are in close proximity.

At this level inter-communication is of two kinds; between those departments of different works which belong to the same trade union, and between those which belong to different trade unions.

Inter-communication between departments belonging to the same printing union is generally very good. In nearly every department there are some men who have worked in other firms, they know people in these works and often have close friends in them with whom they exchange information. Union meetings are an important medium for exchanging information with departments of other firms, this is particularly true in small craft unions like the A.S.L.P. and the N.S.E.S. where attendance at union meetings is high. As examples of the difference in speed of transmission of information in interest/

interest and local groups the following cases are interesting.

In Works "A" the foreman of the Lithographic Machine-Room was reduced in status to the rank of an ordinary machine man. Two weeks later many active members of other departments in Works "A" had not heard of this, but I found that lithographers in other firms outside Works "A" had heard all about it. Men who had never been in Works "A" and had little interest in its affairs had heard the news because they were members of the same union as the foreman. Men and women in different unions who were working in Works "A", and had been working there in some cases for over thirty years had not heard of it. To take another case, in the Bindery of Works "A" a rumour got around that the firm would soon go onto short time working. Within a week the same rumour was told to me by people in the Binderies of other local firms, but six weeks later the rumour had not penetrated to some of the other departments of Works "A". Later there was a sudden rush of work in the Bindery of Works "A" and the firm had to take on extra workers. Within a few days this was known in the Binderies of other works but it took much longer to penetrate to some of the other departments of Works "A". In yet another case the firm was bringing out a new type of book which it wished to keep secret until the actual time of publication. In spite of attempts to preserve secrecy I was told about this book in the Bindery of another works several months before publication.

I have stated earlier how the Foundry and the Case-room in Works "A" were both working an incentive scheme but that neither knew how much the others were making. So far as I could discover none of the other workers in Works "A" knew how much the stereotypers in the Foundry were making, yet I found that stereotypers in other works did have a pretty good idea of how much bonus they were getting under the scheme.

The above are the outstanding cases, the ones which strike the eye, but apart from these I always found in general conversation with printers that most of them had a pretty sound idea of what the pay and conditions of work were like for men of their own trade in the principal works in the Glasgow area. They usually could tell me the foreman's name and reputed character, the type of work the firm did, the kind of machines in use, the amount of overtime a man might expect to get and the general reputation of the firm. But, except for the few men who were very active in trade union affairs and who were interested in the trade generally, they rarely know much about the conditions of other tradesmen either in their own or other works. It is obvious from the above that common interests promote, conflicting interests prohibit, communications between workers. If it has this effect upon inter-communication then it must exercise a similar effect upon the formation of social relationships between individuals. If there is no inter-communication it is unlikely that there will be any significant social relationships; on the other hand when communications are good there must be some degree of social relations. And it is evident that interest even more than locality exercises an influence upon communications in Works "A".

Thus, the effect that differences of common interest/

interest have upon communications inWorks "A" confirms what we have seen of the effect of differences of common interest upon informal grouping in the Works. In both cases it is clear that common interests stimulate, differences of interest inhibit, social relationships.

STATUS AND PRESTIGE IN THE PRINTING INDUSTRY.

In this Chapter status and prestige among the printers will be discussed. The printer has status as a printer, that is as a member of the group of printers. Although there are many trades in the industry all tradesmen have much the same status and a member of any particular trade - a compositor, lithographer, etc. - will describe himself simply as a "printer" if telling people outside the trade what he does. Apparently tradesmen are satisfied that the term "printer" conveys their status accurately enough. The non-tradesmen in the trade are not, strictly speaking, printers, and they do not have status as printers. However, the number of non-tradesmen in a printing works is small* and, within the works, their status is low. In their community or communities their status, though lower, is derived from the status of the printer; their pay and conditions are tied to, and fluctuate with, those of the printer.

Status and prestige will be discussed in three sections:- (1) the status of the printer in his community; (2) the status of the printer in the works; and (3) the prestige of the individual printer in his works.

(1) The Status of the Printer in his Community.

The status of the printer in his community is that of being a printer, of sharing in the status of printers generally. They believe that, as printers, they have a high status in the community, higher than that of almost all other kinds of tradesmen. Many of the more self-critical of printers openly admit this, but most show it only by their attitude to other tradesmen. I have heard this feeling of superiority remarked upon several times by men who have had experience of other industries before coming into printing. One of the more obvious ways in which the printer shows this feeling of superior status is in his attitude to dress. He is almost invariably well dressed when going to and from work, though he may change into older clothes at the place of work, and usually wears an overall of some kind while working. This is a recognised characteristic of the trade and printers going home at the end of the day look more like office workers than industrial workers. According to older printers it is not long since bowler hats were commonly worn to work by printers as a mark of their status, just as it is still a common practice in the Clyde shipyards for foremen to wear bowler hats even while at work as a badge of their status. A typical comment on this status evaluation is:- "It is a well-known fact that people who work in their "going out clothes" generally have higher status/

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* Footnote: Works "A" has, owing to the kind of work it does, an unusually large number of non-tradesmen. But even in Works "A" there are only 60 non-tradesmen to 410 tradesmen. In the N.S.E.S., A.S.L.P. and S.L.A.D.E.P.W. there are no non-tradesmen; in the S.T.A. the proportion of tradesmen to non-tradesmen is five to one; in the N.U.P.B.&P.W. non-tradesmen outnumber tradesmen, and in Natsopa there are no tradesmen.

status than those who wear occupational garbs."*

Another way in which printers show their own view of their social status is in their generally "respectable" behaviour. For example, they avoid violent industrial action, and at chapel or branch meetings, or during works disputes, they preserve a degree of restraint, no matter how heated the debate may become. They show it too in their leisure pursuits: in their tendency to play golf; in the type of Golf Club they join; in their tendency to mix more with professional than working class groups in social intercourse.

The following quotation from an official statement made by a union secretary clearly illustrates this "upward-looking" attitude. "It is at this point that we draw your attention to the fact that there is omitted from their list of agreements the one recently reached with the National Union of Journalists, the union with which we have worked most closely and have so much in common. All down through the history of newspaper printing there has been a constant association between these two groups, and even in these days of specialisation it is still a very common practice for the compositor on the small country newspaper to leave his case, pick up his notebook and pencil, and go forth to write up his own copy. I could mention many instances of famous journalists, writers, and proprietors, who were originally compositors. Now, if we unprotestingly accept the label being placed upon us by the S.D.N.S. we are no longer to be creative craftsmen - we are merely mechanics-automatons.

It is true in modern methods of production a portion of our members work composing machines, but these still demand a little more than the repercussions of an automatic reflex response. Basically, their craft is still very little different from that of all their predecessors from Caxton downwards. It is still the job of the compositor, no matter the changes that have taken place in supplying him with the parts, to assemble an immense volume of minute matter into an integrated whole, and that we know can't be done by the category of mechanics into which the S.D.N.S. now wish to place us. If our wages are to be related with any other union, then it is our claim that these be related to that of the journalist, with which we have most in common."** Again in the same report - in the section devoted to Branch reports - there is a statement from the Edinburgh Case Branch referring to American production methods as described in an article in the London 'Observer'. That article stated very definitely that "Americans seem unperturbed by methods which in Britain might be regarded as damaging to the status and dignity of craftsmen. They set less store by individual skill and resources in their work-people./

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* Footnote: "Industrial Sociology", Miller and Form, p. 356.

** Footnote: From a statement of Mr. Lean on behalf of the S.T.A. to the S.D.N.S. quoted in the 114th. report of the S.T.A. December, 1950. This outburst was in answer to an S.D.N.S. statement which had spoken of the S.T.A. as a "mechanical craft union".

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work-people. The brains and initiative are applied, outside the work-shop, to the pre-planning of production. Inside, the aim is to make work easy and repetitive. The British Steel Founders, for instance, report that labour in American foundries is conspicuously unskilled. A report of the Letterpress team that was sent to American early in the year will be published by the Stationery Office at a probable cost of 3/- per copy. We would suggest that trade unionists who have reason to study that report should keep trade union ideals constantly in mind. The craftsmen in the Letterpress side of the industry must not be reduced to the level of becoming merely hands on repetitive operations."*

The high status that the printer has in his community is caused very largely by the high pay and good working conditions he enjoys. Printers have always been among the very highest paid tradesmen in British industry, the differential between printers and other trades is less than it was pre-war but it is still substantial. A comparison between the basic minimum rates of printers and those of engineers makes this clear. In 1952 the basic rate of a printing tradesman was 143/6, plus a cost of living allowance of 21/-; that of an engineer was 129/-, and the engineer had no cost of living allowance. In fact the printing non-tradesman with a basic rate of 118/- plus a cost of living allowance of 21/- was better paid than the skilled engineer.

Thus the printer has a high status in his community, a status that he derives from membership of a high status group. This group - the printers - derives its status from its claims to high craft skill, and from the high pay and good conditions which their trade unions, using the bargaining power that craft skill gives them, obtain from the employer. As the individual printer belongs to this high status group by virtue of his membership of a printing trade union and loses his status if expelled from the union, he is dependent upon his trade union for his status in his community.

(2) Status in the Works.

The status of the printer in the works, like that in his community, is status as member of the group of printers. In order to defend his status he has to defend the status of his group relative to that of other groups. Within the printing works there are two groups whose status, relative to that of his own group, is important. These groups are those of tradesmen in trades other than his own, and of non-tradesmen. Hence we shall go on to study:- (a) the relative status of the various trades within the industry; and (b) the relative status of tradesmen and non-tradesmen.

(a) The Relative Status of the various Trades within the Printing Industry.

I have already stated in the introduction to this Chapter that the status of printer is common to all tradesmen/

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* Footnote: 114th.Report of the S.T.A., p. 61.

men in the industry. Here are my reasons for making this statement.

There is little or no difference in status between the various trades in the printing industry in spite of some evidence to the contrary. The contrary evidence concerns erstwhile pay differences and the existence of stereotypical assessments of one trade by another. There were until recently differences in pay between the various trades but these existed mainly because each union negotiated wage increases separately and their bargaining power often differed. These differences disappeared after the wage agreements of 1950.* Before that time there were constant claims for parity by the lower paid trades and the close connection between the wages of all the various trades meant that an increase in pay for one trade would lead at once to demands by the other trades.

The following statement made before a wage arbitration board shows this interconnection. "During 1948 and following that award, the Scottish Daily Newspaper Society entered into a series of agreements which settled the wage rates for the different unions employed in the industry upon terms mutually acceptable to the contracting parties. The dates of the relevant agreements are:- Stereo Society, August 1948; Process Workers, August, 1948; Transport, November, 1948; S.T.A. December, 1948; N.U.P.T.January, 1949. Any increase granted to Association members as a result of the present application, based on an alteration in rates of the general trade - and given for a special reason which does not apply to the newspaper industry - will inevitably face the Society with a series of claims by other trade unions, which will regard their internal relationship with the Association members as having been disturbed. The Society submits that it should not in fairness be subjected at one and the same time to the effects of changes which occur both outside and inside the newspaper industry".**

Although this statement refers specifically to the newspaper side of the trade it is equally applicable to either side of the industry and shows the close relation between the wages of the different trades. Since 1950 all the trades have the same basic rate and there have been few serious complaints about this parity of economic status. There are higher rates of pay in London and the larger cities but these are local rates depending upon the cost of living and have nothing to do with trade status.

Each/

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* Footnote: For example, between the World Wars the stereotypers were paid a pound a week more than the other trades in the industry while the bookbinders received a little less than the general rate for tradesmen in the industry. These differences were directly related to the bargaining power of their respective unions at this time.

** Footnote: In the above quotation "Association" refers to the S.T.A. and "Society" to the S.D.N.S. The quotation is taken from a reply to a request for a pay increase made by the S.T.A. to the S.D.N.S. It was given as a statement before a wages arbitration board in February 1950 and is taken from the 114th Report of the S.T.A.

Each trade does tend to create stereotypes about other trades:- "the letterpress printer is only a machine-minder", "the bookbinder does a lassie's job", "the stereotyper is just a mechanic", are common examples. But in spite of this I do not think there is any really strong feeling of status difference between printing trades. I have two main reasons for saying this. Firstly there is the fact that a common wage rate for all trades was accepted with no complaints, and no claims were made, based upon status differentiation, that any trade should be better paid than others. Secondly, and this seems to me to be the most significant evidence, men bringing their sons or other relatives or friends into the industry are not unduly worried about getting them into their own particular trade. A sponsor is usually satisfied if a vacancy can be found in any of the different trades, and if the relative or friend sponsored has a leaning towards any particular trade he will try to get him into that trade even if it is not his own trade. There does not appear to be any suggestion that to a sponsor one branch of the industry is regarded as of lower status than another. The status difference to which importance is attached is that dividing the skilled tradesman from the non-tradesman.

At this point I must mention as an example of the complexities of status evaluation, one particular branch of the printing industry that has always been higher paid than the rest, that is, the newspaper side of the trade. The workers in newspaper offices claim that the higher rate for newspaper work is a traditional differential. In this connection Mr. R.H.Lean, Secretary of the S.T.A. said:- "Daily newspaper workers have always had a higher rate and shorter hours than that of general office compositors or machinemen, very largely because theirs is a highly specialised job, calling for efficient workmanship performed at very high speed. In respect of the worker it is one of the special disabilities requiring compensation that he is called upon to sacrifice his Saturday afternoon - a sacrifice which is regarded as being of greater importance than ever before, as witness the change in shopping hours. The reason for the higher rates paid to night workers is, of course, obvious, and is acknowledged by all".

Again, "Finally, we repeat, we are obliged to insist that there is a traditional and historic relationship between the two sections of our industry and that the traditional higher rate is caused by the nature of the employment in this specialised section. It is granted because of the social disabilities caused by the hours of work, and also not a little because a craftsman who is proud of his skill must be offered monetary compensation before he will enter a daily newspaper office. He knows he is bound to forfeit the opportunity of exercising his skill to the fullest".*

The above statements were made in the course of wage/

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* Footnote: Mr. R.H.Lean, General Secretary of the S.T.A. quoted in the 114th.Report of the S.T.A., December, 1950.

wage negotiations in which the employers and the independent arbiter - though rejecting the claim that there was a fixed differential - agreed that the pay in newspaper offices had always been higher than in the general trade. Mr. Lean's statements make it clear that the newspaper side of the industry receives higher pay because of the special working conditions only, and that the question of status differences between printers in newspaper offices and those in the trade generally does not arise.

The position is, in brief, that there is no evidence of any real difference in status between different trades within the printing industry.

(b) The Relative Status of Tradesmen and Non-Tradesmen.

The tradesman has a distinctly higher status than the non-tradesman, a difference which is marked in four main ways: (i) the tradesman has a monopoly of certain kinds of work which are fenced off by "lines of demarcation", and if a non-tradesman or a member of another trade crosses these lines it leads to a demarcation dispute; (ii) the institution of apprenticeship, denied to non-tradesmen, which is the normal method of entry to the rank of tradesman; in some respects an apprenticeship corresponds to the initiation ordeals which precede entry into status groups among primitive peoples: the idea that apprenticeship is a form of ordeal - owing to the low pay and the time spent at night school - is common among tradesmen and is used by them as a justification for higher status; (iii) higher pay: any diminution of pay differential between tradesman and non-tradesman is regarded by tradesmen as being an attempt to destroy their status and is strongly resisted; (iv) a sense of higher social status: this feeling, though it exists within the works is subtle and difficult to detect there: in social life outside the works, however, it is very strong and easily detected.

(i) Lines of Demarcation.

The occupational status of the printing tradesman depends upon his ability to retain status giving differences. It is important to remember that so many so-called restrictive practices are designed primarily to maintain status differences and not to restrict output - just as some of them are designed to preserve unity in the work group. Occupational status is defended by (a) the lines of demarcation which preserve the monopoly rights of one particular trade in one particular type of work. The tradesman defends these rights against all other tradesmen and all non-tradesmen irrespective of what union they belong to and even if they are members of the same union. For example, compositors and machinemen in Scotland both belong to the S.T.A., yet in spite of this there are strong lines of demarcation between them and many disputes are caused by compositors pulling "fair proofs", a job which is recognised as machineman's work.

The principle behind this claim for the monopoly of a certain class of work rests upon the belief that skilled work can only be done properly by a craftsman trained in that particular trade. If anyone else does the work there is a risk that it will be done badly and this will reflect upon the skill and hence the status of the tradesman. The professions - Law, Medicine, and Accountancy, for example - have equally strict lines of demarcation for similar/

similar reasons. The actual line of demarcation in itself often appears to be rather insubstantial, for example a compositor may pull "readers proofs" but not "fair proofs", which can only be pulled by a printing machineman. Yet there is usually a sound explanation. In the example given, "readers proofs" are needed only for use within the works and anything which is readable serves the purpose. But "fair" proofs go outside the works - that is become examples to the public of the tradesman's work - and a high standard is required. Thus the pulling of this type of proof is reserved for the printing machineman since the standard of printing is their responsibility. *

It is interesting that an ex-compositor Louis Katin has also noted this; he says that workmen place a high value upon "standard of workmanship" ** and goes on to say: "it is obvious that workmen will look with resentment upon anyone who, by his inability and lack of experience, is likely to weaken the efficiency - 'the tone' - of the collective force." ** A little later he says that "To a workman who has graduated through his trade, non-apprenticeship spells inefficiency.

It is interesting in this connection to note the reason, given to me by the Branch Secretary of the A.S.B.P., as to why some of his members keep up a line of demarcation between themselves and their assistants which the Branch and the Union are prepared to relax. The work that it is proposed that the assistants should be allowed to do is that of preparing "blankets" for the rollers of the machine. It is a simple job but if not done properly it can affect the quality of the work. The Secretary said that the tradesmen prefer to do the job themselves because they feel that the assistants, not having any pride of craft to uphold, have no interest in the quality of the work and therefore cannot be expected to observe proper care in preparing the "blankets". They do not deny that the unskilled assistants could do the work; they merely claim that the assistant with nothing at stake would not take the care that a craftsman takes because the craftsman knows that the quality of the work is his responsibility.

The lines of demarcation as laid down by the trade unions are really abstract principles drawn from the practices found in the various work groups. Practice is found to vary from one work group to another but it varies in/

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* Footnote: Lines of demarcation often reserve much unskilled work for the tradesman but this usually happens because of the need for a clear cut line of demarcation. For example, it is obviously easier to forbid a non-tradesman to touch a machine than it is to draw up a long list of things which tradesmen and non-tradesmen may and may not do on it.

** Footnote: Louis Katin from the "Workers' Point of View", pp. 139 and 140. Hogarth Press, 1933.

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in detail within the framework of certain basic principles which are maintained in almost every case. For example, a basic principle in the Letterpress and Litho machine rooms is that the non-tradesmen assistants must not control the machine or interfere with its working in any way. Though this principle is strictly enforced there are variations in the kind of work the assistant is allowed to do on the machine; in some works the Litho assistant may only be allowed to feed the machine; in others he may be allowed to wash the rollers, while in yet others he may be allowed to wash down the whole machine. The difference is a matter of works custom. Lines of demarcation may vary in different parts of the country or even in different works. For example, in Scotland women can take charge of folding machines though in England this is strictly a man's job. In Works "A" women do certain jobs e.g. "blocking" which are considered a man's job even in other Glasgow firms. The reason for these differences is one of local or works custom. In the Bindery of Works "A" the line of demarcation between men's and women's work which permits women to do blocking is the result of an agreement of 1913 which fixed the status quo of that date as the permanent line of demarcation. Such local variations are known in the trade as "House Customs".

The reason for the differing degrees of strictness seems to the difference of feeling towards the non-tradesmen within any particular group. In some works the tradesmen are afraid that if the non-tradesman is allowed to do too much he will learn a lot and may go away and work for a non-union employer, hence they allow him to do only the minimum of work upon machines. In other works tradesmen may not feel that the non-tradesman is likely to do anything of the kind and they will allow him more scope. But in no case is the non-tradesman allowed to do work which obviously threatens the tradesman's prerogative.

The various status-giving trade and union rights of the printing tradesman are sometimes threatened by new mechanical processes which do not fall within their scope. The way the printer gets round new threats of this kind to his status system is simple. He absorbs the new processes into the system. For example, at the turn of the century the composing machine became a threat to the hand compositor. Manufacturers even boasted that they would enable a female typist to do the work of two or more compositors. This threat was overcome by the unions who claimed that since the machine did the work of the compositor only a trained compositor should have the right to man the machine. Today only a compositor can man a composing machine of any kind and instead of being threatened by a machine in the hands of unskilled workers the compositor works the machine and gets extra pay for doing so.

At the present day this struggle is being refought over the "office printing machine". These machines are designed mainly for use in offices, and they are often worked by one or two office girls. The printing unions claim that only their members should be permitted to work these machines. At the moment, the position is that the unions have agreed that the man in charge should be a member of one of the craft unions appropriate to the type of work done by the machines. One type of machine does work of a letterpress type and it is held that this type of machine should be under the control of a man appointed by/

by the appropriate union which in Scotland is the S.T.A. The other main type of machine does work of a lithographic type and it is held that the man controlling this type of machine should be provided by the A.S.L.P. Unskilled assistants, if any are needed, should be provided by whatever unions provide the assistants in the letterpress and litho. departments of printing works in any given area. In Scotland the S.T.A. and the P.B.& P.W. respectively.

At the present day the printing unions have established the right to decide which union shall man any new machine which does not fit into the existing pattern. When it is clear which union has the right to man a new machine, the union in consultation with the employer decides how many men are needed to man it. In these ways printers defend their status against potential threats from non-tradesmen.

So far I have been speaking of the way the tradesman uses demarcation against other tradesmen, and against non-tradesmen in order to retain his status. However lines of demarcation are also used by printing non-tradesmen in order to maintain their occupational monopolies against outsiders of all kinds. * The printing non-tradesman has no craft status to defend, but he has got a very high relative rate of wages for an unskilled man, and he knows that his relatively high financial status springs from his union's monopoly of a certain class of unskilled work. For this reason even the unskilled man in any one printing union enforces a strict line of demarcation against unskilled men in other printing unions and claims that a certain type of work can only be done by members of his union. In other words certain types of work are regarded as the "property" of particular unions and this "property" right is shared by the union's members, and by them alone. Here the status to be defended is not that of a craftsman but that of a member of a privileged group, i.e. the trade union.

When speaking of the office printing machines I showed not only that the tradesman claims the right to man these machines but the non-tradesman also claims the right through his union membership to supply the unskilled assistants. To give another example, in some parts of England assistants who are members of the P.B.& P.W. act as feeders on both folding machines and letterpress printing machines. In Scotland the feeders on letterpress printing machines (except in newspaper offices where it is done by Natsopa assistants) are provided by the Auxiliary members of the S.T.A. In England the assistants are interchangeable, in Scotland they are not. In one works in Glasgow an English manager, accustomed to the English line of demarcation, put S.T.A. men who were feeding letterpress machines on to feeding folding machines. The N.U.P.B.& P.W. assistants immediately objected and the men had to be taken off. The N.U.P.B.& P.W. men objected/

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* Footnote: I have earlier cited a case where a Chapel protected a non-tradesman in his job against a tradesman, on the grounds that the non-tradesman has job "rights" that must be protected.

objected because the S.T.A. assistants were encroaching on their property rights and had it been allowed to go unchecked they could see that a day might come when the S.T.A.would claim the right to man these machines in all circumstances.

The growth of rules of demarcation among the unskilled is an imitation of the practices of skilled men. When asked for a justification of such rules the non-tradesman often goes even further in his imitation of the tradesman and produces a type of craft claim, maintaining that he is not unskilled but semi-skilled and that his work requires a fair degree of skill and training. The non-tradesman may even assert his union claims against the craft claims of the tradesman, and defend these claims by lines of demarcation. For example, Natsopa is a non-craft union but its members have built up a claim to act as letterpress machine-minders in newspaper offices. They base this claim upon skill acquired not by apprenticeship but by long experience as machine assistants, which earns them the right to promotion to machine-minder. Machine minding has always been looked upon as a skilled job and machine-minders in printing works have served an apprenticeship, and are members of the T.A. in England, or the S.T.A. in Scotland. It is only because of the peculiar nature of the newspaper side of the trade that some Natsopa members have become machine-minders in it. Having placed members in this occupation the union now claims the right to continue to do so.

Mr. R.W.Briginshaw, the General-Secretary of Natsopa, said at a meeting of the Administrative Council of the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation: "N.S.O.P.& A. made a number of sacrifices to bring that about (the placing of Natsopa men on letterpress printing machines) for his union members had been running those machines for many years, and it was a right of the N.S.O.P.& A. to run those machines." * This attitude leads to disputes in newspaper offices between Natsopa and the craft unions involved - the T.A. in England, the S.T.A. in Scotland - and we see the non-craft union exercising lines of demarcation against a craft union.

Examples of other disputes of this kind are contained in a somewhat involved statement by Mr. H. Riding, the General-Secretary of the Typographical Association which he made before the Administrative Council of the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation in reply to the speech of Mr. Briginshaw quoted above. Mr. Riding said: "To overcome the difficulty of legitimate complaints that N.S.O.P.& A. had to teach craftsmen who were newcomes to newspaper production, the T.A. desired that an agreement should be reached that a senior apprentice from the general trade could gain experience in newspapers. N.S.O.P.& A. balloted their membership and rejected the proposals.

"Quite recently in Manchester in the largest newspaper house in Britain, the T.A. arranged a scheme for the better training of apprentices and it was agreed that an/

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* Footnote: Quoted from a report of Mr. Briginshaw's speech in "The Federation Bulletin", November, 1952, p. 19.

an apprentice should first work in the general printing department, in the same way that the L.S.C. (London Society of Compositors) or T.A. compositor must learn the case before going on to linotype in the news department. It was fine scheme and part of the arrangement was that he should 'sit in' the news reading department next to the reader, as part of his training; but again N.S.O.P.& A. objected, and N.S.O.P.& A. copyholders would not read if a T.A. apprentice was sitting by. It had created further bitterness between the two organisations.

"Once the T.A. opened the door how far would N.S.O.P.& A. slam it against T.A. members? Similar difficulties took place in Watford when 22 T.A. members were dismissed because there were not sufficient N.S.O.P.& A. assistants to do the job, as N.S.O.P.& A. refused to permit any more assistants to be employed unless the firm would join in bringing pressure to bear on the craft union to provide for assistants to be promoted to minders in the gravure department. These sort of things, Mr. Riding felt, should be 'placed flat on the table' before discussing the Productivity Team's recommendations for promotion. There would be no extension of promotion in the present set-up." *

Thus Natsopa which has no apprenticeship system on which to base myths of craft skill bases its claim to put its non-tradesmen members into skilled jobs on the experience these members have gained as assistants on the machines, the "sacrifices" they have made, and the "right" of Natsopa, as a union, to these jobs. This is in fact a double claim which Mr. Briginshaw stated but did not clarify. The skill of Natsopa members, despite the fact that they have not served an apprenticeship; and the property "right" Natsopa has over these jobs, this "right" being established on precedent - "his union members had been running these machines for many years."

(ii) <u>The Institution of Apprenticeship</u>.

Apprenticeship is the symbol of craftsmanship. It is believed by printers that no other system of training produces the requisite degree of skill needed to uphold the craft status of the tradesman, and that if men who have not undergone apprenticeship are allowed to do skilled work it will lower the standard of craftsmanship and hence the status of the trade. Apprenticeship emphasises the gap between tradesman and non-tradesman and indeed makes it almost impossible for the non-tradesman to bridge it. This is because apprenticeship must normally be served in a man's youth or not at all. In some trades there is an age limit for commencing apprenticeship. The Stereotyper's age limit (except in newspaper offices) is seventeen **; the Lithographic Printer's limit is eighteen***: the N.U.P.B.& P.W. allow a man to begin his apprenticeship up to the age of twenty-three if he has finished or is/

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* <u>Footnote</u>: Mr. Riding reported in "The Federation Bulletin", November, 1952, p. 18.

** <u>Footnote</u>: Rules of the N.S.E.S. rule 35b.

*** <u>Footnote</u>: Rules of the A.S.L.P.& A. 1949-51 rule 18, cl.8.

is exempted from his national service.*

However, even where there is no age limit laid down, as in the S.T.A., few employers would take a man of mature age as an apprentice, and there are few mature men who could accept the low wages of an apprentice even if they would. The few men who do manage to become tradesmen without undergoing an apprenticeship usually achieve this in one of the following ways:

(a) a trade union is nearly always ready to organise men working in non-union offices and to extend its influence will often accept those non-tradesmen doing a tradesman's work into the union as tradesmen.

(b) when there is a shortage of labour, unions allow some adult trainees, known as "dilutees", to do a shortened course in lieu of apprenticeship, and may even accept into the union men who have worked in the trade but have no kind of special training.

A strong prejudice exists, however, against men who have become tradesmen in any of these ways, and they are usually looked upon as not being fully competent.

This is my own experience of the attitude to people who have not served an apprenticeship. In "The Workers Point of View", the ex-compositor, Louis Katin, who did not serve an apprenticeship, writes strongly about the prejudice shown by tradesmen against those who have not served an apprenticeship, and he puts it down to the fact that the tradesman feels that the untrained man is liable to make mistakes which will reflect upon the tradesmen.

The apprenticeship system also emphasises the rise in status on becoming a tradesman. The apprentice does not gradually work his way up until he is on par with the journeyman. There is a huge jump in status the moment his apprenticeship is concluded. This is marked by the change in wages. The apprentice begins at 25% of the tradesman's rates: this is increased until in his last year he is getting 60% of the rate, so that there is a sudden jump of 40% in pay on completion of his training. It is notable that the very small wages of the apprentice are accepted as an essential part of the apprenticeship system and the trade unions show little interest in the prospect of raising them.

It is notable, too, that the change from apprentice to journayman does not pass without incident. Nearly every printing works has some form of initiation ritual to mark and publicise the change in status. Usually the apprentice has to stand some form of treat to the other members of the chapel or work-group. This is usually known as a "General Indulgence": nowadays it is usual to wait until a few apprentices have finished their time and then with money provided by them, and with the addition of something from the chapel funds, to have a night at the theatre and to visit one or two public houses. The apprentice's time finishes at noon and it is then usual to make some form of demonstration. Usually by everyone hammering on the work benches, what is known as "hammering out" an apprentice. In some cases the apprentice has/

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* Footnote. General Printing and Bookbinding agreements, June 1951, p.6

has to leave the room for a few minutes then return and ask if there are any vacancies for a journeyman and be taken on again in his new status position. Such ceremonies are ancient - going back to the early days of printing - and are obviously intended to mark a change of status. Before the advent of trade unions such a ceremony would impress on the minds of his fellow workers that a certain person had successfully passed his apprenticeship, and if a man went to work elsewhere and his trade status were questioned he would always be able to call on his fellow workers of this time to testify for him. It may still serve a similar purpose at the present day, for Louis Katin in "The Workers Point of View", remarks that on entering a new works the printer often finds that his new workmates make inquiries to find out if he has really served an apprenticeship, and if so, with whom.*

Katin states: "When a workman has long passed his apprenticeship period, when he has his Trade Union card in his pocket, and can show that he has given satisfaction to other employers, these proofs are considered adequate for his admittance. But his work mates are not so easily satisfied. Sooner or later the dreaded question, casually uttered, arises: 'Where were you apprenticed?'."

Apprenticeship is thus regarded as being of vital importance to status. Status is based on craft skill, a skill which, it is believed, can be acquired only through training as an apprentice. Hence the myth of craft skill on which the printer's status depends centres on the institution of apprenticeship.

(iii) The Wage Differential between Skilled and Unskilled.

Broadly speaking there seems to be a feeling in British industry that higher status should always be marked by higher pay, hence the tradesman's status is closely connected with the pay differential. The tradesmen feel that a wide gap in wages between skilled and unskilled men is a necessity, but there is little agreement about what constitutes a proper differential, in fact very few seem to have given anyhthought to what would be a fair differential. The reasons given for needing a differential are: (i) that the tradesman has a right to a higher payment in return for his higher skill and greater responsibility; (ii) that there must be some inducement or boys will not be willing to undergo the sacrifices of apprenticeship.** In wage negotiations with the employers the tradesmen always maintain the principle of a differential, in fact sometimes the unskilled men acxuse them of being more interested in maintaining a differential than in securing a pay increase for themselves.

This is shown by a statement made by the employers' federation during the last wage negotiations. In offering a wage increase the employers said: "At this point I may/

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* Footnote: "The Workers Point of View, p.137.

** Footnote: I have often heard remarks like the following about the smallness of the differential at the present day. "They'll soon not get lads to serve an apprenticeship"; and "What the hell did I serve seven years for?"

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may say that we realise there may be some feeling of disappointment on the part of the Unions representing non-craft workers that the increase proposed for them is a shilling or two less than that for craft occupations. We have, however, felt obliged to pay some heed to the argument so frequently put to us by the craft Unions that their relative position has suffered in recent years!"*

During the same wage negotiations the counter proposals of the S.T.A. asked for 14/- for tradesmen, 10/- for non-tradesmen and 8/6 for women, the final agreements embodied a differential rate. ** There is a constant fear among tradesmen that the non-tradesmen may accept wage changes which will affect the tradesman's status. During the wage negotiations referred to above this came out quite clearly "In explaining the position of the unions that day, Mr. Riding (chairman of the union side) said that they were trying to preserve some form of unity. There were aspects common to all but it had been found impossible to reconcile craft and non-craft rates. The sections (craft, non-craft, and women) would negotiate separately and only be responsible for agreement in their own section." ***

The Secretary of the P.& K.T.F. speaking of a "wages structure for the industry" has said: "Twice since the war and before the L.S.C. dispute, our industry has seriously considered wages structure. Each time the effort proved unsuccessful. One need not try here to analyse the failures, but the Court of Inquiry into the L.S.C. dispute made an observation on what was a strong factor in the matter. It ran: 'The idea of a wage structure covering the whole industry had, it was stated, been agreed in principle by all the trade unions, but it had been impossible for them to reach agreement on measures which would safeguard the position of the small craft unions in collective negotiations on wages. The craft unions feared that they would be outvoted on proposals to which they might be strongly opposed by the much larger unions catering for semi-skilled and unskilled workers'."****

It can be seen from all this that there is felt to be a very real relationship between pay differentials and craft status, and that tradesmen in the industry believe they have a right to higher pay than the non-tradesmen. They/

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* Footnote: Statement by the B.F.M.P. and Newspaper Society to P.& K.T.F. at Conference, 13th. December, 1950. Reported in the 115th.Report of the S.T.A., December, 1951, p.10.

** Footnote: 115th.Report of the S.T.A. p. 12.

*** Footnote: 115th. Report of the S.T.A. p.14.

**** Footnote: Mr. J. Fletcher, Secretary of the P.& K.T.F. writing in 'Federation Forum', in the February 1953 issue of the Scottish Typographical Journal.

They defend this claim by pointing out that the tradesmen have the skill - earned at some sacrifice as apprentices - and the responsibility for the standard of workmanship.

(iv) Social Status.

There is a distinct feeling that the tradesman is socially superior but it is hard to give concrete evidence of this. Most tradesmen when questioned deny that they feel that they are socially superior but on the other hand most non-tradesmen maintain that the tradesmen think of them as inferior. The tradesman is usually keen enough to put his son into the industry as an apprentice, yet, should they fail to get in as apprentices, few seem keen to put them in as non-tradesmen in spite of the high pay.

The difference in status shows strongly in social life outside working hours, the wife usually boasts that her husband is a tradesman, sometimes even when he is not.* The fact that people in the trade are very conscious of craft status is shown by the following example. One of the printing trade union secretaries in the Glasgow area is a non-tradesman. He is a very able man and there are few complaints about his work. Nevertheless whenever he was mentioned to me in conversation by printers of many different trades and unions - and this has happened literally dozens of times - on every occasion some mention was made of the fact that he is not a tradesman was made. It did not matter whether he was being praised or criticised, some remark about his being "not even a tradesman either, just a labourer", was sure to occur. Those who praised him seemed to think it was quite remarkable that a non-tradesman should be a good secretary, while those who criticised made it clear they thought no unskilled man was a fit person to be a trade union secretary in the printing trade.

In addition to status consciousness here there is also the feeling that all non-tradesmen are irresponsible and, not being imbued with the value system of the tradesman, are not to be trusted to preserve their interests. Many members of the S.T.A. - which is dominated by the tradesmen - are very critical of the N.U.P.B.& P.W. because of the power held by non-tradesmen in that union. As one S.T.A. man put it: "If the non-tradesmen run the union it's the tail wagging the dog; standards are bound to fall." Such attitudes clearly show a belief in the general inferiority of the non-tradesman.

Summary.

To summarise what has been said on the subject of status. The status of a printer in his community and in his works is that which he derives from membership of the group/

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* Footnote: The tradesman usually makes a point of telling one that he is a tradesman, the non-tradesman often is evasive on this point, sometimes even claiming that he is a tradesman.

group of printers - thus his status is that of being "a printer". This status is created by the trade unions on the basis of craft skill and it is maintained by the trade unions by means of apprenticeship and lines of demarcation. The trade unions give a man status when they accept him as a tradesman, and it can take away his status by expelling him from the union since this will bar him from employment at the trade almost everywhere. On the other hand, the trade unions guarantee that the status of printer is accepted universally. If a printer is sacked by a particular employer his status is unaffected and he can find employment as a printer elsewhere. Thus the status of a printer is in no way dependent upon his employer. In short, the status of a printer is independent of his employer but entirely dependent upon his trade union.

(3) The Prestige of the Individual Printer in his Works.

The prestige of the individual printer among his workmates depends upon two main factors: (a) his skill as a craftsman; and (b) how well he preserves the unity of the group.

(a) Skill as a craftsman. The individual printer's skill as a craftsman is of vital importance in determining his prestige. I found that in every case where a printer's skill was low his prestige was low also; on the other hand where a printer's skill was high his prestige was also high. This regardless of the printer's personal character or of his popularity with his workmates. A printer could be - as I have seen in actual cases - popular as a man and admired for his activities as a trade unionist, yet, if he was a bad craftsman he was always spoken of somewhat contemptuously. On the other hand, a man could be strongly disliked as being ill-natured and unsociable, yet, if he was a good craftsman he was always spoken of with admiration. I often heard printers speak of a workmate in expressions like the following:- "He's a terrible bloody man but a great craftsman, it's a pleasure to look at his work."

Matin apparently found much the same for he says: "From personal experience in many factories, I am certain that a workman is judged primarily by his mates, not upon his personal qualities or his standing in the union, but upon his standard of workmanship." *

(b) Preserving group unity. Preserving the unity of the group is only one of the values of the printers but as we have seen it is, in the context of their work, the highest of their values. Consequently, it is the value which has the greatest affect in determining prestige apart from craft skill. The importance of this upon prestige is more easily detected in the breach than in the observance of group unity. The printer who breaks the unity of the group in any way loses prestige immediately and permanently. Such actions as, carrying tales to the employer; breaking union rules to seek favour with the employer; ignoring lines of demarcation; and working/

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* Footnote: Louis Katin "The Workers Point of View",p.139.

working too fast; these and similar actions immediately lower a printer's prestige and cause his workmates to take sanctions against him. The ultimate social sanction of ostracism is reserved for such offences, and the seriousness of the fault is revealed by the seriousness of the sanction.

To cite an example one printer told me how another had refused to limit his piecework earnings to the level agreed by the rest, he said: "We treated him like shit, we never spoke to him, we refused to do anything for him until he gave in and joined us." He went on to say that this man's prestige had never recovered although the offence had occurred ten years before:- "We talk to him now but nobody bothers much with him; he'll never be liked in here, we know what he is."

A printer can gain prestige by contributing to unity, by little actions like "covering up" for other men, defending them against the employer, sacrificing his own interests to those of the group. But gains in prestige made in this way are difficult to detect except over a long period since each individual action makes little difference and it is the accumulation of actions which counts. The gain in prestige is thus less easy to detect than the sudden loss caused by breaking unity.

To sum up on prestige. The prestige a printer has among other printers in his works depends upon how well he "performs a function and so fulfils his role," as Paterson puts it, his function being, in the eyes of the printers, to forward the interests of the printers as a group. There are two main ways of doing this:- (a) by having skill as a craftsman the printer adds to the craft status of the group; and (b) by preserving the unity of the group he strengthens the group and increases its power to resist the employer.

SUMMARY OF THE PRINTING RESEARCH.

(i) The beliefs and myths of the printing trade unions were examined and it was found that the trade unions have an ideology which is based upon a system of beliefs and myths about the employer-employee relationship. It is believed that the employer has interests opposed to those of the employees, and that it is necessary for employees to unite in order to forward their own interests in opposition to those of the employer. This is the basis of the trade unions which are associations to forward the common interests of their members. To quote the Prefaces of two of the printing trade union rule-books: "This union is composed entirely of working men and women who are united for the purpose of protecting and advancing their interests and that of their class." * and: "The Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers has for its primary object the elevation of the social and economic status of its members and the promotion and advancement of their interests." **

It is noticeable that the rule-books state that they are intended to advance the interests of their members but do not say whom they are to forward them against. Nevertheless, it is implicit throughout the rule-books that the trade unions are common interest associations intended to forward the interests of their members against the opposition of their employers.

(ii) The printing trade union rule-books were examined in order to discover what the values of the trade unions' values, as indicated by trade union sanctions, are. It was found that the highest value is that set on unity, and in particular on unity against the employer. Equality is also valued by the printers, the reason being that equality among members as a group helps to preserve the unity of that group.

(iii) The behaviour of printers in the workshop was studied in order to see to what extent the printers actually observed the trade union values. It was found that the printers did, in fact, observe the values of unity and equality and used them as guiding principles in their behaviour within the workshop, and in particular in their behaviour in relation to their workshop Chapels.

(iv) The value of unity among members of the same common interest group - the trade union or the works Chapel - tended to make these groups exclusive. It was seen that informal groups within the workshop tend to be based upon common interests. Differences of interests divide men into different informal groups, common interests bring men together into the same informal groups. Communications in the works were affected in the same way - and it was found that common interests stimulate, differences of interests inhibit, communications between printers.

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* Footnote: Preface to the Rule-book of the National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers.

** Footnote: Preface to the Rule-book of the Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers and Auxiliaries.

(v) The status of the individual printer was found to be that of "printer", that is, his status arises from membership of the group of printers. As such his status is created and maintained by the trade unions which act on behalf of the printers as a group. The trade unions guarantee that the status of printer is universally accepted; they give status by accepting a man into membership, and can take away status by expelling him. The status of a printer is entirely dependent upon his trade union and independent of the employer. The prestige of the individual printer depends upon his skill as a craftsman - which adds to the craft status of the group of printers; and upon how well he defends the unity of the group.

It can be seen from this that the key to the ideology of the printers lies in their opposition to the employer. The trade unions who propagate the ideology are common interest associations created in <u>opposition</u> to the employer. The value of unity is basically <u>unity against</u> the employer and arises out of the opposition to the employer. The value of unity against the employer dominates the behaviour of printers in their place of work. Unity and its companion value of equality are used as guiding principles, guiding and controlling all action. Unity among members of the same common interest group leads to exclusiveness and affects the formation of informal groups, it also limits communications between individuals belonging to different common interests groups within the works. Unity also affects status, for the printer has status as a member of a common interest association <u>not</u> as an individual.

THE OFFICE.

The Clerks.

The research was carried out over a period of one year spent in the Glasgow Office of Stewarts & Lloyds Ltd. This company is engaged in the manufacture and sale of iron and steel tubes but, since it produces its own raw material, it is also one of the largest iron and steel makers in Britain. The company is the largest of its kind in the British Empire with over 44,000 employees and with branches and agencies all over the world. There are three main offices in Britain; Glasgow, Birmingham, and London. The Glasgow Office is the largest, it is the company's main sales office and the registered office of the company. It is staffed by over 300 clerks and 200 female staff.

The office is contained in one large four storey building in the centre of Glasgow. Within the office each department has its own room, and within each room the clerks work at long tables, two to four clerks sitting on each side of a table. The tables are set end on to the outside wall of the building and project inwards. Where the room is wide enough other tables are set end on to the inner wall leaving a corridor down the room between the ends of the tables. Within each department there are various sections and each section occupies one side of a table. The most senior man in the section - the section leader - sits nearest the window and the others sit in order of descending seniority with the most junior at the far end of the table. Where there is a second row of tables end on to the inner wall the most senior sits nearest the corridor, the most junior nearest the wall. If a section is increased in numbers the men in it move nearer to the section leader and leave a gap at the far end for the new man. This seating arrangement is not that of the company but is traditional among the clerks. The company allots the table for each section, the seating at the tables is arranged by the clerks themselves.

Thus the arrangement within each room is a row of long tables set at right angles to the outside wall at which the clerks sit facing each other. The number of clerks in each room varies according to the size of the department, ranging from 20 to 40. In most rooms there are also two to six female staff who do the typing and filing for the department. I will describe the peculiarities of the various departments later when describing the layout of the office.

The layout is as follows: The Office is arranged round a central well and there is a corridor on each floor round the well, the offices lie between the corridor and the outside wall of the building. On the ground floor there is the Postal Department which deals with the internal and external mail, this department is staffed by commissionaires. There is a small typing pool which also contains the comptometer operators, and the office canteen for all staff, male and female, below the rank of manager.

There are two sales departments on the ground floor. The Specials Department which deals with fabricated tubes; that is tubes which the customer wishes to have bent or twisted for a particular purpose - for example, bends in a pipeline. This department occupies a very large room with tables at right angles to both the outer and inner walls. Each section consists of two men seated on the same side of a table. The senior sits nearest the window at the tables along/

along the outside wall, the junior nearest the wall at the tables along the inner wall. The manager of the department has a small room at the end of the department, this is really a part of the main room cut off by partitions. His assistant sits just outside this room in the department proper.

The other sales department on the ground floor is Poles and Derricks Department. This deals with steel tubes to be used for street lighting poles or for ships' derricks. This is in a much smaller room than Specials Department have and the men are seated three on each side of a table in their sections. The head of the department sits at a table within the room.

On the first floor of the building there is the main typing pool; the Shipping Department; and three sales departments. Shipping is a small department with clerks sitting two to each side of a table and with the head of the department sitting at a table within the room. The three sales departments are, Boiler and Pressure Department; Mechanical Department; and Export Department. In all three there are tables along the outside wall only, four tables in each room. There are three or four clerks on each side of the tables according to the size of the various sections. The manager of each department occupies a small room within the department with his assistant outside in the room proper.

The work of the departments is as follows: Shipping makes the shipping arrangements for all tubes exported. Export Department deals with all orders coming from outside Britain. Boiler and Pressure Department deals with all orders for tubes to be used in steam boilers or for any other purpose which requires tubes capable of withstanding high internal pressure. Mechanical Department deals with tubes to be used in various ways in connection with machinery.

On the second floor of the building there are the Accounts and Invoicing Departments which consist of women under the charge of two men in each department. The only sales department on this floor is Mains Department which deals with tubes to be used for gas and water mains. In this room there are three tables set along the outside wall with two or three clerks on each side according to the size of the section. The manager occupies a small room off the main room with his assistant at a table within the department.

On the third and topmost floor there is the Purchasing Department, which consists of female clerks under the supervision of two men; the Managers' Canteen, the General Managers' Canteen; and two large departments. The two canteens each consist of one small room, one for the eighteen men ranked as managers, the other for the four general and one assistant-general managers.

The two large departments on this floor are first the Technical Department which provides assistance in technical details for the various sales departments. This department does no sales work of its own but exists to deal with advanced technical problems which the other departments cannot solve for themselves. In Technical Department there are rows of tables at right angles to both the inner and outer walls, the clerks sit two at each side/

side of the tables, the manager occupies a small room off the main room.

The other large department is the C.T.O. - the Central Tube Office. This is not a sales department but is the liaison between the sales departments and the works. All queries from sales departments to the works about the progress of orders, the setting of delivery dates, and so on, must go through this department. I shall give details of the work of this department later. In the C.T.O. there are five long tables set at right angles to the outside wall and one long table parallel to the inner wall. At three of the tables by the window and the one along the inner wall the clerks sit, three or four on each side of the table according to the size of each section. The female typists and a comptometer operator sit at the remaining table; there are four girls who do typing and filing and one comptometer operator. The department manager occupies a small room away from the C.T.O. - just off the Technical Department in fact - but his assistant sits at a table in the C.T.O.

As I have shown, each department has a manager in charge of it. These are responsible to the general-managers. There is a general-manager Home Sales in charge of all the sales departments except Export; a general-manager and an assistant general-manager in charge of Export. These are all responsible to the director in charge of sales. There is a general-manager in charge of the C.T.O. who is responsible to the director in charge of tube production. And there is a general office-manager in charge of the administration of the office and of all works offices in Scotland. The general office-manager is deputy secretary of the company and is responsible to the company secretary who is a director.

The duties of clerks in a sales department are highly complex but I will try to give a rough idea of what they do. The clerks deal with inquiries and orders coming from customers to the company. These are often very involved. The customer may in some cases be fairly vague about what he wants, or what the company can supply. In such cases the sales clerks may have to advise him about the most suitable type of tube for the job; the type and number of joints or couplings he would require; the type of protection required - e.g. bitumen sheathed or lined etc; and the price. Even if the customer specifies exactly what he wants working out the price can be a very involved matter. In some cases the customer may send in drawings and the clerk may have to work out his requirements from the drawing. In addition to this there is the routine correspondence with customers and the companies' agents about complaints, expedited deliveries, inquiries, and so on.

The sales departments each deal with tube of a particular kind or kinds, except Export which deals with all foreign inquiries. Within departments there are sections each of which deals with a section of the department's work, a particular type of tube, or a particular kind of customer.

The work requires considerable technical knowledge of steel tubes. Practical experience of tubes or tube making is rare among the clerks, but they need to know a great/

great deal about types of tubes, their strengths, weight, types of joint, types of finish and protection, and the company's sales policy. Thus a great deal of technical knowledge is required and the clerks often call themselves "estimators" or "technical estimators" rather than clerks. Both the clerks and the company use the terms"clerk"and "estimator" as synonymous when referring to clerks in sales or technical departments, clerks in Purchasing or Shipping which are non-technical are only referred to as clerks, never as estimators.

It is reckoned by the clerks and the departmental managers that a man requires from five to ten years experience in a department before he has picked up enough knowledge about tubes to be fully competent, and even after that time he needs the occasional advice of more senior men. There is no doubt that the technical side of the work is far more important than the clerical side. This has its disadvantages from the point of view of the clerks for, since Stewarts & Lloyds have almost a monopoly in Britain of these types of tube, this painfully acquired technical knowledge is of no value to any clerk who decides to leave the firm.

The clerks in Accounts, Shipping, and Purchasing Departments carry out the normal functions of clerks in such departments and require no specialised knowledge of the tube trade. As I have indicated they are few in number as most of the work of these departments is carried out by female clerks.

The nature of the work permits good communications between clerks in the office. Discipline is not rigid and men in one department can talk to the other members of their department quite freely during working hours. They can easily talk across to them if seated at the same table and, as they frequently have to visit clerks at other tables on work matters, they can talk to them too. There are two tea-breaks, morning and afternoon, officially of 15 minutes each but usually longer, and these give further opportunities for conversation between the clerks.

Communication between departments is good because clerks frequently visit other departments in the course of their work. An order or inquiry may include various types of tube and may involve the co-operation of several departments in answering it. In additional all departments deal with the C.T.O. about delivery dates, Shipping Department for shipping dates, and with Export Department on all orders for export. Thus the clerks have the opportunity and excuse to visit other departments in working hours.

The office has an excellent canteen which is used by most of the staff. This also helps communications although there is a tendency for people from the same department to sit together at the same tables and not to mix with those from other departments.

There are certain points of interest about the clerks which have a bearing on the research and which I will describe below. The first point is age distribution. The sales departments have expanded very considerably since the war and had been expanding, though more slowly, before it. As a result staff has been recruited at an increas-

ing/

ing rate and, in consequence, the younger men predominate in the office and the proportion of men over fifty is low. Another point worthy of note is the educational level of the clerks. Most of the men over fifty have only a primary school education, most of the under fifties went to secondary school to the age of fifteen or sixteen, and most of those under thirty were at school to the age of seventeen or eighteen. Thus the standard of education among the clerks is in inverse ratio to age.

Another point of importance is the way in which the clerks are recruited. The company has been established in this area for over a hundred years and has established a considerable tradition. It has seven works in Scotland at the moment. There are four in the adjacent towns of Coatbridge and Airdrie, ten miles from Glasgow, and in these towns Stewarts & Lloyds is easily the largest employer of labour. There are two works in the east end of Glasgow near the town of Rutherglen, and one other works existed in this area but has been closed since the war. Thus Stewarts & Lloyds are a major employer in Rutherglen and the east end of Glasgow. The remaining works is at Bellshill in Lanarkshire.

Each works has its own works office, and the staff of these offices is largely recruited from the friends and relatives of company employees. Having friends or relatives in the company is considered to be an advantage, and the company has on its application form for prospective employees the question, 'do you have any friends or relatives in the company?'. The Glasgow office recruits most of its male and many of its female staff from the areas near the works. Some are recruited direct but many come in from the works offices and a posting to the Glasgow Office is regarded as promotion by the clerks in the works. Before the war nearly all the office staff were recruited in this way but, owing to the rate of expansion in recent years, it has been necessary to recruit an increasing number of clerks from Glasgow who have no previous connection with the company.

The system of recruitment means that a good many of the staff of the office live near each other and know each other outside the company. Many of them travel to work together, and the fact that Coatbridge is ten miles from Glasgow, Rutherglen four, means most of the people from these areas lunch together in the office canteen. It means too, that a man from these towns is almost certain to have acquaintances in various departments of the office. The fact that so many of the staff, particularly of the older and more senior staff, live near each other in these two small towns and have friends or relatives in the company's works, considerably helps communications among the clerks.

The company has only one social club which is centered on the office, this is the "Thirty Plus Club" membership of which is confined to those with over thirty years service in the company. This club meets monthly during the winter. The company has several sports clubs and recreation facilities but these centre round the works, most of them in Coatbridge where the swimming, cricket, and bowling clubs have facilities. Many of the clerks who/

who come from Coatbridge belong to these clubs. The office has a football team which plays the various works' teams on the grounds attached to the works.

I will now go on to describe my findings from the research on the clerks. But first it is necessary to point out that the method by which I arrived at my conclusions was somewhat different from the method used in the printing research. The printers had common interest associations - their trade unions - which served as an index to their interests and values. These interests and values were studied in the rule-books and checked against the actual behaviour of the printers. The clerks had no comparable interest association which could be studied. It was necessary, therefore, to use some other means of discovering their interests and values. The means chosen was to study the attitudes of the clerks to various aspects of their life in the office, and their beliefs about these aspects, and deduce from these what their interests and values were. It is for this reason that I begin by first describing the attitudes of the clerks to, and their beliefs about, the main aspects of life in the office.

Attitudes to the Company.

There are two main attitudes to be discussed and I propose to deal with them separately. These are:-

a. The attitude to the Company as "S.& L."

b. The attitude to the Company as an employer.

a. The Attitude to the Company as "S.& L."

The clerks in general - with the exception of one or two of the older clerks - have an attitude of indifference to the Company, and they look upon it, as one clerk put it, as "just another employer". The clerks look on themselves as employees of the firm and nothing more; they have no feeling of belonging to the firm or of being part of it. The attitude of the clerks is that they work for S.& L. because it pays them, and if any other firm offered them better pay and conditions they would leave and go to it. Their reasons for working for S.& L. are purely practical and sentiment for the Company does not enter into it.

How Expressed.

The clerks show no particular attachment to the firm, and most of those interviewed said they would leave it immediately if they saw a chance of a better job elsewhere. Some clerks do leave the Firm for what they believe are better jobs, and these are looked on as lucky by the other clerks, who say they have "done right". Even the occasional clerk who is known to have gone to rival tube firms - T.I. for example, - is envied, and clerks frequently discuss the prospects of a job in rival firms. There is no feeling of "letting the firm down" attached to leaving it, even for rival firms. There is certainly no animosity towards the firm, but, at the same time, there is no particular loyalty towards it. It is a matter of expediency; the clerks work for the firm so long as it pays them to do so; if it pays them better to go to another firm they will do so without any qualms. There is no feeling among the clerks against this and the man who leaves it to "better himself" is praised not blamed.

The attitude of the clerks towards S.& L. is shown by their outlook on nationalisation. Most of the clerks admit they were bitterly opposed to nationalisation, not because it would mean the end of S.& L., but because of its possible effect on themselves. Having had experience of nationalisation, and finding it made no difference to them personally, they are reassured and are not now afraid of it. Most of the clerks are still opposed to nationalisation on political grounds but they are not afraid of its effect on this Company, as they say: "We've had it before, it doesn't make any difference at all to us; it may affect the big shots but that's their worry".

The clerks do defend the Company against outsiders - e.g. customers - and in this way they show loyalty to the Company. Indeed the clerks feel themselves to be under an obligation to do so, so long as it employes them. But this loyalty must not be overestimated; it is the same loyalty that they would show to any other employer they may have, and is not due to any sentimental attachment/

ment to S.& L. Nevertheless, while employed by the Company they show a considerable degree of loyalty to it and expect the other clerks to do the same. They identify themselves with the firm and its interests to a far greater degree than did the printers.

Beliefs.

The attitude of indifference arises from the clerks' belief that the firm is "too big". The clerks regard the firm as being something vast and impersonal - of Civil Service type and proportions in fact. Because of its size they say that the management look upon them as employees only, and have no interest at all in them as individuals.

They display this belief in expressions such as the following: "This firm's too big, the individual is lost in it"; "In here nowadays you are just a number - it's too big"; "To S.& L. you are just another clerk"; "You don't feel you belong in here, it's too big and impersonal"; "One clerk is just like another in here, as long as the work gets done they don't care who does it"; and, finally, an expression which is in constant use in the Office "You are only a cog in the wheel in this Company"; or, as one particular clerk put it more picturesquely, "You are only a tiny wee cog in a bloody great wheel, you just don't count at all".

Thus the clerks believe the firm is quite impersonal and indifferent to individuals, and this produces in them an attitude of indifference to the firm. But the fact that they feel aggrieved by the firm's impersonal approach clearly reveals their desire to identify with it. The printers had no wish for a personal approach from their firm, indeed resented any attempt at it as being an attempt to identify them with the firm instead of with their trade union.

Origins of the Belief.

The belief that the Company is "too big" has two main origins:-

a. The growth in size of the Company and of the Glasgow Office. Both Company and Office have grown considerably in recent years, the Office having doubled itself since the war. Even in the 1930's these clerks who came in from The Scottish Tube Company on amalgamation say they found S.& L. too big, and felt that the individual did not count in it. Since then the Office has grown considerably and absorbed a large number of new clerks.

Clerks can no longer say - as they said of the pre-war Office - that they know everyone in it, and many of the new clerks remain strangers to each other and to the older clerks. In fact, most of the clerks who have come in since the war admit that they know few people outside their own department. As a result, the Office has become more impersonal, and many of the clerks - particularly those from small companies and Works Offices - say/

say they "feel lost" in it.

b. Communications in the Office are bad. I have dealt with this fully under "Attitudes to Management" and in Chapter IV "Communications", and I di not intend to offer further evidence on it here.

The effect of bad communications is to make the Office and the Company seem even larger and more impersonal than it is. Bad communications with management make the latter seem distant and aloof to the clerks, and the general impression is that the Company is a vast and impersonal body which is not in the least concerned about individual clerks.

Remarks.

The clerks regard S.& L. as a good employer but are aggrieved by the fact that the Company is growing more impersonal. According to the older clerks the firm shows less interest in the clerks than it did pre-war and the clerks, as a result, have less interest in the Company. There is no doubt that the clerks would like to feel part of the firm and a good deal of their apparent indifference to it is assumed in reply to the firm's indifference to them. Even now they show a greater interest in the firm and identify themselves with its interests far more than the printers did with their firm. I make this point because there is a considerable difference in degree between what the clerks and what the printers would call indifference to the firm.

Attitude to the Company as an Employer.

Attitude.

As an employer the clerks like S.& L.; in fact they look upon it as one of the best employers in this area.

How Expressed.

All the clerks I interviewed agreed that the firm is a very good employer; in fact many of them, after grumbling about the firm, expressed the fact that they are well off here. One clerk summed it up by saying that his grumbles, important as they are, are only luxuries, and that the firm gives him all the essentials for a decent standard of living. The clerks express this belief in action by staying with the firm, and few of them leave except for jobs which offer them promotion or prospects of promotion, and the clerks believe and say that anyone who left without such prospects would be a fool.

I met several clerks who told me that they hope, in time, to leave and get promotion in another firm, but they intend to stay here until the chance comes. They admitted that there is no point in changing until you get a good job, for few other firms are as good to their clerks as S.& L. Indeed, some grumbled to me that ordinary clerks are too well off in here, and that as a result they do not want to leave though they know they ought to if they want to "get on".

I heard plenty of grumbles, and certain serious grievances, - which will be dealt with later - but I did not/

not meet any clerk who was not ready to admit that the firm is an outstandingly good employer, and that they are lucky to be employed by it.

Beliefs.

The belief the clerks hold of the firm as an employer is that it is very good but not quite as good as it used to be, and it lags a little behind the best firms - Coats, I.C.I., and Colvilles. They believe it offers good pay and conditions and a degree of security which is considered quite exceptional. It is generally agreed, in fact, that no one is ever sacked except "for rape on the premises and dipping the till".

Origins of the Belief.

The basis of the belief lies in the reputation that S.& L. has built up as an employer in the past, and especially its reputation for high security during the depression when security was rare. As a result, there is a local tradition, not confined to S.& L. employees, that the firm is a very good employer which looks after its workers. The strength of this tradition is revealed by the fact that many of the clerks say that they made it an ambition to get into the firm because of its reputation, and, as one clerk put it: "You were considered to be made for life if you got into S.& L."

The clerks make no secret of their belief that clerks in other firms are of a distinctly lower order, and they claim that these clerks envy them.

This reputation is not entirely in the past, for several of the new clerks told me that they were given the choice of various jobs at the Labour Exchange but chose S.& L. because of its reputation.

Next in importance is the fact that conditions remain good at the present day. Pay and conditions of work for the clerks compare favourably with those they could obtain in any other form of employment open to them. The clerks know and admit this; they trumble that industrial workers are paid more than they are, but none of them holds this belief strongly enough to make them seek employment in industry. And they admit themselves that few firms offer better conditions.

There seem to be three reasons for the complaint that the firm is not so good an employer as it was -

a. The reputation of the firm is so good that the clerks tend to expect perfection and grumble when the reality falls short of it.

b. With the coming of full employment conditions of work generally are now much better than pre-war. Consequently this firm is not now so much better than other firms as it was pre-war.

   For example, pre-war security was rare, today security is commonplace because of full employment. Pre-war high wages were rare, nowadays they are normal.

   This levelling up of conditions all round has lowered the relative status of S.& L.

c. The clerks believe that pre-war there were fewer "trainees" and so more opportunities of promotion; nowadays they believe there are more "trainees" and consequently less chance of promotion.

Remarks.

I have said above that the clerks believe S.& L. to be a very good employer. But later in the chapter I shall describe various grievances that they have against the firm. This may seem contradictory, and when the reader sees the detailed grievances he may well disbelieve the statement that S.& L. is a very good employer. In actual fact there is no such contradiction; it is all a matter of seeing the grievances in their true perspective, of recognising the limits within which they operate. One may assume that all workers, in fact all human beings, have some grievances, no matter how well off they are, and the grievances of the privileged and "well off" are every bit as important to themselves as are those of the most under-privileged.

For example, if one examines the grievances that workers in various firms and industries hold about their conditions of work, one finds that the grievances of workers in one industry or firm may be trivial in comparison with those of the workers in another. Yet there may be no corresponding difference in the intensity of feeling aroused by these grievances. The navvies on the hydro-electric schemes have conditions of work far worse than anything I have seen elsewhere in industry, but I found they had fewer grievances than the workers in the printing trade whose conditions are generally considered to be among the very best in industry. The clerks in this Office, though their conditions are even better than those of the printers, complain at least as much as the latter do.

Clearly one cannot assess the relative importance of a grievance over conditions by comparing the intensity of feeling the grievance arouses with the intensity of feeling aroused by other grievances in other firms or industries. One can only make such an assessment by comparing the actual conditions which give rise to grievances. By such a comparison this Office comes out very well; general conditions of work for clerks in here are far better than those of any workers I have ever seen in industry. I have little experience of clerical work, but I am told by the clerks I know, and by the officials of clerical trade unions, that conditions in this Office are very good.

Thus, there seems no doubt at all that S.& L. is a very good employer, and that conditions of work for clerks in this Office compare well with those of clerks and workers generally.

Nevertheless, the clerks in here have grievances, and these grievances are felt as strongly as those of any other group in industry that I have met. When one examines the conditions of the clerks and compares them to those of other workers there seems to be no reasonable basis for their grievances, but it is necessary to remember that the clerks normally think only in terms of this/

this Office, and do not compare their conditions with those elsewhere.

In this connection I found it interesting that those clerks who have experience of other firms are the most contented, the clerks who are most bitter about their grievances being those who have worked only in S.& L. All the clerks with experience elsewhere told me that they are well off and don't know of any other firm that will give them such good conditions. But some of the clerks who have been in this firm since leaving school, talk as though it were a "sweat shop". When I ask them why they don't leave and go to a better firm they climb down and grudgingly admit this is a good firm. But, unless they are thus forced to think in relative terms, they ignore conditions elsewhere and think only in terms of this Office; and in doing so they often magnify their grievances out of all proportion.

In saying this I do not mean to imply that the clerks' grievances are without foundation. The point I am trying to make is that when we come to examine these grievances in detail we must not allow them to distort our picture of the firm as a whole. Even though the grievances be accepted as proved it will not alter the fact that, on the whole, the clerks are very well off and that the firm is relatively a very good one. Thus, when examining the grievances of the clerks, we must always remember that these - though they must be taken seriously - are the grievances of men who are in reality very well off by the standards of present day life, and the existence of such grievances does not in any way imply that the clerks are badly treated.

The Management.

In this report on the Office, wherever I use the term "management" I use it to include only general-managers and above; I specifically exclude those men who are termed "managers" in this Office and who use the Managers' Canteen. My reason for excluding them is that they do not manage and so are not really managers at all. Opinion on this point seems to be unanimous. The clerks look upon their managers as senior clerks; they say they do not manage, and they state quite emphatically that they do not look on them as part of management. The managers I have met agree that they do not manage, and say themselves that they are not part of management.

Finally, I have enquired of the true management - general managers and above - as to whether the managers are regarded as part of management, and the answer I received is that at present they are not. According to what I am told, the title "manager" has been given to the present holders as part of an attempt to raise their status to managerial level - not as an acknowledgment of the fact that they have already reached that level.

Thus it seems clear that the managers are not management and that no one in the Office thinks they are.

It has been suggested that I refer to the managers as "management"; the general managers and above as "top-management". I have not done so for two reasons -

a. The Managers are clearly not part of management.

b. The General Managers are not all part of top-management.

Hence I have followed customary Office practice in referring to men as managers, or general managers, according to their official title, but I have used the term "management" - as applied within the Office - to cover only general managers and above.

Attitudes.

The clerks have attitudes of (a) opposition to, and (b) suspicion of, the management.

How Expressed.

a. The clerks speak of the clerks generally as "us", of the management as "them". Relations in the Office are spoken of in terms of opposition between "us" and "them". They say "'We' want a pay scale, 'they' want to keep pay secret for their own ends"; "'We' want equal opportunities of promotion, 'they' want to keep the good jobs for their friends"; "'We' want higher pay but 'they' want to keep wages down". When being interviewed clerks said: "'We' don't mind talking to you as long as 'us' are sure you won't carry it back to 'them'."

b. The clerks express suspicion of the management in both words and actions. Some clerks state openly that they/

they are suspicious of management; among such statements made to me were the following - "You can't trust the management in here"; "You can't trust anyone in here, you never know where you are"; "The management promises a lot but we don't take much notice, we don't trust them any longer".

The clerks express suspicion in action in several ways. They suspect that the Management permits unfair anomalies in pay and that it gives extra pay to people who have friends in management.

They show the same suspicion over promotion. The attitude of the clerks in this respect is clearly shown by the way that the advent of any new "trainee", P.A., or O & M man is hailed by queries of "I wonder who is pushing him".

Their original suspicion of me, and of my research, in itself indicated suspicion of management; for they suspected that I was a management "spy", out to discover the clerks' opinions and pass them back to the management so that the latter could "deal with" those who expressed unfavourable opinions about the firm.

Beliefs.

These two attitudes arise from the beliefs that the clerks hold of management. The clerks see this Office - and all other offices for that matter - as being divided into two sides. On one side the "employees", the clerks; on the other an entity referred to as the "Firm" which profits by organising their labour. However, I must point out that when they speak of the Company as a whole they speak of it as divided into two: manual workers on one side; the clerks together with the management on the other.

The "Firm" is represented by the management, the men who do the actual organising and who look after the "Firm's" interests. Thus the clerks see the Office as being divided into two groups, an in-group which consists of "us", the clerks, and an out-group, consisting of "them", the management. These two groups have opposed interests within the Office. The clerks, representing themselves, are out to get as much as they can in the way of wages and conditions; the management, representing the "Firm", is out to get as much work as possible out of the clerks for as little pay as possible. Thus the management is seen as "them", the "other side", the opposition, the people who are out to exploit "us" in the interests of the "Firm".

In addition to representing the "Firm's" interests, in this way, the management is believed to want to get what they can out of it for their own group. In other words, they try to exploit the "Firm's" resources in the interests of the management and of their friends. Thus, in brief, the belief held of management is of a group who seek to exploit the clerks in the interests of the "Firm", while, simultaneously, they seek to exploit the "Firm" in their own interests.

Origins of the Belief.

I intend to speak of the origins of the belief under two headings:-

A. Those which are common to all industrial and commercial situations in Britain.

B. Those which are particular to, though possibly not peculiar to, the Office.

A.

i. The belief that employers and managements are the "other side" and have interests opposed to those of the workers is common in British industry, and, judging by the clerks and the officials of clerical trade unions that I have met, it is also common among clerks. Thus the clerks in this Office have encountered this belief before, they will have heard it at home, and from the people they live with, or mix with, outside the Office.

And, when he does enter a Works or an Office, the boy is ready to interpret the actions of management in the worst possible way. If the management refuse to raise pay or shorten hours it is never because they can't, always because they won't. At the time of the recent pay increase one clerk said to me: "This firm could give a 100% pay increase and never miss it". He was a quite normal and intelligent clerk but he believed that the firm could do so, and most of the clerks in the Office would agree with him. The clerks in the Office see S.& L. as most clerks and industrial workers see their own firm, that is as an immensely wealthy body which could improve pay and conditions enormously if it wanted to. That it does not do so is put down to the fact that management and the "Firm" want to keep as much as possible for themselves.

ii. Within the Office the clerks inevitably find themselves in opposition to the management at times. The very idea of management and managed entails some degree of opposition of interests, and there is no way of avoiding this. The management may belong to a private firm, to a nationalised industry, or even, as in Russia, to the Soviet State, but in every case it is a management, and as such its interests on some points will be in opposition to those of the managed.

To take examples from this Office. It is clear that the management want to get as high an average standard of clerks as possible. But good men normally expect promotion, and if a firm gets too high a proportion of good men some must be disappointed of promotion and will blame their disappointment on management. To a certain extent this has happened in here. Men with good qualifications were recruited as clerks, they expected promotion because of their qualifications and when it was not/

Footnote: For the existence of this belief among clerks generally see "By Hand and Brain". "The Story of the Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union". F. Hughes, O.B.E., Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1953.

not forthcoming they became embittered with the management. One cannot blame the management for recruiting the best men available; on the other hand one cannot blame the men for expecting promotion as the reward for their ability.

There are many such cases. The older clerks expect more pay than the young ones, on the grounds that they have more experience; on the other hand the young ones are often doing the same work, and hence claim that they should get the same pay. Some departments think they should have higher pay than others because they do more difficult work, but of course each department thinks it has the most difficult job and should get the highest pay. In such cases the management cannot please everyone but most find itself in opposition to one section or other of the clerks. Because of these conflicts some degree of opposition between management and managed is natural and inevitable, and one cannot envisage the total elimination of this element of opposition.

B. Origins of the belief which are particular to this Office.

i. The clerks in this Office believe that they and the management are in opposition over promotion policy. The clerks are almost all keen to get promotion and they believe that any clerk with ability who works hard is entitled to promotion. However, they suggest that the management does not intend to promote any more clerks but that promotion is reserved for friends of the management and for people of the same social class as the management who enter the firm as "trainees". I shall go into this subject in detail later under "Attitude to Promotion".

ii. The clerks feel that they are in opposition to the management on matters concerning pay. The clerks believe that a clerk should be paid according to his ability, the work he does, and his seniority. They suspect that the management does not keep to these criteria but gives extra pay to those clerks who are friends or connections of theirs.

iii. The clerks generally suspect that the management deliberately misleads them about their chances of higher pay and promotion in order to make them join the firm, or, if already in the firm, to stay in it. To quote specific instances, there are five men who came in from the Appointments Office, and who believe that they were promised higher pay and opportunities of promotion within a year or so of entering the firm. This mistake seems to be largely due to the fact that Appointments Office caters only for executives and trainee executives.

In addition there are fifteen of the older clerks that I know of who believe that they were promised promotion and that these promises were broken. This belief/

Footnote: See Ministry of Labour and National Service "The Appointments Service" A.D.L.2 (Revised March, 1954)

belief is not confined to the men concerned, for the clerks generally know, and quote, cases of men who are held to have been so cheated.

The clerks generally believed at first that those clerks asked to attend the Management Studies Course at the Commercial College had been picked out as future managers. The mere fact of being asked to attend this course was looked upon - particularly by those asked - as a "promise" of promotion. When it was found that this was not so, many of the clerks felt that they had been cheated, and they complained to me that the management had been dishonest with them.

A great many of the clerks, of all ages, believe that they have been "promised" promotion, all are rather vague as to the exact nature of these "promises", but they are firmly convinced that some such promises were made. I found this particularly so among the young clerks, and this is borne out by the experience of others.

For example, one clerk, who takes a very keen interest in Office matters and is very active on the Staff Association, told me on several occasions that he considers the discontent among the young clerks to be entirely due to their exaggerated hopes of promotion. This he blames upon the management who, he claims, whether intentionally or not, gives the clerks the impression that they are picked out for promotion. He blames the management as there is no one else in the Office who could give them this impression. This clerk claims that he is always pointing out to the young clerks that they cannot all be managers and that, since they have good wages and conditions, they should be content as ordinary clerks. But, he says, "it has little effect; every one of the younger clerks seems to think that he has been picked out for promotion".

Another case is that of a clerk in his middle-thirties who has been in the firm since leaving school. He says that when he came back from the forces, he and other ex-servicemen were given a lecture by a Sales General-Manager who drew a glowing picture of their prospects in here. After a year or two he realised that this was all nonsense and that there are no chances of promotion in this Office.

Thus it is clear that the clerks believe that the management misleads them, and makes them promises it does not intend to keep. It is commonly said in the Office that "if you go and complain about your pay and promotion prospects they will promise you the Kingdom of Heaven to get rid of you. It's a waste of time going to them". Naturally enough this increases the clerks' suspicion of management and the feeling that things which the management does in the firm's interest - like making these promises - are in direct opposition to the interests of the clerks.

iv. The clerks suspect that the management has no interest in them as individuals but looks on them merely as numbers. The older clerks claim that before the war they saw members of the management every day and worked in close contact with them. They felt confident that the management knew them as individuals, knew whether their work was good or not, and knew how much responsibility they carried. But, since the war, it is claimed that management has lost all interest in them and is now completely aloof.

The clerks complained to me that very little information comes down from the general managers, and that often enough the clerks are not even told of changes in policy and other information vital to the work. They feel that the management thinks that the clerks are far too unimportant to be given such information.

The fact that management takes so little interest in them does not inspire confidence in the clerks; the less they actually know about management the more they suspect. And the lack of communication between management and clerks increases the feeling of separateness, of belonging to different groups and different sides.

Remarks.

i. As I have indicated, some degree of opposition between clerks and management is inevitable, and should surprise no one except those who cling to paternalistic ideas of firms as being "big happy families". The clerks themselves accept it as normal that they should be at odds with the management over certain things and would expect a similar state of opposition to occur with any management in any firm. However, the clerks feel that this conflict should be governed by certain unwritten rules and that the management in this Office has broken these rules.

There are two particular instances they complain of. One is the extent to which - so they believe - personal "influence" governs pay and promotion. The clerks expect "influence" to be important to some extent. For example, they expect the son of a director to get certain favoured treatment if he joins the firm - they may grumble about it but, on the whole, they expect it and accept it. But the clerks do not expect <u>all</u> promotions to be governed by personal influence and when - as they believe - they see this happening they feel that management has broken the rules. Similarly, the clerks think that misleading them about promotion and breaking promises made to them is taking an unfair advantage of the clerks and is not keeping within the rules.

ii. The question of broken promises and the misleading of clerks. As I have indicated this is not the complaint of one or two clerks; a large number of them seem to hafe been misled so that one cannot discount it as the imaginings of one or two. On the other hand, I see no reason to believe that the management is deliberately misleading the clerks. The trouble seems to be due to faults in communication between/

between clerks and management, and in particular to the inability of each side to understand what the other side really means. It may easily be that the general-managers fail to realise the impression they make upon the clerks they interview. Because of his high status a general-manager is listened to with great attention and his lightest words are taken very seriously. The merest hint may be taken as a promise of promotion; statements about promotion uttered in the privacy of a private interview are all too easily taken as confidences, and confidences from a general-manager indicate that the confident is singled out from his fellow clerks. It seems to me that because of the difference in status, private interviews between managers and clerks are very liable to such misinterpretations.

The interpretation placed on the same thing by clerks and management may be very different. For example, when the management asked certain clerks to go on a Management Studies Course at the Commercial College, the management was only asking them to go on a course which might prove generally useful. The clerks in general - particularly those asked to go on the course - interpreted it as a mean of training those whom the management had selected for promotion. Selection for the course was looked upon as a promise of promotion, and when the clerks found this was not so they believed that the management had cheated them.

Thus it would appear that many of these so-called "broken promises" are the result of bad communications between clerks and management.

iii. There is one other point I wish to make and it concerns the difference between the attitude the clerks in the Office show towards management and the attitude shown towards management by the manual workers I have met and worked among. At first sight these are identical. The manual workers show the same attitude of opposition to, and suspicion of, management as do the clerks. They hold the same belief of management as being "the other side", an out-group with interests opposed to those of the workers. They see industrial life as being a conflict between the two sides, between "us" the workers and "them" the management. In all these things they are in complete agreement with the clerks, but there is one very important difference. To the manual worker this state of opposition is <u>permanent</u>, workers are workers, and management is management, and the line that divides them is virtually impassable. The manual workers do not expect to become managers, and in fact they do not even want to. Not only that, they do not approve of other manual workers becoming managers. Men who are obviously keen to get promotion are abused and ridiculed and are looked upon as "traitors to their class", "bosses' men", and "blokes who have gone over to the other side".

To the manual worker a man belongs by birth to one side or the other; if he is born a worker he should remain one and he should defend the workers "side" against/

against the management "side" - to go over to management is nothing short of treachery. One finds that manual workers look upon their "class" with something of the patriotic fervour that men in general feel for their nation. For a worker to desert to management - their enemy in the "Class War" - is little better than for a man to turn traitor in war-time and espouse the cause of the enemy.

The clerks in this Office see things somewhat differently. They believe that the interests of clerks are in opposition to the interests of management, and, as clerks themselves, they share this opposition to management. But, and here is the important point, they do not expect to remain clerks permanently; the day may well come when they will be promoted to management themselves, and when that happens they expect to change sides and to become opposed to the other clerks. They accept the possibility of such a change both for themselves and for others, and they are not in the least shocked when men are promoted and change sides.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is clear enough. Clerks and manual workers share the same attitude of opposition to management. But whereas the attitude of the clerks is only temporary and changes with circumstances, that of the industrial worker is permanent and does not allow for any change. This is a very important point, for it has a considerable effect upon the strength of the opposition that each group shows to management, and upon their social and industrial outlook in general.

It is important to remember that I have been speaking of relations <u>within</u> the Office. The clerks often feel they are in opposition to management <u>within</u> the Office. But, in the company as a whole, the two opposed sides are the management on the one hand, the manual workers on the other, and in this situation the clerks align themselves on the management side. In every dispute that occurred between management and workers during my time in the Office the clerks took the management side. And, with the exception of the half dozen Socialist clerks, they always spoke of the workers as being on the opposite "side" to the clerks.

The Managers.

I use this term to describe the men in charge of departments who use the Managers Canteen and who do not rank as general-managers or assistant general-managers.

Attitude.

The attitude of the clerks to the managers is one of sympathy - the sympathy which exists between members of the same group. The managers are looked on as being "one of us", fellow clerks and members of the clerical in-group, as opposed to "them", the management out-group.

How Expressed.

The clerks express this attitude in two main ways:-

i. They express it in the way they speak about the managers. These are always referred to as "us"; and when the clerks speak of "management" and clerks as two distinct sides the managers are included on the clerks' side.

The clerks often spoke to me of the firm as being comprised of an active and a passive side; an active minority - the management - who manage; and a passive majority - the clerks - who are managed. The managers are included by the clerks in the passive side; they are not blamed for acts of mismanagement but are spoken of as being passive victims like the clerks. When the clerks speak of what they believe to be the unfair treatment of certain managers, they speak of it indignantly as being typically unfair treatment of clerks by the management, and as things which affect the clerks as a whole.

On the other hand, promotions and demotions among what they regard as the management - the general-managers - are talked of with detached interest, as things that do not affect them at all. It is significant, too, that the clerks complain about the need for managers below the rank of general-managers. It is a common complaint that the main difficulties which arise in the Office are due to the lack of a lower management. This complaint reveals quite clearly the fact that the clerks do not see the present managers as constituting this "lower management".

Whenever I found that I was interviewing a clerk who had Works experience I asked him to define the status of the managers in Works terms. The answer I got every time was that the managers are equivalent to Works foremen, no more; it was strongly asserted that the managers in here are in no way equal in status to managers at the Works.

ii. The clerks express the attitude in the way in which they speak to, and behave towards, the managers. In dealing with managers the clerks are respectful, but respectful in the way they are towards the older and more senior clerks, not in the way they are towards general-managers. The older clerks usually call the managers by their Christian names - something they would never do to a general-manager; the younger clerks normally address them as "Mr.", this being the same/

same mode of address that they use towards the older clerks.

As I will show later, the clerks speak freely to their managers on matters concerning the Company and the Office while they do not speak freely on these matters to the general-managers. One example of the fact that they will speak freely in front of managers is their election of a manager to the committee of the Staff Association.

If a general-manager walks into a room there is a distinct change in the atmosphere; clerks pretend to be very busy, those who are talking to each other begin to whisper, and there is a general feeling of constraint. The effect of a manager entering a room is almost negligible, the clerks go on with what they are doing, regardless of whether they are working, reading the paper, or teasing one of the girls.

Beliefs.

The belief that the clerks hold of the manager is that they are not managers in the true sense at all but only senior clerks.

Origins.

There are several reasons for the belief.

i. There is a historical reason for it. The title manager was, until a few years ago, only used by men who had the functions of the present general-managers. The men who are known as managers to-day were known as section-heads, department heads, or chief clerks, and were looked upon as no more than the head clerks of their sections or departments. When the change in title was made it involved no change in function, the same people went on doing the same work but were henceforth known as managers. Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that neither the clerks nor the new "managers" attach much significance to this change of nomenclature.

ii. The clerks claim that the so-called managers in this Office have not got full status as managers. They say that to be a real manager one must hold an official Company appointment as such, and have a salary that is fixed by an official scale, and can only be altered by the Company Secretary. The clerks say that most of the men designated managers in this Office hold only a local, not a Company, appointment, and their salary, like that of the clerks, is a matter for the Office Manager to decide.

iii. The clerks claim that the managers in this Office do not carry out the functions of management - they do not manage. It is held that a real manager's job is to make policy, fix prices, make decisions about the work, and to handle all personnel matters in their departments: these functions, however, are performed by general-managers in this Office. All matters that require a decision are referred to general-managers and the managers rarely make decisions, even on minor matters. The clerks complain that very few of the managers will accept the responsibility of making a/

a decision on anything concerning either the work or personnel matters. One clerk said to me, in defining the position of managers - "If I want anything I go to the general-manager, I go through the manager but never to him. The manager is just a channel to management, he doesn't make the decision he just leads to someone who will". Another clerk said to me of his manager: "If I even want an afternoon off to go to a wedding it has to go to the general manager, the manager can't decide a thing".

This characteristic of the managers impresses other people as well as the clerks. One new O. & M. man had dealings with certain managers and general-managers before he knew their exact status in the Company. One day he asked me about the official status of each of these people and found that I confirmed his own guesses. He then said: "It's quite remarkable the difference between managers and general-managers. Every one of the general-managers I have met would state an opinion and make a decision on the spot. The ones you say are managers would never commit themselves to anything, and always referred me to someone else. The general-managers were confident and quite at their ease, the others were nervous and dead cagey". He went on to remark on the distinct difference in social behaviour between managers and general-managers.

I noted these remarks at the time as I considered them an interesting example of the immediate impressions that the managers and general-managers made upon a man whose powers of observation I respected, and whose observation at that time was still unaffected either by personal prejudice or any knowledge of the reputations of the people concerned. It seems clear enough that, until the managers act independently and begin to manage, the clerks will not take their status seriously.

iv. The clerks and the managers belong to the same social class, and to similar, and in some cases the same, social groups within that class. The managers have been promoted from clerks, and their promotion, while it raises their status within their social class, is not sufficient to raise them into a different social class. The clerks and managers follow the same behaviour patterns, they speak in the same way, and live in the same districts. In some cases they are personal friends of clerks, or of their families, and regularly visit their houses. The managers attend the social functions of their departments as a matter of course and their presence is not felt to impose any constraint. Within the Office, as I have said, the older clerks often call them by their Christian names and will occasionally slip out for a drink with them.

The similarity of social background between clerks and managers is emphasised by the difference of social background between these two and the general-managers./

managers. In speech and social behaviour patterns the general-managers are distinctly different; as I remarked above, this is one of the things which impress an outside observer immediately. These differences make close social relations between managers and general-managers very difficult, and force the managers to depend on each other, and on the clerks, for their social relations. Thus, as the clerks see and note, the managers belong socially to the clerks' group and are cut off socially from the management group: this confirms the belief that they are not part of management.

Remarks.

The Company is trying to raise the status of the managers and the institution of a separate Managers' Canteen is part of this attempt. So far, they have been unsuccessful. There are two main reasons for this:-

i. The older managers were trained to look on their jobs as those of head clerks and they refuse to believe that they are now managers. Some of them still do a certain amount of routine clerical work that is really the job of ordinary clerks, and they see nothing incongruous in doing this kind of work. Some of them have told me openly that they are not managers and do not pretend to be; one said: "Anyone who likes to kid himself that he is a manager is welcome to, but most of us know bloody well we aren't". Only time and a new generation of managers can change this outlook.

ii. The separate Managers' Canteen has had little effect as yet, mainly because it has not had time to do so. Another factor which affects its success in this respect is that the canteen includes many men who are clearly only clerks, and who are included - so the clerks believe - only as a reward for long service to the Company. The clerks ridicule the idea that these men are managers and this lowers the status of the canteen, and consequently of the men who use it. It is commonly said by the clerks that age and service are more important than one's job in determining who uses the canteen.

Having said this, I must admit that with the present paucity of real managers no-one can be blamed for the present membership of the canteen. It is obviously a matter of including non-managers or of having no canteen. Nevertheless, it is unfortunately true to say that the presence of these men has adversely affected the status of the canteen.

Attitude to Promotion.

Attitude.

The clerks are very keen on promotion and attach great importance to it.

They express this attitude in various ways.

i. Almost every clerk I spoke to said he was keen on promotion, only a half dozen said they had a good job and were content with it; the rest openly admitted that they want promotion. Almost all the young clerks I spoke to had some particular job they aimed/

aimed at, and they expected to get promotion - if not in this Company then in another. When I asked clerks if they want promotion I got such answers as "Everybody does"; "Who doesn't"; "Everybody worth a damn wants to get on"; "Of course I do, I'd be daft if I didn't"; and "It's natural to want promotion, everybody does".

During my interview with them the clerks talked more about promotion than about any other subject and speculated at great length about it. The older clerks showed their interest in promotion by their bitterness at not having had the success that they had expected. Almost all of the older clerks I met thought they should have gone further in the Company, and many were embittered because they had not done so.

ii. The clerks' keenness on promotion is also shown by the fact that they rate promotion as the subject which causes more discontent than any other in this Office. The intensity of feeling on this issue shows clearly how highly promotion is valued.

iii. Several of the older clerks have told me that they would not put their sons into this firm because of the lack of opportunities of promotion. They admit that the firm pays well and gives good conditions but they say "it provides no outlet for a young man with ambition", and as they want their sons to "get on" they don't bring them in here.

iv. Some clerks who came in from other firms told me that they chose to come to S. & L. not for higher wages but because they thought such a large firm would be able to offer good opportunities of promotion. It is significant that nearly all those clerks who left other firms gave as their reason for leaving "I could see no prospects of promotion".

v. Many of the young clerks I interviewed are thinking of leaving the firm and are on the lookout for other jobs. These admit that it is unlikely that they will get higher wages or better conditions in any other local firm, in fact most think it unlikely that they will get as good, but they believe that other firms offer better opportunities of promotion and they consider these to be more valuable.

vi. The clerks make considerable sacrifices of time and effort to attend night school, and they do this because they think their night school studies will help them to get promotion.

vii. The great resentment the clerks show towards the "trainees" is due to the fact that they believe the "trainees" are "stealing" their chances of promotion.

Beliefs.

The belief that the clerks hold of promotion is that it is something which is highly desirable and which everybody wants, or ought to want.

Origins of the Belief.

The origins of this belief lie in a clerical tradition that clerks should want and strive for promotion.

I/

I have found this tradition among the clerks in S.& L., including those clerks who have come in from other firms, and among clerks generally that I have met in Glasgow. The existence of such a tradition in this area is confirmed by the officials of Clerical Trade Unions.

That it is peculiarly a clerical tradition I know from my experience of manual workers in this area who show little interest in promotion. The tradition may be learned at home, as in the case of those clerks who come from clerical families; but it is also taught in the Office, the old clerks teaching the new ones, for there are many clerks in the Office who come from families of manual workers but who hold the tradition just as strongly as do any of the other clerks.

There are two main reasons why such a tradition should exist among clerks though it does not exist among manual workers:-

i. Opportunities of promotion are far greater for clerks than for industrial workers. The proportion of jobs which gives the holder authority over other people is far greater in an office than in an industrial undertaking. For example, in C.T.C. with twenty-eight men there are six who hold such authority; in Mains with twenty-one, there is a manager, his assistant, and three section-leaders. These are only the jobs which carry actual authority; there are various lesser jobs held by old and very senior clerks which are looked on as promotion by the clerks, but which carry no official authority over others - though the holders often wield considerable unofficial authority.

   Few industrial undertakings carry foremen and leading hands in anything like this proportion, with the result that few manual workers can hope to reach positions of authority and most are resigned from an early age to staying ordinary workers. On the other hand many - in some cases most - clerks can hope to reach a position of at least minor authority - being in charge of two or three men or so. In consequence clerks hope for and even expect promotion as a matter of course.

ii. The clerks accept the values that the employer sets on private property and freedom of enterprise; the manual workers reject these values. Because they accept those values the clerks believe that each of them should try to improve his <u>own</u> position within the firm by his <u>own</u> enterprise. As a result of the value set on private, individual enterprise, the clerks are free to accept promotion and make their way individually, manual workers are not. The Trade Union movement has built up a value of working-class unity, and to create this unity it has attacked everything which creates competition between individuals. In consequence, industrial workers have become accustomed to regard anything which creates such competition as bad. They do not seek advancement for the individual as such, but the advancement of the individual through the advancement of the industrial group of which he is part. Any preferment or promotion for the individual tends to create disunity among the workers, and gives the employer the opportunity to play one man off against another. Therefore,/

> Therefore, it is bad, and men are taught not to compete, but to co-operate. Thus industrial workers are taught to look on promotion as a potential source of disunity, and hence do not value it. Clerks on the other hand are not held back by such a belief and there is no check on their desire for promotion.

One can sum up the situation by saying that there are two main reasons why clerks, unlike industrial workers, are keen on promotion. They are, first, that they have a reasonable expectation of achieving it; and second, that they have been taught to value promotion.

Promotion in the Office.

Attitude.

The clerks show a very strong attitude of discontent towards the promotion system in this Office.

How Expressed.

This is the subject about which the clerks grumble the most frequently and the most bitterly. Clerks of all grades, from junior clerks to Department Heads, complained bitterly to me about it and maintained that it is the biggest grievance in the Office. This is confirmed by the officials of the Staff Association who have accepted it as a major grievance and who are trying to get something done about it.

The attitude of discontent is also expressed in the fact that of all the young ambitious clerks attending night-school that I have interviewed, only one says that he is doing so in the hope that it will bring promotion in this Office. The others said they go because the qualifications obtained at night-school will enable them to leave this firm and seek advancement elsewhere. I have been informed from various sources that among the group of ambitious clerks who attend night-school it is generally accepted that to "get on" one must leave this Company.

Beliefs.

The clerks believe that there is no system or policy behind promotion and that the governing factor in deciding promotion is personal "influence". This causes the clerks to believe that they have no hope of promotion for, they say, without "influence," ability and hard work count for nothing. By "influence" the clerks mean two things:-

i. Direct personal influence through having a friend or relative in management.

ii. An indirect form of influence due to having the same social background as the management. The clerks feel that the management belongs to a different social class and that they try to recruit new managers from their own class, using social background rather than ability as the main criterion for selection. The clerks say that University graduates and public-school boys are recruited for training as managers, not because of their education, but because attendance at a Public-School or University proves their membership of what the clerks call the "Officer class". The clerks thus feel that this is an almost insurmountable barrier of social class set between themselves and the management, and that this barrier is steadily hardening, and spreading to include all the better jobs which are regarded as promotion.

Origins.

The origins of the belief are complex: they are as follows:-

i. Within this Company, as in many companies, there are people whose families have been in the firm for generations. This in itself is normal practice; wherever/

wherever there are good prospects a father will "speak for" his sons; an uncle for his nephews. This process can be seen at work in all levels of society; a docker in someparts must be the son of a docker; in Ireland a joiner must be the son or nephew of a joiner; in printing, as I found in my previous research, most apprentices enter the industry through family "influence". At these higher levels it is very conspicuous and occasions adverse comment.

Strangely enough the family connections at the very top of this firm - and in other firms I am acquainted with - do not arouse much antagonism. What the clerks do resent, and resent bitterly, is what they believe to be the downward extension of "influence", until the jobs which they might rise to themselves are reserved for men with "influence". It is at these lower levels that "influence" is felt to threaten the interests of the ordinary clerk. The clerks have little proof of "influence" in these lower appointments, but they all know and can quote examples of "influence" at the highest levels. Paradoxically they quote the known and accepted examples of "influence" at the top level as proof of the fact that appointments at lower levels are determined by "influence".

However, there are certain appointments at the lower level which are quite inexplicable to the clerks except in terms of "influence".

ii. According to the clerks, ever since 1918 there has been an increasing tendency for management to be recruited from a social level higher than that of the clerks. This has been done by what the clerks call the "trainee system". University graduates and public-school boys are brought into the Company for special training in order to fit them - so the clerks think - for management. Since the end of the last war the scale of this recruitment of "trainees" has increased until the clerks believe that the intention is to confine promotion to this class of "trainee" alone.

iii. The clerks say that the "trainee system" is a deliberate attempt to place promotion to management on a class basis, for these "trainees" are recruited because they belong to a certain social class, not because of their ability. The clerks support this claim by pointing out that education cannot be the criterion for the public-school boys are no better educated than those clerks who went to local secondary schools. Nor can ability be the criterion, for they have worked with these "trainees" and have found them no abler than the average clerk.

The feeling that it is all based on social class is strengthened by the fact that the "trainees" form a separate and distinct social group within the Office. No matter what departments they may be spread over the "trainees" get together and form a social group which stays together both inside and outside the Office. This group does not include any clerks, but it immediately absorbs any new "trainees" who appear in the Office. This may be natural enough in the circumstances, but it does create the impression that the "trainees" consider that the clerks are their/

their inferiors and do not wish to mix with them.

iv. The clerks complain that they never hear of ordinary clerks - "people like us" - getting promotion; the younger clerks claim that they know all the men of their own age in the Office and that none of them is "getting anywhere". They say that the only form of training for promotion is that reserved for the "trainees", and, since ordinary clerks are denied this training, they will not be promoted.

Remarks.

The promotion situation causes much bitter in the Office. Normally I have found that the feeling between clerks and management is much less bitter than that between industrial workers and management. The reason being that clerks feel fairly close to management and believe that they themselves may become managers, while the industrial workers usually feel that there is an insurmountable barrier of social class between themselves and management. The Marxist idea of "Class War" which is so strong among industrial workers is felt much less strongly by the clerks, as can be seen from the reluctance of clerks to join trade unions.

In this Office the clerks are certainly not "class-minded" in the sense that industrial workers are; politically nearly all the clerks I have met in here have been strongly conservative, and it appears that "it is not quite the thing" to be a socialist. Only two of the clerks interviewed admitted to voting Labour. However, the "trainee" system is arousing much class feeling in the Office, and if it continues and cuts down, or seems to cut down, the opportunities of promotion open to the clerks, it may eventually lead to strong "class" feeling and to a demand for militant trade unionism. This development would take a long time, but it seems to me to be inevitable should social class become the criterion for promotion.

Thus it is clear that it is the possibility of promotion which leads the clerks to identify themselves with the management "side" rather than the workers "side". If possibilities of promotion are removed identification becomes impossible and the clerks will become a group in opposition to management within the firm as a whole.

Seniority.

Attitude.

The clerks show an attitude of respect for, and interest in, seniority.

How Expressed.

The clerks show much respect for the senior clerks; they usually address them as "Mr.", consult them on all important questions concerning the work, and defer to their opinions. They accept, on the whole, the principle that the senior men should be better paid and have longer holidays, though some of the younger clerks grumble that this is sometimes carried too far. The clerks show their interest in seniority by being able to tell me immediately their exact seniority in their section and department, who is senior and who is junior to them, and what their own prospects of reaching promotion through seniority are. The advent of a new clerk junior to themselves is welcomed in the belief that it increases their own seniority since it means that: "You have another bloke beneath you so you are a step higher".

Beliefs.

The belief the clerks hold is that there is a scale of seniority and that every clerk has an exact position on this scale. It is believed that the clerk's position on this scale is known to management and that it is taken into account by them in estimating his status in terms of pay and prospects of promotion. Hence the senior man is normally supposed to have higher status, higher pay, and better chances of promotion than any of his juniors. (But see also my note on pay anomalies).

Origins of the Belief.

The origins of the belief that seniority affects one's status, pay, and prospects of promotion lie in certain traditions which are well-established among the clerks in this Office and indeed among the clerks in many offices in this area.

i. Promotion, among clerks generally, often goes on seniority. The principle is well-established among Railway clerks and in the Civil Service; according to the clerks and trade union officials I have met the principle is also accepted in many Glasgow offices. The clerks in this Office who have come in from other firms all stressed the importance of seniority in their previous firms. In fact, several told me they left their previous firm to come in here because they believed - going by seniority - that they had no further chance of promotion in the firm.

The clerks in this Office think that seniority should be important in determining promotion. The older clerks told me that in the past promotion usually went on seniority, and at the present time when senior clerks are passed over for junior ones it causes a great deal of unrest. A good many of the/

the minor promotions - e.g. to be section-leaders in charge of a section of three or four men - still go by seniority - quite properly the clerks believe.

ii. It is generally accepted in this Office that one's pay does in fact depend largely on seniority. The clerks know that it is normal to get a pay increase every year, or every few years, thus, other things being equal, the more senior a clerk is the higher his pay. The clerks themselves believe that the senior clerks earn several pounds a week more than the junior ones.

iii. The Company recognises seniority in various minor ways. The senior clerks get longer holidays, they are allowed to pick the time when they want their holidays and the junior clerks have to take what is left; and there is the award of a gold watch for long service. All these things are regarded as the rewards of seniority and they raise the status of the senior clerks in the eyes of the junior ones. They also make it clear that the Company values seniority and leads clerks to suppose that if it rewards them in these ways it will also reward them with higher pay and promotion.

iv. The senior clerks are more experienced than the junior ones and as the work depends to a large extent on experience the junior clerks have often to approach the senior ones for advice and information. This tends to place the junior clerks in a position of subordination to the senior ones, and gives both the impression that any promotion must of necessity go to the senior man since he knows more about the work.

v. The clerks recognise a scale of seniority among themselves - whether the management does so or not; the clerks in charge of sections work through their senior men downwards. Thus the senior clerk is often the channel of communication between a junior clerk and his superiors, and as several of the young clerks pointed out to me: "You have to be polite to them, they can put in a good word for you or a bad one; they have the boss's ear, you haven't".

Remarks.

i. The clerks base seniority on service in the Company; service in a particular department, and age, in that order. Thus, in the eyes of the clerks, a young clerk with five years in the Company is senior to a much older man who is new to the Company. On the other hand, a clerk with long service in the Company who goes from one department to another, or from a Works Office to a department in here, is regarded as being senior to all clerks in his new department who have less service in the Company. Thus length of service in the Company rates higher than length of service in a particular department, and both rate higher for seniority than age alone.

As I have seen myself, when a senior clerk is moved/

moved into a department the junior clerks in it accept the fact that he is senior to them, and will have higher pay, a better chance of promotion, and first pick of holidays - even though he knows far less than they do about the work of that department. In such circumstances, I have heard the junior clerks grumble about the newcomer and say that he has pushed them a step lower in the seniority of the department, but I have never heard them question his actual right as a senior to his privileges. They may complain that he should not have been brought in, and that it is unfair to them, but once he is in they do not question his right to be senior to them.

ii. The attitude of the clerks towards seniority is in striking contrast with that of the industrial workers I have seen. Among the industrial workers I have met, seniority counts for very little, the only status differences being between skilled and unskilled and between men and boys. An adult labourer is the equal of any other adult labourer, and a journeyman of any other journeyman. Any sign of respect for older and more experienced men is rare, and all men normally address each other by their Christian names, or by their surnames alone. This equality is strongly defended and men will only take orders or advice from a foreman, or some such officially appointed "gaffer". The reasons for this lack of respect fore, and interest in, seniority are:-

a. That the workers I have met were not at all interested in promotion, and the idea that the senior man was a step nearer to promotion never occurred to them, and, if it had, it would have meant very little.

b. That there was equal basic pay for all adult workers, the only difference being between skilled and unskilled men. A man might get extra pay for doing a particular job or tending a particular machine but substantially higher pay for seniority alone was unheard of.

There are industrial workers who do take an interest in seniority but these are cases - e.g. on the railways and in certain jobs in the steel industry - where seniority brings higher grading and with it a higher pay and status. It seems clear then that interest in, and respect for, seniority occur only where seniority is associated in some way with higher pay and promotion.

Night-School.

Attitude.

The clerks are very keen on night-school.

How Expressed.

The younger clerks express this attitude by attendance at night-school; the older clerks do so by their approval and encouragement of this attendance. Most of the young clerks attend night-school, and most of the older ones attended night-school when they were younger.

This night-school attendance is voluntary, and though clerks may be urged by their managers to attend night-school they cannot be forced to go. Such attendance is no light matter for it involves two or three nights a week at night-school - which often means a good deal of travelling - and another night and part of the week-end spent in homework and study. This may go on for several years; a Higher National Certificate involves six or seven years at night-school, according to the subject, and in cases of failure in the yearly examination may take a couple of years longer. I consider the fact that the clerks make such sacrifices voluntarily shows a very considerable degree of keenness on their part.

Beliefs.

The clerks believe that the qualifications they can obtain at night-school will enable them to "get on" - that is, to get higher pay and promotion.

Origins of the Belief.

i. There is a tradition held by clerical workers in this area that employers set a high value on night-school attendance. (I say "in this area" not because I believe it to be peculiar to this area but because I have not done research on clerks in other areas). The clerks believe that employers will always prefer a clerk with a good night-school record to one who has none, and that only clerks with such a record are favourably regarded for promotion. This tradition is based upon clerks' experience of employers over several generations. I found it not only among clerks in this Office but also among clerks in other Glasgow offices, and local clerical trade union officials assure me that it is commonly accepted by clerks in this area. It has become a tradition which is handed down from one generation of clerks to another.

ii. If a clerk wishes to "get on" he must be prepared to move from department to department, from office to office, and even from one company to another in search of promotion. A difficulty arises here for the clerk as there are no generally accepted criteria for clerical status; no examination standards as in the Civil Service; nothing comparable to the apprenticeship culminating in journeyman status/

status of skilled tradesmen. Thus a clerk moving from place to place has no proof of his skill. The only way in which the clerk can get over this difficulty and acquire some such proof is to obtain certificates of competence in those subjects which are believed to be useful to clerks. Hence, clerks attend night-school in order to obtain these certificates.

In short, night-school certificates are assets which, like the tradesmen's union card, are evidence of skill, and which are generally recognised as such. They give the clerk the mobility he needs if he is to "get on", for with the help of these certificates he can "sell" himself to another manager in the same Company, or to a different employer.

Remarks.

It is significant that so many of the clerks in this Office still attend night-school though they no longer believe that it will help them to get promotion in this Company. They do so, they claim, because it will give them qualifications which will enable them to leave and look for jobs with better prospects elsewhere. Some clerks who do not intend to leave have given up night-school because they think it is a waste of tiem when there are no prospects of promotion in this Office. Thus it is clear that clerks will only make the considerable sacrifice of time and effort which night-school study entails if they are rewarded by higher pay or promotion. If such rewards are not forthcoming in this Office then they will seek them in other firms or simply give up night-school altogether.

The "Trainees".

When I speak of the attitude of the clerks to the "trainees" I am not speaking of their attitude towards the "trainees" as individuals, but their attitude towards the "trainees" as a group and towards the system of recruitment and training which creates the "trainees". The attitude of the clerks towards the "trainees", and their attitude towards the "trainee" system of recruitment are indistinguishable; the clerks see the "trainees" as part of a system, and they cannot be considered except as part of that system.

Attitude.

The attitude of the clerks to the "trainees" and the "trainee" system is one of hostility. The clerks believe that the whole system of training and recruitment which lies behind the "trainees" is most unfair to the clerks and is, in fact, a serious injustice.

How Expressed.

The clerks rarely express their hostility directly in their behaviour towards the "trainees"; in fact, most of the "trainees" I have met did not even suspect there was any hostility towards them. Among themselves, however, the clerks frequently discuss the "trainees" and express their dislike of them very strongly. Liking is sometimes expressed for individual ones, but the "trainees" as a group are rarely spoken of except with contempt and hostility. The clerks refer to them as: "The highly polished types"; "The old-school tie gang"; "The fancy characters"; and "The spivs". All the clerks I interviewed spoke about the "trainees" at some length, and all were hostile to them. Many clerks became very heated and delivered a violent attack upon the "trainees", and upon the firm for having them. There could be no doubt of the hostility towards them; the mere sight of a new "trainee" in a department or in the canteen was enough to arouse hostile comment.

I will give an example of one conversation I heard in the canteen when a new "trainee" appeared. On seeing the new "trainee", one clerk said to another "What the hell's that?", to which the other replied "Another of these trainee bastards, what else could it be." The rest of the table then took up the subject with such comments as: "I wonder what poor buggar's got him to train" and "He'll be some big shot's bloody relative no doubt". I quote this conversation as typical of many such. Often when I was interviewing a clerk and a "trainee" came into the department the clerk would point him out to me with comments like: "Look at that, that's our future bosses"; and "Look at the bloody comedians we have to put up with".

The system of having "trainees" is called a gross injustice by the clerks, and they remarked of it: "It sickens you off with the firm"; "It takes the heart out of you"; and "It's the sort of thing that breeds communism". Much of the clerks' hostility to this system is expressed in the deep distrust they have of management on promotion matters. This will be discussed later under "Promotion".

Beliefs.

The beliefs held of the "trainees" and the "trainee" system are complex and contain the following main points:

i. The "trainees" are believed to be members of a privileged social class, what the clerks call the "public school" or "the officer class"; and the clerks say that the only reason for their selection as "trainees" is their membership of this class. They believe that, because of their social background, the "trainees" are given training and opportunities of promotion which are completely denied to the ordinary clerk. It is expected that they will come to monopolise promotion in the Company, thus "stealing" jobs from the clerks who feel that they are being forced to train men with less ability and experience than themselves to be their managers.

ii. The "trainees" are believed to have friends or relatives among the management.

iii. The "trainees", in spite of their youth and inexperience, are believed to be more highly paid than the clerks.

iv. The "trainees" are believed to think themselves intellectually superior to the clerks, and to claim they can master in a few weeks the jobs which clerks take years to learn.

v. The "trainees" are believed to think themselves socially superior to the clerks, and to hold themselves aloof, mixing with the clerks as little as possible.

vi. The "trainees" are believed to think their status in the Company is higher than that of the clerks and to behave as if they were members of management.

Origins of the Beliefs.

i. The most important source of these beliefs lies in the class structure of our society. Because our society is divided into certain distinct social classes a belief has arisen that all the higher appointments - what we may call in military tems the "officer" as distinct from the "other rank" jobs - in most branches of our society are the monopoly of one social class. Officer rank in the forces, the better posts in the Civil Service and management jobs in industry are believed to be reserved for this class. Thus the chief qualification for an "officer" post is membership of the "officer" or "public-school" class. It is believed that people who do not belong to this class have little hope of getting "officer" posts. Whether this belief is true or false does not concern us here; what is important is the fact that it exists, and is believed by many people - including the clerks in this Office.

The clerks in this Office believe that the "trainees" all belong to this "officer" class. To the clerks the one thing the "trainees" have in common is their social class. They all show the patterns of speech, manners, dress, and behaviour, which the clerks associate only with people of the "officer" class. For/

For example, the accents of the "trainees" are what the clerks term "public school", or "Oxford", or, in plain Glasgow, "pan loaf": their dress includes white collars with striped shirts, bowler hats, hacking jackets and tight trousers. These are looked on by the clerks as symbols denoting the wearer's membership of the "officer" class. Since the "trainees" are members of this class they must - in the clerks' view - be intended for management. The reasoning behind this is simple enough. People of the "officer" class only do "officer" jobs, the management of S.& L., who also belong to the "officer" class, would not allow another member of their class to do ordinary clerical work.

ii. Clerks have worked with "trainees" for some time now and they have come to the conclusion that the "trainees" have no special qualities, and that, on the whole, they are no better than the average clerk, while most are distinctly worse than the good clerks. This helps to convince the clerks that "class distinction" is the sole reason for the opportunities given to the "trainees".

iii. The "trainees" appear to have a higher standard of living than the clerks; they dress, and appear to live at a standard which the clerks could not afford. This leads the clerks to assume that the "trainees" are far more highly paid than they and that, in consequence, they have higher status in the Company. This fits in with their belief that the "trainees", as members of the "officer" class, have to be paid enough to enable them to live up to the standards of that class. The Company is thus forced to promote people of this class if only in order to have an excuse for paying them so highly.

iv. The "trainees" interact with management more than the clerks do, and are more self-confident in their approach to management. In conversation they are apt to give the impression that they are on intimate terms with members of the management. Some of the "trainees" bandy the names of directors and general-managers about as though they were personal friends of theirs. It is quite possible that these "trainees" do want people to believe that they have friends in management, and they certainly make this impression on the clerks.

v. All the "trainees" I have met think they are intended for management and make no secret of it. They believe they are being trained as future managers, and none of them expects to end up as an ordinary clerk. The clerks know this and comment about it among themselves.

vi. There is apparently only one system of selection and training for promotion - this being the "trainee" system - and the ordinary clerks feel they are never selected under this system. As "trainees" are, in the clerks' view, always ex-public school boys this means that the only system of training and/

and recruitment in the Company is governed by social class and the ordinary clerk is permanently debarred from promotion.

vii. Some "trainees" do think that they are superior to the clerks, both socially and intellectually, and they show this in their behaviour. Others, as becomes future managers, do not care to be too friendly with the clerks. But the biggest factor in producing the impression of snobbery is the fact that clerks and "trainees" have a very different background, and find it hard to mix with each other. The "trainees" tend to gravitate towards other "trainees". They can be seen forming a single and separate group in the canteen, and they are known to have contact with each other outside the Office. In some cases individual clerks and "trainees" have tried to establish friendly relations with each other, but I know of no case where really friendly terms have been established. Clerks who have tried complained to me that they could never get over the "social barrier". This "barrier" may be due to differences of background rather than a deliberate withdrawal.

To sum up, the clerks dislike the "trainees". Their reason for doing so is that the "trainees" are depriving the clerks of opportunities of promotion. This is yet another example of the value the clerks set on individual promotion.

Pay.

There are two main aspects of pay and they require separate discussion: they are:-

(a) The amount of pay.

(b) The system of pay.

a. The Amount of Pay.

Attitude.

The attitude of the clerks to the amount of pay is, on the whole, one of satisfaction. They are not over-enthusiastic about the amount they get, but they are certainly not seriously dissatisfied.

How Expressed.

This attitude is expressed mainly in a negative way by the lack of any serious grumbling about the amount of pay. The clerks rarely volunteer the opinion that pay is good, but, if asked, say: "It's not bad"; "We can't grumble"; "We do quite well". Since the clerks are not inclined to be over-demonstrative these statements can be taken to imply that they are well satisfied with the amount of pay.

Beliefs.

The belief held about the amount of pay is that this firm used to pay its clerks very well indeed, and that it was one of the best paying firms in the country. Since the war, it has ceased to be quite so good and now it lags a little behind such firms as Coats, I.C.I., and Colvilles: nevertheless it still pays better than most firms.

Origins of the Belief.

The older clerks spread stories of how well the firm paid pre-war, and the Company seems to have had a great reputation in this area for paying well. The clerks take great interest in the I.C.I., Coats, and Colvilles, and try to discover their pay and conditions. According to the stories current in the Office, these firms have, in recent years, paid better than S.& L. and they tend to lead in pay increases, with S.& L. always following their lead, never taking the initiative in raising pay themselves.

The clerks who come in from smaller firms and the clerks who have friends in smaller firms confirm that S.& L. still pays better than these firms.

b. The System of Pay.

Attitude.

The attitude to the system of pay is one of dissatisfaction.

How Expressed.

The clerks express this attitude by two complaints:-

i. The clerks complain of unfair anomalies in pay, and that there are cases of new clerks being paid more/

more than experienced men, and ordinary clerks more than those in charge of them.

ii. They also complain there is too much secrecy over pay so that no-one knows the rate for any particular job, or whether one department is paid more than another.

Most of the clerks claim that there should be a fixed and published scale of pay in order to stop the supposed anomalies.

Beliefs.

The belief held by the clerks is that the existing system of pay is unfair and is full of anomalies. The clerks believe their pay should be decided by three main factors:-

i. The responsibility of the job.
ii. Individual ability and application.
iii. Age and service in the Company.

They complain that this is not the case in the Office and thatpay is decided in fact according to the following factors:-

i. "Influence", i.e. having friends among the management. They believe that those who have "influence" of this kind are given higher pay regardless of their merits or the work they do, and that even an ordinary clerk with "influence" may be paid more than his own section-head if the latter has no "influence".

ii. Bargaining Power. The clerks believe that because of the shortage of labour the firm offers more to new men entering the firm than it pays to those already in it, and thus, in many cases, newcomers are earning more than the experienced clerks who have to train them.

iii. Age and Service. The clerks accept this factor on the whole.

The clerks believe that because the firm does not want to let people know how unfair its system of pay is it insists on the strictest secrecy in pay matters.

Origins of the Beliefs.

i. This is a long established firm and there are several people whose families have worked in the Company for generations; some of these people are thought to have "influence"; indeed, some of them like it to thought that they have. There are many stories in circulation about people like this who are supposed to be very highly paid, and many clerks have told me that they know of people in this position. In actual fact I have heard very little evidence given to support such stories; nevertheless they are widely believed to be true.

ii. Many clerks say that they knew for certain that some newcomers with no special qualifications are paid more than they. They claim to have discovered this by/

by two methods:- in some cases the newcomer has openly revealed his pay; in others, they have worked it out from odd scraps of information about rises and so on. One clerk claims to know, through a friend, that the firm is offering a higher rate at the Labour Exchange for new men than it pays to the clerks in the Office. Once again these stories are widely believed.

iii. Pay is treated as being very secret and no rates are published. This is common enough in offices, but the very fact of secrecy arouses suspicion and gives credence to the stories of unfairness over pay; the clerks ask "Why should pay be kept secret unless there is something to hide?" The clerks themselves look on the secrecy as definite evidence that there are unfair anomalies which must be hidden. And, because of this secrecy, there is no evidence available to refute stories of unfairness over pay.

Remarks.

There is a strong feeling in the Office over the supposed anomalies in pay, and over the secrecy in pay matters. The clerks are convinced that such anomalies exist in spite of lack of concrete evidence, and nearly all the clerks claim they want more information on pay matters. However, this should not be taken as meaning that the clerks really want an end to pay secrecy. Very few of the clerks are willing to talk about their pay to others, and they made it quite clear to me that they wish their own pay to remain secret. Most of the clerks would like more information about general rates, and about what are the top rates that ordinary clerks can achieve at different ages. But I have no doubt whatever that nearly all the clerks would object strongly to any publication of their own pay.

The Staff Association.

Attitude.

The attitude of the clerks towards the Staff Association is one of contempt.

How Expressed.

Outside the officials of the Association, I met only five clerks who said it is doing a good job. The rest of the clerks expressed complete contempt for it in such expressions as: "It's a waste of time"; "No one takes any notice of it, it's a farce"; "It can't do a thing, it's just a figurehead"; "No one takes it seriously, we all treat it as a joke"; "It's just a bloody comic turn; no one treats it seriously except one or two of the officials. The management treats it with contempt too".

These comments are typical of many received from the clerks interviewed. One had only to mention the Association to arouse ribald comment, and as these comments were made openly and even shouted across a room from one to another it was clear that they were generally accepted as standard comments on the Association.

Another way in which the clerks showed this attitude was in the way they ignored the Association. They talked little of the Association among themselves and seemed to find it a subject of little interest.

When they discussed grievances with me, as they did frequently, clerks would talk of taking them up with their manager, or general-manager, but they never spoke of taking them to the Staff Association. When I asked "Why not take them to the Staff Association?", I received such replies as "That would be a waste of time"; "What could they do?"; "I don't want that lot messing about in my business". I know from the officials that clerks do take grievances to the Staff Association, but the ones who do are few, and the grievances of a kind that the clerk is afraid to raise himself; for example, the question of promotion and scales of pay.

Beliefs.

The belief that the clerks hold of the Staff Association is that it is a useless body, useless because entirely powerless. They look on it as a mere figure-head, a body that talks but can do nothing. In order to clarify this I will detail the three main beliefs that the clerks hold of it, which are:-

i. That it is completely subservient to the management and goes, to quote one commonly used phrase, "cap in hand to the management". The clerks say that the Association, being powerless, simply cannot stand up to the management.

ii. That the Association is a puppet created by the management as a substitute for real trade unionism.

iii. That the management decides which matters the Association/

Association may and may not deal with, and that they do not permit it to deal with things of real importance - e.g. pay.

Origins of the Beliefs.

i. The clerks claim that the Association has never benefited the clerks in any way. They claim that the improvements in pay and conditions which have been negotiated through it would have been given in any case, and that the management merely negotiated them through the Association in order to raise its prestige. The general summing up is that the management decides what changes in pay and conditions they will make, and then inform the Association: the latter does not really negotiate but merely acts as a means of transmitting management decisions to the clerks.

ii. Certain members of the management are members of the Staff Association, their reasons for joining being to raise its status and give a lead to the clerks. The officials of the Association agree that the first effect of this was good, for many clerks who were afraid to join it in case management disapproved were thus reassured and joined the Association. But at the present time the fact that members of management are full members of the Association and can attend its meetings, vote, nominate people for office, etc., is interpreted by many clerks as proof that the Association is not independent and that the management intends to maintain control over it. Time after time clerks said to me: "It's not independent, how can it possibly be when the management belongs to it."

iii. It is widely believed by the clerks that the Association is not permitted to discuss pay. This idea seems to arise from the fact that the predecessor of the Staff Association, the Office Council, was not permitted to discuss pay. In any case, this is the common belief and it was frequently quoted to me. Since pay is the most important subject to Trade Unions and similar associations, the - believed - ban on discussing pay seems to reduce the Staff Association to impotence.

iv. The clerks believe that the management of this Company is, and has always been, bitterly opposed to trade unionism among the clerks. The older clerks claim that before the war attempts were made to organise Tollcross, Clyde, and British Works Offices, and that the management was bitterly opposed to it and the organisers were told to drop the union or get out.

The clerks say that the Staff Association was created by management as a substitute for trade unionism. Seeing that some form of association was inevitable under post-war conditions, they preferred to create an association they could control rather than leave a vacuum to be filled by a trade union which they could not control. I must add here that this is a statement not a complaint. Nearly all the clerks I have met prefer the Staff Association to a trade union since they disapprove of trade unionism among clerks. I will go into this more fully in the next section.

v. The clerks point out that the Association could not call a strike, it has neither the power to do so nor the funds to support one. Without such power, they claim, the Staff Association cannot negotiate with management as an equal. If its proposals are rejected the Association can do nothing, and it is powerless to protect its officials against victimisation.

While I think this is a fair assessment of the Association, I must point out that the clerks make such an assessment only to prove that the Association is powerless. Only a handful of the clerks want to see the Association with such powers; the great majority stated emphatically that they did not want to belong to an Association which had them.

vi. The clerks complain that the Association exercises no control over matters of welfare in the Office. Many clerks complained to me that there should be some form of committee controlling the canteen on which the Association would be represented. The fact that it had no say even in such minor matters as this was held to show its lack of power.

vii. The extremely small fee for membership makes the Association ridiculous in the eyes of the clerks. Admittedly there is no reason for a higher fee, but an Association which charges a yearly subscription of one shilling can hardly avoid ridicule.

Remarks.

The Staff Association is now a recognised Office scapegoat. It is blamed for not achieving the impossible. The clerks criticise it for not being as strong as the strongest trade unions, yet they are not prepared to give it a fraction of the support a trade union must have.

The officials of the Association are widely abused and ridiculed - though very few clerks would take on their jobs and it is difficult to get people to stand for office in it. The officials have the difficult and unpopular job of taking the often unreasonable demands of the clerks, reducing them to reason and making out a case to present to management. For example, many clerks want an end to anomalies in pay but do not know what these anomalies are; many clerks want a pay scale to be published but want to keep their own pay secret; many clerks demand that there should be an organised system of promotion but have no clear idea idea as to what is promotion, or what kind of a system they want. The officials have the job of reducing these ideas to something concrete and persuading the clerks to moderate their wilder demands. Such pleas for moderation only too often bring sneers of cowardice from clerks who are themselves afraid to tell management the truth.

The officials are in an awkward position though they have a far better idea than most of the clerks as to what is a genuine grievance and what is not, and what it is possible to get from management and what is impossible, yet they are often forced to present cases to management which they know are weak. On the other hand, it is doubtful/

ful if management fully understands the pressure which the clerks often put on the officials to present grievances which may sometimes be silly, at other times may be genuinely felt but in so vague a manner that they are almost impossible to express. For example, how does one present a grievance that is expressed by "Pay's a fiddle", and which cannot be broken down to a logical documented case about unfairness?

The clerks are very critical of the weakness of the Staff Association and its officials, but this weakness is one which they, and they alone, could remedy, if they chose to. The real reason why the Staff Association is weak is simply that the clerks do not want it to be strong. All that the clerks need do to make it strong is to give it their full support. This the clerks will not do. In order to make an association strong the members must give up some of their individual freedom of action; they must set a higher value on unity than on individuality. This is what trade unionists in industry do, whether the union is right or wrong, whether the case at issue affects himself adversely or not; the good trade unionist supports his union's action - however much he may disapprove of it. If he acted on his individual judgment each time the union would be powerless. The clerks will not give such support to any association. They act individually and set the highest value on individuality; they think it right and proper to do what benefits them personally, not what benefits the clerks as a whole. Their interest lies in raising their own individual status in the Office, not in working through an association to raise the status of all the clerks.

I am not sitting in judgment on these values; it is not for me to say whether they are right or wrong. However, I must say that the clerks are unreasonable to blame the Staff Association for being weak when they themselves make it weak by preferring individual to collective action. There seems little doubt that clerks would not, at present, tolerate a Staff Association which was strong enough to interfere in matters which they prefer to keep private. Hence it seems to me only fair to say that the clerks have the kind of Association they prefer, and their grumbles about its weakness are not to be taken too seriously.

Trade Unions.

Attitude.

The attitude of the clerks in general towards trade unionism is distinctly unfavourable. It varies between individuals; a few are favourably disposed but the attitude of the great majority ranges from mildly unfavourable to bitterly hostile.

How Expressed.

The clerks express this attitude when discussing trade union matters among themselves, as they often do when trade union activities are featured in the newspapers - e.g., when there are strikes or threatened strikes, like last year's rail strike. In these discussions the clerks express very anti-trade union sentiments, few of them can see the trade union point of view, and in every case the trade unions are assumed to be wrong automatically.

When the clerks complained to me about the Staff Association I used to ask if they would prefer a trade union; only four men said they would; a few were non-committal; but the great majority gave a very definite negative. I was repeatedly told that trade unions are no good to clerks, and that they want no part of them. They express this attitude in action by refusing to have anything to do with trade unions, and attempts to recruit them into one have failed.

Beliefs.

The beliefs which the clerks hold of trade unions fall into three parts. The clerks believe:-

i. That trade unionism is something peculiar to manual labourers and that if clerks join trade unions they are running the risk of lowering their status to that of the manual workers.

ii. That trade unions have no practical advantages to offer to the clerks in this Office since their pay and conditions are already better than the trade union minima.

iii. That trade unionism means collective bargaining with a consequent end of individual enterprise and of individual differences in pay. The clerks do not want this, for each clerk believes that he can do better by his own individual enterprise than any trade union can do for him.

Origins of the Beliefs.

i. One of the basic reasons for these beliefs is the widespread feeling among the clerks that they are socially a distinctly superior class to manual workers. One does not see this at work in the Office where all are clerks, but the feeling can be detected when the clerks speak of manual workers. The clerks think it wrong that manual workers should earn as much as clerks do, and they make such statements as: "Workers just do as they are told, they don't have to think, they aren't brain workers like us"; "The manual worker hasn't/

hasn't the responsibility we have, he just works under orders, he can't be trusted to work alone".

All the clerks I interviewed who had Works experience - both in this and in other firms - said that there is a very distinct snobbery between clerks and workers in the Works, and that the clerks think themselves "superior to workers". They maintain this superiority by deliberately avoiding behaviour patterns which are peculiar to manual workers. Membership of trade unions is one such behaviour pattern, and so it is avoided. Many of the clerks I interviewed who were highly critical of trade unions were prepared to admit that they are probably useful, and even necessary, for manual workers but are certainly not "the thing" for clerks. That this feeling is or was widespread among clerks is indicated by a clerical trade union history which says "Trade unionism might or might not be all right for the working man; it was beneath the dignity of the clerk".

Footnote. "By Hand and Brain" The History of the Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union. Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1958. Page 11.

It is clear then that one great objection to trade unions, in the eyes of the clerks, is their association with manual workers and the consequent fear that they may lower the relative status of the clerk.

ii. Since the war one attempt has been made to interest the clerks in trade unionism. Contact was made with a clerical trade union, and officials of this union held a meeting with the clerks in a nearby hall. During the course of this meeting the clerks discovered that the union's minimum rates of pay were well below the wages paid in this Office at the time and this caused the clerks to lose all interest in the union.

This particular point about union rates being lower than their own created a great impression and the story was widely circulated in the Office. During interviews, this story was repeated to me by clerk after clerk; often the clerks repeating it had not been in the Office at the time of the meeting but had learned the story from older clerks. It now seems to be well established in Office tradition, and is the final condemnation of trade unionism in the eyes of many of the clerks, who say: "If we joined the union we would lose, for the firm would only pay us the union rate. We would be made to join a union".

iii. As I have mentioned elsewhere, the clerks keep their pay a very strict secret from each other. Though the clerks are very interested in each other's pay they will not divulge their own; and, as one clerk put it: "The subject of pay seems to be taboo in here". The clerks know that a trade union and collective bargaining would mean the end of this secrecy and they do not like the idea of their pay becoming public knowledge. This is in contrast/

contrast with the demand that some clerks make for a published pay scale, and is an interesting example of the blatantly contradictory beliefs that the clerks - like most of us - can and do hold simultaneously.

iv. The clerks are interested only in getting on individually, they are not interested in "getting on" collectively - that is, by raising the general standard of all the clerks in the Office. Almost every clerk I met - except those close to retirement - had some individual aim; sometimes this was vague, but often they had a clear and concrete aim. For example, some clerks aim at a particular job in their section or department, while others want to become travellers, or look for promotion in a Works Office.

These are the purely individual ways in which they want to "get on". The clerks appreciate the fact that a trade union cannot help them in these personal ambitions, it can help clerks as a whole but not individuals, and, since it is the individual self they are interested in, they claim that trade unions have nothing to offer them. It may be argued that in improving the lot of the clerks as a group each individual clerk is improving his own lot. This is true enough, but it misses to point that each individual clerk is hoping to escape from the group, and therefore has, so he thinks, only a temporary interest in raising the standards of the group, as a whole.

The clerks not only believe that a trade union cannot help them individually they also believe that it may be a positive hindrance. Many clerks pointed out to me that one big difference between themselves and manual workers is that the latter have no direct access to management while the clerks have. The clerks have purely personal ambitions, and hope to use personal contact and negotiation with management to fulfil them. They fear, as many of them have told me, that if they joined a trade union their only approach to management would be through the union. This would mean an end to personal contact with management, and, so the clerks think, a consequent limitation on their personal ambitions and the individual progress which they value. This emphasis on individualism and individual opportunities of promotion is the most important reason for the clerks' rejection of trade unionism.

Remarks.

The situation can be summed up very simply by saying that the clerks are individualists who reject trade unionism because it is a collective means of "getting on", and as such is opposed to individual initiative. However, the clerks are individualists only because they believe in the possibility of "getting on" or "working one's way up" as an individual. If the clerks should lose this belief there would be no reason for their individualism, and one would expect them to lose their prejudices against collective methods of progression, and, hence, to turn to trade unionism. At the present time the belief that the individual clerk can "get on" in this firm/

firm is being questioned, and it is claimed that only "trainees" get promotion. If the clerks became finally convinced of the truth of this they may well change their attitude to trade unionism.

The C.T.O.

Attitude.

The attitude of the clerks in Sales departments to the C.T.O. is one of hostility, and they claim that the department is entirely unnecessary and should be abolished.

How Expressed.

During interviews many of the clerks complained to me about the C.T.O., and I frequently heard clerks complaining to each other about it and running it down in discussions. It was only necessary to mention the C.T.O. to Sales clerks in order to get a flood of complaints, and there could be no doubt at all that it is the department most deeply and generally disliked in the Office.

While I was in the C.T.O. I found that the clerks there knew that the Sales departments were hostile to them; in fact every clerk in the Department pointed this out to me at one time or another. Several of the clerks told me of disputes they had with Sales departments and showed me examples of distinctly rude and hostile memos which had been sent up from Mains and Boiler Departments. Some of the Sales clerks - but by no means all - who came up to the C.T.O. were met with distinct hostility, and it was quite obvious that relations between Sales and C.T.O. were strained.

Beliefs.

The belief held of the C.T.O. by the Sales clerks is that it is entirely unnecessary.

The clerks say that the C.T.O. is supposed to be a liaison unit between Sales and the various Works, but that it acts only as a barrier between them, and effectively prevents Sales from presenting their case to the Works. The Sales departments believe that if they had direct access to the Works they would be able to get whatever their customers want on the dates they want it, and that the Works would gladly fulfil all their requirements. Thus they believe that the delays in delivery and their refusal to do certain jobs exactly as specified by the customer, are entirely due to the C.T.O's intransigence and not to the needs of production. In short, the C.T.O. is seen as the cause of all Sales difficulties in obtaining customers' requirements. The reason why they create difficulties is held to be a mixture of incompetence and sheer "bloody-mindedness".

Origins of the Belief.

The origins of this belief are highly complex and in order to explain them I must first outline the history of the C.T.O. I will do this by quoting from a report on the department written by two men temporarily attached to the O.& M. Department.

This report says of the C.T.O.: "The method of allocating enquiries and orders prior to the inception of the C.T.O. was for each Sales Department to issue lists of/

of orders and enquiries requiring allocation and delivery times to the various Works, and to select the most favourable replies. This system was satisfactory when a Buyer's Market was in existence and the Works were looking for orders. But in 1941 it became obvious that in order to maintain a balanced and economical flow of production within the Company, some form of central control and channelling organisation must be set up to deal with the greatly increased loads and the correspondingly longer delivery times. As a result the Central Tubeworks Office was set up primarily to control Shell and Tube production under wartime conditions. However, by 1945, it had assumed greater responsibilities and it was obvious that its existence would be justified at least until the tremendous post-war demand for tubular goods had subsided."

Footnote. Report on C.T.O. Ref: JGS/MHS. 15.5.53.

The clerks and managers I have spoken to agree with this statement and point out that pre-war there was a shortage of work and the customer came first. Production had to be adjusted to suit the customer. This was not difficult for the Works were not overloaded and could usually give the customer what he wanted and at the time he wanted it. Since the war the Works have been overloaded and the needs of production came before those of the customer - except for the very important orders. It is no longer possible to meet customers' demands without insisting that they accept standard sizes of tube and that they agree to a certain delay in delivery.

These are the facts of the situation and the reasons for the existence of the C.T.O. The Sales clerks are perfectly well aware of these facts for they have often told me of them, yet it does not alter their attitude to the C.T.O. I have talked to many of the older Sales clerks about the C.T.O., and at first I was given the belief as described above. I did not attempt to argue with these clerks but asked, as one seeking information, if they thought the pre-war practice would work at the present time. In every case the clerks pointed out that conditions to-day were very different, production was much higher than pre-war and the Works were now overloaded with orders, whereas pre-war they were distinctly slack. Their descriptions usually wound up with a grudging admission that perhaps the C.T.O. is necessary under present conditions.

In spite of this knowledge the older clerks still keep pointing out that before the C.T.O. existed they could get the customer what he wanted, while since the inception of the C.T.O. they cannot. From this they draw the conclusion that the C.T.O. is the source of all their difficulties and if it is abolished the Works will, as pre-war, gladly fulfil all their requirements. The younger clerks know nothing of pre-war conditions but they repeat what the older clerks say and likewise blame the C.T.O. for all their difficulties.

The question arises: why do the clerks persist in/

in keeping to this attitude and beliefs when they know the real facts? There are two reasons for it:-

i. A good deal of the ill-feeling towards the C.T.O. stems from a mere handful of the older clerks, men who can remember conditions pre-war. Some of these have a positive mania about the C.T.O. and run what can only be described as a private feud against it, missing no opportunity to cause trouble. Few though these men are, they have a considerable effect on their own departments and, in particular, they impress an anti-C.T.O. outlook upon the younger clerks.

The only explanation I can find for their behaviour is that in pre-war days - according to the clerks - a great deal depended upon the personal relations between the Sales clerks and the clerks in the Works Offices. A Sales clerk who had good contacts in a Works Office could get priorities and special privileges for his own customers. Nowadays this is impossible because the Sales clerks have no direct access but have to go through the C.T.O.

Thus the clerks who, pre-war, could get these privileges and priorities now feel that they personally have lost by the introduction of the C.T.O. Some of them have told me how easy it would be for them to get a job done if they could only call up "Willie" or "Davie" at one of the Works, and they believe that the abolition of the C.T.O. would restore their privileged position. To take an example, the clerk who is most notoriously anti-C.T.O. still demands priorities for his customers' orders - no matter how trivial - and is highly indignant if he does not get them. Several of the C.T.O. clerks believe that he, and certain other clerks, get "back-handers" (presents) from some local firms and consequently try to give these firms priority. Certain rumours are current about clerks getting cases of whisky at the New Year and so on, but there is no concrete evidence of any kind. Though there may be no truth in these rumours of bribes, I do consider that some of the older clerks who are violently opposed to C.T.O. are so opposed because the department curtails their former privileges.

ii. In addition to this rivalry between individuals in Sales for priorities, there is a similar rivalry between departments. The C.T.O. clerks say that Sales clerks expect priority for their own department and think they can step ahead of other departments. Mains have the most important orders in terms of money and think that this should give them priority over departments where orders are not so valuable. Specials deal only in small amounts of tube and think their orders should be slipped in ahead of big ones as they won't make much difference anyway.

Each department has a reason why it should get priority and each one blames the C.T.O. when it does not get it. Under these circumstances, C.T.O. is always blamed for it is obviously impossible for them to satisfy the conflicting demands of the different/

different Sales Departments.

The C.T.O. clerks claim that as well as a C.T.O., which acts as liaison between Sales and Production, the firm needs a Sales Liaison department which will act as a liaison between all Sales departments and will settle some of their conflicting problems.

iii. Certain Sales departments have little technical knowledge of the tube trade and, in consequence, they often send orders and enquiries up to C.T.O. without sufficient technical data. This annoys the C.T.O. clerks and when they - not always very politely - ask for more data the Sales clerks in turn become annoyed and claim that is unnecessary and is just C.T.O's "bloody mindedness". These conflicts do not occur with departments which have a high degree of technical knowledge - e.g. Mains and Specials - but occur with the less technical departments, and in particular with Export Department. The sort of things that C.T.O. complain of are as follows:-

a. One department sent up an order for 1,000 feet of 6" tube. There was no indication of what the tube was for, or whether jointed or not; simply an order for 1,000 feet of 6" tube.

b. Another order was from a customer who asked for several thousand feet of tube, as per his order of last year. The customer gave the reference to last year's order, but Sales sent up the current order without attaching the order of last year which carried the specification.

c. The customer asked for a grade of steel which is not listed in the book; Sales sent this order up without checking that there was such a grade of steel and C.T.O. had to query the grade of steel with Sales, who in turn had to query it with the customer. The C.T.O. feel that orders should be checked to see if they carry the necessary information, and for correctness, before they are passed to C.T.O.

d. 'O' Department is in the habit of sending up orders in foreign languages without a translation. C.T.O. then has to go to Export for a translation before they can deal with them.

These are minor points in themselves, but occurring frequently as they do they cause a great deal of friction, and help to get the C.T.O. a reputation for "awkwardness".

iv. The C.T.O. has now become that very convenient thing - the Office scapegoat. Any clerk who cannot get exactly what the customer wants, without delay, has only to blame the C.T.O. to be sure of a sympathetic hearing from the other clerks. The facts of the case do not matter; anything said against the C.T.O. will be well received; there is little danger that anyone will defend the C.T.O. and throw the blame on the clerk concerned. If a customer cannot have his order by a certain date, if/

if there is any delay in delivering an order, or if the Works say they cannot supply the exact type of tube the customer wants, then the C.T.O. is to blame. There is no question of blaming the Works, or of seeing that the order does not fit in with production needs; there is one simple explanation for everything: "The C.T.O. are being awkward again".

In this the C.T.O. serves a very useful function. To the Sales clerks the customer is nearly always right, but, on the other hand, the Works cannot always be blamed, for that would be to accuse their own firm of inefficiency. The C.T.O. provides an easy way out of this dilemma by providing an ever ready scapegoat. Having become established in this role they are blamed by the Sales clerks automatically, even when the latter do know at bottom that it is not the C.T.O's fault.

The opposition to the C.T.O. as a department and the use of it as a scapegoat is not accompanied by any special animosity towards the clerks in C.T.O., and they get along quite well with most of the clerks from other departments. There are some individuals in C.T.O. who do not get on with individuals in other departments, but these are mainly personal dislikes which are aggravated but not caused by the work. Certain individuals in Mains and Boiler are generally disliked in C.T.O., but it is only fair to add that these individuals are disliked in their own departments and elsewhere.

Remarks.

The C.T.O. acts as a buffer between Sales and Production, and, as one would expect from a department in this position, it is attacked by both sides. Sales accuse it of being interested solely in the Works; the Works accuse it of pandering to Sales. This situation is natural and perhaps inevitable, and is a sign, though by no means proof, that the department is not unduly biassed towards either side.

The Values of the Clerks.

In this chapter I shall be discussing the values of the clerks as a group. I shall not be discussing their basic ethical values or their religious and political values, but simply those values which are peculiar to the clerks in this Office as such, and which mark them off from other groups such as the management or industrial workers.

To me, after much experience of industrial workers, the outstanding characteristic of the clerks in this Office is their ambition. Almost every clerk I met said that he wants to "get on" in life, wants to raise his individual status - both inside and outside the Office - a little further. Note, I say "individual status"; each clerk wishes to improve his status as an individual, much less value is placed upon raising the status of clerks as a group, or the status of Stewarts and Lloyds' clerks as a particular group. It is because the clerks set a high value upon "getting on" in life that they also set a high value on these things which will help them to get on; these can be divided into two categories:-

(a) Things directly connected with their work.

(b) Things not directly connected with their work.

We will first examine category (a).

There are two things directly connected with their work which help the clerks to "get on" and which are valued in consequence. These are:-

i. Security.

ii. Promotion.

i. Security.

It may seem strange to say that people who want to "get on" value security; many people believe that to "get on" one cannot have security, one must take risks. The answer lies in what is meant by "security" and "taking risks", for these are terms which mean different things at different levels of society. To the clerks security means the difference between a good living and the risk of a poor one - during the depression it meant the difference between a decent living and almost certain poverty - and many clerks still remember the depression.

What does security mean to, let us say, a graduate "trainee"? I ask this question because it has been pointed out to me that a "trainee" has less security than a clerk. If a graduate "trainee" is sacked his degree will help him into various other jobs in industry or the Civil Service; at worst he can certainly get a job as a school-teacher at a wage considerably above that of the clerk. A clerk who is sacked will, unless he has some educational certificate - e.g. a Higher National Certificate - have to start at the bottom in some other firm and may lose heavily in wages and prospects. In terms of employment in S.& L./

S.& L. alone the clerk has more security, but, if we are speaking of absolute security and not confining it to this firm, the clerk is much less secure than the graduate "trainee" because of his lack of marketable qualifications.

The same thing applies if a "trainee" is not a graduate but has influential social connections. Speaking once again in terms of absolute security such a "trainee" is more secure than the clerk because his chances of getting a <u>good</u> job elsewhere are much better.

In both cases the social status and standard of living of the "trainee" are much more secure than those of the clerk; when they "take a risk" the risk is much less than the one the clerk takes in similar circumstances. It is a risk involving degrees in good living not one entailing a risk of a poor living.

To the clerks security is extremely important. If they have security, even without high pay, they can take on certain financial commitments which they dare not undertake without it. They can buy a house, or a car, or set out to educate their children and put them through the University; and many of the clerks have done one or more of these things. All these are things which raise the status of the clerk and his family in the community in which they live and allow him to feel he has "got on" in life.

The clerks know this and value such things accordingly. When I was interviewing them, many openly boasted to me that they own their own houses, or that they have a son a doctor or a schoolteacher. Those things cannot be achieved without security; for example, a shipyard worker who often has to change his job, and who, until recently, was subject to periods of unemployment, can hardly think of taking on such financial burdens no matter how high his pay is while actually in work.

Without security a clerk or a manual worker cannot hope to raise his standard of living; the best he can hope for is to prevent any deterioration of his present standard. If he saves a little money he dare not spend it on buying a house or educating his children but must keep it as insurance against possible periods of unemployment.

Thus it is clear why clerks should value security; that they do so value it is shown by their own statements. Most of the clerks interviewed praised the degree of security that this firm gives and it is regarded as being the Company's best feature. The older clerks claim that pre-war the great attraction of this Company was the degree of relative security it offered, and they say that even at the present day it is its greatest asset in recruiting new men. Many clerks, particularly the older men, pointed out that in the long run security is the most important thing of all. As one clerk put it: "It's great to know that you are secure, to be sure of your wages the next week and the week after".

Several/

Several clerks admitted that they came into clerical work in the first place because of the security; and when complaining that industrial workers to-day earn more than clerks they would often add "Of course they haven't the security like us, it's great for a short time but you never know when it will end". Many of the clerks would like to leave the Company and try to "better themselves" elsewhere, but most of these admit that it is the question of security that holds them back. They hate to strike out into the unknown when they are so secure in here.

The two most obvious results of the value set on security are the low turnover of labour and the emphasis the clerks place on security. The turnover of labour in the Office is very low, very much lower than in industry generally. There are the odd types who drift in and then out again in a few weeks, but the great majority of clerks are long service men who have been in the Company for years, and it is quite an event when one of these men leaves for another job. The interest and respect the clerks show for seniority springs from the same value, for seniority without security would be impossible; advancement by seniority is a method of combining opportunities of promotion with the maximum possible security. As such, seniority is due to a combination of two values, those of security and promotion.

ii. Promotion.

The clerks also value promotion very highly, more highly in fact than any other feature of their conditions of work. All the clerks interviewed indicated that they were interested in promotion; what they mean by promotion varies with age and ability, as the older clerks say "When you are young you all expect to become general-managers", but all do want some degree of promotion. The clerks discuss and analyse all new promotions, and, judging by the unrest promotions cause in a department, many of them actually expect it.

Prospects of promotion are of great interest to the clerks and this subject was constantly raised during interviews, no other subject being raised so frequently or discussed at such length, or with so much interest. Promotion appeared time and again as the motive behind many of the attitudes and beliefs of the clerks and seemed to lie behind most of their grievances. Let us glance briefly at the various points discussed fully in the last Chapter which can be directly attributed to the value set on promotion.

i. Lack of promotion prospects is the greatest single source of discontent in the Office and is accepted as such by the clerks.

ii. Several of the older clerks say they will not bring their sons into this Office because of the lack of opportunities of promotion.

iii. Several clerks have come in from other firms not/

not for higher wages or security - so they claim - but because they hope for better prospects of promotion than in their old firm.

iv. Many of the more ambitious young clerks in the Office are on the look out for jobs outside that offer them prospects of promotion. These admit that they are unlikely to get better pay or conditions as clerks elsewhere; what they are after are prospects of promotion.

v. The clerks make considerable sacrifices of time and effort to attend night-school because, and only because, they think attendance at night-school will help them to get promotion.

vi. The animosity the clerks show towards the "trainees" is primarily caused by the fact that they believe the "trainees" are "stealing" their chances of promotion.

vii. The clerks complain of supposed anomalies in pay and that clerks with "influence" are paid more than those who are senior to them. Some of the ill-feeling this arouses is due to the obvious injustice of it - if true. But there is no doubt that much of the indignation is due to the fact that those believed anomalies destroy the value of promotion, for a promoted man who is paid less than his junior has got nowhere. In the eyes of the clerks such a man has not been promoted at all, and promotion on these terms is meaningless.

viii. In the last Chapter I have shown that the clerks attach great value to seniority and try to assess their exact seniority in their section and department. I have shown how this is due to the fact that the clerks value both security and promotion. Seniority is promotion in the eyes of the clerks, and every step upwards in seniority is a minor promotion bringing one nearer to a major promotion, such as being put in charge of a section.

It is important to note that the clerks value promotion on merit. They do not look upon it as a kind of lottery but expect promotion as a reward for ability and achievement. The clerks, as I have seen, will accept the promotion of a rival if they think he merits promotion but, as in the case of the "trainees", promotions based on criteria other than merit are strongly resented.

Two interesting results of this value set on promotion which have not been discussed earlier are secrecy and lack of solidarity among the clerks.

The only restrictive practice that I have found in this Office is that which the clerks refer to as "secrecy"; this is the practice of deliberately withholding information from other clerks.

The clerks say there are two reasons for this practice. The first, and major reason, is that it helps clerks to get promotion. A clerk who has a monopoly of certain/

certain information can make the other clerks come to him for information and advice. This raises the clerk's prestige in his department and may impress his superiors. In addition, withholding information from others helps to hold back potential rivals for promotion.

Several clerks have told me that they had difficulty in learning their jobs because older clerks kept back vital information; in every case the clerks presumed the reason to be that: "He was scared I might do him out of his job". From my own observation I know that many of the older and senior clerks build up the importance of their work and are afraid of the younger clerks learning to do it. They are not afraid of the sack but of the loss of status in their department, and the possible end to their hopes of promotion if it were found that a younger clerk could do their work.

A second but minor reason given by the clerks is that secrecy gives a clerk security because it makes him indispensable since no-one else can do his job properly. The clerks say that during the depression this was far more important than it is to-day; indeed many claim that during the depression it was the major reason for secrecy.

Thus it can be seen that this practice springs from the value set on promotion and security, particularly - at the present day - that set on promotion.

The other important result of the value set on promotion is the lack of any solidarity among the clerks, I use the term "solidarity" in its trade union sense as being a feeling of unity in defence of common interests.

Most of the clerks I have met definitely do not want a trade union, and their support of the Staff Association is at best half-hearted. The officials of the Association, and the clerks themselves, admit that it could not count upon the support of the clerks if, in defence of their interests, it took any action which brought it into conflict with the management. The clerks prefer to use the Staff Association for fairly unimportant matters of general interest, and state that they do not want it interfering in such things as their individual pay or prospects of promotion. I have even heard clerks say that it is better to have little to do with the Association for it will not please management or help one's prospects if one is too keen on it.

I will illustrate this lack of solidarity by the following example. The clerks grumble constantly about supposed anomalies in pay and about secrecy over pay; all that is needed to break this secrecy is to reveal their own pay, but none of them will do this. The Staff Association has found it quite impossible to discover from its members what they are being paid.

I have been speaking of solidarity in the Office as a whole, but even within departments the situation is much the same. The clerks tell me that any united action is impossible and that if they were to complain about any matter they could not rely on the support of more/

more than one or two of the other clerks. I have not studied every department, but I spent three months in Specials which is generally agreed to have the greatest unity of any department in the Office. In Specials I found that socially the clerks were on good terms with each other, but that every man kept his pay - and his hopes of promotion - to himself. Though they were friendly, every clerk was clearly a separate unit, kept his own counsel, and went his own way. By the standards of the Office, Specials is a tightly knit group; by the standards of, say, the printing industry, it is simply an aggregation of individuals with little group solidarity.

Another department in which I spent three months was the C.T.O. This too had the reputation of being a department with exceptional unity, and when I first went into the Office the department was comparable to Specials in this respect. However, within six months I saw its unity go completely, and it became simply a roomful of mutually suspicious individuals. The cause of this break up was the promotion of one man, and subsuequent minor alterations in the seniority of others.

The promotion of this man was put down to "influence" and caused much ill-feeling among the other clerks. There was one strongly knit group of seven men of which this man was a member; this group interacted a good deal with each other within the Office and went out with each other at nights quite frequently. After this man's promotion there was suspicion and ill-feeling among this group and it broke up. At present there is no group of men who are really friendly in the C.T.O.; there are five distinct pairs and the rest are strictly individuals. A re-arrangement of the large Seamless section which demoted, or was thought to demote, two relatively senior clerks in it caused further suspicion, and a general feeling of suspicion and discomfort seemed to spread through the department. When I went into the department clerks used to joke and call across the room to each other. Now everyone is very dour and the clerks talk to their neighbours only, and rarely go across to another man except on matters concerning the work.

Promotion or rumours of promotion have caused unrest and suspicion in Boiler, Mechanical, Poles, Export and Mains Departments. I do not wish to imply that the Office is a hotbed of suspicion and ill-feelings: on the whole the clerks are fairly friendly, though they rarely seem to be on intimate terms with each other. But whenever an opportunity for promotion arises every clerk who thinks he is eligible begins to look on the others with suspicion as potential rivals.

The clerks are generally friendly among themselves and in each department there are groups of two, three, or four men who are especially friendly and who lunch together and occasionally go out for a drink together after work. In Specials Department and the C.T.O. there was, as mentioned earlier, greater coherence and the entire department, excepting the older and more senior men, formed one social group. These two departments had occasional departmental outings.

Nevertheless, the clerks in these two departments put their own individual interests first, before those of/

of the group or its other members. The group was united only for social activities and showed no unity in other matters. For example, the group did not support any of its members against the management on pay, promotion or other work matters and was in no way a pressure group acting for its members against the management.

The only occasions on which departments show a degree of unity in work matters is when a dispute arises with another department. Difficulties over an order or inquiry often lead to a dispute between the individuals immediately concerned. These may be taken up by the heads of the departments concerned and become official interdepartmental disputes. At such times the clerks in the department as a whole usually support their department head and speak with feeling at the efficiency of their department as a whole as compared with the failings of the other department. At such times the clerks are most aware of their identity as a department and internal disputes are temporarily forgotten. Yet the department never takes any collective action against the other department.

Individuals who are friendly with individuals in other departments remain friendly; those not so friendly may become niggling and obstructive, but there is no unity of action.

Such disputes are of short duration and when they are over the feeling of unity soon goes and internal jealousies and individual ambitions become more important than unity against the other department.

This degree of unity under pressure of opposition never occurs against the management. Clerks may complain of the action of management and one department may feel that management gives preference to the other departments - e.g. Mains think Export Department are better paid. But there is never any attempt to put pressure on management to redress the grievances, instead individuals try to improve things for themselves by getting higher pay or a transfer to another department.

The cause of this lack of solidarity among the clerks is the value they set on promotion as individuals: this creates a situation in which the clerks are competing against each other for promotion, and makes unity among them virtually impossible. I do not imply that this is good, or bad, I merely wish to point out that it is the inevitable result of their values.

b. Things not Directly Connected with the Clerk's Work.

There are certain things not directly connected with the clerk's work which can raise his social status, and are valued accordingly. The most important of these are his -

(i) Social behaviour patterns.

(ii) Social activities.

(i) Social Behaviour Patterns.

The clerks display their desire to "get on" in the patterns of social behaviour which they follow. They/

They believe that some patterns of social behaviour are generally recognised as superior to others, and that conformity to a "superior" pattern raises the conformant's status in the community. For example, the clerks believe themselves to be of a higher social status than industrial workers - both skilled and unskilled - and they seek to publicise this "superiority" by following patterns of social behaviour which they believe to be superior to those of the industrial workers.

I must point out here that in actual fact their behaviour patterns do not differ in kind but only in degree. Basically they are the same, but those of the clerks are a little more refined and polished. The basic similarity is proved by the fact that clerks can, and do, mix freely with industrial workers - particularly the skilled ones - some of them are the sons or brothers of industrial workers, and marriage into the families of industrial is not infrequent.

Thus the differences in behaviour patterns are slight. This becomes clear when we compare them with the behaviour patterns of the "trainees" and the management which are of a different kind. An industrial worker in this area would find nothing really strange in the behaviour patterns of the clerks, but both clerks and industrial workers find the behaviour patterns displayed by "trainees" and management - their accents, dress and manners - both strange and irritating, and people following these behaviour patterns are disliked and ridiculed.

However, though the behaviour patterns of clerks and industrial workers differ only in degree, they do differ, and as this difference is of importance to the clerks we will examine it in more detail.

i. The clerks speak in an accent very similar to that of industrial workers in the area, but with the rough edges off it, and without the use of those expressions and pronunciations which are considered "common" and "gallus" - for example the glottal stop. To have too strong or too rough an accent is thought to lower one's status, and I have heard clerks complain that some of the new girls in the typing-pool lower the status of the Office because of their accents, dress and behaviour. I myself incurred the displeasure of certain of the typists for teaching an English O.& M. man "gallus" pronunciations and expressions.

   At the same time, the clerks do not like the "English" accents of management, and people who try to speak with this accent are ridiculed by the other clerks. One of the clerks said to me of a member of the Training Department who tries to speak "English", or "pan loaf": "He's as Brigton as I am yet he tries to talk as though he had a mouthful of jorries". The clerk has to keep the straight and narrow path between "pan loaf" and "pure Glasgow", and by use/

use of the sanction of ridicule the older clerks stamp out tendencies towards deviation in the newcomers. I have frequently seen the use of a Glasgow phrase like "youse", "hurted", or the ending of a sentence with "but", bring shocked expostulations from others. People of lower status than the clerks, kitchen staff and commissionaires for example, are free to speak "Glesga" if they choose.

ii. The clerks swear in much the same way as do industrial workers in this area, and anyone who has heard industrial workers in other areas - Lanarkshire for example - swear will realise that there are considerable regional variations in swearing. But the clerks swear much less frequently than industrial workers; too much swearing and swearing in public are held to "lower" one. Several clerks have pointed out to me that I swear excessively and that it is "not quite the thing".

The women swear very little, in public at least, and it is not considered proper for them to swear. This is in contrast with my experience of women in industry in this area; these tend to swear openly and often.

iii. The clerks are much more formal in their manners and behaviour than industrial workers. In works in this area men normally call each other by their Christian names, surnames, or nicknames; in the Office clerks call each other by their Christian names, if they know each other fairly well; if not, they address each other as "Mr." The older clerks are usually addressed by the younger ones as "Mr." Industrial workers in Glasgow often call each other by surname alone, but in the Office - as among students in the University - this is considered insulting and is "not done".

The clerks lay great stress on greeting each other when they meet, the greeting being formal or informal according to how well they know each other. People who ignore this custom - and some do from shyness - incur considerable unpopularity, and when such a person is discussed this point is always brought up against him. The clerks apply this standard to management and the Chairman is said to be "a nice bloke, always speaks to you", while some general-managers are "ignorant sods who can't even say Good Morning".

The general behaviour of the clerks is much more formal and reserved than that of industrial workers. There is little of the general ease and familiarity which one finds in a works; indeed, the clerks make it clear that they object to undue familiarity from anyone. The clerks take longer to get to know, and even when one does know them they are more reserved than industrial workers; among themselves they are rarely/

rarely completely open butkeep each other at a certain distance. Even in Specials, which is by general admission the most friendly department and forms the most closely knit social group in the Office, the clerks are, by the standards of a works, distant and formal and keep many secrets from each other.

Being accustomed to industrial workers I found the formality of the clerks quite striking and it took a little time and effort to adjust myself to it.

iv. The clerks are more formal in their dress than are industrial workers. According to themselves, the war, and the example of the present Office manager, have made dress much less formal than in pre-war days, but even to-day they are still formally dressed by the standards of industrial workers. Clerks who do not live up to the proper standard of formality in dress are adversely commented on by the other clerks, and even get joking but pointed criticisms made to them directly. In matters of dress the clerks provide an interesting parallel to the craftsmen in the printing industry. Printers consider themselves to be of much higher status than other tradesmen - e.g., electricians, plumbers, joiners, etc. - almost of professional status in fact. Consequently, though they work in overalls they go to and from work formally dressed. Their dress is held to indicate their high status, and in pre-war days printers often wore bowler hats to work. To-day, like the clerks, they wear soft hats, but very rarely wear anything so common as a "skippit-bunnit".

Here again the difference between the clerks and industrial workers is one of degree not of kind. Industrial workers wear much the same type of clothes; the main difference is that they do not wear them to work. The clothes that management wear tend to be of a different kind or kinds, and so are those of the "trainees" who go in for such things as bowler hats, white collars and striped shirts, hacking jackets, and tight trousers. The clerks do not always approve of the dress of members of management; one or two of them who go in for Glen Urquhart and other checks are considered as being "too informal for an Office". The dress of the "trainees" is widely ridiculed. Clerks who wear items of dress like those of management or "trainees" are "kidded on" by the other clerks, and I have heard a clerk who came in wearing a hacking jacket asked if he thought he was the new general-manager.

To the outsider these differences in behaviour patterns between clerks and industrial workers may seem unimportant, but the clerks value them highly for they show how he has "got on", how he has raised himself above the industrial worker.

An interesting example of how they consider their/

their own patterns of behaviour to be superior to those of the industrial worker is the following. Many clerks consider that the Office Manager is too informal in dress and manner and that he swears too much. Time after time I have heard clerks say of him: "He's really a good bloke, but he's not the type for an Office; he would make a great Works Manager they would love him in the Works", and "He'd be a wonderful Works Manager, he's just the type they would appreciate but he's out of place in an Office." Most of the clerks like him but consider his behaviour lowers the tone of the Office. In a Works his behaviour would be quite appropriate and would fit in with the "lower" behaviour patterns of the workers.

Thus it is clear that the clerks value these patterns of behaviour because of the way in which they show their superiority to industrial workers. It is interesting that the clerks do not appear to feel that their speech and behaviour patterns are in any way inferior to those of management, and they make no attempt to imitate the management but, instead, emphasise the fact that they are different from the management and the "trainees". They clearly value their distinct identity as clerks.

(ii) Social Activities.

The desire to "get on" and to "improve themselves" is shown by the activities that the clerks follow outside the Office. I have already spoken of the way in which they sacrifice a considerable amount of their leisure time in order to attend night-classes which may help them to get promotion. But, in addition to these, many clerks attend classes to raise their general standard of education and culture.

To give examples of the kind of thing I mean - I know of two clerks who are working for their Highers; one who is working for an external B.Sc. in Economics; one working for his final examination of the Chartered Institute of Secretaries; one taking a Gaelic class; one taking English Literature; one doing a course in advanced physics; one man is interested in astronomy, belongs to the local Astronomical Society, and has made his own telescope; one is interested in Spanish and belongs to the local Spanish Society. These are but a random selection from the large number of clerks who have such outside activities and they show how keen many clerks are to raise their cultural standards. It contrasts strongly with my experience of industrial workers who will rarely make the effort to attend night-classes.

Even more interesting is the part that clerks play as leaders in social work of various kinds. I have collected no statistics of this - though I hope to do so at a future date - but can quote the following. There are fifteen clerks, that I know of, who are Boys'/

Boys' Brigade Officers, Scoutmasters or assistant-Scoutmasters. This number, though not the full total, represents a contribution out of all proportion to the total number of clerks in the Office. In addition to this, there are a number of older men who were at one time Boys' Brigade Officers or Scoutmasters. As well as these there are three clerks who do work as Youth-leaders in the Corporation sponsored Youth Clubs; there is one who is an office-bearer in the Y.M.C.A.; another an office-bearer in the Scottish Youth Hostels Association; and one an official in the Church Badminton Association.

I know much less about the social activities of the women, but here again there are eight, to my knowledge, who a re leaders in such things as the Guides, Brownies and Life Boys.

In addition to these youth activities, there are clerks who take an active part as leaders - holding some office or other - in the Church, local politics, St. Andrews Ambulance Brigade, and the Territorial Army (as volunteers). It is clear that, relative to their total numbers, the clerks contribute a very high proportion of leaders to the communities in which they live. This is all the more interesting as there is no attempt on the part of the Company to deliberately recruit such people, or to force their employees to take up such interests.

I have never met industrial workers in any works who make a proportional contribution. Indeed, when I think of printers, who are among the best educated of workers, I can think of one firm of jobbing printers where most of the adult males have been in the Boys' Brigade, but where there is no one who is, or has been, a Boys' Brigade Officer.

This shows that the clerks, as part of their desire to "get on", are ready to accept leadership in the community, and are willing to accept the considerable sacrifices of time and effort which such leadership entails.

In all these things the clerks show quite clearly that they set a very high value on "getting on". People with a middle-class background may see little unusual in this, for, according to Lewis and Maude this is a common middle-class outlook.

Footnote. Roy Lewis & Angus Maude "The English Middle Classes". Penguin Books London, 1953.

But anyone who knows the working-class background of many of the clerks will realise how unusual it is in their own social circles, and how much it is due to the accident of their having been trained as clerks and not as industrial workers. It helps one to realise just how strongly they will r esent anything - the "trainees" for example - which comes between them and their ambitions.

~~CHAPTER IV.~~

Communications.

When I talk about communications I refer to the means whereby information is passed from one person or group to another person or group. When I speak of good or bad communications I refer to the quality of communications, not to their quantity; for example, if two people work in close contact and talk to each other frequently about trivialities - e.g. the weather, sport, newspaper scandals - but carefully avoid discussing any matter of real importance to either of them, I would say that communication between them is bad. On the other hand, if two people work in different parts of the building and meet infrequently - say at lunch time only - but freely discuss matters important to them both - e.g. their pay, grievancesm and prospects of promotion - then I would say communication between them is good. Thus when I say - as I will say later - that communications between clerks and "trainees", or between men and women, are bad, I do not mean that they do not talk to each other at all. I mean that they do not talk to each other freely on subjects which are important to them.

Owing to the rapid growth in the size of this Office since the war, certain physical barriers to communication have arisen. By physical barriers I mean barriers created by time and space; the Office has become too big for it to be physically possible for a clerk to know everyone, and clerks simply do not have the time or opportunity to establish communications all over the Office. In this report we are concerned with the effect of mental barriers on communications, that is, with the barriers created by differences in interests and values, and by the different patterns of behaviour which arise from different values. We shall study the effect of different interests and values upon communications between the following groups in the Office.

A. Between the various groups of clerks.

B. Between clerks and managers.

C. Between clerks and managers on the one hand and "trainees" on the other.

D. Between clerks and managers on the one hand and management on the other.

E. Between men and women.

A. Between the various groups of Clerks.

As I have said there are certain physical barriers to communication between clerks, and, in addition, there are often feuds between departments or members of departments which hinder communications. We are not concerned with these here; what concerns us is the relation between values and communications. So far as the clerks are concerned it is safe to say that values offer no barrier to communications, the reason being that all the clerks belong to one large group having in common the same basic interests and values.

The result is that there is free communication between the clerks in the Office. Admittedly, there is a certain amount of departmental rivalry, and this causes a certain amount of reluctance to discuss departmental/

mental affairs with outsiders, but they can and do talk freely to each other on general Office matters. On these general questions there is no restraint at all; the clerks talk freely to each other about their grievances, complain about promotion and the "trainees", discuss the characters of members of the management, and joke about the stupidity of the Training Department and the O.& M. Department. The clerks obviously feel perfectly safe in discussing these subjects among themselves, and take it for granted that all other clerks share their views on them. Thus rumours about pay, new promotions and so on, spread freely throughout the Office and are hindered only by physical barriers.

To take some examples:-

At the time of the recent pay increase a rumour that there would be such an increase arose; it was carried from department to department and within a few hours had become common knowledge in the Office.

A few weeks ago a similar rumour arose about the transfer of Specials Department to Tollcross; this too took only a few hours to circulate round the Office.

Time after time I found that when I heard some piece of information from the original source - e.g. Mr. Rennie's posting to Canada - I heard it again a few days, or even hours later, in different parts of the Office.

Another thing which shows this free spread of information is the way in which clerks in different departments told me exactly the same story about the same person, and the way in which clerks illustrated their points by giving as examples people in different departments. For example, there are certain of the older clerks who are believed to have been cheated of promotion. In every department I have been in I had the stories of these men repeated to me with exactly the same details. Similarly, the clerks draw their illustrations from all over the Office. A clerk in Mains Department complaining to me about the Training Department drew his examples from clerks in C.T.O. and Specials Department. A clerk in C.T.O. talking on the same subject drew examples from Mains, Boiler and Export.

As I have said, physical barriers have an effect; Shipping being out of the way hear less than most departments, and in all departments some clerks hear more than others because they have more contacts. For example, it is widely known that there is discontent in C.T.O., but the only clerks who know the real details are:-

a. Certain men in Specials Department who work closely with the Specials Section of C.T.O.

b. Certain older clerks who have lunch with two of the older clerks in C.T.O.

c. Certain young clerks in the football and swimming clubs - there is one C.T.O. clerk in the football club, three in the swimming club.

The only reason why the details are not more widely known is that other clerks do not have such good contacts with/

with C.T.O. There is apparently no other reason than lack of physical contact.

It is quite clear that information circulates quite freely among the clerks, and even things of a controversial nature are widely known. As a result, there is a distinct unity about the information one receives from the clerks; and one hears the same grievances, expressed in the same way and supported by the same examples, all over the Office. Clerks in all departments had much the same things to say about pay, promotion, and the management, and they discussed these things with acquaintances in other departments.

B. Communications between Clerks and Managers.

I must first remind the reader once again that the clerks draw a distinct line between the managers and the management - the general-managers and above. Of communications between clerks and managers I can say that on the whole they are very good. There are one or two managers who are suspected of carrying tales to the management and these are not trusted, but communications between the clerks and most managers are quite free. The clerks talk quite freely to their managers about their grievances - e.g. pay, promotion and the "trainees" - and I have found the managers to be very well informed as to their clerks' feelings in these matters. Things which a clerk can say to another clerk can normally be said to his own manager; they may not be said quite so violently as to each other, but they can be, and are said. In fact, the clerks often talk to managers about matters like pay which they keep secret from their fellow clerks. To give the reader some idea of what I mean I will describe briefly interviews I had with two departmental managers - I will call these A and B.

When I interviewed A he was able to tell me which of his clerks was disgruntled with their pay and how they had complained to him about it. He also knew that certain of his clerks were disappointed over the lack of opportunities of promotion and over the "trainees", and several of them had been to him to discuss the promotion situation. He greatly sympathised with these men and agreed that there seems to be little opportunity of promotion for the ordinary clerk in here. A was also well informed about the objections of certain clerks to the Training Department and once again he sympathised with them. It was perfectly clear that A had a thorough knowledge of what his clerks thought about all aspects of life in the Office, that his outlook was practically identical with theirs, and that he sympathised with them on every point.

B was in much the same position as A, though I think he was on even more intimate terms with his clerks than the latter. B also knew all about the grievances of his clerks and sympathised with them. He felt strongly that the "trainees" were robbing the clerks of their chances of promotion and said as much to the clerks in private. Individual clerks went to him with their problems about pay, general prospects, and so on - I know this to be true because the clerks themselves told me of their interviews with him on these matters. Although B was quite a strong disciplinarian within his department,/

ment, all the older clerks called him by his Christian name in private, and he encouraged them to do so. Outside the Office at Departmental nights-out he mixed freely with his clerks as an equal. There could be no doubt that B was fully accepted by his clerks as one of them, and that he was kept well informed on all matters.

The managers in turn talk freely to some, at least, of the clerks, usually to the ones in their own age group. The clerks know what many of the managers think about the firm and quote their criticisms about promotion, the "trainees", and "influence" in the firm. The clerks know too of the grievances of particular managers and I know clerks who have discussed these grievances with the managers concerned.

The older clerks in particular are on very open and friendly terms with the managers and can discuss such things with them, though I also know of some of the younger clerks who have been given the confidences of managers. In fact, it is a point which several of the clerks have made to me when speaking of their own experiences that very often older and senior men make confidents of the very young clerks who work with them.

Thus it is clear that communications between clerks and managers are free and open and there is a flow of information both ways, though I believe that, on the whole, the clerks speak more freely to the managers than do the managers to the clerks. The reason for this free communication is that the managers are essentially the same as the clerks, they are not managers but senior clerks, and the clerks look on them as senior men within the clerical group, not as real managers who would be outside it.

As I showed under "Attitude to Managers" in the previous chapter, the managers are promoted clerks and after promotion they still retain the values and behaviour patterns of clerks, and continue to mix freely with the clerks. In the clerks' eyes the managers are a higher grade of clerk not a part of the management hierarchy, and so a man remains within the clerical group even after promotion to manager. The managers form the highest grade of that group and are treated with respect accordingly, but they are still part of the group, still "us" and not "them".

Communications between the various managers are good, which is to be expected as they are all of similar origins and hold the same values. In the case of the managers the sheer physical difficulties of meeting have probably been a bigger barrier to communications than differences of values. However, the new Managers' Canteen has helped greatly to remove this obstacle. Nearly all the managers use the canteen - for tea at least - and this enables them to get together and know each other. Those who lunch in it usually go out together afterwards for coffee or a drink.

In these ways social relationships are formed, and, though the talking of "shop" in the canteen is forbidden, the mere fact of knowing each other makes it much easier for managers to arrange meetings whenever they have official/

official business to discuss. They can meet as friends, or at least as social acquaintances, not merely as official representatives of their departments. In this way the Canteen is a great help to communications though none of the managers could make greater use of it than they do at present.

C. Communications between Clerks and "Trainees".

Communications between clerks and "trainees" are distinctly bad. On the surface relations between them are friendly enough, and there is no open dislike shown on either side, but communications between the two are confined to matters of work, and ordinary polite small talk. "Trainees" do not talk of things which are important to them in front of clerks, nor do the clerks discuss such things before the "trainees". "Trainees" only relax and become "free" in their speech when no clerks are present, and the clerks in turn are always guarded when "trainees" are near.

Communications from "Trainees" to Clerks.

There is little communication in this direction. The "trainees", though spread throughout various departments, come together to form a distinct social group whenever possible. For example, they eat in the canteen with "trainees" from other departments rather than with the clerks from their own departments. They meet together socially outside Office hours and show a distinct preference for each other's company. This "trainee" social group is entirely confined to "trainees", O & M men, and Personal Assistants - the O & M. men and P.A's also being "trainees" in the sense of trainee managers. I have never known any clerk to be included in the group though new "trainees" are rapidly absorbed into it.

The clerks are interested in the "trainees" and speculate a good deal about them; what their qualifications and background are; how they were recruited; and what are their hopes and expectations in this firm. In spite of this interest the clerks get very little information from the "trainees", and their relative ignorance about them is in distinct contrast with what they know about each other.

Some clerks claim that they have tried hard to make friends with the "trainees" but they have never been successful. These clerks say the "trainees" are quite polite but keep them "at a distance". As one clerk put it: "You get so far then you are up against a barrier and you can't get any further". Many clerks complain that the "trainees" are always trying to get information but are never prepared to give any, and keep their own affairs secret.

I can confirm this from my own experience; I mixed with the "trainees" on occasion, and in fact I had firmly to resist attempts to absorb me into their social group. Among themselves the "trainees" talk of things they keep from the clerks; what members of management they have met and what they think of them; what the prospects for "trainees" are, and how other "trainees" they know have progressed in the Company; and the things a "trainee" must/

must and must not do. Among themselves they relax and "act the fool" which they never do in front of the clerks.

The "trainee" group has a "pool" of information and when one finds out something about the firm, or about living in Glasgow, the information is put into the "pool" and all the "trainees" make use of it. One example that was quoted to me by a member of the staff concerned the Public Libraries in Glasgow. I showed one "trainee" the Central Public Library and this member of the staff signed a ticket for him. She had never been asked to do this for a "trainee" before, but within a few weeks of doing this for the first one several other "trainees" had been to her to get tickets signed. The "trainees" keep in touch with "trainees" in other parts of the Company and pass round information about them. It is clear that the "trainee" group, in its widest sense, covers all the "trainees" in the Company, and not merely those in face-to-face contact within one office.

I do not wish to make this "trainee" group appear to be something sinister. People with a common social and educational background, as they have, who find themselves among clerks with a very different background will very naturally come together. The process is natural and inevitable, but it is bad because it means that clerks and "trainees" are divided into two distinct groups, each of which regards the other as an "out-group", and between which there is little communication.

Communication from Clerks to "Trainees".

On matters concerning the actual work, communications have been very good, and the "trainees" admit that the clerks are very helpful. However, there are signs of a change; certain clerks now say that they will answer any questions that "trainees" put to them, but they will not volunteer information that is not asked for. These clerks make no secret of their attitude, and their example is influencing others. Their reason for adopting this attitude is simply that they believe the "trainees" are intended for promotion and they don't like it. This is their way of showing their feelings.

On other matters communications are bad. The clerks are suspicious of the "trainees" and take care to hide their opinions from them. I have noticed that whenever clerks are discussing some controversial matter - e.g. pay, promotion, or "influence" - they immediately change the subject if a "trainee" comes within hearing. The "trainees" do not know of the grievances the clerks have over pay and promotion, though these are matters which I found that even the newest clerks had heard about. The ordinary Office gossip about changes, promotion, odd scandals, and so on, is not passed on to the "trainees" - even the most popular of them. None of the "trainees" seems to have any inkling of what the feelings of the clerks are towards them. One "trainee" - and one of the most popular at that - told me that he knows the clerks prefer to see "trainees" coming in as managers rather than see other clerks promoted. A theory in line with the old Army one that the other ranks prefer to be officered by "gentlemen". In both cases it is completely wrong.

The clerks rarely tell "trainees" anything of their feelings/

feelings towards management or individual general-managers. For example, I found that clerks in Mains, C.T.O., and Boiler Departments know what the clerks in Export Department think of their general-manager, but that "trainees" in Export did not know. In fact I found that the "trainees" had some strange ideas about the popularity or otherwise of the various general-managers.

To sum up the situation. We have two groups, "trainees" and clerks, who work together, and are officially of the same status, yet these two groups are quite distinct; and though they live together in a state of polite neutrality and converse freely with each other on trivialities there is no communication between them on subjects which are really important to either. To move from the "trainee" group to a group of clerks is a far greater change than moving from one group of clerks to another, for though there is a community of interests and subjects for discussion between all groups of clerks there is little between the clerks and the "trainees".

What are the reasons for these bad communications? First of all I must make it clear that there are no physical barriers which restrict communications. The "trainees" work among the clerks, often sitting at the same desks with them; they move from clerk to clerk and usually work in two or three departments so they meet many clerks; and they have plenty of time to get to know the clerks for they normally spend several months in the Office. It is clear that the actual conditions under which they work are no hindrance; in fact the "trainees" have greater opportunities to meet the clerks than the clerks have to meet each other. Thus the barrier between clerks and "trainees" must be one of a mental rather than of a physical nature, and such a barrier does in fact exist in the form of a difference between the interests and values of the two groups. I will now try to show how the values of (a) The Clerks, and (b) The Trainees, conflict with each other and create such a barrier.

<u>The Clerks.</u>

1. As I explained in the previous chapter, the most important value of the clerks is that they place upon promotion, and the "trainee" system appears to the clerks to clash with this value. In terms of the clerks' values, any man with ability who works hard and sacrifices his leisure time in order to study has a <u>right</u> to get on. They do not claim that every clerk has an automatic right to promotion, but they do claim that every clerk should, by making an effort, be able to establish a right to at least an opportunity of promotion.

   A man who enters the firm as a clerk, serves it well in that capacity for several years, demonstrates his ability through his work, and sacrifices his leisure time to attend night-school, is felt to establish a claim on the firm. Such a man, it is argued, has served the firm well and accepted sacrifices in order to make himself a more efficient servant of the Company, and, in return, the Company <u>ought</u> to take an interest in him and consider him for promotion. People rarely give for the sake of giving/

giving alone, expecting nothing in return. Giving and receiving establish obligations and counter-obligations, and when a man gives help to another he may not make a bargain, but he will normally assume that the help given will be returned should he ever need it.

This principle of reciprocity is accepted by the clerks. Some clerks put a much greater effort into their work and into their night-school studies than they need do, and they are fully aware that they are "doing more than they are paid for". They make this extra effort because they think it necessary, and indeed proper, to do so, in order to establish a claim for promotion. A clerk who refuses to make this extra effort thereby disqualifies himself for promotion in the eyes of the other clerks.

However, the clerks believe that the "trainees" have now monopolised the prospects of promotion and that the ordinary clerk has very little chance. The clerks interpret this as meaning that the qualities they value - proved ability, technical knowledge, hard work and sacrifice, and loyalty and service to the Company - are completely valueless in the eyes of the present management. This impression is confirmed by the fact that the "trainees" appear to possess none of the qualities that the clerks value - they have no special skill, no technical knowledge, and have given no proof of their ability to do the work. Most important of all in the eyes of the clerks, they have not given any service to the Company, nor are they prepared to serve it <u>except in a privileged position</u>.

The clerks ask: "What are the qualities which the management values in the"trainees"? The conclusion they arrive at is that the management values them mainly for their social background; the fact that they belong to the same social class as the present management. They believe that the management also values - though to a much lesser extent - the standard of formal education acquired at public schools or Universities. The clerks claim that the social class angle is predominant and that the actual school or University attended is more important than the standard of scholastic achievement of the "trainee".

It can be seen from this that the "trainee system" has no justification in terms of the values that the clerks hold, and the "trainees" are looked upon as "usurpers" of the promotion opportunities which rightfully belong to the clerks. This in itself prejudices the clerks against the "trainees" and makes acceptance of them difficult.

ii. The clerks value patterns of behaviour different from those of the "trainees" and find the manners, speech, dress, and behaviour of the latter very irritating. Their accents annoy the clerks, while their mode of dress - striped shirts with white collars, bowler hats, tight trousers, rolled umbrellas, hacking jackets and so on - arouses a good deal of ribald comment. As does the use of current/

current "smart" phrases and words such as the present use of the word "naughty".

It is not really the individual items of dress and behaviour which irritates the clerks, but the fact that added together they make up a pattern of behaviour which we can call - loosely and for want of a more exact term - English upper-middle class. The behaviour pattern is associated with social class, and with what is termed an "upper class", as such is held to be a symbol of "class distinction", a means of showing that one is superior and belongs to an "upper class". Because of the ideas of superiority and inferiority of social class associated with it, this pattern of behaviour arouses much animosity among people of a lower social class. I have found such animosity to be strong in England where it is a matter of class feeling alone, but it is even stronger in Scotland where the behaviour patterns are regarded as alien in origin, and are held to indicate Anglicisation as well as class distinction.

The dislike aroused by these behaviour patterns must not be underestimated; indeed, it is to be found at many levels in our society. For example, among the students at Glasgow University it is strongly marked. A minority of the students - mainly those who have been to public schools - exhibit this behaviour pattern, and by doing so they arouse the animosity of many of the other students. I must emphasise that this is not a reaction against individuals, but merely a reaction against their behaviour, for many of those who react in this way do not know as individuals the people they criticise.

iii. The clerks identify the "trainees" with management because, to the clerks, the behaviour patterns of the "trainees" are identical with those of the management. It is believed that because they are "upper class" they must be intended for management since people of their class would never be allowed to work as ordinary clerks. The similarity of their behaviour patterns indicate that "trainees" and management are one group; just as similarity in behaviour patterns indicate that the clerks and managers are basically one group.

Because the clerks see the "trainees" and management as one they dare not tell the "trainees" anything that they would not tell direct to management, for they assume that there must be communication between "trainees" and management. The clerks also assume that the "trainees" will one day return as managers and, for this reason, as one clerk put it: "The less they know the better". Consequently the clerks are very chary of telling "trainees" their opinions about things and people in the Office.

The "Trainees".

The "trainees" have different values which cause them to take a very different view of the situation.

i. The "trainees" I have met take it for granted that they have been recruited for jobs well above the level of those done by the ordinary clerks; in fact they believe they have been recruited for management. They believe that their social background, and in some cases their education also, fit them for such jobs. In terms of their own values they have a right to such jobs, and few of them even suspect that the clerks do not accept this "right". The "trainees" are not to be blamed for this; they are simply following the accepted values of their group, just as the clerks are; but it is clear that the values clash with those of the clerks, and inevitably lead to opposition between clerks and "trainees".

ii. As a natural result of the belief that they are intended for management the "trainees" keep the clerks at a distance. They are friendly, but never familiar; they are always aware that in view of their future position in the Company they must not be too friendly with the clerks in case it may lead to embarrassment after their promotion. There is nothing openly unfriendly, but relations are always conducted in terms of formal politeness; they only relax and become openly friendly and familiar when in the company of other "future managers" like themselves.

The clerks are perfectly aware of all this and have commented on it to me; naturally it does not make them any the more friendly towards the "trainees". It might be argued that the answer is that the "trainees" just happen to be more formal than the clerks. But this does not appear to be so; I have seen the "trainees" relaxing among themselves and their behaviour at these times is much less formal than that they show to the clerks.

To summarise the situation. Bad communications between clerks and "trainees" are caused by differences in interests and values. The clerks value promotion on merit - merit being proved by individual ability and achievement in their work. Hence they have a like interest in promotion on merit. The "trainees" on the other hand are members of a group which is given special opportunities of promotion. The criteria on which they are chosen for this group are those of social class, that is for having the background and behaviour patterns of the English middle-classes. This sets them off from the clerks in two ways, (a) the clerks belong to a "lower" social class (b) the class criteria valued - attendance at public school for example - are distinctly English and are not found in the Scottish middle-classes. The "Trainees" have a like interest in defending their right to promotion on a basis of social class and value the behaviour patterns which emphasise that they are of a different social class and background to the clerks.

The basic reason for bad communications between clerks/

clerks and "trainees" is the fact that they have conflicting interests in promotion. The differences in patterns of behaviour are not important in themselves but are an irritant since they constantly remind the clerks that the "trainees" are different, and that their special privileges spring from this difference.

It seems clear then that good communications between clerks and "trainees" cannot exist so long as they entertain these different values. Good communications will come only when either (a) the clerks freely acknowledge the inherent superiority of the "trainees" and accept their claim to promotion; or (b) there is genuine equality of opportunity between clerks and "trainees", with the latter coming in as clerks with no special opportunities or privileges, and working their way up on merit, and on merit alone.

D. Communications between Clerks and Management.

The communications between clerks and management are distinctly bad. Below I give the evidence for this statement; some of it has been given earlier in the report, and those parts I shall only summarise.

i. The reception of my previous reports indicates that the management was not aware of the full extent of the clerks' discontent over promotion and the "trainees", and seriously underestimated the strength of feeling about the pay system and the O.& M. and Training Departments. The clerks do not conceal their feelings on these subjects from each other, and I have found that new clerks after only a few weeks in the Office know about them, but they are apparently concealed from management.

ii. The management is misinformed about the feelings of the clerks towards people of the management "class" - that is towards other members of management and "trainees" who are expected to become members of management.

The clerks do not seem to pass on their "true" opinions of "trainees" at all, or, if they do, they are expurgated by the managers before being passed to management. To take one case: I was told by a member of management that a "trainee" I will call Mr. A is very intelligent and that he seemed to be doing very well at his work. As I had heard different opinions I followed this up. I spoke to the manager of the department in which Mr. A was working - the manager at this time regarded me as connected with management and was always very guarded when talking to me - who told me that Mr. A was very good and was doing very well. I next spoke to the clerks who worked with Mr. A and these summed him up as follows. "He's all right, he's keen enough but he's not very bright"; "He's very childish, he hasn't grown up properly yet"; "It's difficult to teach him because he thinks he knows it all; he is convinced anything us ignorant buggers can learn in five years he can learn in three months"; and "He's quite a pleasant bloke to talk to, not a bit offensive, but he keeps aloof. He seems to know he is marked down for higher things and he doesn't want to get too friendly with people like us."

The/

The clerks agreed that he was pleasant enough and keen, but in intelligence and learning ability was not up to the average clerk in that department - an opinion I would entirely agree with. The question is how can this be reconciled with the opinion passed back to the management? In another case - that of Mr. B - management appears to have been left uninformed about this man's remarkable talent for arousing the dislike of the clerks he worked with. To look at the other side for a moment; management does not seem to have been informed of the exceptionally good impression that one "trainee" made on the clerks, who thought him outstandingly able and very pleasant to work with. I shall speak of the reason why the clerks conceal information about "trainees" later.

iii. There is very little contact between general-managers and clerks. I have spoken of this before under "Attitudes to Management", so I will not go into it in detail again, but the management in this Office takes very little notice of the clerks.

iv. On matters concerning the work, communications between clerks and management are bad. I have dealt with this in detail in the previous chapter under "Attitudes to Management", and will not go into it again here.

v. We saw in the previous Chapter under "Attitudes to the Company" that the clerks themselves feel that there is no communication with management, and as a result feel that the Company has become impersonal. The clerks speak of the firm being "too big" and of themselves as being "only cogs in a wheel".

vi. Under "Attitudes to Management" in the last Chapter I described how many clerks believe that members of management have promised them promotion. Since I am assured that the management did not have any intention of making such promises, and since the clerks say that the promises, though always vague, were unmistakably promises I believe this to be another example of bad communication.

The question arises: Why are communications so bad? Bad communications can be due to a fault in the actual mechanism of communication - a lack of opportunity to meet and pass information. In our case this is not the main reason, for even when the opportunity exists - as in the case of the "trainee" - communications are very little better. The real barrier is the distrust that the clerks feel towards management as an out-group whose interests are opposed to their own. This distrust of management extends to all individual members of management, though the degree of distrust may vary. Some members of management are trusted more than others, but even the best of them are part of management and come in for some share of the distrust.

In this Office the clerks were afraid to talk to me at first and discussed among themselves what it would be safe to tell me. At first many of the clerks thought I was a spy of the Company's sent to discover anything they might say or think against the firm. The idea being/

being that I would report back to management who would then punish anyone who was guilty of any criticism. Consequently at first I was greatly feared and was nicknamed "Creeping Jesus".

Most of the clerks interviewed wanted to know what I was going to do with the information, and required assurance from me that I would not reveal the names of my informants to management. Departments had discussions and decided in advance how much they were prepared to tell me. Mains, for example, had a long discussion in the lavatory one day on what they should tell me. One man is very unpopular with certain of the older Mains clerks, and it was reported to me that, during this discussion, the question of what they should tell me about him arose. Several of the clerks said - to quote my informant - "If he asks me what I think of this man I'll say he's all right. If it gets back to management that we hate the bastard we'll all be in trouble".

Eventually I was able to overcome this attitude, but at first suspicion was intense and was aimed, not at me personally, but at the suspected connection between myself and management. Clerks who were out at the Works Offices at the time of Mr. McNab-Chassels's Job Evaluation inquiry told me that the same suspicion of him existed at first. In both cases the clerks' fear arose from a suspicion that management would be told of the opinions or grievances of individuals and it would immediately try to punish those who expressed any opinions unfavourable to the firm. This may seem incredible to some readers, but I can assure them that the clerks were quite convinced this would happen.

One example of this is the way that the clerks conceal their opinions of the "trainees" from the management. When clerks told me that certain "trainees" were no good I asked them whether they told the management their opinions. A typical answer I got was: "You have to be very careful what you say about these blokes, you never know whose friends they are, if you say anything against them you may offend one of the bosses".

There is little doubt that the clerks are genuinely afraid to express criticism of the "trainees" to the management; they believe that management will resent such criticism. One story which circulates among the clerks illustrates this. The story, as told to me by one of the clerks who claimed to have been directly involved in it, is as follows. The clerk was working in a Works Office shortly after the war when an unusually stupid "trainee" came in. The clerk spoke of the man's stupidity at great length ending with a story of how he was set to estimate the amount of tube to be produced from a certain tonnage of steel. The "trainee" estimated the tonnage of tube as being greater than the initial tonnage of steel and the clerk had great difficulty in proving to him that he must be wrong. At the end of his training the Works' Office manager was asked to submit a report to management on this "trainee" and before doing so he consulted his senior clerks. These agreed that the "trainee" was no good, and an unfavourable report was submitted. The result was that the Works Office Manager was twice called up to the Glasgow Office and cross-questioned/

questioned on his report, and it was pointed out to him that the "trainee" had a University degree and hence could not be bad.

The Works Office Manager later called together his senior clerks and told them that the inference was that the management would not tolerate bad reports on their "trainees", and that in future he was only to submit favourable ones. He is supposed to have told his clerks: "Even if a "trainee" can't read or write he must get a first class report; I don't intend to get into any more trouble over them."

How much of this story is true, I cannot say, though I got it from informants whom I have found to be reliable. But whether the story is true or false, it does typify the sort of thing the clerks believe will happen should they have the temerity to criticise a "trainee", or for that matter any other choice or action of management.

A further example which I observed myself occurred when a meeting of all the clerks attending the Management Studies Course at the Commercial College was held, in order to ascertain their opinion on this course. One man who attended this meeting - I will call him X - expressed certain criticism of this course. The other clerks - some of whom I know shared his opinions - came away from the meeting saying such things as: "X is finished now, he'd better start looking for another job; he's had it"; and "X is a bloody fool, you can't tell management what you think and get away with it." The other clerks present expressed horror, not at what he said, but because he had said it to management. Within a single day the news was round the Office and the clerks were all sitting back waiting to see what would happen to X. A little later X himself decided to take another course at night-school, and as he could not possibly do both courses he was taken off the Management Course. When X was told of this, the news was soon passed round the Office and it was generally agreed that this was the first instalment in the management's plan to "victimise" X. The clerks showed little sympathy for X; in their opinion he had "asked for it" by breaking the unwritten rule not to give management a straight answer.

I have found the same fear of talking openly to management in Collins - and indeed among workers generally. In Collins men may be quite outspoken when acting as trade union representatives, but individuals dealing with management were careful not to criticise the management or the firm. The workers sneered at the management's picture of the firm as "one big happy family", but they were careful to maintain that fiction in front of the management. One worker said to me of a director: "I could scream the roof off every time he starts to talk about his "big happy family", but I say nothing, I don't want to lose my job."

The workers were careful to hide their feelings on any controversial matters not only in things concerning the work. One woman told me that one director must be "a bloody idiot" because he spoke to her about the Royal family. She went on to say: "Fancy a grown man talking/

talking about the Royal family; he must be daft! Of course I just kidded on I was daft too and agreed with him, otherwise I'd be out in the street."

In Collins, as in here, the workers were afraid of talking to me at first, and if I had not been guaranteed by the trade unions I should have found things very difficult. Both the workers and the trade unions were very anxious that in my report I should avoid the use of names or any details which would enable the management to identify my informants. Both the union officials and the workers were convinced that any individual who was identified would be "victimised".

I have found that there is a general belief that managements have peculiar ideas and values which the worker - or clerk - does not accept, or even understand. But he must pretend to believe them for to disagree with management means some degree of "victimisation", if not the sack. To argue with management, no matter how good a case one has, will inevitably result in being classed as an agitator. Any criticism or opinion on management policy, however mildly expressed, is classed as agitation. As one clerk in this Office put it: "It just doesn't pay you to open your mouth too far, you daren't let management know what you think." Or to quote two revealing phrases I have heard used several times in here, with minor variations on their wording: "X wants to watch his step, he is too outspoken, he will get into trouble; the management won't stand for that kind of thing"; and "Y is a good bloke but he never got anywhere, he just says what he thinks and it doesn't do in here." I myself have constantly been counselled when working in industry "keep your mouth shut if you want to get anywhere, always tell them what they want to know."

The barrier of distrust which stands between clerks and management is difficult for individuals to overcome because members of management are so obviously different from the clerks. The management have different patterns of social behaviour, they dress differently, speak differently, and behave differently. Thus when a clerk does talk to a general-manager the latter's speech and behaviour constantly remind the clerk that he is not dealing with an individual but with a member of management. Some clerks have worked their way up to become general-managers, but these adopt the behaviour patterns of the management group and thus "go over to the other side" and become isolated from the clerks.

These behaviour patterns are important because of their apparent connection with promotion. They mark the management off as a separate social group and emphasise the importance of social criteria in promotion. This emphasises the difference in interest between the clerks who have an interest in promotion on merit, and the management who are believed by the clerks to have an interest in promotion on social criteria.

Thus the belief that they have different values and interests causes the clerks to fear and distrust management. At the same time different patterns of behaviour/

behaviour - occasioned by different values - act as shibboleths by which the clerks easily identify members of management as being "one of them", not "one of us". Since the clerk is constantly reminded by the difference of behaviour that members of management are the "other side" he is self-conscious and guarded whenever he talks to them.

The Managers.

We have seen that the communications between clerks and management are bad, and we have seen why they are bad. The next question to be discussed is that of the managers. Where do they fit in? Should they be the link between clerks and management? If one examines the theoretical structure of the firm - the type of diagram beloved by theorists in management studies - one sees it as a pyramid made up of a series of steps, rising one by one from the most junior clerk or worker to the Chairman himself. In such a pyramid the senior clerk is a step above the junior clerk; the manager a step above the senior clerk; the general-manager a step above the manager. We move upwards steadily one step at a time. Thus in theory the managers form the step between senior clerks and general-managers, and, as such, they connect the two levels. One would expect them, in theory, to form the communications link between the two, but it is clear that in this Office they do not do so and we must try to find out why.

The answer is that there is a fallacy in the idea of a pyramid of control and communications; a fallacy which exists not only in this firm but in all other firms of which I have experience. In order to clarify the nature of this fallacy I will draw a comparison with the clearest parallel to it I know of - that existing in the British Army. In the Army we have a very clearly marked pyramid of control, a whole series of ranks ranging from corporal to Field-Marshal with a single step between each rank. But all the steps are not equal, for between sergeant-major and second-lieutenant there is the very large step, one may call it a gap, which divides the commissioned officer from the other ranks.

This gap divides the pyramid of control and the system of communications within the army into two distinct levels; official communications - orders and reports - cross this gap without difficulty, but it forms a considerable barrier to unofficial communication. At the officer level there is good communication between officers of different ranks; at the other-ranks level there is also good communication; but there is little communication between the two levels. At the other-ranks level each rank acts as communications link between the rank below and the rank above. Thus the sergeant-major talks freely to the sergeant, the sergeant to the corporal, and the corporal to the men.

In this manner information passes freely up and down; the private can bring things unofficially to the notice of the sergeant-major, the latter can convey an unofficial/

unofficial warning to the private. The sergeant-major has a pretty good idea of what goes on in the barrackroom; while the barrackroom soon knows of the latest gossip in the Sergeants' Mess. But when one comes to the step between sergeant-major and officer the chain is broken; unofficial information does not pass freely either way; the officers know little of the men, while to the men the officers are a complete mystery.

The reason why the big step comes here, and not at any other level on the pyramid, is mainly a social one; all officers by convention are "gentlemen"; they have in common certain values and behaviour patterns which mark them off from the other ranks. These may be somewhat diluted in wartime but they do survive; anyone promoted to be an officer is expected to act like a "gentleman".

The other ranks also have certain values and behaviour patterns in common; to the private even senior N.C.O's are essentially "people like us". Away from a depot senior N.C.O's and privates often mix freely when off duty, and a private or corporal suddenly promoted to the Sergeants' Mess finds the transition comparatively simple. But officers and N.C.O's do not mix freely, and promotion from the Sergeants'to the Officers' Mess involves a considerable change in values and behaviour patterns.

Thus within the Officer level there can be said to be degrees of rank; within the other-ranks level there are degrees of rank; but between officers and other-ranks there is a difference in the kind of rank.

I have found a very similar situation in industry though it is rarely quite so clear-cut as in the army. Somewhere between worker - or clerk - and employer comes the step, or gap, which divides a firm into two different levels - which separates "officers" from "other-ranks" - the exact place may vary, but in my experience the gap always exists. In industry it usually comes between foreman and manager. In this Office it lies between manager and management.

The existence of such a gap in this firm is fully recognised by the clerks in the Office. They have told me that they see the Office as being divided into two sides, the gap which divides them lying between the managers and the general-managers. The clerks say the managers are senior clerks, and compare them to foremen in the Works; they do not see them as being "management" in the true sense at all. The managers themselves have a similar view of the situation. They call their canteen "the Sergeants' Mess" to distinguish it from the general-managers' dining room - "the Officers' Mess - and they picture themselves as foremen or N.C.O's - not as "officers". Some of them state openly that their rank is the highest an ordinary clerk can aspire to, for to become a general-manager one must belong to the "officer class" and have the behaviour patterns of that class.

The parallel with the army is close for the managers are basically the same as the clerks and have the same values and patterns of behaviour. They are senior as N.C.O's in the army are senior, but just as N.C.O's are "other ranks" so the managers are basically clerks. The general-managers, on the other hand, are officers and are distinctly/

distinctly different from the clerks.

Thus the idea of managers as a link between clerks and general-managers is a fallacy. As one clerk put it to me: "There are no managers in this Office, only senior clerks." The rank of manager implies simply a different degree of clerk. There is no easy transition from clerk to management, but a great gap between the manager as the highest degree of clerk and the general-manager as the lowest degree of management.

Thus we are once again up against this problem of promotion on merit or on social class. The managers belong to the same class as the clerks, have the same behaviour patterns, and mix easily with them, but they do not mix with the management. The "trainees" mix more easily with the management and the management with the "trainees" than the managers do with the management of the Company. Hence socially criteria are of vital importance in this question of communications. The managers believe they have risen on merit but can rise no further for social reasons. And they believe that the management who stop their promotion have an interest in seeing that further promotion depends on social background not on merit.

E. Between Men and Women.

Communications between men and women are bad. Though they work in close contact and talk to each other a great deal they rarely discuss subjects of importance with each other. The clerks do not talk to the women - except a few of the older women - about their work or their grievances. The women in turn do not talk to the men about their interests. During tea breaks the women in a department form a separate group that sits apart from the men and discusses matters of interest to themselves. Similarly, in the canteen at lunch-time most, though not all, of the women sit apart from the men.

After a time it became clear to me that men and women had separate lines of communication within the Office. The grievances over pay, promotion, and the "trainees" are known to every clerk I have met, but the women - again with the exception of the few older ones - are unaware of these grievances. Even the few women who do know of them know a good deal less about them than the ordinary clerk does.

The men in turn do not know of many things which are common knowledge among the women in the Office - for example, information about marriages, engagements, and the marital status of members of the staff. To quote one typical example, there is a male clerk - X - who has an excellent grasp of the male system of communications and who is one of the best informed men in the Office. X sits next to four girls who form the female staff of his department, but none of these girls knows anything of the men's grievances or interests, and they hear almost nothing of the information which X receives and passes out through the male lines of communication. X, on the other hand, knows very little of what passes through the women's lines of communication.

In/

In one case, certain women in the Office heard that a man - who was quite friendly with X - was married; this caused quite a sensation among the women who had thought - quite rightly - that he was unmarried. Within a few days this rumour was known to most of the younger women in the Office, including the four who worked next to X; yet, six months later, X had not heard the rumour. In fact I never found any man in the Office who had heard it although it was common knowledge among the women. This is one example, but it illustrates the gap which exists between the male and female lines of communication in the Office.

As in the cases of the "trainees" and the clerks, and the management and the clerks, the barrier which prevents communication is caused by a difference in interests and values. The men expect to spend the major part of their lives working, most of them expect to do it in this Office, consequently the work, and the conditions of work, are of vital importance to them, and they set a high value on such things as pay and opportunities of promotion. The women, on the other hand, fall into two distinct categories; the young ones, who are in a large majority, and the minority of older ones.

The young ones hope, and indeed expect, to get married; marriage and prospects of marriage are highly valued and form their main interest. Anyone who requires confirmation of this might try reading a selection of magazines which are published for women. Because of this interest in marriage, life in the Office is looked on as a temporary phase and little interest is taken in conditions of work. The older women, who accept the fact that they are in the Office for life, do take a much greater interest in conditions. But even these older women, probably owing to the effect of living for years among women and being taught women's values, take much less interest in conditions than do the men.

Thus the reason for bad communications is that most of the women take little interest in the things which are important to the men and vice versa. Where there is some community of interest, as between the older women and the men, a degree of communication does take place.

The lack of communication between men and women in the Office is due to the different roles played by the different sexes, and, as a result, it appears to be quite normal. Certainly it is similar to the situation I have seen in other places where men and women work together. Men of all ages normally take a great interest in pay, in conditions of work, and in their trade union as a means of "pushing" their interests. Among the women, only the older ones show a similar interest, and on these falls the whole burden of trade union work. I often found in Collins that young women did not even know what their piece rate was, while a union meeting would attract up to eight out of nearly a thousand women. On one occasion I heard some girls discussing leaving the firm for another works. The question of pay and conditions was never mentioned, but it was constantly emphasised that the other works had "more men" in it.

To sum up on communications. It can be said that communications between the clerks in the various departments,/

departments, and between the clerks and their managers, is good. The reason for good communications being that the clerks and managers share the same interests and values. Communications between men and women are bad because they have different interests and values.

Communications between clerks and managers on the one hand, and "trainees" and management on the other, are bad because they have different and opposed interests and values. The clerks and managers have a like interest in promotion on merit, the "trainees" and management have a like interest in promotion based on certain social criteria - having the same social background as themselves.

It is necessary to note that the management have not reached the point of stating openly that they base promotion on social criteria. They mix merit with social criteria and say they take people from public schools and with a certain type of social background because "experience has shown they are better people". They say there are still opportunities for a clerk to rise on merit but since promotion goes mainly to members of the "trainee" group from which the clerks are excluded on social grounds this is hard to believe.

STATUS AND PRESTIGE IN THE OFFICE.

It has been shown that the printer's status is that of a "printer" and that he has this status in both the works and in the community in which he lives. The clerk,however, has no status as a "clerk". The reason for this difference is that the printer has pay, conditions, and a level of skill, which are more or less standardised, the stand being guaranteed by the trade union. Hence, there is a degree of uniformity among printers. There is no such uniformity among the clerks. Pay, conditions, and skill, may vary very considerably between different clerks in different establishments so that the term "clerk" by itself conveys very little.

The status of a clerk in his community depends, not on being a "clerk" but upon (a) the reputation of the firm for which he is a clerk; and (b) his own status within that firm.

(a) The status of a clerk as a member of a particular firm depends upon the reputation of that firm; that is its size, standard of work, and its success. The status of a clerk depends also on the standard of living which that firm gives its clerks - their pay, conditions of work, and security. Stewarts & Lloyds clerks have a high status because their firm is very large and has a high reputation. It is also known to be a good employer and gives its clerks good wages and conditions, and security. Thus giving them a comparatively high standard of living in their community.

(b) The clerk's status within his firm. Apart from the status of being a "Stewarts & Lloyds clerk", the clerk also has status according to the position he holds within the firm. For example, whether he is manager, section leader, senior clerk, and so on. If a man is known to have a high status in his firm this increases his status in his community both directly and indirectly. Directly because people give him status according to his status in his firm; indirectly because high status in the firm means higher pay and a higher standard of living, and this too raises his status in the community.

Because of the size and reputation of Stewarts & Lloyds the clerks have a status higher than that of most clerks in the area. Clerks in smaller firms in the area look upon it as a step up to get into Stewarts & Lloyds. In the same way, because of the security and good conditions the clerks have a standard of living and a status higher than that of most manual workers except the very highest class of tradesmen - e.g. higher than plumbers or electricians but not higher than printers.

The clerks emphasise their superiority to manual workers by adopting patterns of behaviour which they believe to be superior to those of the manual workers. Any clerk who behaves or speaks like a manual worker soon finds that social pressure is put on him by the other clerks to conform to their standards. This has been discussed fully under "The Values of the Clerks".

Status in the Office.

Within the office a clerk's status depends upon his/

his standing in the company's hierarchy. It depends upon two things. Firstly, his position, manager, section leader, and so on; and secondly, upon his seniority in that position. Status may also be reckoned, though more vaguely, in terms of pay. Some of the older men, as I have shown earlier, are inclined to hint that they are very highly paid. This is done to impress the junior clerks that the firm accords them higher status than is indicated by their official appointment.

The men who do this are often successful in impressing the other clerks but it is a very limited way of achieving status. For example, a senior clerk who raised his status by hinting that he was exceptionally well paid raised his status relative to that of the other junior and senior clerks of equal or lower official status. But he was still accorded lower status than people who held official appointments senior to him, for instance the two senior clerks who were officially appointed assistants to the departmental manager.

It can be seen from this that pay is connected with status in the office. This is the reason for the discontent about believed anomalies in pay. The clerks believe that some clerks are paid more than those senior to them, and this upsets the clerks as it is contrary to their values for they believe that pay should be related to one's status.

The clerks are very much aware of their status relative to each other and take care to keep it up at all times. To take an example. In the office, as in many offices and works, unofficial presentations are given by the staff to members on the occasion of their marriage or retirement. To this end subscription lists are circulated throughout the office, each subscriber adding his name and the amount of his subscription to the list. Several of these lists were examined and it was found that the amounts the clerks subscribed were related directly to their status. General managers gave £1, managers 10/-, senior clerks 5/-, and junior clerks 2/6. The only ones who gave varying amounts were those of intermediate status. Thus, senior clerks who were second or third in command to the departmental manager gave amounts varying from 6/- to 8/-. More than the senior clerks but less than the departmental manager. Junior clerks with long service who were nearly at senior clerk or section leader level and who would be promoted when a vacancy occurred gave 3/- to 4/-. More than the junior clerks but less than the senior clerks.

These subscription lists were quite unofficial and were destroyed after all the subscriptions had been collected - I had to make special arrangements to copy them before they were destroyed. The company took no official cognisance of these subscriptions and put no pressure, official or unofficial, on the clerks. Yet, in spite of this, and in spite of the fact that some subscribers were friendly others unfriendly towards the person who was to receive the presentation, the amount was always in strict proportion to the status of the giver. Friends never gave more, nor enemies less, than their status would justify.

The scale was set by the general managers who were given the list first and they gave £1, the others ranked themselves/

themselves downwards from this amount. As the subscription list went round departments by starting at the department manager and going downwards in order of status each clerk knew what his senior gave but never what his juniors gave. Thus the senior set the standard for the junior but, not knowing what he gave, could put no pressure on him to conform to it.

It can be seen from the above that the status system of the clerks is in strong contrast with that of the printers. I list the most important contrasts below.

(a) The clerk is dependent on the employer for his status. The employer can give status or he can take it away by promoting or demoting the clerk. There are no restrictions on the employers' power to do this since the status of the clerk is not guaranteed by the trade union or any other body external to the office. Thus, if a clerk leaves an employer he loses his status, and if he goes to a new firm his status in it depends entirely on the new employer.

(b) The guarantee of status which a clerk has lies in the qualifications he can acquire through educational certificates - e.g. at night classes.

(c) Because his status comes from the employer the clerk, unlike the printer, can move from job to job and can aspire to any job in the office. As there is no apprenticeship system there are no rigid boundaries between different types of jobs and a clerk can change from one job to another at any time, and at any age. The employer, and the employer alone, decides what job a clerk shall do and what the status of that job shall be.

(d) Because there is mobility between jobs there are no lines of demarcation. The clerk cannot defend the status of his job against other jobs in the office but must leave the question of job status for the employer to decide. One result of this is that there is good communications between clerks who do different jobs whereas in printing, as we saw, lines of demarcation between jobs prevented free communication.

The only "restrictive practice" used to protect status is "secrecy" which has been discussed earlier. It is significant that secrecy is a means of defending the status of the individual rather than the status of the job. The senior clerk who keeps important information a secret from his juniors is defending his status, his senior position, since the actual job he does is fundamentally the same as theirs.

Prestige in the Office.

The prestige a clerk has in the office depends on how well he fulfils the values of the clerks. As I have shown, the clerks value enterprise, "getting on", which, within the office, means the ability to achieve promotion on merit. Prestige among the clerks depends upon the individual merits in his present job and on the drive for promotion that he displays. To put it another way, prestige, as Paterson says, depends upon how well a man fulfils his function, and it is believed by the clerks that their function is to do their work well and to earn promotion.

Certain/

Certain qualities that increase a clerk's chances of promotion are also valued and possession of these qualities adds to a clerk's prestige - for instance qualities like the standard of education attained at school, achievements at night-school, and self-confidence and initiative. However, these qualities add to a clerk's prestige only if he is good at his job. The man who is not good at his job has low prestige and possession of such qualities as a high standard of education does nothing to raise it. The reason being that ability to do one's work is looked upon as the main requirement for promotion.

It can be seen that, as with the printers, the primary factor in determining prestige is the ability to do one's job well. But, whereas with the printers the secondary factor is the ability to forward the interests of the group, with the clerks the secondary factor is the ability to forward one's individual interests by earning promotion.

SUMMARY.

I summarise the main points from the office research below.

(i) The clerks believe that the office has become too big, and, as a result, that the company no longer takes a personal interest in them but looks on them as mere "cogs in the wheel".

(ii) The clerks believe that the company is, on the whole, a good employer but not as good, relative to other companies in the area, as it used to be.

(iii) The clerks believe that within the company as a whole there are two distinct and opposed sides, management and workers, and that the clerks are on the management side. However, within the office the clerks find themselves opposed to the management on many issues, in particular they believe that the management is depriving them of opportunities of promotion. Thus the clerks believe that there are two sides within the company but that within the office their own side, the management side, is further divided into two opposed groups; on the one side the clerks, on the other the management proper.

(iv) The clerks believe in freedom of enterprise and set a high value on individual promotion. They are not restricted in the pursuit of individual promotion by membership of a trade union or by a belief in the value of collective action. However, the clerks are very discontented with the present promotion situation in the company. They believe that in the past the company gave clerks excellent opportunities of promotion but that at the present time few opportunities of promotion exist except for those with "influence" in the company, or for those with an upper middle-class background who are taken on by the company as trainees.

(v) The clerks have a great respect for seniority. They believe that everyone in the office has his place on a scale of seniority and that seniority is important because it has a bearing on pay and promotion.

(vi) The clerks are very keen on night-school and make considerable sacrifices of time to attend it. The reason for this being that they believe night-school qualifications will help them to gain promotion.

(vii) The clerks show hostility to the company's trainees. They are hostile to them because they believe that the trainees are a privileged group who are coming to monopolise promotion in the company.

(viii) The clerks are satisfied with the amount of pay but dissatisfied with the system of pay. They believe that there are many anomalies in pay and that certain clerks with "influence" are paid more than their seniors.

(ix)/

(ix) The clerks are contemptuous of the Staff Association. They grumble about its weakness but they themselves keep it weak because they refuse to sacrifice their individual freedom of action in order to build a strong and unified association. The clerks state openly that they prefer to negotiate with the management directly and individually about their wages and conditions rather than do so through the medium of the Staff Association.

(x) The attitude of the clerks to trade unions in general is similar to their attitude to the Staff Association. They are not interested in bettering the conditions of clerks generally within the company but want to get on individually, to earn individual promotion. They believe that trade unions limit individual freedom of action and enforce collective bargaining, hence they reject trade unionism.

(xi) The clerks have an interest in "getting on" individually and value those things which help them to "get on". The most important of these things, within the office, is promotion earned on merit. The value the clerks set on promotion is shown in several ways the most important being: (a) their hostility to the trainees because these reduce their opportunities of promotion; (b) the sacrifices they make to attend night-school in order to earn promotion; and (c) the importance they place on seniority. It is important to note that the clerks value promotion earned on merit and place no value on - in fact strongly resent - promotion obtained in any other way.

The value set on individual promotion has a distinct effect upon group behaviour in the office. The clerks in every department are friendly with each other but never form a strong coherent group. They combine only for social purposes and never take collective action against the management on any matter. The only occasions when the clerks in a department show any consciousness that they are a unit is when a dispute occurs with another department, but such consciousness fades rapidly when the dispute is settled. The reason for this lack of unity is that each clerk reserves to himself the right to complete individual freedom of action and puts individual freedom and self interest before the unity and the interests of the group.

The clerks also show their value of "getting on", by their formality of dress, behaviour, and speech, which, they believe, emphasise the fact that they are of superior status to manual workers. The clerks enforce conformity among themselves to these standards of behaviour by social sanctions. They also show their desire to "get on" by their social activities. In particular by the part they play as leaders in social activities of all kinds - e.g. youth work like the Scouts and Boys' Brigade, Church work, and so on.

(xii) Communications within the office are affected by the interests and values of the clerks.

(a)/

(a) Communications among the clerks themselves are good. The clerks have no common interest groups and there is no group exclusiveness. The layout of the office and the type of work they do gives the clerks ample opportunities to meet and talk to each other. Hence there are no barriers to communication. Communications between the clerks and the managers, who share the interests and values of the clerks, are also good.

(b) Communications between clerks and trainees are bad. The trainees form a separate group with a common interest in promotion through the trainee system. The clerks have a like interest in opposing the trainee system, in terms of the clerks' values such a system is wrong; promotion should be earned on merit at the work not obtained through membership of a privileged group. As a result clerks and trainees have different interests and values, and communications between them are bad.

(c) Communications between clerks and management are bad. Again because of differences in interests and values, though lack of opportunity for communication is a contributory cause. The clerks distrust the management and believe that the management have interests opposed to those of the clerks - for example they believe that the management favour the trainee system.

(d) Communications between men and women are bad. Once again the reason is a difference in interests and values. Most of the women hope to marry and have little interest in pay or promotion within the office. Only those women who are likely to spend their lives in the office share the clerks' interest in these matters.

It can be seen from this that similarity of interests and values make for good communications in the office. Differences in interests and values make for bad communications.

(xiii) A clerk has no status from being "a clerk". His status in the community in which he lives is derived from (a) the reputation of the firm for which he works; and (b) his status in that firm.

The status a clerk has in the office depends upon his position in the company's hierarchy and on his seniority in that position. The clerk is completely dependent upon the employer for his status, and the employer can give a clerk status, or take it away, at will.

The prestige a clerk has among his fellow clerks depends upon how well he lives up to the values of the clerks, on how well he fulfils his function as a clerk, which in terms of the clerks' values is to do his job well and earn promotion. As with the printers the basic requirement for prestige is the ability to do one's job well. But whereas among the printers the secondary requirement is to forward the interests of printers as a group, among the clerks the secondary requirement is the ability to promote one's individual interests by gaining promotion.

THE HYDRO-ELECTRIC SITE.

INTRODUCTION

This report is based on my research at a hydro-electric construction camp. I entered the civil engineering industry to do research because I wished to study group behaviour patterns of a type which, by all accounts, was markedly different from those I had met in the printing industry. Through the courtesy of the firm of Wimpey I was given a job as a labourer in their construction camp at Loch Luichart where the firm had a contract for the construction of the intake and two tunnels on the Luichart dam. There was also a small contract for the construction of a fish heck on another dam three miles away.

I worked as an ordinary labourer and told the men in the camp that I was a student working in the vacation, not a very unusual sight in these camps; in fact there was a school teacher working as a labourer in the camp when I got there. Only the agent, his engineers, and the general foreman knew my real reason for working in the camp. I worked as a labourer attached to the joiners' squad for three weeks, talking to the men at work, and in the sleeping huts and bar at night. My reason for working in the joiners' squad was that this squad did not stay in the same place but worked in various parts of the tunnel and the intake, thus, as a member of this squad, I was more mobile and met more men than I would have in any other squad.

The reason I did this research as a participant observer, working as a labourer, is that I did not think the research could be conducted successfully in any other way. The men are very suspicious of outsiders and either close up, or "put on an act", when they think they are being questioned. However, they accepted the school teacher and myself, mainly, I think, because we were actually working along with them, and they talked freely in front of me. Since talking is one of the men's chief recreations I had no difficulty in getting the information I required.

After three weeks in the camp I was injured in an accident and went into an Inverness hospital. I was there for five days during which I was able to interview several workers from other hydro-electric camps who were also in hospital. I then returned to Luichart camp sickbay, where I spent a week; in this time I was able to continue my research and to collect some rough statistics from the camp staff. At the end of the week I returned to Glasgow. Since returning to Glasgow I have added to the information I had acquired by interviewing Trade Union officials, and men with experience of work on civil engineering sites. The following is based on this experience.

THE CAMP AND THE MEN

The second research was done in a Hydro-Electric construction camp belonging to a firm of contractors. The camp was in the North-East Highlands about ten miles from the nearest town. In the camp there were 208 men, exclusive of office staff and camp staff, these were engaged in three main jobs: concreting a tunnel from a dam about a mile above the camp and in building an inlet to the tunnel; on concreting another tunnel on the far side of the valley; and on building a fish heck on a dam about three miles away.

The camp itself was composed of wooden huts and included an office building and accommodation for office workers and camp staff, these were separated by a cookhouse and canteen from the rest of the camp in which the men lived. Here there were huts for the men, a sick bay, a store and post office and a bar. The bar, as is usual in such camps sold only beer, it being reckoned that beer causes less trouble than spirits in such a place. There were two types of accommodation available for the men. The first type was wooden huts in which there were 22 beds, each with a steel locker. The contractor charged 10/- a week for a bed in this and in return provided a weekly supply of clean sheets and an orderly who was supposed to clean the huts daily. The other type of accommodation consisted of similar hits divided into cubicles for two men and for which the price was 15/- a week. The huts themselves were like wartime army huts - which they probably were - the standard of accommodation was about equal to that of the army. That the huts were much dirtier than the army would permit was largely the fault of the men.

The figures I was able to collect during my time in the camp do not cover a long enough period to be of any great value but I include them because the office staff there, and others with long experience in the industry, assure me that the trends which they indicate are typical. For the week ending 23rd August, 1953, there were 208 men in the camp, excluding foremen and office staff; of these 87 were Scots, 108 Irish; 12 were Poles and one Spanish. Included in the 208 were 34 tradesmen; of these 23 were Scots and 11 Irish. The camp staff, and tradesmen interviewed at the camp and elsewhere, tell me that such a majority of Scotsmen among the tradesmen is normal.

Of the non-tradesmen the Irish worked mainly in the various navvy gangs which were overwhelmingly Irish in composition. The Scots provided a large majority of the skilled men such as joiners, electricians, and fitters; and workers in the semi-skilled jobs such as steel-benders and fixers, lorry drivers and storemen; and also provided the cooks, sick-bay orderly, and the keepers of the camp shop and bar. The camp office staff which is not included in my figures was entirely Scots. Thus the number of Scots doing purely unskilled labouring jobs was quite low. The Scots fell into two distinct categories; those who came from all over the country and who were mostly joiners and steel-benders and fixers; and the local men who provided some joiners and lorry drivers and who included some labourers. The number of Scots, not locals, who worked as labourers was very low and consisted almost entirely of immediate Irish descent.

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The turnover of labour for a period of four weeks in August, 1953 was as follows:-

Started 69, 12 tradesmen and 57 non-tradesmen.

Left 44, 7 tradesmen and 37 non-tradesmen.

The turnover, high though it is compared with most industries, was considered normal by the office staff, who said roughly half the men could be considered as being more or less permanent, the rest staying only for a matter of weeks or even days. In comparison with other hydro-electric camps of which I have information, the turnover at the camp was comparitively low. The turnover of tradesmen consisted entirely of joiners. The officials of the joiners' trade uinion - the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers - confirmed that such a big turnover among those who follow civil engineering work is not at all unusual.

The very high voluntary turnover of labour in the industry is no doubt occasioned by the fact that few men in the industry have a perman ent job. When a man is almost certain to be paid off at the termination of the contract he has little reason to cling to one particular job, particularly when other jobs are readily available. Zweig in a study of Civil Engineering in his book on "Productivity and the Trade Unions" makes the point that impermanance of employment is a feature of the industry:- "However, the main feature of the labour relations in the Building and Civil Engineering Industries is its casualness. Nearly all firms have a small nucleus of key men and leading men whom they employ the whole year round and a large casual labour force taken on for a given job which may last a couple of weeks or months, and who are paid off when the job is finished. The nucleus can vary between 10-40 per cent of all the operatives employed at a given time, but is more often in the range of one fourth to one third of the whole labour force." 1.

Most of the men in the camp were out to earn as much money as possible and were willing to work almost any hours in order to do this. The normal hours were twelve a day on weekdays, nine on Saturdays and Sundays; the men were paid on time rate and for these hours a labourer earned £14.14/- a week and a joiner almost £17.[2]. In addition, the men drew a Subsistance Allowance of 35/- a week. Most of the men were constantly looking for overtime and for twenty-four hour shifts; I even came across one man who fitted a twelve hour night shift between two twelve hour shifts, thus working continuously for thirty-six hours.

The few older men, those over fifty, complained that the hours were already too long and said the younger men were obsessed with the question of hours. The men up to ab out fifty, and even over fifty in individual cases, had the attitude that there was nothing better to do in the camp than work. They said they wanted big wages, and if they hadn't wanted them they would have stayed in more congenial surroundings in Glasgow where they could easily have got work offering normal hours.

Wages/

1. Footnote: F. Zweig, "Productivity and Trade Unions", Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1959 - pages 69-70.

2. Footnote: The earnings of the Irish navvies were greatly enhanced by the fact that they did not pay Income Tax. The custom at the camp was for Irish navvies to claim for several dependents in Eire where the Inland Revenue could not check.

Wages and bonus formed the chief topics of conversation and the men were constantly comparing the hours and bonus paid in one camp with those obtaining in other camps. Wages are of primary importance to most workers but I have never met workers who are so completely obsessed by the question of wages as those men.

All the men stated their dislike of the work on the hydro-electric scheme, and the Scotsmen in particular, being used to a higher standard of living, were constantly expressing their disgust with the working and living conditions. Since leaving the camp I have made enquiries among joiners in the Glasgow area and I have met many who worked on the hydro-electric schemes but who gave it up because they found the working and living conditions insufferable. Those who continue in the work admit they do so only because of the high wages, or because they fear they could get nothing else.

This raises an interesting question - why should some men be willing to live a life which consists almost entirely of eating, sleeping and working, under conditions which he does not like?

There seem to be four possible answersto this question. The first answer is that there are a large number of men who have done nothing but labouring work and who feel that they have no qualifications for any other kind of work. Some of the local men and a large number of the Irishmen fall into this category. Some of the local men find it the only kind of work available locally in the slack periods of farming and fishing. The Irishmen come into it because local or family connections with the general foremen give them a start in the civil engineering industry; once in it many of them feel they are unfitted for anything else. In addition the fact that they are coming into an atmosphere that is not alien but predominently Irish must also be an attraction to the Irishmen who enter the Industry.

The second reason is to save money. This was the reason of a minority but still quite a substantial minority. Hydro-electric work gives unskilled men an unparalled opportunity to save money, since, owing to the longhours they work, they earn wages over twice as high as those normal for unskilled men. A man who was really keen to save could save as much as £400 in a year in a camp such as this.

Doing normal labourer's work on a 44 hour week a man would hardly have enough after paying his living expenses to save such a sum in five years. Obviously, even with the higher income tax, the higher the wage, the greater amount left over for saving after expenses have been paid. Quite a number of the men were known to be saving and spent little except on food and tobacco. The reasons for saving varied; there were several Scotlmen who were saving up to get married and who wanted money to buy or furnish a house; there were two men who were saving money in order to set up in business for themselves; and there were local men who could get other work locally but who saw in the hydro-electric scheme a unique opportunity to build up aa little capital even though they had no immediate object in view.

Among/

Among the Irishmen some were saving in order to buy or stock farms; and it was a favourable topic among the Irishmen how much so and so had saved, and how another man had bought a tractor the last time he was home in Ireland. In the case of one individual the men reckoned that he had saved £4,000 in ten years work on the hydro-electric schemes. This question of saving up to buy a farm would seem to link up with the findings of Arensburg and Kimball who point out in "Family and Community in Ireland", [1] that "the farm is as important as the spouse" in Western Ireland.

When a farmer wishes to retire he makes over his farm to his son. The son will then marry, but he will only marry a girl with a dowry, and this dowry will be paid to his father as compensation for the farm. If a farmer has no son his daughter will be given the farm as a dowry but the prospective son-in-law must pay the girl's father the money equivalent of the farm. A man cannot achieve full adult status until he is married and has a farm of his own. Thus a man must have a farm, or the money to buy one, if he is to marry and have full status in the community. Similarly a woman needs either a farm or money as a dowry if she is to marry. Normally only the eldest son or daughter will receive this from their parents; the younger ones must go out into the world and earn the money for themselves. According to Arensburg and Kimball many young men and women go to America to earn money; when they have enough they return and marry. This would seem to explain why some Irishmen at the camp were saving up to buy farms.

The third reason why many men work on the hydro-electric cites was that they simply could not live on less than £12, and wages in excess of this amount are not readily come by in normal work. A large number, possibly the majorily, of the men at the camp fell into this class. I came across this reason for working on the hydro-electric scheme when I heard men saying that the work available in Glasgow was no good as one could not earn more than £10 a week at it, and "how can a man live on £10 a week." At first I thought this was nonsense and was surprised that so many men gave it as their reason for working on hydro-electric schemes. However, on closer investigations I found it to be true, even for those who are single and have no family commitments. The reasons are as follows:-

Nearly all the men, including those who were saving, were heavy smokersseven while working. Unfortunately I was unable to find out exactly how much was spent on tobacco in the camp shop, but the figures I did get indicated that it was at least 30/- per head per week. This estimate of 30/- per head is distinctly on the conservative side, since few men smoked less than 20 cigarettes a day and most smoked a good deal more.

According to the bar receipts 30/- a week was the average weekly expenditure on beer (roughly £300 spent by 200 men each week), and it must be remembered that the camp bar sold only beer. The real drinking was done mainly outof camp on Saturdays and Sundays. How much was spent in this way I have no way of estimating so we must accept the figure of 30/- per week though it is certainly an underestimate.

1. Footnote: C.M. Arensburg and S.T. Kimball, "Family and Community in Ireland", Harvard University Press, 1948.

Food in the canteen camp cost approximately £2.10/- a week; the tea breaks and supper at night added about 12/- to this, and, in addition, almost all the men bought food from the various vans that came round the camp. The men varied considerably in the amount they purchased; some spent only a few shillings a week on eggs and milk, others bought meat or bacon and eggs enough for a substantial meal each evening. The Irishmen bought most and they seemed to attach very great importance to being well fed, maintaining that a man must eat well if he is to do heavy work. The men's own estimates of their total expenditure on food were from four to six pounds a week; including tea breaks, the average could not have been less than four pounds a week.

In addition to these charges the men paid 10/- a week for livingin huts provided by the firm; 15/- if lodged in cubicles. Once again we will take the lowest figure of 10/-. This gives us the following figures:-

	£.	S.	D.
Food of all kinds	4.	0.	0.
Lodgings in camp		10.	0.
Tobacco	1.	10.	0.
Drink	1.	10.	0.
£	7.	10.	0

As I have said, these figures are distinctly on the conservative side as I have taken the lowest figures in each case; even so £7.10/- a week on these four items is a substantial total from a working man's wages. But this is far from being the total expenditure; there are several other items which I found it impossible to calculate, but which are nevertheless important. First there is clothing, which is an item all must spend on. In this type of work and with no proper facilities for washing and repairing clothes, the wear and tear on clothing is very heavy. Pedlars and representatives from local shops come round the camp on paynight and on Saturdays and seem to do a considerable trade. Clothing is certainly an item that must be allowed for in caloulating what a man does with his wages. Another large item was gambling. Most of the men gambled on horses and football pools and there was a "bookie" in the camp.

I hope my estimate, rough though it is, indicates the heavy personal expenditure of these men and the reasons why they look ordinary upon as being inadequate. However, averages, though useful, tend to be misleading. Some men, usually those trying to save,spent less than my estimate on food and drink, though rarely less on tobacco. On the other hand there were men who spent far more, especially on drink, and men who gambled all they had. There were three young Scots joiners in my squad who said they could live at home and earn £10-£12 a week on housing estates but they claimed that this would not keep them going on drink and cigarettes. Another man told me he couldn't keep going in a town at all as he invariably ended by going out drinking every night; and so, no matter what he earned, he never had any money. Many single men had to borrow enough money to pay for their meals by half way through the week, and two left while I was there owing money to men all over the camp, though both were joiners earning £17 a week. There seems to be a large number of men like that in the industry, but even the married men who work steadily and who send money home regularly have a personal expenditure on food, drink and tobacco, which seems to me to be extremely high.

The/

The fourth reason is that the type of life the men lead in these camps completely free from any social ties or obligations of any kind is attractive to many of the men but I shall go into this more fully later.

The Men.

As I have said earlier these were of three kinds, Irish, Scots, and foreign - Ukrainians and Poles. The Irish were mostly labourers but included some joiners, they came almost entirely from Donegal. These, with the exception of the joiners, could best be described as peasants - in the original sense of that word without the derogatory meaning often applied to it at present. Most of them were the sons of small farmers and several had farms of their own which were not able to support them without other work. The Scotsmen were mainly local labourers, men who before the advent of the hydro-electric scheme had been farm labourers, or who mixed labouring on farms in summer with fishing with the trawling fleet in winter. In addition there were a few labourers of Irish descent from Glasgow. The Scots tradesmen were of two kinds, country joiners from the locality and from other parts of the Highlands and North East coast, and joiners and other tradesmen from the Glasgow and Edinburgh area.

By general United Kingdom standards of social behaviour and Irishmen's description of themselves as "A rough ould crowd" was accurate. The standard of education generally was low, being much lower among the Irish than among the Scots who had at least the rudiments of education while many of the Irish were barely literate. Most of the men were not particularly clean, the camp showers were only used regularly by only four or five men. Nor did they change their clothes regularly, most only changed to go out on a Saturday night, they slept in their work clothes taking off only trousers, boots, and waistcoat or pullover. Nearly all the men ate only with a sppon and one or two of the Irishmen ate with their fingers only. Some gave as their reason for this the fact that it was easy to carry a spoon in one's pocket while a knife and fork were an encumbrance. Spitting on the dining-room floor was a common practice. Several of the men had been in prison at some time or other and made no secret of it. One particularly fine day as we came out of the tunnel the man next to me said "Its terrible to think that I wasted last summer in Barlinnie (Glasgow's prison) its murder being in jail in good weather."

Zweig in his book says of Civil Engineering navvies: "The type of labourer in Civil Engineering is different from that in building. He is a hard-bitten man, very mobile with an adventurous spirit, often of a nomadic type, not easily amenable to discipline. He likes to be free and when he falls out with one employer, presents his card to another. The labourer in Civil Engineering - mostly of the navvy and general labourer type - is not so anxious about the security of his job as the craftsman's labourer in the building industry".[1]

1. Footnote: F. Zweig "Productivity and Trade Unions" - page 61.

In their social behaviour there was some difference between the Irish and the Scots. To the Irish their behaviour was on the whole fairly natural although they did complain of the roughness of the other men and of the conditions. The Scots on the other hand, though their behaviour was much the same, were far more self-conscious about it, they admitted that their behaviour was below the norms of behaviour in our society and their reaction as to blame conditions and the bad effects of mixing with the Irish who, they claimed, lowered the standards of everyone in the camp. This attitude of course is common in Britain wherever local labour, even second generation Irish, has to mix with immigrant Irish labour. There was some truth in their claims. The Scotsmen were clearly the products of a country with a higher standard of living, and the military service which most of them had undergone had disciplined them to keeping certain minimums standards of cleanliness and behaviour under camp conditions.

In spite of the crudeness of their behaviour in these respects the men were by no means a "bad lot". As one of the men said "This camp is too far from the city to have the usual crowd of latchikos[1] and hangers on, the men here are here to work." By this he meant that the camp being out of the way was comparatively free from semi-criminal types, like the professional gamblers and their hangers-on who come ostensibly to work but actually spend most of their time gambling, or the petty thieves, and the "long-distance men" or tramps who use camps as convenient stages in their journeys. This was true. Although as I have said, several of the men had been in prison, all the men, with the exception of a few transients, worked and were clearly there with every intention of working. There were no serious cases of theft while I was there and no gambling schools actually within the camp though there were some in nearby camps. The men, in spite of some heavy drinking and a few fights, were on the whole quiet and well behaved.

The general atmosphere of the camp was a very friendly one. The men were friendly to each other and friendly and helpful to any new arrivals in the camp. As there were no exclusive social groups among the navvies - I shall go into this in more detail later - all the men, even the newest arrival, stood in the same relationship to each other. This helped to maintain the general friendliness for it prevented the growth of cliques and ensured that no one was treated as an outsider.

1. Footnote: The term "latchikos" is used to mean lazy men, lay abouts. It may be derived from the Gaelic word Leisg - lazy, which is the same in both Irish and Scots Gaelic.

LEISURE ACTIVITIES

Gambling.

Nearly all the men gambled to some extent. Football coupons were distributed in the camp and practically everyone filled them in. There was a camp "bookie" and most of the men had their daily bet. In this camp the gambling "schools" had been closed up some weeks before I went there and the instigators of them dismissed, but "schools" existed at other camps in the area which some of the men visited at week-ends when they had the time. The games played in these were "Pitch and Toss", "Crown and Anchor", Brag and Pontoon. It will be noted that these are pure gambling games, skill is not required. They are, according to my information, the normal and traditional forms of gambling common in these camps.

Gambling has a great appeal to the men, it enables them to show off their recklessness and is considered something to boast about. For the regular navvy with no ties and no interest in saving money it provides excitement and a means of passing spare time for men whose amusements are very limited. MacGill speaking of his life in the camps says: "I lost most of my wages at the card-table, and the rest went on drink. I know not whether drink and gambling are evils. I only know that they cheered many hours of my life, and caused me to forget the miseries of being." There is a good deal of truth in this, certainly some of the men who had spent years in the camps had reached a state of mind where gambling was an almost essential break to the monotony of camp life and where the loss of money involved meant little. The money would go one way or another so, it might as well go, on gambling as on somethihg else.

In the camp itself ten of the men I talked to confessed to being hardened gamblers and said that when there was a school available they found they could not keep away from it but would spend whole nights gambling. So long as there was no "school" available they did not mind unduly but as soon as one started they would go to it. Other men who knew them confirmed the truth of their statements. These called the gamblers "bloody fools" for wasting their money but at the same time their attitude showed that they thought there was something admirable in such recklessness. The men concerned certainly thought so for their attitude was distinctly boastful. While in hospital after an accident I met men from other camps where "schools" existed, several of these men boasted among themselves about their losses. One, a man with a wife and family, told of how he had lost forty pounds in the last forthight.

Judging from what I saw in the other camps in the area, from what I was told by the men, office staff and management in the Wimpey camp, and from what I learned from other sources - trade unions, ex-navvies and so on, it is clear that gambling is a normal feature of camp life. Hundreds of pounds may change hands in a few days. The winners going back to Glasgow or Ireland to spend their winnings in a big spree. The men take a great pride in spending a large amount of money in a short time and most of the "gambling men" had some tale to tell, obviously exaggerated, of how they had won some large sum, usually several hundred pounds.

1. Footnote: "Children of the Dead End" - Page 211.

This was spent or gambled away within a few weeks. No one ever cited examples of men winning money and using it to settle down in life.

Only a minority of the men appear to be regular gamblers on this scale but most of the men seemed to have tried it at some time or other, and liked to boast about it. Gambling on this scale seems to be a tradition in the industry and one that the men are very proud of. For a description of it fifty years ago I would refer the reader to MacGill, Chapter xxvi.

Drinking.

Drinking was another favourite method of relaxation and there is no doubt it did provide some relief from the boredom of camp life and enabled men to overcome fits of depression. The men drank far more heavily than any other group of workers I have met, much more heavily even than men in the Army. There seemed to be no teetotallers in the camp, but those who wanted to save money tried to keep out of the bar as much as possible. It was significant that a question commonly addressed to newcomers was: "Do you drink". This seemed strange at first in a society where practically everyone drank; but after a time I discovered that what the question really meant was "are you an habitual drunkard". The man who drinks regularly, but fairly moderately is not a "drinker", the"drinking man" is the habitual heavy drinker.

The beer bar in the camp took in an average of over £300 a week from just over 200 men, but this is no real measure of what was spent on drink for most of the heavy drinking was done on Saturdays and Sundays, and was done out of the camp in some nearby town or village where the men could buy spirits. As a result of drinking spirits the men were usually more quarrelsome at the week-ends and most fights started on Saturday nights. Drunkenness was so commonplace as to pass without comment.

Drinking seemed to be used to in order to screw a man up to make a decision. During the time I was in the camp several of the men who had worked there for a long time - six months or so was a long time to these men - decided to leave and travel to another part of the country. Some of these men simply left once they had made their minds up but other hesitated and, building up a stock of liquor, stayed drunk for several days before deciding to leave. This practice was apparently common and the other men referred to it as "Drinking a Jack."

There was some "Jake" drinking in the camp, but, knowing the men concerned, I think it was done more for bravado than genuine addiction. "Jake" consists of some very cheap wine hotted up with Brasso, Methylated Spirits, or some other substance that will cause rapid intoxication. Some of the men show remarkable and dangerous ingenuity in their choice of "hotting-up" agents.

The men seem to acquire the habit from tramps who are given to this form of drinking. Sometimes tramps will put up in the camp for a few days. Another source of contact with them is in the Model Lodging Houses in Glasgow; the experienced navvy usually stays in a "model" when/

when working in or passing through a city and here he makes contact with tramps and "meth" drinkers of various kinds. There was not much of this in the camp but it did occur and shocked no one. Most of the men had experienced it before in other camps but disapproved of it because of the danger involved. In point of fact one man in the camp died and several of his friends became very ill as a result of a particularly vile concoction of "Jake" which he created. As the men concerned could well afford to buy alcohol in legitimate forms, and as none of them were addicts I think this incident occured from bravado, letting the camp see what wild men they were, rather than from any other cause. The man who died was always seeking a reputation as "a hard man" by his feats at work, and by the number of fights he got into and it would seem that this drinking bout wasan attempt to add to his reputation.

Sport and Other Leisure Activities.

The men took a great interest in sport of all kinds; they read the sports pages of the papers religiously, and would discuss sport, especially football, for hours on end. There were no facilities in the camp for sport but some of the men organised a tug-O-war team to compete in the local Highland Games. This aroused great interest and the whole camp would turn out on fine evenings to train or to watch and help the others training.

At week-ends the young men went drinking and dancing in the nearest town, while the older ones went out drinking and visiting acquaintances in other camps. There was a cinema show in the camp twice a week and this was very popular; the wireless was also popular; there was no camp set but some of the men had their own portable sets and there was at least one of these in every hut.

Possibly the most important recreation was talking. The men used to lie on their beds and talk across to each other or they would go to visit men in other huts and sit on their beds and talk. Men coming back from Ireland would go round the huts giving the home news to those who lived near them. The Irishmen showed great interest in any newcomer they did not know, especially if he was also from Ireland, and they would gossip and speculate about such a man endlessly, asking him craftily phrased questions about himself, then deciding he was a liar and wondering who he really was.

The men also liked to talk about the work and the camps. There is an astonishing "grapevine" and the men seemed to know something of every big civil engineering scheme in the country; what the food is like, wages, bonus, and the personalities of the foremen and outstanding individuals in each camp or company. The question of relative wages and bonus constantly comes up, and comparisons are made between different camps. For example, in my hut the men spent a large part of one evening arguing about what were the highest wages and bonus ever paid on the hydro-electric schemes.

Newspapers were sold in the camp and most of the men bought one, but it is significant that they were sold by the camp "bookie" with the intention that his customers should know the day's "starters". The sports page and the latest murder or sex scandal were the only items which the men discussed.

For all practical purposes this covers all the men's spare time interests.

ATTITUDE TO THE EMPLOYER

The men at Luichart looked on Wimpey's as an average firm for the industry, neither particularly good nor particularly bad. They expected nothing from the firm, taking it for granted that it would pay as little as it could, would get as much out of them as possible, and would sack them the moment it had not further use for them. In return they felt they owed the firm nothing, and looked on their relationship with it as an all-in struggle each side out to beat the other by any means. The men showed not the slightest degree of trust in Wimpey's, or in any other firm for that matter, taking for granted that the firm would take no care for their welfare or safety.

Employer- worker relations were typified by the attitude to industrial injuries. The work is dangerous and accidents are common. The men's attitude to accidents was that the firm did little to enforce safety regulations but if accidents h ppened they did their utmost to evade responsibility: they had a saying "they'll spend a hundred pounds on lawyers before they'll spend a penny on compensation". The men in turn were determined to exaggerate every injury in order to cheat the firm, and tales of how men had cheated various firms and how the firms in turn had cheated men were a common topic of conversation. It was interesting that even a struggle for compensation was looked on as a purely individual matter, and the men showed little interest in the way trade unions can help them in such matters. The attitude was again one of self-reliance, if you were clever enough you beat the firm, if not the firm beat you, and you had no one but yourself to blame.[1]

Industrial injuries claims caused much ill-feeling against the employer. Though the industry is dangerous and accidents frequent, it is very difficult to get a settlement on any injury claim. If a man is injured and goes into hospital all witnesses may have left the camp before he can get in tough with them. The men believe y that potential witnesses are sacked in order to increase the difficulty of finding them. Be this as it may, the turnover of labour in itself makes it difficult to find men. A claim against a firm is covered by an insurance company and the real dispute is between the insurance company and the men concerned, but few men know this and the firm itself gets all the blame for the difficulties involved. The policy of the firm - to quote the men - is to delay any settlement until the case is due in court. With the pressure of business on the Court of Session this normally means a delay of two years, sometimes longer. In view of this it is hardly surprising that the men look on compensation for industrial injury, not as a right, but as a form of gamble, comparable to Crown and Anchor.

The financial hardship to a navvy who is incapacitated by injury is considerable. Pay stops from the moment of injury and the man is entirely dependent on the £2. 2/- a week paid by the National Insurance scheme. If the man's dependents live in Britain he will get an allowance for them, if they are in Eire he gets none. Sometimes an injured man may be sent to the camp sick-bay; here his minimum expenses will be £3 a week - £2. 10/- for food, 10/- for lodgings - against this he has only the £2. 2/- injuries/

1. FOOTNOTE: The men's attitude to industrial injuries was aimed not specifically at Wimpey's but at all firms in the industry.

injuries benefit. These circumstances often compel injured men to accept the first offer made to them as a settlement and some men are forced back to work before they are fit. One result of the difficulty of getting compensation is that men do not even try to get compensation for slight injuries for which in the printing industry they would do so autimatically.

The whole situation regarding compensation was in direct contrast with what I found in the printing industry. Here, though the industry is far less dangerous, the sumsinvolved in compensation are considerable; in 1952 and 1953 the National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paperworkers with 140,000 members recovered each year £185,500 in settlement of the claims of members. In spite of the cost to the employers the settlement of claims was rapid and, as a result, there is no feeling among printing workers that they are being cheated by the employer.

To sum up the situation there is little doubt that the question of industrial injuries contributes considerably towards the strong feeling the men have against employers in the industry, and it would seem that there is a case for the revision of the existing methods.

The general bad feeling towards the employer was normal to those men with no experience outside the industry.[1] But there were some men in the camp having their first experience of civil engineering industry, and these men commented on the atmosphere of ruthlessness and brutality that exists between worker and employer. I have since met men in Glasgow who have worked in the industry and they too commented on this, as one man put it, "civil engineering is at least fifty years behind every other industry".

When talking to both workers and office staff at Luichart it was noticeable that both sides took a distinct pride in this bad feeling, both had the attitude that "this is a hard life and we are tough", and each side was contemptuous of the other. The men believed that the staff cheated them out of their pay and allowances whenever possible, and they in turn took pride in cheating the staff whenever they could. The worker-employer relationship seemed to be based on the belief that animosity between employer and worker was inevitable, and to some extent even laudable.

1. FOOTNOTE: Zweig says of the navvies: "They treat the employer with suspicion and their experience with the worst type of employer is often transferred to the good employer. The bad employer leaves his imprint on the mind of the casual worker and it takes a long time to cure him of his suspicions and fears absorbed in his former jobs."
"Productivity and Trade Unions" - page 70.

ATTITUDE TO DISCIPLINE

The attitude of the men to discipline at work was a curious mixture of servility and independence. On the one hand the men appeared to be afraid of their foremen, and in particular, of the general foremen. They were terribly afraid of being even a few moments late for work of of being caught idling by the foremen. The sight of one of the general foremen in the distance would start a panic among the men and even when they were working hard already they would stary to dash about and look as busy as possible. No matter how hard they were working the general foremen seemed to find fault with something -. this seemed to be their tradition of foremanship - but the men accepted criticism however unmerited without trying to defend themselves. The men stood for a considerable amount of abuse from the foremen and in particular from the general foremen. Abuse of a kind which is not permitted to N.C.O's. in the Army, and which would cause a strike in some industries. This abuse was taken quite seriously, and was in no way a form of joking. A newcomer to the civil engineering industry said to me one night that he had never in his life seen grown men so afraid of authority. All the men, not only the prmanent workers, behaved like this; even those who rarely stayed more than a wek or so in any camp behaved in the same way. The only differences were ones of degree and it was noticeable that the Scotsmen in the samp, though they also behaved like this, did not do so to the same degree as did the Irishmen.

Men who did not get on with the foremen and who were sacked left quite meekly and rarely seemed to retaliate by abusing or striking the foreman. Only one man in the camp had ever struck a foreman. This had happened outside of working hours and in a camp belonging to another firm. Though it happened some time ago it was apparently so unusual that the man was regarded with admiration, and the incident was frequently referred to. The reason why foremen are rarely attacked seems to be that a foreman may sack a man but will take him on againaa week or two later. If a man attacks a foreman he is unlikely ever to be taken on again. Since many of the men wandwr round in a kind of circle, frequently returning to the same camp, this is an important consideration. To show what I mean I can quote the case of one of the joiners in my squad who was working at Luichart for the third time in just over a year; in between working at Luichart he had travelled round the other hydro-electric camps and even been to work in England.

In these ways the men at Luichart showed greater fear of authority than any other industrial workers i have ever met. But, on the other hand, they showed a very considerable degree of independence. They addressed the foremen and general foremen by their Christian names and talked to them as equals. They would leave the job at any time on a momrntary whim. Sometimes when the foreman, or even the general foreman, said something they resented, or blamed them for his own mistake, a man or men would turn and abuse him to his face. I saw this happen several times with different foremen, and the foremen did not seem to resent this as an infringement of their authority but would laugh it off or argue with the man as an equal. This contradicts what I have said before, nevertheless this is what I have seen happen. Men who normally suffer abuse and fault finding from the foreman may suddenly turn on him and abuse him.

The/

The reasons for this kind of behaviour are not clear. It may be Irish in origin and be communicated by the Irishmen to the industry as a whole. Certainly, though the Scots at Luichart showed a fear of authority to a much greater degree than I have ever seen among Scotsmen in industry, they showed it to a much lesser degree than did the Irish.

Another possible reason lies in the traditions of the industry. The foremen have complete power to employ or sack without reference to management. In fact I have been told that the engineer in charge of the contract cannot employ or sack men except through the general foreman. Thus the foremen have great power which they use without hesitation; men may be sacked for very little and are consequently afraid of provoking the foreman. On the other hand, the foremen, andin particular the general foremen, have to find and keep an adequate labour force and they know if they go too far the men will simply leave. Hence the foremen must humour the men at times if they are to keep them. The apparent contradictions in behaviour being caused by the conflict between the power of the foremen and theindependence of the men.

However, not one but both reasons may be involved. The behaviour pattern may be Irish in origin but exaggerated by the conditions of the industry. At the moment I have not enough evidence to attempt a final answer.

ATTITUDE TO WORK

One thing about the men which I found unusual was their attitude to work. Inmany industries there is a distinct fear of doing too much work and "spoiling a job", or "working yourself out of a job". A man who works too hard will soon be warned by the other workers, and men who work hard are looked upon as endangering the livelihood of the other workers, and treated accordingly. The men at Luichart had nothing of this attitude to work, and by the standards I have seen in other industries, nearly all could be considered good workers. No one objected to any individual working hard, and I have never heard derogatory remarks about a man for doing so, on the contrary, I often heard men remark that "so-and-so" was a good worker. The men were natural hard workers and worked steadily even when unsupervised. The habit of working hard seems to be one of the good traditions of the industry, and there was definitely no deliberate restriction on the pace of work such as I found in printing, and which has been found in many other industries. The pace at which a man chose to work was looked upon as his own business, but an ability to work hard definitely gave a man prestige in theeyes of other men.

ATTITUDE TO TRADE UNIONS

The Joiners: These were all union men. In fact they had to be in order to get a job at Luichart since the joiners enforced a closed shop. The joiners valued the union as a defender of their status against the competition of the labourers, and took care to enforce a strict line of demarcation against the labourers. Apart from this they showed little interest in the union and did not let any trade union scruples stand in the way of their aim to make as much money as possible. There was no great feeling of solidarity among them. The Union was used only to maintain differential status and apart from that it was every man for himself. While I was in the camp one joiner with a labourer took over a job formerly done by three joiners. The other joiners were worried in case he was allowing the labourer to do the work of a joiner, or as they put it, "does he all w him to handle tools"?[1]. When they were satisfied that the labourer was not allowed "to handle tools" they raised no objection to the joiner and his labourer taking over the job of the two joiners who had left in addition to their own work.

I found this surprising, for in many industries - printing for example - the other workers would have insisted that it was the work of three men, and therefore three men must be employed to do it; and that for one man to do the work of three was to do two men out of a job. But the attitude of the men at Luichart was, if one man wants to do the job -let him. He is "a bloody fool" and he "will work himself to death", but that is his lookout. There wasapparently no belief, as there is in many industries, that a man owes a duty to his workmates not to do another man's work in addition to his own.

The Labourers: The labourers had no interest at all in trade unionism. Many had been in the Transport and General Workers' Union in other camps and admitted that it had done them a lot of good in bettering conditions of work, but they showed little interest or faith in it. The men's attitude to trade unionism was very similar to their attitude to the employer. They did not trust trade unions thinking them corrupt, and believing that union officials, like employers, were out to exploit them for their own ends. The majority of the men believe that every man looks after his own interests best, and do not believe a trade union, or any other body, would be really interested in any other interests but its own. The individualism of the men stands out again. By 'its' they mean the paid officials of the union. As in the case of friendship with other men, they seem reluctant to accept the responsibilities nd the limitations on individual action that a man imposes upon himself by becoming a member of a group.

1. FOOTNOTE: The line of demarcation between joiner and labourer lies in the use of tools. A labourer may use a hammer, or a pinchbar, to extract nails, but he must not hammer nails in. The use of other tools, such as the saw, is completely forbidden to labourers. In practice I found at Luichart that the joiners would allow those labourers who formed part of the joiners' squad to hammer in nails, but when labourers from other squads tried to hammer in nails one of the joiners would always stop them and take the hammer from them. Even the labourers in the joiners' squad were not permitted to use any tool other than the hammer.

THE GENERAL OUTLOOK AND ATTITUDES OF THE NAVVIES.

Whatnwas particularly noticeable about all the men I met in the industry was their individualistic outlook. This was in surprising contrast to the findings of most research workers in industry. Mayo and the Harvard School in America; Taylor, Jacques, and others in Britain; have laid great emphasis on the importance of the primary group or work group in industry. In another industry in which I have done research - the printing industry - the influence of the work-group was enormous and I expected to find something similar at Luichart. Instead I found a distinct lack of group feeling. There were aggregations of individuals but these were bound together by any network of social relationships such as have been found to bind individuals into groups in other industries. Every man went his own way and there was no attempt to subordinate the needs of the individual to those of the group. The industry as a whole has a very high turnover of labour and Luichart was no exception, as I have shown above. This high turnover may account to some extent for the fact that the men do not form strong social groups but it cannot account for it completely.

The floating population at Luichart was only half the men, while the other half were "steadies" who had worked at Luichart for a year of more; some had been with the firm for several years and had travelled with the same firm and foremen from site to site. It might reasonably be expected that the half who formed the floating population would not have much group feeling, though I have seen groups with a strong feeling forming under similar circumstances in the Army, for example, in transit camps, such groups often formed within a few days. On the other hand one would expect the steady half who worked, and even lived together for some time, to form strong social groups, especially as the Irishmen among them came mostly from the same county, had some knowledge of each other at home, and in some cases were related to each other. In spite of this there was nothing that I could call a group feeling either in or out of work.

A work gang was an aggregation of individuals rather than a group in the social sense; its members did not interact with each other outside the work any more frequently than they interacted with members of other gangs. In the same way the men did not interact with the men who shared the same hut with them any more than they did with men from other huts. My own gang had a core of men who had worked together for over a year but they were scattered in different huts all over the camp though they could have easily moved together into the one hut. The men went out with men from any gang or any hut without any apparent preferences.

There was no tendency for the joiners, the largest body of tradesmen, to form a group or groups among themselves. In this camp the joiners were scattered throughout the various huts, some in cubicles, some in huts according to personal preference. I am told in some camps the joiners have a separate hut, but in this camp they had no such hut, nor did they show any particular desire for one. In the same way there was little tendency for Scots and Irish to form separate groups, they mixed together in the same huts with little attempt to keep separate. This was despite the fact that/

that the Scots in private often affected to despise the Irish and were contemptuous of their way of living. The foremen also showed no tendency to form a separate group; although the firm provided them with a separate canteen they had no separate sleeping accommodation and some slept in huts with the men, other in cubicles, entirely according to personal preference. As with the joiners, higher pay and status did not lead the foremen to seek accommodation apart from the men.

The only men who could be said to form separate groups were the Poles and Ukrainians, who ate together, slept together, and, whenever possible, worked together. The men said the Poles always keep themselves completely separate in every camp. The degree to which the Poles at Luichart had interacted with the Irish and Scots must have been very small, for although they had been in civil engineering work since the end of the War their command of English can only be described as rudimentary. In other words, ethnic groups isolated by languages and custom are the only ones which survive.

The individualism of the men is shown by the way in which they chose to keep apart from each other in the huts. In my own hut there were 22 beds; of these, fourteen were occupied by regulars, the rest by the floating population. Of the fourteen regulars, two, a father and son, worked together and slept in adjacent beds; another three worked in the same squad and had done so for over a year. These did not have beds together but were disposed one at each end of the hut and one near the middle. I would have expected from my experience of men in the Army that the men would have used adjacent beds. Certainly in Luichart it would have seemed more convenient to have a man you know in the next bed rather than have a succession of strangers, often of dubious character, occupying the next bed. But the men preferred to keep separate, though there was no animosity at all between them.

While I was in the camp one man suddenly decided to move to another hut and just went; he had been six months in the hut and was on friendly terms with everyone in it, but he felt like a change so he moved out into a hut where he knew no one except by sight. The other men showed no surprise at this behaviour; in fact I got the impression, which would need further research to confirm, that it was no considered "the done thing" to become too friendly with anyone and the men deliberately behaved in this way in case their behaviour should otherwise be interpreted as being too friendly.

In the next hut to my own were two Scotsmen; the rest were Ukrainians. The two Scotsmen were both regular workers but they had little to do with each other. In the next hut, on the other side, there were three Scotsmen; a foreman, a joiner and a labourer; the rest were Irish, three being joiners and the rest labourers. Every hut showed the same mixture: Irish, Scots, tradesmen and non-tradesmen from various work gangs, all mixed together indiscriminately and showing no desire to move to other huts.

Very few of the men had a regular "mate". They would go out drinking or into Dingwall with anyone who was going; if no one else was going they would go alone. Once again this is strictly in contrast with behaviour in the Army, where men usually go about in groups and where men would stay in or go out together with their friends, individual preference being subordinated to the wishes of the group as a whole. There was nothing like this at Luichart/

Luichart; every man followed his individual choice irrespective of what other men did. Only a few men had a "mate" and these were usually joiners who normally work in pairs; such a pair would live in the same hut and eat and go out together. Even in these cases the ties of friendship were slight. In one such pair , one man took a sudden liking to another job in the camp, asked for the job and got it, leaving his mate on the old job. There was no particular advantage in the new job, no better hours, pay or conditions; it was just a whim. He said "he felt like a change". In two other cases I saw a man leave his mate to go to seek work in another camp. Significantly, none of the other men commented on this behaviour; it was acceoted as normal. In no case was there any suggestion that a man fell out with his mate; they parted on the best of terms and each went his own way quite amicably.

Much the same kind of behaviour was seen between relatives. There were three sets of two brothers in the camp; in two cases the brothers slept in the same hut but in different parts of it, in the other case they were in separate huts. The brothers interacted with each other more than with strangers but even so they each tended to go their own way. Many of the men had brothers and other relatives in other camps. I knew of two cases where the brothers had been together at Luichart but one had since left to work elsewhere; they did not write to each other and only got information about each other when a man from the brother's camp came to work at Luichart. I saw this happen several times while I was there.

There were several cases of cousins and other relatives, both by blood and marriage, in the camp but these were difficult to find out because in no case were they indicated by any increased social interaction. They were only discoverably because so many of the Irishmen came from the same district hence knew each other's family. Concealment of relationship[1]. could hardly be the aim of this lack of interaction for, as I have said, many men in the camp knew of the relationship.

In spite of this completely individualistic outlook there was a very good feeling among the men and they would give or lend money, even to comparative strangers, if they were in need. There was no question of the men being unfriendly in their attitude, but friendship was always subordinated to individual interests; the obligations attendant on close friendship, such as subordinating one's individual interest, were avoided. There was a sort of general friendliness in which all participated, but the growth of any particularly strong bonds with any individual or individuals was avoided, and, so far as I could tell, was deliberately and consciously avoided. I believe this pattern of behaviour may be Irish in origin, but I would require to do considerably more research before I could be sure about this. In its present manifestation in the industry as a whole it is common to both Scots and Irish.

This/

1. FOOTNOTE: What I have said here about relatives not interacting socially to any marked degree may seem to contradict what I shall say later about kinship obligations in getting work. In fact there is no such contradiction; among the Irishmen kinship did apparently impose certain obligations, but social interaction was not one of them.

This individualistic and independent attitude was shown by most, but not all, of the men in their attitude to the firm. The men fell into two main categories, the floating population which was roughly half, and the regulars who formed the other half. The regulars were of two kinds; those who had worked with many firms and who found a job which suited them and stayed for some time, but who had no particular attachment ot the firm and were likely to leave at any time if they felt like it; and those who followed a particular general foreman from site to site and were very unlikely to leave the camp as long as the general foreman stayed in it. [1]. (Such men were almost entirely Irishmen.)

These last were really attached not to the firm but to a particular general foreman - it was the general foreman who was attached to the firm and their attachment was an indirect one through him. What the connection between a general foreman and his followers is I cannot say exactly at the moment. The men concerned were reluctant to talk about it; many professed to hate the general foreman and were constantly talking of their quarrels with him. The followers formed no distinct social group; they were scattered on various jobs and slept in different huts. Kinship seems to have been important in the relationship and I was able to discover certain kinship bonds between some of the men and the general foreman; locality was also important and most of the followers came from the same district. [2].

With the exception of the general foreman's followers, the men had a very independent attitude towards the firm. They often stated that a good man can get a job anywhere and they expressed contempt for any man who would stay with the one firm, saying that it showed he wasn't a good enough worker to take his chance with other firms. The followers of the general foreman were known as "Wimpey's men" and this was used as a term of derision. It implied nothing against the firm but a good deal against the men; in other camps the terms "Carmichael's men" or "Logan's men" are equally derisive epithets. These"Wimpey's men" were said to have "bought their jobs", and to be afraid of going elsewhere. Two of the men in my hut, a father and son, had been with Wimpey's for over two years and the other men were constantly making rude remarks about this in conversation, oretending that it was incredible that any man would do that. It was obvious the men set a high value on their independence and showed this independence by frequently moving jobs; they did not like to feel they were tied down to any one employer.

This was most clearly demonstrated in their attitude to "jacking"; [3]. the custom of the industry is two hours' notice on either side and the men take full advantage of/

1. FOOTNOTE: Zweig says of this: "The casual labour is really bu the industry as such, not by an individual employer. They stand in no personal relationship to a particular employer and have no loyalty to him, more often following the foreman." "Productivity and Trade Unions" page 70.

2. Arensburg and Kimball deal with the influence of kinship and locality in finding jobs for emigrants and it seems likely that the same practice obtains in civil engineering.

3. FOOTNOTE: The verb "to jack" means to lift one's cards and lying time and leave the job. It has been in use for at least fifty years, as the term is used in the novels of Patrick MacGill for example on page 166 of "Children of the Dead End."

of it.[1]. I have seen a man suddenly get bored with the camp or take a dislike to the foreman and leave the camp the same say. This happened not only with the floating population but even with men who had been in the camp for some time. The man in the next bed to me had been in the camp for two years. One day he suddenly got tired of it, got drunk for three successive days and left on the fourth day. As one of the men put it to me, "He was drinking a Jack". [2].

The other men accepted this kind of behaviour as being quite normal and when I asked why a man left they would day "I expect he wanted a change". This was the usual, and apparently a sufficient reason, for leaving. What was even more significant was the obvious pride the men took in "jacking". It seemed to be an accepted symbol of independence and had a high status value among the men. A man who "jacked" seemed to feel thatnit enhanced his status in the eyes of the other men, and so far as I could see this assumption was correct. The less real reason a man had for "jacking", the more "jacking" showed his independence and the higher the status it gave him. For example, to "jack" because he knew of a better job did not give a man as much prestige as to "jack" because he felt like a change. The result of this was that the word "jack" wasin constant use; a man would talk of "jacking" if there was a temporary setback in the work, if the food was worse than usual, or if any other minor irritation cropped up. Many of the men were constantly boasting about having "jacked" from other camps, or about being just about to "jack" from Luichart. These obviously wished to be looked upon by the other men as persons who would "jack" at the drop of a hat. Such an attitude indicates a belief that to "jack" gives one high status and because of the status factor it was practically impossible to get a man to admit he had been sacked or left a camp for some good reason; all changes of job were put down to a desire for change or to some other whim.

It seems to me that the men's basic value was independence and that "jacking" as the symbol of independence has a high value for the men. Thismis an important point and it is possible that the high turnover of labour in the industry is at least party due to this value of of independence/

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1. FOOTNOTE: Zweig questioned a trade union official about the question of two hours notice and was given the followibg answer: "Empl yment is terminable by two hours' notice on either side to expire at the end of the normal working hours of the day, while in building termination of work can only be notified on Fridays. When I questioned a Trade Union official about this state of,affairs, the anwer was that the men in Civil Engineering prefer that sort of termination because it gives them a greater sense of freedom." "Productivity and Trade Unions" - page 62.

2. FOOTNOTE: Some men "drank a jack", some did not. The practice seemed to be due to the factnthat in some men there was an obvious conflict between the desire to live up to the values of the industry and to "jack" and a reluctance to leave the camp. Hence the drinking in order to screw himself up to leave.

of independence. [1].

One very noticeable feature of the men's behaviour was their general air of bravado, this was found particularly among the younger men. They clearly liked to think of themselves as very tough men doing a hard and dangerous job and working and living under conditions which few men could stand up to. Men completely careless about the danger of their work, reckless men living only for the moment with no thought and no fear for the future. Among themselves they liked to boast of being "travelled men"who had worked all over the country, of the number of jobs they had held, the camps they had lived in and the wild "goings-on" they had seen. The men on the more dangerous jobs cultivated a tremendous swagger and liked to show off, for example the tunnellers liked to be known as "Tunnel Tigers" and would wear the protective helmets that distinguished them from the other men all the time. As one man said "they only take the helmets off in bed." There was much boasting of what hard men they were, how much they drank, how much they had lost at gambling, how hard they could work, how much they had earned, how they had held good jobs and left on a mere whim just to show their independence. Most of this was confined to the younger men several of whom were constantly trying to make "a name for themselves", in some way. These would try to outwork each other, to lift and carry more, to take the more dangerous jobs. Since the men moved from camp to camp in a kind of circle and since there was a strong oral tradition, especially among the Irishmen, and stories of various feats were constantly retold to admiring audiences, a man could make himself quite a wide reputation by accomplishing some feat. One of the men in the camp had beaten up the general foreman in his previous camp, on another occasion he had beaten up four soldiers. Hearing of such feats described admiringly the younger men were moved to emulation. I can illustrate what I mean by a story told to me by a navvy I met in the Army. This man used to tell me of how young navvies tried to get a reputation and told me what happened in his own case. He said: "I used to hear the men talking about this man who had hit the foreman and that man who had chased the ganger with a pick and so on. So when this ganger kept picking on me I thought the next time he starts I'll through him down the cutting, then the men will point me out and say 'That's Joe Sullivan, him that threw the ganger down the cutting'". He did it, and got the sack, but his name was made and fearsome stories circulated about him. Few men went so far as to attack foremen but many of the young ones were clearly striving for the "bubble reputation". The men over thirty were quiter perhaps because they felt they were already known.

The more famous of the men and the more important foremen and general foremen are known generally thoughout the industry and many stories about them are current. There/

1. FOOTNOTE: It is possible that the value placed on independence and on "jacking" as its symbol grew out of necessity. The navvy was constantly being sacked as each job was finished, so he had no incentive to stay long on a job ; in addition the only form of discipline was the sack and men were constantly being sacked, hence if a man found he did not get on with his foreman he knew that he could be sacked; so he left anyway. Even at Luichart, not getting on with the foreman seemed to be the commonest real, as opposed to avowed reason, for "jacking".

There were songs about some of the companies and their foremen and about famous incidents that had occurred. It was clear that the camps had a life of their own quite unconnected with the home life and environments of the men. It could not be compared to the wartime Army for the Army was too large and impersonal for men to become widely known through a purely oral tradition. What I was most strongly reminded of was the life portrayed in the sagas, a small community where a man had to establish some name and repute by his actions which would become part of an oral tradition.

The stories that the men told served the purpose of giving the life a certain glamour in their eyes, something comparable to that of the Foreign Legion or the lumber camps of Canada. This dramatisation of the navvy's life and work is seen in the books of MacGill.

Part of the navvy's self-dramatisation is the belief that his hard life is forced upon him by an unsympathetic world and is in no way due to his own faults and feckleslessness. [1] This gives rise to the feeling that the navvy is something of a social outcast with every man's hand against him andin consequence he must be independent and self-reliant. This belief goes some way to accounting for his suspicion of all outsiders, the way in which he avoids close friendship with other men, and for his complete distrust of employer and trade union alike.

Conditions at Luichart, though apparently normal by civil engineering standards, seemed to me to be exceptionally bad compared with those in other industries. However, the men accepted these conditions without question and there seemed to be little strong desire for improvement. Indeed, in spite of the conditions, the men were less discontented than those I have met from other industries with far better working conditions and wages. There are several possible reasons for this. Many of the men have never known any other working conditions; the really discontented do not stay in the industry but clear out - and I have met a good many men in Glasgow who have done so; frequent movement from job to job temporarily allays the discontent when it becomes strong, and may have a cathartic effect.

Another explanation put to me was that few men look upon this kind of work as a permanent way of life. They enter it for a short time and they are always "about to leave", but in fact they just drift along until they are too old to change. Speaking from my own experience, I met scarcely anyone who admitted he intended to stay in the industry. In any case, if Luichart be at all typical of the civil engineering industry as a whole then I see no organised demand for better conditions growing up in the industry. The men at Luichart, and those I have met in Glasgow and elsewhere, sought improvement for themselves by winning a football pool, "cleaning up" a gambling school or by saving up capital to buy a farm and thus getting out of the industry; but no apparent desire to,improve conditions within the industry itself. Once again we are up against the factor of individualism; it is every man for himself and no thought or desire for joint action. This is an attitude very different from that which sociologists have found in many British and American industries.

1. FOOTNOTE: This attitude shows strongly through the works of MacGill; for example "Children of the Dead End", p. 243 et. seq.

THE VALUES OF THE NAVVIES

The navvies set the highest value on complete freedom of action. Freedom to come and go as they please, to take jobs or throw them up whenever it pleases them to do so. In order to have such freedom of action the navvies need to be free of all ties and obligations. Hence the navvies try to avoid having ties to employers, to trade unions, or to their fellow workers.

As I have explained above, the navvies go to considerable trouble to preserve their independence of all ties and obligations and they change their jobs frequently to avoid becoming attached to any one employer. Although jobs in Civil Engineering are usually only temporary a large contract may last for several years and there is no reason why a man should not stay on a contract for more than a few months. The contract I worked on lasted for over two years but few of the men saw it through from start to finish, and many of the men in the camp were on their second or third visit to the site. This often happens, men work on a site, leave, and then return a few months later only to leave again.

With the exception of the hard core of permanent workers few of the men stay on in the camp more than a month or two. Even the so-called "permanent workers" who may stay a year or more are liable to leave at two hours notice if the mood takes them. Such a rate of turnover is unnecessary and is far greater than enforced by circumstances. There are certain advantages in staying on the one job, for one thing the longer a man is there the better his chance of a "cushy" job. However, it is considered "bad form" to stay with the one employer for long as this indicates a lack of independence. Thus, even if a camp had food and amenities superior to those of other camps, the men still do not stay. Though the men consider some contractors better than others, and some camps better than others, they do not stay in the good camps but will leave a good camp for a bad one "just for a change".

In the same way the navvies avoid any trade union ties even though they admit that trade unions can be helpful to them, and have improved conditions in many camps. The men also avoid any ties to their fellow navvies, although in a situation like that of the camps it could be useful to have friends, and in spite of the fact that the Poles obviously derive certain advantages from keeping together in a group. The navvies know and appreciate the advantages but prefer freedom from obligations which membership of a group entail.

The navvies also value the ability to work hard, and they openly expressed their admiration for good workers. As I have stated above, a man could work as hard as he liked and no one would hold it against him. The ability to work hard is valued because it adds to a man's independence. A good worker can get a job anywhere and knows it. The navvies constantly use the phrase "a good man can get a job anywhere" and they believe that only the lazy or the weaklings stay in the one job. Thus confidence in one's ability to work hard add's to one's feelings of independence.

The/

The navvies also value mobility, getting around the country, showing enterprise by working on sites all over Britain. In the huts, and the bar at night men would boast of being "travelled men", and recite the places they had been, and the sites they had worked on. Those who stayed on one site for a long time and had little breadth of experience were held in contempt.

The navvies also value "wild" and reckless behaviour - drinking, gambling, and fighting. A man could make a reputation by his indulgence in one or all of these pursuits. The men would speak in admiration of any feats of these kinds that they had seen, and would speak boastfully of their own drinking, gambling, or fighting prowess. Reckless behaviour at work was also valued. All the men took unnecessary risks, and the younger ones would compete to do the more dangerous jobs in order to show their recklessness.

These are the values of the navvies. The most important value is that placed on freedom of action; and most of the other values are connected, directly or indirectly, with this value. For example, the navvies' independence of all ties, and their mobility, are clearly connected with the value set on freedom of action. Even their "wild" behaviour is done largely to show their defiance of all ties and conventions; they boast of their behaviour in terms of mock contrition in order to emphasise that they know they are breaking the rules of conventional behaviour and don't "give a damn." Thus there is a certain defiance of society and the conventions of society in these values.

I have been told that the values of the navvies are similar to those of migrant labour elsewhere, for example in the gold mines of South Africa. As I have no experience of other types of migrant labour I can neither confirm nor deny this. As I have said earlier, the nearest approach to navvies' values that I have read of are those described in the sagas. However, it is not possible to go further into this parallel here.

THE STATUS AND PRESTIGE OF THE NAVVIES

Status in Society.

The navvy has status as "a navvy", that is as being a member of the group of navvies. The status accorded to "a navvy" in Britain is a very low one. It is low because of the work they do, and because of the patterns of behaviour which are associated with navvies. Navvying is looked upon as hard, dirty, dangerous work and is associated with very bad working and living conditions. The navvies themselves are looked upon as "toughs", men who drink and gamble to excess, who fight at the least excuse, who have no permanent jobs, and who are feckless and irresponsible. In short, the very opposite of what a good citizen ought to be. In my brief spell as a navvy I was made aware of the fact that I was regarded as being of low status and was an object of suspicion to those outsiders I came into contact with - e.g. shopkeepers, publicans, etc.

The navvies are very conscious of their status in society and of the fact that people generally look down on them as "a lot of savages", and fear and distrust them. This is shown very clearly by MacGill who in several passages speaks of the navvies as "outcasts", for example: "And we, the men who braved this task, were outcasts of the world. A blind fate, a vast merciless mechanism, cut and shaped the fabric of our existence. We were men flogged to the work which we had to do, and hounded from the work which we had accomplished. We were men despised when we were most useful, rejected when we were not needed, and forgotten when our troubles weighed upon us heavily. ---- Where we were working a new town would spring up some day; it was already springing up, and then, if one of us walked there, " a man with no fixed address," he would be taken up and tried as a loiterer and vagrant. [1].

In spite of their complaints about their low status the navvies accept the valuation that society puts on their work. In my conversations with the navvies, or while listening to them talking among themselves, I never heard any of them express any liking for their work. On the contrary they all expressed strong dislike of it, using such expressions as the following: "It's a low kind of work, not proper work for a decent man"; "Only the lowest of the low like this kind of life"; and, "This kind of work is fit only for animals."

When I spoke to navvies alone I found that in every case they dissociated themselves from navvying, and from the other navvies whom they would class as "low ignorant men". What they resented was not the low status of the navvies, which they accepted, but the fact that they themselves were classed as navvies, although, so they claimed, they were in the industry only temporarily. Most of the men were apt to speak bitterly of the fact that necessity drove them to this kind of work. Few of them looked upon themselves as permanent Civil Engineering workers but talked constantly of giving it up. They looked upon navvying as merely a temporary episode in their lives. As one man said to me: "They all stary off thinking this is just temporary, then they drift and drift along in it for life. But they never accept it as permanent, they are always just about to chuck it up."

Another factor which affects the men's outlook on status is the fact that they look upon the status of a navvy as a purely occupational one, one that does not affect their status when at home in any way. The men made it clear in their conversation that they felt they shared the low status of navvies only when in the camps .

[1]. Footnote. MacGill "Children of the Dead End" page 227. On this theme of the navvy as "outcast" see also Chapter XXXL.

That when at home their status changed and reverted to that held before they took up navvying.

The fact that the men look on navvying as being only a temporary career, and believe that it does not affect their status when at home, goes far to explain why they show no real interest in raising the status of "navvy". They accept that the presentllow status of navvies is a just one, and they are not interested in raising the status of navvies generally, but only in raising their own, individual status. They hope to do this by leaving navvying and entering some other occupation which has a higher status. Hence, they have little incentive to try to raise the status of navvies.

Group Prestige in Society.

Although the status of the navvies is low their prestige as a group is high. This is prestige attached to navvies as a group and is quite distinct from individual prestige. The things which give navvies high prestige are exactly the same things which give them low status, The hardness and danger of the work; their wild behaviour - drinking, gambling, and fighting; thoir roving life and their independence of any employer. These things give the navvies a certain glamour in the eyes of men - though rarely in those of women - as being "tough", as doing "a man's job". The same kind of prestige is attached in wartime to being a member of the Commandos or Paratroops. In civilian life one sees it attached to professional boxers and footballers; both occupations have low status but high prestige. One can also see this kind of prestige on the films which often make heroic "epics" on low status groups which have a high prestige because of their "toughne ss". For example, railway construction teams as in "Southern Pacific"; civil engineering navvies in "Boulder Dam"; and boxers, Western Gunfighters, and even gangsters in innumerable films.

The navvies are very much aw are of this kind of prestige and they try to maintain and increase it in various ways. They all, particularly the younger men, try to live up to this "tough" behaviour in one or more ways; by taking risks at work, drinking, fighting, and gambling. And, as I have explained earlier, most of the men go to great lengths to stress their independence of the employer by "jacking" whenever they feel like it. They also like to tell stories - usually exaggerated - of the feats that they or other men have done. For example, of the fights they have seen, the gambling games in which immense sums have been won andlost, and the long orgies of drinking they have indulged in. They boast too of the danger of the job and of the number killed on it, for instance in the camp I studied they boasted of the three men who had been killed that summer. When some feat happens, as when one of the men beat up three soldiers in a fight one Saturday night, this is seized upon and made the subject of a legend which is told to newcomers and passed on to other camps.

Thus the navvies set store on their prestige as a group and do all they can to maintain it.

Status at Work.

Among the actual navvies, the unskilled labourers, all have the same status and pay. The tradesmen have a higher status and pay. The tradesmen themselves are conscious/

conscious that they have a higher status but the navvies are reluctant to concede them this status. The labourers often say among themselves that the so-called tradesmen are not really tradesmen as: "no real tradesman would do this kind of work." The joiners, who are by far the largest class of tradesmen, do a great deal of heavy manual work as part of their jobs, and the labourers say that this proves they are not real tradesmen as real tradesmen would never do heavy work, but insist on their labourers doing it. Outside of the work the navvies and the tradesmen mix on equal terms and eat and sleep together, and go drinking together, without any apparent status differences.

The company appoints foremen and gangers who have higher status and pay than the navvies and tradesmen. The status of these varies considerably according to the permanence of their appointment. There is a handful of senior foremen who are permanent employees of the company and whose status as foremen is permanent - these have higher status. On the other hand there is the majority of the foremen and all the gangers who have only temporary status and who will be paid off when the job is finished. These share the men's eating quarters - though some of the more senior eat in the foremen's canteen - and sleeping quarters, and mix with the men on equal terms outside working hours. When at work their status is hardly more than that of equals and I had some difficulty in finding out who actually were the gangers, since in most cases they worked along with the men and gave few orders. These men know that their status is only temporary and that they may be ordinary labourers on their next job, hence, neither they nor the other men set much store on their pre sent status. In short one can say that - with the exception of the few high-ranking permanent foremen - the differences in status between foremen and non-foremen, tradesmen and non-tradesmen, are only slight.

The company treats all the men, with the exception of its permanent senior foremen, as being of low status. This is shown in the way the company treats the men. The food and living conditions are bad and the company does nothing to better them on the grounds that, "anything is good enough for that lot". The management and the office staff speak of the men with contempt, and treat them contemptuously in their dealings with them. The men know and resent this and the fact that all are treated in the same way helps to prevent any important status differences growing up between them. For example, it is hard to believe one's foreman is of higher status when he may be sacked at two hours notice.

INDIVIDUAL PRESTIGE.

Individual prestige is decided by the contribution the individual makes to the prestige of the group, and is thus decided by the same factors which give the group prestige. As th e navvies have to interest in the status of navvies as a group, factors which add to their status are of no importance in determining individual prestige. The most important factor in determining the prestige of an individual is his ability to work well. The reason for this is that a man who is known to be a good worker can get a good job anywhere; thus it is necessary to be a good worker in order to be independent of any one employer. It is one of the insults thrown at the company's permanent employees - "Wimpey's men" - that they are afraid to leave the company because they couldn't get a job elsewhere; and it is said that only poor workers have to cling to a job when they get one.

Men try to gain prestige as workers by feats of strength and endurance. This is particularly true of the younger men who still have to "make their name". I found that if the men were carrying one plank each I had only to carry two to have the young men trying to carry two or even three. It is a compliment to call a man a "horse", one who "horses it", who is a good worker. A good worker has high prestige regardless of anything else he does, and even an unpopular ganger or foreman may be respected as a good worker. On the other hand any man who is not a good worker has low prestige and is held in contempt, regardless of his other virtues. Any man dodging the work is soon "told off" by the other men, even though he may not be putting extra work on to them by his laziness.

The other factor in determining the individual's prestige is how well he lives up to the value set on wild and reckless behaviour. How often he changes his job, or how readily he does dangerous work like tunnelling. As I have explained earlier, the men, especially the younger ones, like to make their name by some feat or other and establish themselves as "fighting men", "drinking men", or "gambling men". And they like to boast of the things they have done in this line.

In short one can say that the navvies have a low status in society; at work they are treated by the employer as having low status, and there is little variation in status between tradesmen and labourers, or between foremen and workers generally. However, the navvies as a group have high prestige arising from the "glamour" of the job, and from its associations with "toughness" and independence. The navvies value this prestige and try to maintain it. Individual prestige depends upon the same factors and the individual navvy gains prestige first by being a good worker, and, as such, independent of the employer; and, secondly, by the wildness and "toughness" of his behaviour.

SUMMARY

(i) It was seen that the navvies are migrant labourers, that few of them have permanent jobs with the company, and that most of them rarely stay more than a few months on a job but like to move frequently from one camp to another. The men are highly paid, but spend a high proportion of their wages on food, drink, tobacco and gambling. The work is hard, and living and working conditions are bad. The main reasons why the men put up with these conditions are: (a) Habit, being used to this kind of work and knowing no other; (b) The high wages, because they wish to save money; (c) The high wages, because they spend heavily; (d) The attraction of the freedom and independence of this kind of life.

(ii) The navvies dislike and distrust the employer - in fact they dislike and distrust all employers as such - and they wish to be completely independent of any employer. Nevertheless they are good workers and have no restrictive practices.

(iii) The navvies like to be free from obligations to other men. Hence, they reject all ties and obligations, even social ties, and they avoid joining with other men to form groups lest membership of these should limit their freedom of action.

(iv) The navvies distrust the trade unions and wish to be independent of trade unions.

(v) The navvies set the highest value on individual freedom of action, and value anything which contributes to such freedom - e.g. independence of all ties and obligations and mobility. The navvies also value wild and reckless behaviour as this serves to emphasise their freedom.

(vi) The navvies have low status as a group and are not interested in raising this status since they hope to leave the industry for other occupations carrying higher status. However, the navvies as a group have high prestige created by the same factors as those which cause their low status - their "toughness", and wild behaviour and also their independence. They value this high prestige and try to maintain it. Individual prestige is gained in accordance with how well the individual contributes to the prestige of the group - i.e. by his toughness and independence.

COMPARISON OF THE THREE STUDIES.

COMPARISON OF THE THREE STUDIES.

In order to compare ~~the~~ and contrast these three groups we will examine (i) what they have in common; (ii) in what they differ.

What they have in common.

(i) The members of all three occupations have in common the fact that they are employees. That is they are in their industrial life subordinate to an employer - or the management who acts for that employer. The enterprise they work for is conducted by the employer in his own interests and the employees are expected by their employer to accept these interests as their own and to work to forward them. The employer claims the right to decide - within the limits of the law - the wages and working conditions of his employees in accordance with the interests of his enterprise.

(ii) The members of all three occupations have certain interests arising out of their situation at work and have systems of values connected with these interests.

(iii) The members of all three occupations work with a group of groups of other people who have the same relationship to the employer, do the same kind of work, and have similar interests and values. And, as a result, certain relationships are developed between members of these groups.

(iv) The members of all three occupations have:-

a. A status in society arising from their work. This depends largely upon the ideas which society holds of their work.

b. A status and prestige within their place of work.

In what they differ.

Although members of all three occupations have these situations in common they vary considerably in the ways in which they react to them. The basic situation, the relationship to the employer, is common to all and I will describe this situation and its implications before passing on to compare the reactions of the three occupations to it.

The employer-employee relationship.

There are many writers on industrial relations but, strangely enough, very few of these have bothered to define the employer-employee relationship. One who has is J. Cunnison and I give his definition below.

> "Of such features (the features which cause Labour organisation) the most significant, from this point of view, is the relation between employer and employed. The service, labour, is sold by the latter and bought by the former; and the relation is therefore, from one point of view, that of buyer to seller. But it is not the ordinary, 'buyer-seller' relation. Peculiar conditions are introduced by the fact that wealth production (at any stage in its development) involves/

involves the co-operation of capital (including land) on the one hand - and labour on the other; and that at the present stage of industrial development, although the ownership of capital is probably more widespread than hitherto, the greater part of capital is in the hands of those who are employers of labour, while those who give their labour possess, as individuals, little capital. The employers, therefore, possess that without which labour could not be sold, and could not, under present conditions of industry, even function. Employers furnish the instruments and the materials on which labour must act if it is to contribute to the production of wealth. Further, the question what is to be produced, and how it is to be produced, is decided by the employers; the employed have no ultimate determining voice in the direction of industry, but give their labour as directed in return for a fixed payment in the form of wages.

"Such a description implies that there is a clear distinction between the class of employers and that of the employed." *

Cunnison goes on to say: "On the other hand, as separate classes, they have also separate interests peculiar to themselves, and these, at least on a short period view, may be antagonistic. It is of special interest to the employed that the conditions under which their labour is given should be good; these include conditions as to sanitation, safety, health, and hours of labour. It is to their special interest that the remuneration for their labour should be satisfactory, and that they should have security of tenure in their employment. And it is to their special interest that they should have some voice in determining all these conditions. Possibility of conflict between employers and employed arises in connection with the distribution of the product; and the demand for an increased share in the direction of industry and control of its conditions on the part of labour involves some interference with the freedom and power of the employer, which has, in general, been strongly resisted at every stage." **

Cunnison sums up the relationship by saying: "The workers, therefore, stand to the employers in a relation of double dependence, depending on them for the sale of their labour, and also for the requisite conditions of its production. It is this double dependence that gives importance to the interests which are common to workers." ***

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* Footnote: J. Cunnison, "Labour Organisation". Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons Ltd. London, 1930. pp. 1 & 2.

** Footnote: Cunnison, pp. 2 & 3.

*** Footnote: Cunnison, p. 4.

The Ideology of the Employers.

The employer's interests have been referred to briefly above but it will be necessary to define them in some detail. The reason is this. The employer, because of his position, has always held the initiative in forming the employer-employee relationship. He has decided in the terms of his ideology what his interests and values are and has then tried to govern the relationship according to these. The employee's ideology, his interests and values, have always been a reaction to those of the employer. The employee may accept the interests and values of the employer or he may reject them, but he can never ignore them, and his own interests and values must be affected - either positively or negatively - by those of the employer.

The employer has three main interests in industrial matters, three things which he values, and which he claims as his rights. These are the rights of private property; the right of private enterprise; and the right to the loyalty of his employees. These are examined below.

Private Property.

In the ideology of the employer the rights of private property and private enterprise are regarded as fundamental. Democracy is identified with the right of every man to do the best he can for himself, with the minimum amount of intervention from the state except for the protection of private property rights. The state is expected to protect private property as being the foundation on which freedom rests.

More important than the property itself is the power which it confers on the owner. As Professor Ginsberg has said: "Property determines not only the relations between persons and material things, but as a social institution it governs the relations of persons to each other. Historically, as we have seen, the assertion of power over others is one of the methods of acquisition, but, however acquired, property becomes an instrument for further power. In particular it has become an indstrument whereby those who have can control the life and labour of those who have not." *

In mediaeval conceptions of property the obligations of property were strongly emphasised. To quote Tawney: "Property is not a mere aggregate of economic privileges, but a responsible office. Its raison d'etre is not only income, but service. It is to secure its owner such means, and no more than such means, as may enable him to perform those duties, whether labour on the land, or labour in government, which are involved in the particular status which he holds in the system. He who seeks more robs his superiors, or his dependents, or both. He who exploits his property with a single eye to its economic possibilities at once prevents its very essence and destroys his own/

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* Footnote: Morris Ginsberg, "On the Diversity of Morals". Heinemann, London, 1956, p.319.

own moral title, for he has 'every man's living and does no man's duty'." *

It is only after the Revolution of 1688 that ideas of private property owing no obligations to anyone arise. To quote Tawney again: "The theory which took its place, (the place of feudalism) and which was to become in the eighteenth century almost a religion, was that expressed by Locke, when he described property as a right anterior to the existence of the State, and argued that 'The supreme power cannot take away from any man any part of his property without his own consent'." **

The employer's beliefs about private property and private enterprise stem directly from Locke. It is impossible for anyone to say at the present day that the rights of private property are unrestricted but the view is still held that they ought to be. While employers accept, more or less reluctantly, the right of the State to interfere in their works they still claim complete control over their employees. In terms of their ideology employers believe that they have the <u>right</u> to complete power over their employees. The right to pay what wages they like, to hire and fire at will, in short, to decide - within the limits of statutory regulations - the working conditions in their factories. ***

This last statement may seem exaggerated in view of the control that trade unions now exercise over working conditions, but the limitations set by trade union rules and agreements are regarded as being bargains or concessions of a temporary nature, revocable at will, and in no way affecting the employer's inalienable sovereignty within the works or his right to settle conditions at will.

The extent to which this remains a part of the employer's ideology is illustrated by the fact that a leading industrialist, Sir Frederic Hooper, can say this of his fellow employers in an article in "The Director": "No longer are employers able - even if they were willing - to exercise the pre-war sanction of fear of the sack and all that went with it. If British Industry is to thrive in such conditions, the authority of the employers must undergo a profound change. It must depend not on compulsive power over the workers, but on persuasive power <u>with</u> the workers.

"That this view has not yet been wholly accepted by industrialists was shown by the feeling among some members of the Institute of Directors because Mr. Frank Cousins had been invited to address the annual conference in October."

And later in the same article he asks of British managers "Do they yet realise that they must concede reasonable/

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* <u>Footnote</u>: R.H.Tawney, "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism", Penguin Edition, p. 154.

** <u>Footnote</u>: Tawney, p. 252.

*** <u>Footnote</u>: On the ideology of employers see also "Work and Authority in Industry" by Reinhard Bendix, John Wiley & Sons Inc., New York, 1956.

reasonable conditions of labour as a matter of right, no longer as a matter of privilege? That the benevolent despots of Victorian industry are to-day as obsolete as the relief of poverty by indiscriminate charity? That the ideal relationship between employer and employed is a synthesis rather than a conflict of powers? I doubt it." *

The above supports the view that, whatever changes may have taken place in practice, the theory of the unrestricted rights of private property is still a part of the employer's ideology.

Private Enterprise.

The right to exercise private enterprise and individual freedom of action is, with private property, the key to the employer's ideology. Free enterprise is believed to be the mainspring of our form of society and any restriction of it will, it is believed, inevitably lead to the decline of our society.

To quote a typical view on this. Lewis and Maude in their book "The English Middle Classes" state: "It will prove increasingly difficult to keep the mainspring wound up without these basic, crude incentives which alone keep free enterprise free and enterprising. There seems indeed but one alternative to the early halting of the egalitarian policy; and that is a disastrous breakdown, in which all will suffer and which might be succeeded by a totalitarian regime." **

Here, however, we are concerned with the beliefs about free enterprise only in so far as they affect relations within the workshop, and it can be claimed that the trade unions restrict the freedom of (a) the employers, (b) the employees. Hence the reason for the traditional opposition of employers to trade unions. We will examine the employer's claims that trade unions restrict freedom more closely, since these claims throw considerable light on the employer's belief in free enterprise.

(a) The employer's freedom. The various "rights" which trade unions claim greatly restrict the freedom of the employer in the management of his business and particularly in his dealings with his employees. The trade unions dispute the employer's right to settle wages and conditions of work at will, and also his right to hire and fire labour.

(b) The trade unions restrict the freedom of their members by their insistence on collective bargaining and collective agreements. Private negotiations between individual employees and the employer is not permitted; they must deal with each other only through the medium of the trade union and the individual members of the union must accept any terms it agrees upon. In addition the trade unions insist that all their members shall participate in any sanctions against the employer which they may feel to be necessary - e.g. bans on overtime working, "go slow", and strikes./

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* Footnote: "The Director" (The Journal of the Institute of Directors) January, 1957, p.71.

** Footnote: "The English Middle Classes" by Roy Lewis and Angus Maude. Penguin Edition,1953,p.220.

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strikes. The individual member is forced into these actions, sometimes against his will, by union pressure.

It is held too, that the collective principles of trade unions prevent private enterprise among workers by removing all individual incentives. For example:-

(a) The establishment of standard rates for the job.

(b) The - largely unofficial - limitations set on piece-work earnings.

(c) The principle of holding a job on seniority - last in first out.

(d) The principle of promotion to better jobs on seniority. *

All four remove any incentive for a worker to be better than his fellows.

Employers complain that in these ways the trade unions crush enterprise among the workers and prevent employers from taking any action to reward the good workers or penalise the bad ones. In terms of the employer's values this is wrong for every individual has the "right" to try to get on by his own efforts and the less able or less hardworking must accept inferiority.

They complain too that in enforcing collective action on their members the trade unions are guilty of crushing personal freedom. This issue has been raised several times in recent years. In May 1956 an association calling itself "The People's League for the Defence of Freedom" which declared its first object to be "To organise public support for a policy which will afford protection and help for all citizens whose standard of life or freedom is threatened by the growing abuse of power by trade unions." In a letter to the Trades Union Congress it also/

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* Footnote: This may seem to contradict what has been said earlier about the industrial worker not valueing seniority but this is not really the case. The kind of seniority is somewhat different. Among clerks seniority gives a man status and higher pay, a clerk with high seniority has a higher status and pay than a clerk with less. This is not the case with industrial workers, they claim equality of pay and status but concede that when there is a better job available, or when men have to be paid off, then the man with the longest service should get priority. Status does not come into it, it is simply that length of tenure establishes certain rights. The industrial worker also places great emphasis on the fact that the use of seniority in such cases prevents competition. If there were no principle to guide them then the decision would be left to the employer and this would lead to competition for the employer's favour.

also declared "One of its (the League's) declared objectives is to oppose the growing tyranny of the trade unions." In 1958 the League ran buses during the London Bus Strike as a practical means of pursuing this objective.

Other similar attacks have been made in the magazine "Scope" - whose title page declares that it is "For Business and Industrial Executives" - for October 1957 the editorial column of which began: "Why have the British Trade Unions allowed themselves to be regarded by large sections of the general public as a reactionary force." And goes on to say: "Cases of intimidation to force independent workers into union membership have alienated much of public opinion."

"The Economist" in its series on "The Trade Unions" in February 1958 attacked the closed shop and said "freedom not to join a trade union may mean freedom not to have one's working habits (and one's opportunities for earning money - and producing goods) restricted by rules with which one may not agree." *

It is clear then that there are many who believe that trade union practices are contrary to the value they set on the freedom of the individual.

Loyalty.

In the employer's ideology the highest loyalty which a man owes - within industry - is to the Company which employs him and to the management who act on behalf of the Company. The argument is that the Company provides a man with his living and therefore in return he owes it loyalty. In other words the employer is not simply buying labour from men as a purely economic transaction, he is also doing them a service in giving them work, and loyalty is owed in return for this service. This is a long step from the eighteenth century idea of unrestricted private property and enterprise back towards the idea of social reciprocities that obtained in the Middle Ages.

Most employers lay great stress on loyalty. The practical forms they expect it to take are that men will stay with the Company no matter what inducements other firms have to offer; that they will do extra work over and above their normal duties when it is required by the Company; that they will move their homes permanently or temporarily if the Company wishes them to do so, and in general will subordinate their personal convenience to that of the Company. In some cases this may involve men in breaking trade union rules or agreements in the Company's interest.

Some firms do attempt, as one director put it to me, "To buy loyalty" by looking after the interests of their employees, for example, by having pension funds and sick pay, taking an interest in their welfare both inside and outside the works, and giving priority to relatives of employees when they have jobs to offer - e.g. giving children of employees first chance when they have vacancies for apprentices. In these ways they hope to establish a bond between the Company and its employees./

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* Footnote: "The Economist" February 22nd., 1958, p.640.

employees.

Such employers are in a minority, many employers apparently believing that the act of hiring a man in itself establishes a bond of loyalty and that the man should be grateful for being accepted as a member of their Company. One can only suppose that they think of men as "joining them" of being "accepted into the firm" rather than of being hired.

The Ideology of the Printers.

The printers react to the employer-employee situation and to the employer's ideology by an ideology of their own which I shall describe in relation to the employer's ideology.

Private Property.

The rights of personal property are clearly recognised but the right to private property on a very large scale is only partly accepted. As was shown, the personal property of individuals, whether workers or managers, is regarded as sacred but at the same time thefts from the firm - except on a large scale - are scarcely regarded as offences at all.

On the question of the power arising from private property and the right to wield such power the situation is but vaguely defined. That the employer holds certain powers arising from his ownership of the works is recognised but these are believed to be limited in practice by the rights of the employees or workers. These rights can be divided into four broad categories as follows:-

i) The right to work.

ii) The right to share in profits.

iii) The right to be consulted on all matters that affect working conditions.

iv) The right to challenge any ruling of the employer which they think unfair or to be a breach of established custom. I discuss these at greater length below.

i) The Right to Work.

The right to work has been accepted as a fundamental principle by all the British trade unions since the early 19th century. The T.U.C's "Interim Report on Post-War Reconstruction" of 1944 laid down three main objectives of which the second was full employment: "Secondly the Trade Union Movement is concerned with the opportunities which exist for the worker to obtain work. 'Full Employment' is an aim which the Trade Unions have always pursued...." *

Apart from defending the general trade union principle of the right to work the printing Trade Unions have long tried to assert this right within the workshop by ensuring that the maximum possible number of men should be employed. The method of doing this has been to prevent individuals getting more than their "fair share"/

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* Footnote: Trades Union Congress "Post-War Reconstruction: Interim Report" 1944, p.7.

share" of work.

To enumerate some of the means used to achieve this end:-

a) Overtime working is banned or limited when there is unemployment.

b) The number of machines a man may work is limited by union rule, on large machines the union fixed the minimum number of men who shall work it.

c) The trade unions insist on various precautions where men work piecework or incentive schemes. They insist that no one shall be made redundant through the introduction of such schemes, and when agreeing to their introduction they have a saving clause asserting their right to withdraw from such schemes in the event of unemployment.

d) The number of apprentices is limited with the intention of preventing the skilled labour force ever exceeding the demand for labour. *

In addition to these official trade union measures there are various unofficial or semi-official methods of setting limits on productivity when there is a danger of unemployment. For example, setting a limit on each man's output, or "pooling" the work of all the men working on the same job. Examples of such practices have been given earlier.

ii) The Right to Share in Profits.

One of the oldest rights in the trade union ideology is that to "a fair day's pay for a fair day's work". This phrase is misleading for it implies that a "fair day's pay" is something that - except for cost of living increases - remains constant. In actual fact the amount which constitutes a "fair day's pay" in the eyes of the printers increases as profits increase, hence it is, in reality, a claim to share in profits.

I have described the trade union aims and objects in detail earlier in this thesis and in the quotation from union rule-books that I gave then were included the following. The rule-book of the A.S.L.P. put forward the demand for "a fair share of profits"; that of the N.S.E.S. spoke of "a fair price for our work"; and the rules of Natsopa give as an object "to maintain reasonable hours of work and fair rates of wages".

iii) The Right to be consulted on all matters that affect working conditions.

The printers claim the right to be consulted on all matters that affect their conditions of work. This right is asserted by the trade unions at national level, and by the Chapels at works level. The ways in which they put this right into practical application are as follows:

1. The trade unions claims the right to negotiate hours, wages, and conditions of work with the employers.

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* Footnote: Examples of the practices outlined here are described earlier in this thesis. Some can also be found in "Productivity & Trade Unions" by F.Zweig. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1951.

2. Within the works the Chapels claim the right to negotiate with the employer on working conditions which are not already covered by the trade union agreements.

Section (2) usually covers such questions as the following:

a) The methods of wages payment, piece rates, and incentive schemes.

b) The manning of new machinery and new processes.

c) The introduction of work study,

d) The arrangement of shifts and the distribution of overtime.

e) The training of apprentices.

iv) <u>The Right to challenge any ruling of the employer which they think to be unfair or to be a breach of established custom</u>.

It is accepted that while an employee is in the works he is subject to the rules of that works and to any sanctions - within the law - that the employer may use to enforce them. At the same time the printers believe that they have the right to challenge any rules, sanctions, or actions of any kind which they believe to be unfair.

This right is asserted in trade union rules and also in many unwritten workshop customs and practices. For example, all the printing unions claim the right to limit the sanctions of dismissal if it is used as a means of getting rid of trade union officials. All six pay "Victimisation Benefit" and all will take action to defend a victimised F.O.C.

The unions limit the employer's sanctions in other ways. For example, by ruling that their members shall not permit themselves to be fined for spoiled work, and shall not accept part time working or suspension. *

In practice these trade union limitations on the employer are rarely challenged and disputes with the employer usually occur over the interpretation of accepted principles of fair dealing or of local or works custom. I have already cited examples of these in my description of the Printing Chapel. It can be said that in every works customs grow up, and these may differ from works to works even within the printing industry. In respect to custom each works stands alone and men in one works may refuse to adopt practices which are accepted in other similar works but are contrary to their own customs. For example, the respective duties and lines of demarcation between different trades, between tradesmen and non-tradesmen, between men and women, are all subject to works custom as well as to union rule, and any attempt by an employer to change these is almost certain to be challenged by/

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* <u>Footnote</u>: For examples of rules concerning spoiled work see Rule 57 of the A.S.L.P. Rules, and Rule 26 of the N.S.E.S. Rules; for short time and suspension, Rule 4 of the Working Agreements of the S.T.A.

by the workers concerned.

The important thing about this right is that the printers do not believe that they must accept the employer's ruling or leave his employment. Instead they believe that they have the right to stay in their job and force the employer to accept their idea of just dealing. In short they claim the right to make the employer keep to the customs and practices which have become accepted in that works; and to their own standards of what institutes fair dealing.

The Property Rights of the Printing Trade Unions.

In addition to asserting the "rights" of the workers the printing trade unions have built up claims to property rights of their own which conflict with the claims of the employers. These property rights take the form of rights over jobs, some unions claiming that only their members may fill certain jobs, or man certain machines or processes.

This may be kept up in spite of technical changes. For example Musson in his history of the "Typographical Association" has pointed out how this union set out from the early 19th century to control all new processes in the typographical field.* In fact all the British typographical unions did the same so that at the present day all type-setting machinery - linotype and monotype - is manned by men who have first served an apprenticeship as hand compositors. The claim that only compositors shall handle type, no matter how the process is mechanised, serves to keep type-setting as the monopoly of the typographical unions.

The justification for these property "rights" lies in the beliefs about craft skill. It is held that only those who have served an apprenticeship are fit to do a skilled job. Since the trade unions control apprenticeship this means that only their members can do these skilled jobs. The trade unions claim that they do employers a service since they, thorugh the system of apprenticeship training, guarantee the skill of their members. The employer who employs a non-union man takes a risk as he has no guarantee of the non-union man's skill. This is the basis of the printing trade unions' claim and it is, in effect, similar to the claims made by the professional bodies of doctors, lawyers, or accountants. The claim that they alone guarantee skill.

The claim to property "rights" over unskilled and semi-skilled jobs is less clear cut. But it rests, in the main, on the claim that the union which controls the skilled job needs to control the unskilled jobs on the same machine or process lest these unskilled men should pick up a little knowledge, set themselves up as skilled men, and by their incompetence bring the craft into disrepute and lower its status.

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* Footnote: A.E.Musson, "The Typographical Association", Oxford University Press, 1954. Chapter xi.

This property "right" reaches its fullest development in the "closed shop" where the right to do a certain job is strictly confined to members of the union which controls that job. No man who is not a member of the appropriate union being allowed entry to the works on any pretext. All the printing unions operate, or attempt to operate, the closed shop.

Property rights are defended not only against the employer but also against other unions, being defended against these other unions through "lines of demarcation". Examples of such lines of demarcation have been given earlier and it was seen that lines of demarcation are used by tradesmen to defend the right to control a job against men in different trades, whether they belong to the same trade union or not. Lines of demarcation are also used to defend the right of a trade union to control an unskilled job against unskilled members of other unions.

Thus the job "belongs" to the trade or the trade union, not to the employer nor to the man who does it, and the trade union can dismiss a man from his job by expelling him from the union and thus making him ineligible to hold a job which is reserved for union members. The term "property" is not, I think, too strong in these cases, for tenure of the job depends as much on the goodwill of the trade union as on that of the employer; a man may be sacked for a breach of trade union rules just as for a breach of the works rules.

These various rights claimed by the printing trade unions, and by the printers in the workshops, are in opposition to the employer's claims of the unrestricted rights of private property.

Private Enterprise.

The printers do not value freedom of enterprise and individualism. In saying this I refer to their industrial behaviour and do not mean to imply that they do not value individual freedom of action in their private lives. It is individualism andprivate enterprise in industry that are condemned, the reason being that they conflict with the most important of their values, that set on unity.

Unity, or "solidarity" to use the terminology of the trade union movement, is regarded as being vital to the workers. This is not surprising since the basis of trade unions is unity against the employer. In the trade union movement it is believed that workers must - in their own defence - stand united against the employer. In order to attain this unity it is necessary that the members of a trade union should subordinate their right to individual freedom of action and accept the decisions made by the trade union. To put this in terms of rights; workers exchange the right to freedom of action for reciprocal rights to - and duties of - mutual support between themselves on the one hand and their fellow workers and/or trade unions on theother. It falls to the trade unions to keep the advantages of this system of reciprocal rights and duties before their members by constantly emphasising the need for unity against the employer. As we have seen, the myths expressed by the printing trade unions in their rule-books and official histories are used in this way to keep the advantages of unity before their members.

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The printers believe that employers try to create disunity among them with the intention of weakening their resistance to the employers. The methods which, it is alleged, the employers use to cause disunity are two in number.

i) They encourage their employees to act individually instead of collectively e.g. encourage them to compete against each other.

ii) They create differences in pay and conditions between individual workers.

In order to counter the employer and prevent disunity the printers insist that two principles be observed:-

i) That each worker should subordinate his right of individual decision and action to the decisions of the majority.

ii) That, within certain accepted limits, equality between workers must be maintained.

i) The first principle is the basis for the printers' insistence that all must support majority decisions no matter what their private opinion is. Once a decision is taken it is expected that even those who opposed it will accept the will of the majority and work actively to implement the decision. It is a serious offence in terms of the printers' values for a man to refuse to accept a decision of the majority.

ii) The practices used to maintain equality have been given earlier. To recapitulate them briefly the most important are:-

(a) The insistence on an equal sharing of overtime.

(b) The banning of piecework and incentive schemes or the evasion of them by setting limits on production in order to ensure that all receive the same pay.

(c) The insistence on seniority for various types of promotion instead of allowing promotion to be competitive.

(d) Bans on "merit money" payments given by the employer to those workers he thinks to be deserving of it. It being held that this allows the employer to differentiate between individual workers.

To sum up the situation. Unity against the employer is the basic value in the printers' ideology. It is held that without unity the workers are entirely at the mercy of the employer. In consequence any practices which may lead to disunity are disliked and strongly penalised. Among the practices which are condemned as likely to cause disunity are competition and individual freedom of action within the works. It must be emphasised that there is no condemnation of individualism in general, but individual action <u>within</u> the works situation is condemned because it may lead to disunity and will upset the system of reciprocal /

reciprocal rights that bind printers to each other and to their trade unions.*

Loyalty.

The printers do not accept that they owe loyalty to the employer in return for employment. Loyalty to one's fellow workers and trade union is valued, loyalty to the employer is not. Loyalty to fellow workers and trade unions is an essential part of the unity among workers described above when discussing free enterprise. The trade unions' right to the loyalty of workers, and vice versa, proceeds automatically from the system of reciprocal rights and duties between them. Loyalty of the workers to their employers is to a large extent, though not entirely, excluded by their loyalty to the trade unions. But there are other reasons why the employer's right to loyalty from his employees is rejected.

The reasons for not accepting that loyalty is owed to the employer are these. It is claimed that the employers do nothing for their employees but merely make use of them and exploit them. And it is pointed out that the employer does not offer permanent employment and security but hires labour when he wants it, and pays workers off when he does not need them - as when they are incapacitated by sickness or old age. This is in contrast with the way employers treat members of their clerical and supervisory staff who are given "staff conditions", i.e. they have a permanent job, receive full pay when sick, and are pensioned.

It is also pointed out by the printers that they have no functions within the works beyond that of being "hired hands". The employer allows them no say in how the work is run, he even denies them information about the firm's position, and about management plans and policies and the reasons for them. Under these conditions the employees do not really belong to a firm, they are not part of it, hence they cannot be expected to feel loyalty.

It has been stated above that there are some employers who do look after their workers'welfare and the number has been growing steadily since the war. Such attempts to "buy" loyalty are suspected by many workers, and by the trade unions, of being attempts to weaken the workers' solidarity and to wean them away from their loyalty to their workmates and their trade union.

In recent years many employers have instituted pension schemes and in many cases have made it clear that they have done so in order to create loyalty and bind workers to their employer. The trade unions, while they do not object to pension schemes, make it clear that they prefer schemes which will cover a whole industry so that men do not become attached to one employer.

To give an example, the Secretary of the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation had this to say in explaining to members/

members of the printing trade unions why the Federation had been unable to get a pension scheme for the industry: "the employers and ourselves have during that time been irreconcilable on one fundamental of a pension scheme. The fundamental was that 'transferability' should be an integral part of any industrial pension scheme covering our industry. To this the employers took the stand that our fundamental was actually the main objection of their members; they did not agree to our claim that an employee should take his pension rights with him when he changed his job, contending that pensions should be a private inducement and reward to workers to work for individual firms." *

In general we can say that the printers deny the employer's claims to loyalty and assert a counter-claim that loyalty is owed to their fellow workers and trade unions. The reasons for valueing loyalty to each other and to their trade union are similar to the reasons for valueing unity. Loyalty is essential to unity and as such is a vital asset in the struggle against the employer.

It is clear from the above that the printers oppose the employer, and refuse to accept his ideology - his system of beliefs, interests, and values. Instead the printers put forward an ideology of their own which conflicts with that of the employer. They assert rights of their own which conflict with and limit the employer's rights of private property; they reject the value of private enterprise and individual freedom of action, and value unity and collective action instead; and they reject the value of loyalty to the employer, and value instead loyalty to each other and to their trade union. In all these things the interests and values of the printers are not merely different from, but are actually opposed to the interests and values of the employer.

Thus the reaction of the printers to the employer-employee relationship is one of opposition to the employer, and, since the individual printer is too weak to oppose the employer alone, they react by collective opposition as printers.

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* Footnote: Article by the Secretary of the Printing & Kindred Trades Federation in "The Federation Bulletin", January 1958. Vol.2, No. 25,p.12.

The reasons for opposing the employer's ideology.

The reasons why the printers have developed an ideology opposed to that of the employer are to be found in the relations between printers and their employers at the time the ideology was developed - i.e. in the early days of the industrial revolution - and also in their relations at the present day, for changes in the relations would, in time, modify the ideology.

I describe what the printer-employer relations were, and are, below.

i) In the early days of the industrial revolution the relations between printers and their employers were bad and the printing trade unions developed out of these bad relations. Musson in his history of the Typographical Association writes: "Good relations undoubtedly existed between employer and employed in many firms. But the antipathy between capital andlabour was still there. In less enlightened establishments it was blatantly obvious and often resulted in open conflict. Unionism was the outcome of a real need, to protect workers from capitalist exploitation, to maintain and, if possible, raise their standard of living, threatened by unscrupulous, profit-seeking employers." * The printers developed their ideology as a result of these bad relations, hence the beliefs that the employer's interests are opposed to their own and the emphasis laid upon the value of unity against the employer./

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* Footnote: The bad relations between the printers and their employers at the time of the industrial revolution, and the belief that the employers exploited the printers, is mentioned in all the published histories of the British printing trade unions. These same trade union histories show how the bad relations at that time led to the growth of trade unionism and to the development of an ideology which has remained basically unchanged down to the present day. These trade union histories have been mentioned earlier in the text but I give their titles again below.
"The London Compositor"; "The London Society of Compositors"; "The Society of London Bookbinders 1780-1951"; "The Typographical Association";"A Hundred Yeard of Progress" (the history of the S.T.A.) and "The Story of Natsopa, 1889-1929".
For conditions generally at the time of the industrial revolution I would refer the reader to the following:
C.R.Fay, "Life and Labour in the 19th.Century", Cambridge University Press, 1945. and "Great Britain from Adam Smith to the Present Day" Longman Green,London,1944.
J.L. & Barbara Hammond, "The Town Labourer" Longman Green & Co. 1941.
"The Village Labourer" Longman Green & Co. 1936.
"The Black Age", Penguin edition.
"Lord Shaftesbury" " "

employer.

The ideology of the printers has not changed because at the present day the relations between printers and employers - though somewhat less bitter - are still basically the same. The printers are "hired hands", the employer hires their labour and his interest in them, and responsibility to them, does not extend beyond this relationship. The printers have no security of employment and are paid off when their labour is not required, they are not paid when off sick, and are not superannuated. (Some firms have superannuation schemes but these are a very recent development and almost all are post-war). This is in strong contrast with the conditions that printing firms give to their managerial and clerical staffs who do have security of employment, sick pay, and superannuation. This emphasises to the printers that the employers do feel responsibilities to certain members of their staff, and that the printers are accorded conditions which are different from and inferior to those of the clerical and managerial staff.

Even the question of "hire" is controversial. The printers still believe that if the employer could settle their wages at will he would pay them little, and that the only reason he does pay them a living wage is that they are strong enough to force him to do so. I have not met any printer who can remember an employer increasing wages voluntarily, all pay increases are won by the trade unions after a struggle with the employer. Under these circumstances the printers feel forced to challenge the employer's right to fix wages and conditions at will.

ii) Before the industrial revolution a journeyman printer had a good opportunity of setting up as a master printer. With the industrial revolution and the growth of large printing works which necessitated a considerable capital investment this opportunity disappeared. One can say that, from the industrial revolution up to, and including, the present day the individual printer has had very little chance of becoming an employer and his opportunities of becoming even a manager have been few. In the circumstances the right of private enterprise seems valueless to the printers for there is little opportunity to exercise the right.

This question of opportunity is vitally important when considering whether people do, or do not, value the right of private enterprise. H.L.Mencken summed the situation up very neatly when speaking of the American working-man: "But perhaps the political importance of labor is due more largely to the fact that the American working-man, like every other American, has ambitions, and is thus disinclined to think of himself as a working-man. In other words, he refuses to be class conscious. What he usually hopes is that on some near tomorrow, he will be able to escape from work and go into business for himself, and so begin oppressing his late colleagues..... Has anyone noticed that union men are radical in proportion as the trades they practice diminish this hope? At the extreme left stand the railroad engineers and firemen who were for La Follette long before he was an actual candidate. After them come the steel workers and coal miners, and the copper miners and lumbermen of the West. It is easy to see why. A locomotive engineer, save he be/

be insane, must know very well that he can never hope to own a railroad of his own." *

iii) The printers are remote from their employers and management and have little direct contact with them; most of their contact being indirect and through the medium of the foremen. This has been the case since the development of large printing works at the time of the industrial revolution. This lack of contact with the employer, and the fact that he does not guarantee them security of employment, discourage loyalty to the employer. The employer and the trade unions are often in conflict and the printers cannot be loyal to both, so they reserve their loyalty for their trade unions. The reason why they reserve it for the trade unions, rather than for the employer, is that the trade unions guarantee their status, pay, and conditions of work, and most of the printing trade unions also give unemployment pay, sick benefit, and superannuation. The employer does none of these things for the printers he employs. Thus it is natural for the printers to give their loyalty to their trade unions.

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* Footnote: H.L.Mencken, "A Carnival of Buncombe", John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1956. pp.88-89.

The Ideology of the Clerks.

The clerks largely accept the ideology of the employer and react to the employer-employee relationship by identifying themselves with the employer. I describe their reaction to the employer's interests and values in detail below.

Private Property.

The clerks accept the rights of private property and the right of the employer to wield the powers arising out of his private property. They accept that the employer has the right to pay what wages he likes, to hire and fire at will, and to decide working conditions. In short they accept in full the employer's rights as I have described them above.

The clerks do not claim for themselves any of the rights claimed by theprinters. They value good pay and conditions, and security of employment, just as the printers do - but they do not claim them as a right. If the employer gives good pay and conditions they are grateful, if he does not they grumble and will leave if they can get a better job, but they do not deny that he has the right to decide pay and conditions. The Staff Association puts grievances before the employer and, on occasion, asks him to increase pay or improve conditions, but it asks, it does not demand them as a right. If a request is refused the matter rests there. The clerks will not permit their Staff Association to try to force the employer to agree since to do so would be to deny the employer's right to decide at will.

The only thing which the clerks do claim as a right is promotion on merit. They do nothing actively to defend this right but their reaction to the trainees showed that they believe that any man who shows merit has the right to promotion. It is significant that this right to promotion on merit arises out of the value they set on private enterprise - a value which the clerks have learned from the employer.

Private Enterprise.

The clerks accept the value of private enterprise completely and believe that every man the right to individual freedom of action. They demonstrate private enterprise in practice by their pursuit of promotion and by their intense resentment at anything which restricts their opportunities of promotion - e.g. the trainee system of promotion which the company has adopted. It is necessary to emphasise that in the case of the trainee system of promotion the clerks are not disputing the values and rights of the employer. It is the employer who, by initiating a system of promotion based on criteria other than merit, is acting contrary to the value of free enterprise which he upholds in theory, and which he has taught the clerks to look upon as their right. Thus the clerks are not opposed to the employer's values but are resentful because the employer is betraying the values which they hold in common.

The clerks show their belief in private enterprise by attempts to "improve themselves" - and their chances of promotion - by attending night-school classes. In some cases/

cases the aim is to improve their general educational standard, in others to improve their knowledge of subjects useful to their work - e.g. languages in Export Department, engineering in the technical departments. They also show enterprise by the way in which they accept leadership in social activities of various kinds within their community.

The clerks are opposed to trade unionism because they, like the employers, believe that collective action restricts individual freedom of action. They do not allow their own Staff Association to develop on trade union lines and refuse to give it the support necessary for collective action, stating as their reason that they prefer to negotiate individually with the management. Since the clerks do not believe in collective action they do not value unity, and competition between individuals for promotion is accepted as normal and as being good.

Loyalty.

The clerks accept completely the employer's claim that he has a right to loyalty from them while they are in his employment, and they value loyalty to the employer more highly than loyalty to each other or to their Staff Association.

The reason for this loyalty is that the clerks identify themselves with the employer and with his interests. This identification is shown by the way in which they take the employer's side in all disputes between the employer and the manual workers in his employment. At present the loyalty of the clerks is strained, but not broken, by the company's promotion policy and by its apparent lack of interest in the clerks.

The reasons for accepting the employer's ideology.

The reasons why the clerks in Stewarts & Lloyds accept the ideology of the employer are to be found in the relationships between the clerks and Stewarts & Lloyds in the past and at the present time. One cannot speak for clerks generally, as one could speak for printers generally, as there is nothing uniform about their conditions and their relations with the employer may vary considerably from one office to another.

(i) The clerks in Stewarts & Lloyds can accept the company's claims to the rights of private property as these rights have always been exercised with the utmost consideration for the clerks. The company claims, as one of the rights of private property, the right to settle conditions of work at will without consulting the clerks in any way. But the company has always given good conditions to the clerks, far better conditions than it has given to its manual workers. For instance, the clerks have security and are not paid off when there is a shortage of work, even during the depression when the firm had little work no clerk was paid off as redundant though many manual workers were. The clerks also receive full pay when off sick, and are superannuated.

Sick pay provides an interesting example of why the clerks do not challenge the company's right to settle conditions/

conditions at will. The company states in its conditions of employment for clerks that sick pay is only given at the discretion of the directors. It is made clear that sick pay is not the right of the clerk but is a concession the company makes and which it can withdraw at any time and in any case. However, this arouses no ill-feeling among the clerks because the company is, in practice, extremely generous with sick pay and no case is known of any clerk not being paid when off sick. In consequence the clerks do not worry about the company's claimt o have the right to stop sick pay at will.

The clerks, unlike the printers, have no myths and traditions about the struggle of employees against employers in the past. All that concerns them is the relations between clerks and Stewarts & Lloyds in the past and these have been very good. As a result the clerks cannot envisage a situation in which they will be ill-treated by the employer and therefore see no reason to challenge his right to settle working conditions or limit the use of his power in any way. As the same good conditions have existed in the past there has never been any reason for the clerks to challenge the employer's ideology.

(ii) The clerks have had excellent opportunities of promotion in the past and even at the present day there are directors who started as boys in the office - the recent trend towards promotion through the "trainee" scheme is too recent to have upset this tradition completely. Consequently, the clerks value the right of private enterprise very highly for there have always been opportunities for them to exercise private enterprise.

There is evidence which suggests that opportunities of promotion for clerks generally in Britain have not been uncommon. To quote the history of the Clerical and Administrative Workers' Union on the subject of clerks generally in the 19th century: "The older stratum, still continously renewed, felt an affinity with the employers, among whom the mofe fortunate or ambitious expected ultimately to find themselves. They were, generally, 'bourgeois in the marrow'. The new elements were imbued with the notion that they had been given a chance to rise out of the class from which they came, and usually they were anxious to stand well with their new associates and with those in authority." *

(iii) The clerks in Stewarts & Lloyds work in close proximity to the management and know and understand their point of view. Although communications in the office are bad, they were - so I am told - much better in the past, and even to-day the clerks are in very much closer contact with the management than are the printers. Because of the way in which clerks work with, and for, management, and have some part in forming and implementing management decisions, they see disputes within the company - and even those in other companies - from a management or "company" point of view rather than from an employee's point of view. As a result the clerks are able to identify with the/

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* Footnote: "By Hand and Brain", p. 11.

the employer and management and to feel a strong loyalty towards them.

Thus the circumstances under which the clerks work, and the relations they have with the employer, give the clerks reason to accept the employer's ideology.

The Ideology of the Navvies.

The navvies do not actively oppose the employer's ideology as the printers do, nor do they actively accept and support the employer's ideology as the clerks do. The navvies pursue their own interests and accept those of the employer when they happen to be the same as their own, and evade them when they differ from their own.

Private Property.

The navvies accept the rights of private property and the employer's right to wield the powers he derives from the ownership of property. They do not claim any rights of their own -- like those claimed by the printers - which would limit the rights of the employer. But, on the other hand, they appear to feel that the employer's rights limit their personal freedom and would be oppressive in any permanent relationship. Hence, they avoid permanent relationships with employers by frequently changing their jobs. In short, they accept that the employer has certain rights arising from the ownership of private property but they evade the consequences of these rights whenever they find them to be oppressive.

Private Enterprise.

The navvies accept the right of private enterprise and set the highest value upon individual freedom of action. They refuse to accept any ties or obligations which might interfere with their freedom of action. To this end they avoid becoming attached to any one employer, to a trade union, or to any particular person or group of persons. The navvies rarely seek an outlet for private enterprise in promotion within the industry since this can only be done by becoming attached to one particular employer. Their outlets for enterprise normally consist of acquiring money by saving in order to buy a business of some kind outside the industry or, within the industry, of moving frequently from one job to another.

Loyalty.

The navvies do not accept that the employer has a right to loyalty from them. They are paid to do a job, the employer hires their labour and they owe him nothing more. In the case of the printers there is a conflict between the employer and the trade union, both claiming the right to the loyalty of the printers. With the navvies there is no such conflict, the navvies simply refuse to accept that they owe loyalty to either trade union or employer. Loyalty is a tie, an obligation, and, as I have said earlier, the navvies refuse to accept any ties because these limit their freedom of action.

Thus the navvies' reaction to the employer-employee relationship is to try to evade it. They do not accept the employer's ideology of the relationship, nor do they oppose it; they simply ignore the employer's claims and evade the relationship by constantly changing employers and by refusing to accept any ties to any particular employer. The navvies value above all else complete freedom from ties and obligations of all kinds.

The reasons for not accepting the employer's ideology.

The reasons why the navvies do not accept the employer's ideology but have developed an ideology of their own/

own are to be found in the relations between navvies and employers at the time of the industrial revolution and at the present day. We can speak of "the navvies" generally, as we could speak of "the printers" generally, because of the uniformity of their conditions.

i) Navvies, that is labourers on large scale public works, originated during the 18th century. The first large scale public works were the canals, inland navigations, and the men who worked on them were known as "inland navigators" a term which was soon abbreviated to navvies. From the earliest days the navvies were usually well paid because high pay was necessary to attract men, but living and working conditions were very bad and the work was made unnecessarily dangerous by the carelessness of the employers. The navvies had no security but were paid off at once when their labour was no longer required. The employers, in short, showed no consideration at all for the welfare and interests of the navvies.

The best source of information on the conditions of navvies in the early 19th century is to be found in the report of a parliamentary committee of 1846 into the conditions of labour employed in constructing the railways.* This report brings out the appalling conditions in which the navvies lived and worked and the total disregard for the safety of the navvies shown by the employers. For the early 20th century, just prior to the 1914 War, we have the evidence of MacGill's "Children of the Dead End",** This book shows that the conditions of the navvies had improved little since the 1840's. The life was still hard, living and working conditions very bad, and the work unnecessarily dangerous. The navvy still had absolutely no security of employment. My own research, described above, shows that living conditions are much improved, though still not good. Working conditions are still bad and are unnecessarily dangerous - still due to the carelessness of the employer - and the navvy has no security but can be paid off at two hours notice.

Thus relations between navvies and their employers are bad, and have always been bad. In the circumstances it is not surprising that the navvies do not accept the employer's ideology of employer-employee relations, as the clerks do, but try to evade this relationship as far as they possibly can.

ii) The navvies have some opportunities of promotion to foreman level, although foremen's posts are often only temporary, but practically no opportunities at all of becoming an employer or even a manager. Hence there is no outlet for private enterprise through promotion. However, the navvies do have two outlets for private enterprise:- (a) The high pay the navvies receive makes it possible for them to save money and use their savings to/

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* Footnote: The Report of the House of Commons Select Committee on the Conditions of Labourers employed in the Construction of Railways. (1846)

** Footnote: "Children of the Dead End", Patrick MacGill.

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to leave navvying for some other occupation. Only a few of the navvies do this; (b) The high mobility of the navvies permits them to move about the country frequently changing their jobs and their employers. This is an outlet for private enterprise as it permits the navvies to be free and independent of any one employer, and to have frequent changes of locality and type of work. This is the outlet for private enterprise chosen by most of the navvies.

Thus, although promotion is closed to the navvies they have other outlets for private enterprise and so they value the right of private enterprise.

iii) The work of navvies is, and has always been, of a casual nature and navvies are hired as required, sacked when not required. The employer makes no attempt to retain a permanent labour force and keeps only a small force of foremen as permanent employees. Thus it is difficult for a navvy to identify himself with a particular employer and develop a loyalty to him.

As Zweig says of Building andCivil Engineering labourers:- "The casual labour is really employed by the industry as such, not by an individual employer. They standin no personal relationship to a particular employer and have no loyalty to him, more often following the foreman." *

Thus the circumstances under which the navvies work and have worked since the industrial revolution and the relations they have with their employers explain why they do not accept the employer's ideology.

Summary.

It can be seen from the account given above that the relations between each of the three groups and their employers in the past, and at the present time, determine their reactions to the employer's ideology. The clerks' relations with the employer have been good and they accept the employer's ideology; the relations of the printers, and of the navvies, have been bad and they reject it.

The printers and the navvies both reject the employer's ideology but they have developed very different ideologies of their own in reply to it. The printers oppose their employers, the navvies try to evade them.

What is the reason for this difference, in reaction, and the difference in ideology which lies behind it?

The reason is to be found in the circumstances of the printers and the navvies. The printers cannot evade the employer. They are skilled craftsmen and their skill is of no value outside the narrow limits of the printing industry. In any other industry they would be unskilled men with low status and low bargaining power. Thus the position is that they cannot evade the employer by/

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* Footnote: F. Zweig, "Productivity and the Trade Unions".

by leaving the industry except at a considerable sacrifice in status. On the other hand their skill gives them a strong bargaining power within the printing industry, for the employer cannot easily find skilled men to do the work. In short, circumstances make it easy for theprinters to oppose the employer but difficult to evade him.

The navvies, however, cannot oppose the employer. They are unskilled men and there is usually a plentiful supply of unskilled labour. If navvies on a site combine to oppose the employer he can sack them all and readily fill their jobs with other man. This, in fact, happens quite frequently. On the other hand the navvies can easily evade the employer. Their status is low and would be no lower if they were doing unskilled work of any other kind, they are highly mobile and can travel anywhere in search of work, and there is usually some kind of unskilled work available somewhere. Thus, if they get into a dispute with the employer they cannot oppose him but they can leave him and get a job with some other employer.

INTERESTS AND VALUES.

The Printers.

The interests and values of the printers follow from their reaction of opposition to the employer.

(i) The printers have a common interest in opposing the employer.

(ii) In order to oppose the employer effectively they must have unity. Hence they have an interest in maintaining unity, and they value unity. As private enterprise is disruptive of unity they do not value private enterprise.

(iii) Inequality tends to be disruptive of unity, equality promotes unity. Hence the printers have an interest in equality and they value it.

(iv) Loyalty to fellow workers and to their trade union is essential to unity. Hence the printers have an interest in loyalty to fellow workers and their trade union and they value it.

(v) The relatively high status of printers is dependent upon craft skill and upon their monopoly of it. Hence they have an interest in craft skill and they value it.

The Clerks.

The interests and values of the clerks follow from their acceptance of and identification with the employer and his interests.

(i) The clerks identify with the employer and have a like interest in upholding the employer's values, interests, and rights.

(ii) Of the three rights claimed by the employer one, the right of private enterprise, is claimed by the clerks for themselves - this does not mean that clerks do not claim the other rights, they would claim them were they applicable but they are not applicable while they are employees. And the clerks have an interest in, and value private enterprise. They have no interest in unity since they believe it limits freedom of private enterprise; hence they do not value unity.

(iii) The outlet for private enterprise most readily open to the clerks is promotion on merit within the firm and they have an interest in promotion on merit and they value it accordingly.

(iv) Individual merit, as shown in the ability to do one's job well, justifies the right of private enterprise in general, and promotion on merit in particular. Hence the clerks have an interest in merit and they value it.

The Navvies.

The interests and values of the navvies follow from their/

their attempt to evade the employer-employee relationship.

(i) The navvies evade the employer by frequently changing their jobs so that they are never in a stable and permanent relationship to any one employer.

(ii) The navvies justify their frequent changes of job by their interest in, and value of, complete freedom of private enterprise. Changes of job provide the navvies with the readiest outlet for private enterprise.

(iii) The navvies believe that ties and obligations of any kind restrict their freedom of enterprise, and they have an interest in, and value, complete independence of all ties and obligations, whether to employers, trade unions, or fellow navvies.

(iv) The ability to change jobs frequently depends upon the possibility of getting new jobs easily. This is turn depends upon the individual navvy's ability as a worker:- " a good worker can get a job anywhere". Thus the ability to work well gives the navvy independence of any one employer. Consequently, they have an interest in, and value, the ability to work well.

(v) As different jobs may be a considerable distance apart the navvies have to be mobile, otherwise they become tied to one employer. Hence the navvies have an interest in, and value, mobility.

GROUP RELATIONS.

The Printers.

The group relations of the printers follow from their interests and values.

(i) The printers value unity among members of the same common interest group which is, within the works, the Chapel. And to ensure unity they place a very high value on unity and equality among members of the same interest group. As a result they have very strong Chapels. This value set on unity is primarily intended to be a unity against the employer but it tends to become also a unity against all outsiders, and Chapels thus become exclusive groups.

(ii) The fact that the Chapels are strong and exclusive affects informal grouping within the works. Informal groups within the works tend to be based upon the Chapels, the members of the same Chapel form one informal group and members of different Chapels form several different informal groups. These informal groups take the character of the Chapels on which they are based and tend to be strong, coherent, and exclusive.

(ii) The value of unity among members of the same common interest group also affects communications within the works. It promotes communications between members of the same interest groups and inhibits communications between members of different interest groups.

Thus common interest dominates group relations in the printing works. The unity of each Chapel is based upon common interest, while differences of interest between/

between different Chapels make for disunity and bad communications among the printers in the works as a whole.

The Clerks.

The group relations of the clerks follow from their interests and values.

(i) The clerks have no common interests, only like interests, hence they have no common interest groups. The high value set on private enterprise encourages individual action and prevents the growth of common interests and common interest groups. The clerks put their own individual interests first and refuse to subordinate them to the interests of the clerks as a whole. Thus they act as individuals and will not combine for collective action.

(ii) As there are no common interest groups there are no differences of interest between groups - except in temporary inter-departmental disputes - and, consequently, no group exclusiveness. There are informal groups in the office, the boundaries of these are vague but they tend, on the whole, to be based on departments. These informal groups, lacking any common interests except purely social ones, tend to be weak, lacking in cohesion, and not at all exclusive.

(iii) As there are no differences of interests to inhibit communications these tend to be uniformly good.

Thus individual interests dictate the pattern of group relations within the office. The stress laid on individual interests, and individual freedom of enterprise, make for a lack of unity among the clerks and make the formation of strong, coherent groups virtually impossible.

The Navvies.

The group relations of the navvies follow from their interests and values.

(i) The navvies, like the clerks, have no common interests only like interests and, consequently, no common interest groups.

(ii) The value set on complete freedom of private enterprise prevents the formation of even informal social groups. With the exception of the Poles there are no informal groups of any kind. Not even weak social groups like those of the clerks. Certain factors which one would expect to cause the formation of social groups exist in the camps - e.g. common type of work, common place of work, common living and sleeping quarters - but none of these does in fact lead to the formation of an informal group or groups.

(iii) As there are no differences of interest to inhibit communications these are uniformly good among the navvies - again with the exception of the Poles.

Thus individual interests and individual freedom of action dictate the pattern of group relations among the navvies. The enormous stress laid upon independence and/

and complete freedom of action prevents the growth of even the weak informal groups that exist among the clerks.

The common interests of the printers cause strong and coherent interest and informal groups. The lack of common interests among the clerks and the navvies means that they have no common interest groups and also causes them to have either weak informal groups or no informal groups at all.

This is a very important point. The clerks and the navvies have circumstances which are more favourable to the formation of informal groups than the printers have. The clerks work in close proximity and under circumstances which permit them social contact with each other at any time. The clerks have no machines to watch and there is no noise to limit conversation. They have almost perfect conditions for social intercourse. The navvies work in gangs and must co-operate with other members of the gang during work. As they live on the site they spend their whole waking life in close proximity to each other and share all their leisure time pursuits with each other. The printers on the other hand have limited opportunities for social intercourse at work and rarely see each other outside working hours.

Thus it is clear that if social circumstances were the only factors in deciding informal groups the printers would have the weakest instead of the strongest informal groups. It seems, therefore, that common interests are vital to the formation of even informal social groups within the place of work. This is contrary to the findings of Elton Mayo and his followers on informal groups and I discuss the implications of this in Appendix B.

STATUS AND PRESTIGE.

The Printers.

Status. The way in which the printers gain status and prestige is determined by their opposition to the employer and by the interests and values which arise out of this opposition.

(i) The printers oppose the employers collectively through their trade unions. In consequence they cannot seek status through the employers but must seek it through their trade unions.

(ii) The printers cannot seek status individually because they value unity and believe individual enterprise to be disruptive of unity. Hence they seek status collectively as members of a group and base their claims to status, not upon individual merit, but upon the skill of the craft, a skill which all members of the group share.

(iii) The status of the printer is thus dependent upon his group, the trade union, and not upon his employer. The trade union guarantees that the status of printer is universally accepted and if a printer is sacked by a particular employer his status is unaffected.

Individual Prestige. Individual prestige within the group pf printers is decided on the criteria from which the group derives its status. In other words on how well the individual forwards the interests of printers as a group. These criteria are:-

(i) The individual printer's skill at his craft.

(ii) The individual printer's contribution to the strength of the group - i.e. by preserving its unity.

The Clerks.

Status. The way in which the clerks seek status is determined by their identification with the employer and their acceptance of his interests and values.

(i) The clerks identify themselves with the employer and with his interests and so seek status through the employer. His status is completely dependent upon the employer and depends upon (a) the reputation of the firm for which he works; and (b) his status within that firm. Thus if the clerk leaves the employer he loses his status.

(ii) The clerks seek status as individuals and base their claims to status upon individual merit.

Individual Prestige. Individual prestige among clerks is decided on the same criteria from which the clerk derives status.

(i) The individual clerk's ability to do his job well.

(ii) The individual clerk's ability to forward his own interests and gain promotion.

With the clerks, as with the printers, the basic requirement/

requirement in earning prestige is the ability to do one's job well. But, whereas among the printers the secondary requirement is the ability to forward the interests of the group, among the clerks the secondary requirement is the ability to forward one's individual interests through gaining promotion.

The Navvies.

Status. The way in which the navvies evade the employer-employee situation determines their outlook on status. As we have seen the printers seek status collectively, the clerks individually, but both seek status within the context of their work. The navvies on the other hand do not make any attempt to increase their status within the context of their work. The navvy who wishes to increase his status does so by leaving the industry, by taking up other forms of work. In other words they evade the question of status within their present industry.

The status of the navvies in society is low because navvies as a group are associated with patterns of behaviour that are contrary to those valued in our society. The navvies' habits of fighting, drinking, gambling and general recklessness with money, and the fact that they do a dirty and dangerous job and live and work under very bad conditions all help to lower their status. However, the factors which cause their low status give the navvies as a group a certain prestige as being "tough" and doing "a man's job". These factors are:-

(i) The independence the navvies have, in particular their independence of any one employer.

(ii) Their ability to work hard, and to work and live under "tough" conditions.

(iii) The wildness and recklessness of their behaviour - drinking, gambling, etc.

Individual Prestige. The prestige of the individual navvy among other navvies depends upon the same criteria as those from which the navvies as a group derive their prestige. That is from the individual navvy's independence; his ability as a worker; and the wildness of his behaviour.

It will be noted that the navvies are not interested in the status of navvies as a group, but only in the prestige of navvies as a group. As a result individual prestige is based upon factors which add to the prestige of the group, not the status of the group.

To sum up, the printers seek status collectively through their trade unions; the clerks seek status individually through their employer; the navvies evade the question of status but seek prestige collectively as members of a group. Individual prestige in each case depends upon the same factors that give status, in the case of the navvies on the same factors that give the group prestige.

SUMMARY.

(i) It was shown that each of the three groups studied has:- a different reaction to the employer caused by different circumstances both in the past and at the present day; a different ideology which justifies the reaction to the employer, and, by the interests and values embodied in it, ensures that the members of the group behave in ways designed to make that reaction effective; different group relations; different criteria for determining status and prestige, and different methods of attaining status and prestige.

(ii) It was shown that in each of the three cases studied the group relations, the criteria for determining status and prestige, and the method of attaining status and prestige, are determined by the interests and values of the group. *

(iii) It was shown that the interests and values of each group are part of the ideology of that group, and that the ideology is based upon the reaction of the group to the employer and is intended to justify that reaction and make it effective.

(iv) It was shown that the reaction to the employer is caused by the circumstances under which the members of the group work and the relations they have with their employer at the present day, and also by the circumstances and relations/

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* Footnote: The above statement must be qualified in the following way. The criteria by which status and prestige are decided depend ultimately upon the values of the society in which the groups exist - in our case this is Great Britain. Within the limits set by the values of our society, the criteria are decided by the opportunities open to that group and upon its interests and values. Thus the printers base their claim to status on their skill as craftsmen: they can do this because craft skill is valued in our society, because they have opportunities of exercising craft skill, because they value craft skill, and because they can seek status in this way collectively and in opposition to the employer. The clerks seek status through individual promotion: they can seek status in this way because promotion is valued in our society, because they have opportunities for promotion, because they value promotion, and because they can seek promotion while identifying themselves with the employer. The navvies seek status by leaving their present occupation because there is nothing in this occupation which is valued by our society, and on which status couldbe based, and also because the roughness and toughness the navvies value in their work are not valued in our society. On the other hand the roughness and toughness of the work carry prestige in our society, and so the navvies can seek prestige, but not status, by these criteria.

relations that existed in the early days of the industrial revolution.

Therefore it appears that the different circumstances of the printers, the clerks, and the navvies, have caused them to react to their employers in different ways: the printers oppose, the clerks identify with, and the navvies evade, the employer. The other differences in ideology - including interests and values - in group relations, and in status and prestige, all stem from these different reactions to the employer.

CONCLUSIONS.

At the beginning of this thesis I defined my aim as being to discover why the workers in British industry have patterns of behaviour that vary from one industry to another, and even differ between different occupations in the same industry. I will now examine the findings from these three researches in order to see whether they throw any light on this problem.

(i) It was stated that in the groups studied certain behaviour - that is group relations, the criteria by which the status and prestige of the group and of its individual members are determined, and the ways in which status and prestige are gained - are all determined by the interests and values of the group. That interests and values determine behaviour is generally accepted and for evidence of this I would refer the reader back to the section on definitions. *

(ii) It was stated that the interests and values of the groups studied are part of the ideologies of those groups. That ideologies include interests and values is also generally accepted since interests and values are ideas and as such part of the system of ideas which is an ideology. Once again I refer the reader to the section on definitions.

(iii) It was stated that the ideology of each of the three groups follows from the reaction of that group to the employer and to the employer's ideology. I gave the evidence for this at the beginning of the last chapter. I began this chapter by describing the employer-employee relationship/

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* Footnote: This is generally accepted and on the relation of interests and values to group relations I would refer the reader to: "Society" by MacIver and Page, Chapter 10, "Types of Social Groups"; and Chapter 17, "Associations and Interests".

D.C.Miller and W.H.Form "Industrial Sociology". Chapter IX, "The Informal Organisation of Labor".

Elton Mayo, "Social Problems of an Industrial Civilisation". Harvard University Press,1945.

F.J.Roethlisberger and William J.Dickson. "Management and the Worker". Harvard University Press, 1947.

On the relation of interests and values to status and prestige I would refer the reader to MacIver & Page, Chapter 14 "Social Class and Caste"; and to Nadel "The Foundations of Social Anthropology",Chapter VII,section 5: Miller and Form Chapter XI,"Status Organisation of the Work Plant"; William Foote Whyte, "Human Relations in the Restaurant Industry", McGraw-Hill, 1948, Chapter 4, "Status in the Kitchen"; and Eugene V.Schneider, "Industrial Sociology", McGraw-Hill, New York,1957, Chapter 16,"Industry and Social Stratification".

relationship in general and describing the employer's claim to have certain rights in relation to his employees. There are, it is true, considerable differences in the beliefs of individual employers, but there is a common background of beliefs and values which can be generalised as the "employer's ideology". I showed that each of the three groups studied either accepted the employer's ideology or developed an ideology of its own as a reaction to the employer's ideology. This is applicable to any group of employees. Any group of employees must react in some way to the employer's ideology, either by accepting it, or by developing an ideology of its own.

(iv) It was stated that the relations between each of the three groups and their employers in the past, and at the present time, determine their reactions to their employers and to the employer's ideology. For example, the clerks' relations with the employer are, and have been, good, and they accept the employer's ideology; those of the printers and the navvies have been bad, and they reject it. Once again I hold that this is applicable to groups of employees generally and not only to the three groups described. A group which has bad relations with the employer at the present time, and has a tradition of bad relations in the past is unlikely to identify itself with the employer and accept his ideology. On the other hand a group which has, and has always had, good relations with the employer is unlikely to oppose, or evade, the employer and his ideology. I do not state this as an immutable law, there may be exceptions to it - although I know of none - but I put it forward as a generalisation, a statement of what will generally be the case.

It seems therefore that the patterns of behaviour shown by workers in British industry are caused by their reactions to their employers; differences in behaviour being caused by different reactions to the employer. The reactions in turn are caused by the relations between the employer and the employees; that is, by the relations at the present time and the traditions that have grown up as a result of the state of relations in the past. Differences in reaction to the employer are caused by differences in relations.

In this explanation I have reached a conclusion by proceeding step by step from behaviour to its causes. To put my conclusions on why the workers in British industry have patterns of behaviour that vary from one industry to another, and even differ between different occupations in the same industry into its proper sequence I must reverse this and describe briefly the process from cause to effect.

(i) At the time of the industrial revolution there was no precedent for the new relationship of employer and employed. The old and very personal master and servant relationship - it was legally recognised as such in the laws of "master and servant" - which had sufficed in times of small scale industrial organisation was not adequate for a relationship between an employer and a large number of employees. A new relationship, the employer-employee relationship, had to be created and it was the employers alone who were in a position to create it. The employees as subordinates could do little to create a positive relationship, though they could do a good deal negatively by/

by opposing any form of relationship the employers put forward. In this situation the employer developed the relationship in accordance with the current economic doctrine of the time, that which became known as "Laisser Faire". The doctrine which Tawney has summed up in the following words: "That creed was that the individual is absolute master of his own, and, within the limits set by positive law, may exploit it with a single eye to his pecuniary advantage, unrestrained by any obligation to postpone his own profit to the well-being of his neighbours, or to give account of his actions to a higher authority. It was, in short, the theory of property which was later to be accepted by all civilised communities."*

As interpreted by the employers this developed a very one-sided employer-employee relationship in which there was a good deal about the rights of the employer - the rights of private property, private enterprise, and loyalty from their employees - and very little about the rights of the employees. This is of course a generalisation. There were some employers who took a considerable interest in the welfare of their employees: the most famous being Sir Robert Peel the elder, David Dale, Robert Owen, and John Fielden of Todmorden. But even these were paternalistic, and gave good conditions out of charity and not as a right. Like other employers they claimed for themselves the rights of private property, private enterprise, and loyalty from their employees. Nevertheless, it is true to say that employers generally developed a relationship with their employees based on the doctrine of Laisser Faire and in which they recognised no obligations to the employee except to pay for his labour. The exceptions to this were those employees who worked in a close and sometimes confidential relationship to the employer - mainly clerks. The employer often recognised an obligation to these beyond that which he recognised to his workmen. Therefore it can be said that employers generally have a common ideology in which they claim certain rights over their employees. Some employers were more liberal in their treatment of their employees than others but this did not necessarily imply that they did not claim the same rights as the other employers.

Thus the employer-employee relationship did not develop absolutely uniformly but varied considerably in different industries and occupations depending upon two factors. These were: (a) the circumstances of work in that industry or occupation, whether it was in an office, mine, foundry, or workshop; and whether the work was regular as in printing, cotton spinning, or engineering, or was casual as in docking, or building: (b) the pattern set by the employers in the industry, whether it was harsh and brutal as in coal-mining **or moderately liberal as in iron and steel. ***

(ii) As a result of these factors the workers in particular industries developed certain distinct reactions to the/

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* Footnote: Tawney, "Religion and the Rise of Capitalism", p. 151.

** Footnote: See R.Page Arnot, "The Miners", 2 vols. Allen & Unwin, 1949.

*** Footnote: See Sir Arthur Pugh, "Men of Steel", Iron and Steel Trades Confederation, 1951.

the employer and his ideology. These reactions to the employer are embodied in ideologies which explain and justify the reactions to the employer and are in themselves a reaction to the employer's ideology, and the interests and values which are a part of the ideologies which cause the members of the groups to behave in ways which will make these reactions effective. I will clarify this by an example: the printers oppose the employer, and the common interest in opposition and the value of unity ensure that the printers oppose effectively. The ideology justifies and perpetuates the reaction to the employer. The myths and beliefs embodied in the ideology give the reaction a "charter", to use Malinowski's phrase. They perpetuate the reaction and give it permanence and stability, for the members of the group are taught through these myths and beliefs to believe in the "rightness" of the reaction, and are taught that to react in any other way would be "wrong". The interests and values embodied in the ideology ensure that the members of the group behave in ways best designed to further the reaction. The interests and values of the printers ensure patterns of behaviour that facilitate opposition to the employer; the interests and values of the clerks ensure patterns of behaviour that facilitate identification with the employers; the interests and values of the navvies ensure patterns of behaviour that facilitate evasion of the employer. Thus the ideology - including the beliefs, myths, interests, and values which are all part of it - ensures that each group does adhere to one stable permanent basic reaction, and does not fluctuate between the various possible reactions. This applies to all groups, for all groups have ideologies of some kind or are in process of developing ideologies.

(iii) The interests and values mould group relations. For example, it has been shown that common interests and the value set on unity among the printers causes strong and coherent groups; lack of common interests and the value of individual freedom of action among the clerks causes weak groups with little coherence; lack of common interests and the value of <u>complete</u> freedom of individual enterprise and independence among the navvies effectively prevents the formation of groups of any kind.

(iv) The reaction to the employer and the interests and values which proceed from it also determine the criteria by which the status and prestige of the group and of its individual members are determined, and the ways in which status and prestige are gained. The criteria by which status and prestige are decided will depend - within the limits set by the values of our society and the opportunities offered by that type of work - on the interests and values of the group. The ways in which status and prestige are gained will depend upon the reaction to the employer. Thus, those who oppose the employer and who are organised in trade unions, will tend to seek status collectively through their trade union; those who identify with the employer will tend to seek status individually through the employer; those who evade the employer in their present occupation will tend to seek status individually in other occupations.

It is possible to say, in view of the above, that the behaviour of any group of employers depends upon their ideology. Their ideology in turn depends on three factors:-

(1) /

(i) The employer's ideology.

(ii) The tradition of employer-employee relations in that trade, and the reality at the present day.

(iii) The physical circumstances of the trade: that is the type and nature of the work.

Thus it would seem that these three factors govern behaviour, and that behaviour can be changed only if one or more of these factors is changed. Differences in behaviour can be accounted for by differences in one or more of these three factors.

COMPARISON WITH THE MAYO THEORIES.

At the beginning of this thesis it was stated that the aim of the research was to evaluate"the theories of informal group behaviour in industry put forward by Professor Elton Mayo and his colleagues at Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration; that it would, in particular, help to prove or disprove criticisms made of the Harvard researches, on the grounds that Mayo and his colleagues completely ignored the existence of trade unions, and the effect these bodies have upon the behaviour of industrial workers; and that Mayo and his colleagues ignore the fact that many workers believe that they have interests which conflict with those of the employer."

As was pointed out these two criticisms are closely connected for "the belief that workers have interests opposed to those of the employer is a prerequisite of trade unionism". However, since the question of trade unionism has been raised as a separate issue by the critics of Mayo, we will first examine the trade union issue before passing on to examine the wider and allied field of "interests".

The Trade Union Question.

At the beginning of the thesis I referred to criticisms of Mayo by Mary B. Gilson and C.W.M.Hart, which criticisms may now be examined in more detail. Miss Gilson states of "Management and the Worker" . "In all the more than six hundred pages describing the Western Electric experiment, costing hundreds of thousands of dollars and supported by some of the wealthiest groups of this country, no reference is made to organised labor except a short statement, unindexed, that it was so seldom mentioned by any workers that it was not considered sufficiently important to discuss."*

C.W.M.Hart elaborates the same point: "Since all the in-plant research approaches the worker through his activities and preoccupations upon the job, it gives little or no indication of the importance of large, strong, well-run unions..... It would appear obvious then, that in addition to economic studies of labour, such as the older literature provides, and the psychological studies of the worker which the Mayo school has given us, we are badly in need of empirical data upon the sociology of labour unions and their place in the industrial community. The central problem of industrial society appears to be the impact of the new institutions upon the older equilibrium of institutional forces".**

C.Wright Mills charges: "In a 15 year study of a giant industry, executed mainly during the Thirties, a decade/

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* Footnote: Mary B. Gilson in a review of "Management and the Worker" by F.J.Roethlisberger and W.J.Dickson, "American Journal of Sociology", July, 1940, p. 101.

** Footnote: C.W.M.Hart, "Industrial Relations Research and Social Theory", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, February, 1949, pp.72-73

decade when union membership increased approximately 250 percent, one finds no comment on unions".* Landsberger, who has written the most recent and most detailed attempt to evaluate the Hawthorne researches, says of "Management and the Worker": "At the same time it must be recognised that the authors committed a wellnigh incredible sin of omission by not recognising in 1939 that the conditions which they had observed some eight years earlier were precisely the ones which accounted for the rise of formal unionism in the intervening years. Their own analysis would have been fully congruent with such a conclusion. The authors - by wittingly or unwittingly failing to recognise this and state it - have done the field of human relations in industry an amount of harm which, in retrospect, appears to be almost irreparable." **

That Mayo and his colleagues did ignore trade unions is undoubtedly the case. As Miss Gilson points out, "Management and the Worker", which is the full statement of the Hawthorne Experiment, says only that they were not considered sufficiently important to discuss. However, the point to be considered is whether this omission is or is not important in a study of industrial groups. On the evidence of the printing research the omission is very important indeed. Thus in Section 10, page 95 of this thesis it was shown that membership of a trade union had a considerable effect upon interaction between individuals in the works: membership of the same union stimulating interaction, membership of different trade unions inhibiting interaction. It was seen too that the values derived from the trade union, in particular the value of unity against the employer, affected group behaviour patterns generally, and group behaviour towards the employer in particular - see Section 6, page 38.

On page 134 the results of the printing research were summed up in the statement: "It can be seen from this that the key to the ideology of the printers lies in their opposition to the employer. The trade unions who propagate the ideology are common interest associations created in <u>opposition</u> to the employer. The value of unity is basically <u>unity against</u> the employer and arises out of the opposition to the employer. The value of unity against the employer dominates the behaviour of printers in their place of work. Unity and its companion value of equality are used as guiding principles, guiding and controlling all action. Unity among members of the same common interest group leads to exclusiveness, and affects the formation of informal groups; it also limits communications between individuals belonging to different common interest groups within the works. Unity also affects status, for the printer has status as a member of a common interest association <u>not</u> as an individual."

Thus/

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* <u>Footnote</u>: C.Wright Mills, "The Contribution of Sociology to Studies of Industrial Relations". Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting, Industrial Relations Research Association, Vol.1, 1948, pp.199-222.

** <u>Footnote</u>: Henry Landsberger, "Hawthorne Revisited", Cornell University, New York, 1958, p. 64.

Thus it would seem the printing research indicates that trade unions have an important effect upon the development of industrial groups and that Mayo and his colleagues should have allowed for the effect of trade unions or, in the absence of actual trade unions, for the effect of the common interests which give rise to trade unionism. The importance of such common interest is clear in the passage from the printing research summary quoted above. In actual fact the question of trade unions is important not so much in itself but as an indication of the wider omission - that of workers' interests.

Interests.

In order to discuss this question of interests it will be necessary first to analyse in some detail the conceptual system under which Mayo and his colleagues studied and classified the various elements of group behaviour. This is not an easy thing to do for the Mayo group are not given to exact definition and it will be necessary, therefore, to quote at length from the book in which their most important researches are described, researches on which the theories of the Mayo school are based. This is "Management and the Worker" by Roethlisberger and Dickson. I shall concentrate on this particular book for three reasons: (a) because it contains the only concise definition of the Mayo theories to be found in any of the works of that group: (b) because this book, although not the first in order of publication, is the only one which gives the detailed exposition of the research on which the theories of Mayo are based: (c) because in a recent and important study - "Hawthorne Revisited" * - Landsberger has tried to distinguish between "Management and the Worker" and the other works of the Mayo school, claiming that many of the criticisms justifiably directed against the work of the school generally are not applicable to "Management and the Worker".

Definition of Terms.

"For convenience, it may be well to summarise the different parts into which the industrial plant as a social system can be divided and the way in which the labels attaching to them will be used in the two final chapters. The following outline will help the reader to see the levels of abstraction of the different parts of the system":

" 1. Technical Organisation.
2. Human Organisation.
2.1 Individual.
2.2 Social Organisation.
2.21 Formal Organisation.
2.211 Patterns of Interaction.
2.212 Systems of Ideas and Beliefs (Ideological Organisation)
2.2121 Logic of Cost.
2.2122 Logic of Efficiency.
2.22 Informal Organisation.
2.221 Patterns of Interaction.
2.222 Systems of Ideas and Beliefs (Ideological Organisation)
2.2221 Logic of Sentiments".

* Footnote: "Hawthorne Revisited": 'Management and the Worker', its Critics, and Developments in Human Relations in Industry". Henry A. Landsberger, Cornell University, New York, 1958.

"1. The term 'technical organisation' will refer to the logical and technical organisation of materials, tools, machines, and finished products, including all those physical items related to the task of technical production."

"2. The term 'human organisation' will refer, on the one hand, to the concrete individual with his rich personal and social background and, on the other hand, to the intricate pattern of social relations existing among the various individuals and groups within the plant."

"2.1 The term 'individual' will refer to the sentiments and values which the person is bringing to the work situation because of his past social conditioning and present social situation outside of the plant; i.e., the past and present patterns of interaction in which he has participated or is participating outside of work."

"2.2 The term 'social organisation' will refer to the actual patterns of interaction existing within and between employee groups, supervisory groups, and management groups in a plant here and now. It will include those relations that remain at a common human level (friendships, antagonisms, etc.) those that have been built up into larger social configurations (social codes, customs, traditions, routines, and associated ideas and beliefs), as well as those patterns of relations formally prescribed by the rules, regulations, practices, and policies of the company."

"2.21 The term 'formal organisation' will refer to those patterns of interaction prescribed by the rules and regulations of the company as well as to the policies which prescribe the relations that obtain, or are supposed to obtain, within the human organisation and between the human organisation and the technical organisation."

"2.22 The term 'informal organisation' will refer to the actual personal interrelations existing among the members of the organisation which are not represented by, or are inadequately represented by, the formal organisation."

"2.212 and 2.222 The term 'ideological organisation' will refer to the systems of ideas and beliefs by means of which the values of both the formal and informal aspects of the social organisation are expressed and the symbols around which these values are organised."

"2.2121 The term 'logic of cost' will refer to that system of ideas and beliefs by means of which the common economic purposes of the total organisation are evaluated."

"2.2122 The term 'logic of efficiency' will refer to that system of ideas and beliefs by means of which the collaborative efforts of the members of the organisation are evaluated."

"2.2221 The term 'logic of sentiments' will refer to that system of ideas and beliefs which expresses/

expresses the values residing in the interhuman relations of the different groups within the plant."*

"A Condition of Equilibrium".

"The parts of the industrial plant as a social system are interrelated and interdependent. Any changes in one part of the social system are accompanied by changes in other parts of the system. The parts of the system can be conceived of as being in a state of equilibrium, such that 'if a small (not too great) modification different from that which will otherwise occur is impressed on the system, a reaction will at once appear tending toward the conditions that would have existed if the modification had not been impress'."*

It will be noted that in this scheme the industrial plant as a social system is divided into two parts: 1."Technical Organisation"; and 2 "Human Organisation". Human Organisation is, in turn, divided into two sections: "2.1 Individual"; and "2.2 Social Organisation". Social Organisation is sub-divided into two sections, "2.21 Formal Organisation"; and "2.22 Informal Organisation". All these have an effect upon the Informal Organisation which is thus influenced by the technical organisation of the plant; the "sentiments and values" of society outside the plant which are carried into the works through the individuals who make up the informal organisation; and by the formal organisation of the plant and its four components - patterns of interaction, systems of ideas and beliefs, logic of cost, and logic of efficiency. The informal organisation itself is made up of three interrelated factors: patterns of interaction, systems of ideas and beliefs, and logic of sentiments.

So much for the conceptual scheme. We will next examine Roethlisberger and Dickson's findings on work group behaviour, and the reasons for this behaviour, which they based on the Bank Wiring Observation Room study. It will be necessary to quote these findings at length to avoid falling into the error that many previous critics of this work have made: that of quoting sentences out of their context.

1. On the question of the Bank Wiring Observation Room group Roethlisberger and Dickson make the following statement:

"It is necessary for clarity to keep separate two points of view. Any group can be regarded: (1) as a collectivity in and by itself, with certain internal functions; and (2) as a unit in a wider organisation, with certain external functions. In other words, a group can be considered either from the point of view of its 'internal function' or from the point of view of its 'external function'. These distinctions are useful in that they allow one to confine attention to one body of data at a time and to proceed in an orderly fashion". **

They/

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* Footnote: Roethlisberger and Dickson, "Management and the Worker", pp. 565-567.

** Footnote: Roethlisberger and Dickson, op.cit p.511. As I shall be quoting extensively from this book in the next few pages the page number will be given in brackets after each quotation.

They then go on to discuss (a) the internal function of the group; and (b) its external function. For convenience this division is followed below.

(a) Internal Function.

Of this Roethlisberger and Dickson say: "The social organisation of the bank wiremen performed a two-fold function: (1) to protect the group from internal indiscretions, and (2) to protect it from outside interference. The same mechanism sometimes served to fulfil both functions."

"The mechanisms by which internal control was exercised were varied. Perhaps the most important were sarcasm, 'binging', and ridicule. Through such devices pressure was brought to bear upon those individuals who deviated too much from the group's norm of acceptable conduct. From this point of view, it will be seen that the great variety of activities ordinarily labelled 'restriction of output' represent attempts at social control and discipline and as such are important integrating processes. In addition to overt methods, clique membership itself may be looked upon as an instrument of control. Those persons whose behaviour was most reprehensible to clique A were excluded from it. They were, in a sense, socially ostracised. This is one of the universal social processes by means of which a group chastises and brings pressure to bear upon those who transgress its codes." (page 523)

They go on to say: "It can be seen, therefore, that nearly all the activities of this group may be looked upon as methods of controlling the behaviour of its members. The men had elaborated, spontaneously and quite unconsciously, an intricate social organisation around their collective beliefs and sentiments. The question as to what gave rise to those sentiments and beliefs, whether they arose from actual or potential threats to their security, as the operators claimed, is an important one and will be dealt with at length in the next chapter." (pages 523-524)

(b) External Function.

Roethlisberger and Dickson describe the external function of the group in the following terms: "So far it has been shown that the members of the Bank Wiring Observation Room group possessed an intricate social organisation in terms of which much of their conduct was determined. Restriction of output was the chief outer manifestation of this complex of interhuman relations. Let us now turn from the particularities of the bank wiring situation to a consideration of the relation of the group as an entity to the wider company organisation of which it was a part."

"The problem to be considered in this chapter can best be defined in terms of the external function of the bank wiremen's organisation. It has been shown that the internal function of this organisation was to control and regulate the behaviour of its members. Externally, however, it functioned as a protective mechanism. It served to protect the group from outside interference by manifesting a strong resistance to change, or threat of change, in conditions of work and personal relations. This resistance to change not only was reflected in all the wiremen's tactics to keep output constant but also was implied in all the reasons they/

they gave in justification of their actions. Had it been explicitly stated, their behaviour could be said to have been guided by the following rule: 'Let us behave in such a way as to give management the least opportunity of interfering with us.' There is no doubt that the most pronounced over-all characteristic of the interhuman activities described was their peculiarly protective or resistive quality. The problem, therefore, becomes that of discovering those external factors which gave rise to this resistance." (page 525)

On this point of restriction of output, the authors have earlier stated: "The mechanism by which they sought to protect themselves from management was the maintenance of uniform output records, which could be accomplished by reporting more or less output than they produced and by claiming daywork." (page 523)

The reasons why the group sought to protect themselves against management, as given by Roethlisberger and Dickson, are that the management's system of organisation based on what the authors call "the logic of efficiency" conflicted with the social sentiments of the group. "It can be seen that one of the chief sources of constraint in a working group can be a logic which does not take into account the worker's sentiments. Any activity not strictly in accordance with such a logic (and sometimes this means most forms of social activity) may be judged 'wrong'. As a result, such activity can only be indulged in openly within the protection of an informal group, which, in turn, may become organised in opposition to the effective purpose of the total organisation."(page 548)

The factors which give rise to informal groups are summarised as follows: "The significant problem for investigation appeared to be that of specifying the factors which give rise to such informal organisations. In attempting to answer this question, the external function of one group, the bank wiremen, was examined. This function could be characterised as that of resisting change. Following this lead, the position of the Bank Wiring Observation Room group in relation to the total company structure was then examined. This analysis led to the general conclusion that the informal organisation of the bank wiring group resulted primarily from the position of that group in the total company structure and its consequent relations with other groups within the company." (page 548)

Thus Roethlisberger and Dickson see the external function of the group as being to resist interference from outside, in particular to resist interference from the management. The way in which the management interfered with the group was by initiating change in working conditions - conditions in the widest sense, pay, location of work, etc - and the workers resisted these changes. The most important indication of this at the time of the research was the resistance of the group to the management's incentive scheme, this they resisted by controlling and limiting the output of the individual members of the group.

2. Secondly, Roethlisberger and Dickson state: "Restriction of output was the chief outer manifestation of this complex of interhuman relations." (page 525) and they set out to find an explanation for this restriction.

(a) The authors first investigate the question of whether the presence of the observer from the research team/

team in the same room as the Bank Wiring group led to restriction. They state: "It can be concluded that the investigators surely were not observing a situation of their own making. Their relations with the group were very satisfactory. There was no evidence after the first few weeks that the operators were afraid of them or distrusted them. This is not to say they had no influence on the situation. They probably did have, but it is very unlikely that the investigators were merely observing a situation of their own creation." (pages 530-531)

(b) Next they examine the depression as a possible cause but reject this also: "As for restriction of output, it may have been related to the effects of the depression but even that is doubtful. The output figures available, which stretched back before the depression, did not reflect any major interference. Furthermore, it is fairly generally conceded that restriction in one form or another occurs in good as well as bad times. It may grow more or less pronounced, but the basic pattern remains. The interviewers had detected suggestions of this pattern even in 1929, the year in which the company reached its peak of activity. It is fair to conclude, therefore, that this was not a 'depression story', and that any conclusions derived from an analysis of such a situation might have relevance to periods of prosperity as well as to periods of depression." (page 531)

3. Thirdly, the question of whether the workers have an economic interest in restricting output is discussed. As this question of economic interests is one of vital importance to the Mayo theories it will be necessary to quote their views at length. Roethlisberger and Dickson begin by stating the problem: "Perhaps the most common way of interpreting situations like this is to argue that the employee, in acting as he does, is simply protecting his economic interests. It is argued that if he does not restrict his output at some level his piece rate will be cut, the less capable workers will be reprimanded or discharged, or some of his co-workers will be laid off. These reasons are the same as those the worker himself gives for his behaviour and are taken as explanatory and self-evident. It is assumed that the worker, from a logical appraisal of his work situation or from his own past experiences, formulates a plan of action which in the long run will be to his own best interests and then acts in accordance with that plan. This theory is based upon two primary assumptions: first, that the worker is primarily motivated by economic interest; and, second, that work behaviour is logical and rational. In what follows, these assumptions will be examined in the light of the facts of this study."

"Let us begin by examining the reasons the employees gave for their own behaviour. These reasons, which have been quoted in Chapter XVIII, may be summarised in the belief the men held that if output went too high something might happen - the 'bogey' might be raised, the 'rate' might be raised, the 'rate' might be lowered, someone might be laid off, hours might be reduced, or the supervisors might reprimand the slower workers. Now one of the interesting things about these reasons is the confusion they manifest. In talking about 'rates', for example, many of the employees were not clear as to whether they were talking about piece rates, hourly rates, or/

or rates of working. The consequences of changing a rate would vary depending upon which rate was changed; yet the operators did not discriminate. Again, raising the bogey would have none of the consequences they feared. If it induced them to increase their output, the effect would be to increase their earnings; otherwise there would be no effect whatsoever. The result would be the opposite of cutting a piece rate; yet some of the operators felt that the result would be the same. It is clear, therefore, that their actions were not based upon a logical appraisal of their work situation."

"Another important observation which supports the above conclusion is that not one of the bank wiremen had ever experienced any of the things they claimed they were guarding against. Their bogey had not been raised, their piece rates had not been lowered, nor had their hourly rates; yet they acted and talked as though they had. Their behaviour, in other words, was not based upon their own concrete experience with the company. In this connection it might be pointed out that from a logical standpoint the operators should have wanted hourly rates to be flexible. They should have wanted them raised or lowered depending upon changes in the levels of an individual's efficiency, for only in that way could earnings be made to correspond with output. Yet all of them, the highest and lowest alike, were opposed to a lowering of hourly rates." (pages 532-533)

The authors foresee certain objections to the case they have put and try to forestall these objections. "At this point an objection might be raised. Granted that the employees did not clearly understand their payment system, were they not, nevertheless, acting in accordance with their economic interests? Even though none of them had experienced a reduction of piece rates, was it not a possibility? And were they not at least guarding against that possibility by controlling their output?"

"In considering this objection, let us assume for the time being that many of their fears were justified. Let us suppose that the piece rate was endangered if their output exceeded their concept of a day's work. Then what would follow from this if we assume that they were motivated primarily by economic interest? It would seem that each and every worker would push his output up to 6,600 connections per day and then hold it at that point. If all of them maintained that level of output consistently, they would be securing the maximum of earnings possible without endangering the piece rate. The facts are, however, that there were wide differences in the outputs of different individuals and that some of the operators were far short of 6,600 connections per day. If earnings had been their chief concern, differences in output levels should not have existed unless the operators were working at top capacity and that was far from being the case. Furthermore, in these terms it would be impossible to account for the amount of daywork claimed. Had they been chiefly concerned with earnings, they would have seen to it that there was very little daywork. It follows that this group of operators could not be said to be acting in accordance with their economic interests even if we assume that the reasons they gave for their actions were supportable by experimental evidence, which, of course, was not the case." (page 533).
They go on to point out two other reasons why the economic interpretation does not fit this case: "Two other/

other fallacies in the economic interpretation of restriction of output may be mentioned. One of them is the implied assumption that a fixed, unchanging piece rate is desirable on economic grounds. It is argued that a firm should maintain piece rates once they have been established, that this is the only way defensive reactions on the part of employees can be prevented. The general validity of this statement is scarcely open to question. Rapid change in piece rates is likely to undermine the workers' confidence in management and may in itself defeat the purpose of the most carefully constructed incentive plan. The justification of the fixed piece rate, however, is not so much economic as social. From a strictly economic viewpoint, it is to the advantage of the workers to have piece rates change with changes in the cost of living. The firm that takes pride in piece rates of long standing in the belief that it is thereby protecting the economic interests of the workers may be misplacing its emphasis. What it is really doing may lie more in the social than in the economic area."

"The other fallacy lies in the assumption that the worker can effectively control the actions of management by acting in certain ways. Changes in piece rates, hours of work, number of people employed, and so on, frequently lie completely outside the control of the worker and even of management. Furthermore, changes in piece rates at the Western Electric Company, for example, are not based upon the earnings of the worker. The company's policy is that piece rates will not be changed unless there is a change in the manufacturing process. Changes in process are made by engineers whose duty it is to reduce unit cost wherever the savings will be sufficient to justify the change. In certain instances such changes may be made irrespective of direct labor cost per unit. Again, where labor is a substantial element, increased output tends to lower unit cost and thus tends to obviate the need for a change in process. Restriction works precisely opposite. Restriction tends to increase unit costs and, instead of warding off a change in the piece rate as the worker believes, may actually induce one." (page 534)

Roethlisberger and Dickson are satisfied that this disproves the economic explanation for restricting output. They say: "From this analysis it may be concluded that the ideology expressed by the employees was not based upon a logical appraisal of their situation and that they were not acting strictly in accordance with their economic interests." (page 534). They develop those themes later: "the behavior of no one person in an industrial organization from the very top to the very bottom, can be regarded as motivated by strictly economic or logical considerations..... This point of view is far from the one which is frequently expressed, namely, that man is essentially an economic being carrying around with him a few noneconomic appendages. Rather, the point of view which has been expressed here is that noneconomic motives, interests, and processes, as well as economic, are fundamental in behavior in business, from the board of directors to the very last man in the organization." (page 557) Finally, they state: "The results from the different inquiries provided considerable material for the study of financial incentive. None of the results, however, gave the slightest substantiation to the theory that the worker is primarily motivated by economic interest. The evidence indicated that the efficacy of a wage incentive is so dependent on its relations to other factors that it is impossible to separate it out as a thing/

thing in itself having an independent effect."(p.575-576)

Thus the economic explanation for restriction of output in the bank wiring observation room is rejected and the authors throw doubt upon the validity of the belief that the economic motive is of primary importance among workers generally.

2(b) Next, Roethlisberger and Dickson examine the possibility that restriction of output is due to hostility towards the employer. "Another very common way of misconceiving this situation, one which is closely allied to the above, is to conclude that the behavior of the employees is a manifestation of overt hostility between management and employees. This error arises because of a failure to relate the behavior of the employees to their social situation. Instead, their behavior is judged in terms of what it should be according to the formal organisation. It is contrasted with an ideal and, of course, is found wanting. Here it is relevant to point out that the company had a long record of fair dealing with its employees; and its attitude, as reflected in its socially directed employee relations policies, was distinctly sympathetic. Moreover, verbally in the interviewing program and overtly in their continued connection with the company, as shown by an exceptionally low labor turnover, the employees gave ample evidence of their appreciation of, and friendliness toward, the company. In the interviews of 1929, where over 40,000 complaints were voiced, there was not one single unfavorable comment expressed about the company in general." (page 536)

It is pointed out later that there could be no opposition to the employer in Western Electric as there was, in fact, no employer: "It is clear that no simple dichotomous classification of the company's personnel could be made. The personnel could not be divided into an employer and an employee class because there was no employer class. Every person in the company from top to bottom was an employee. This point is emphasised here because many of the problems which have been encountered in these studies are commonly attributed to a conflict between employer and employee. To find them in a company that has no employer other than a scattered group of stockholders, many of whom are themselves employees of the company, suggests that these problems may be related to some other factor or factors. Also, although one could with some justification divide the personnel into supervisors and nonsupervisors, even this would misrepresent the actual situation. The study of the supervisors in the Operating Branch showed that the supervisory group were far from homogeneous. The lower grades of supervision had more in common with the nonsupervisory group than with the higher grades of supervision. Furthermore, the nonsupervisory group itself was exceedingly heterogeneous." (page 542)

Thus the hypothesis that restriction of output may be due to hostility to the management is rejected.

(c) The possibility that restriction is due to the supervisor is also rejected: "It is only too clear that the supervisor could be pictured more accurately as victim than as contriver of the situation in the observation room." (page 536)

Another/

Another possibility that is examined is that the restriction is due to "inefficiency and poor management" (page 537). This also is rejected and it is pointed out that the men in the wiring room were not inefficient: "Judged by customary standards, the output of the workers was acceptable and satisfactory. In the bank wiring department, output per worker was considered high." (page 537)

The authors deal with these two points very briefly and as they are not important to this thesis there is no point in expounding them further.

3. Having thus eliminated various possible causes of the restriction of output, Roethlisberger and Dickson then go on to put forward an hypothesis of their own, as follows. "Since the preceding considerations do not provide a satisfactory explanation of the situation in the Bank Wiring Observation Room, let us now turn to an examination of the relation between the social organisation of the wiring group and the company structure, of which the wiring group was a small part. This relation can best be shown by first describing the social structure of the company and then showing the position of the bank wiremen in that structure." (page 538)

They begin their examination of the social structure of the company by discussing what they call differentiating factors, they point out: "The first thing to note about the total personnel of the company is that it was differentiated in many ways. One of the most important distinctions was the division of the personnel into office workers and shop workers. The social status of the individual varied considerably depending upon the group in which his job placed him. There were a variety of differentiating factors, other than the type of work itself, which may be looked upon as subheadings under the office and shop distinction. These fell into three groups: working conditions, method of payment, and privileges." (page 538)

They conclude that this differentiation has a certain social significance: "The significance of these differentiating factors lies in the fact that the more bases there are for differentiation within a collectivity, the less likelihood there is for any one group to separate out. Thus nonsupervisory office employees have something in common with nonsupervisory shop employees, but their interests and sentiments are by no means identical. Similarly, the shop employees and the shop supervisor have a common ground in relation to the office employee and the office supervisor, and the supervisory group as a whole has something in common in relation to the whole nonsupervisory group. This criss-cross of relations creates communities of interest which only partially coincide. Individuals are thus integrated with and differentiated from one another. The result is not a dichotomous classification into office and shop workers, or into supervisors and nonsupervisors. It is instead a complex configuration of relations in which different groups are separated out and yet tied together." (page 540)

Next they turn to the question of what they term "integrating factors". "Let us turn now to another set of factors which, unlike those just mentioned, extended to all groups irrespective of rank or job. These may be called 'integrating factors', to distinguish them from those factors which applied to some groups but not/

not to others. Perhaps the secret of this company's history of favorable labor relations lies in the fact that it possesses a remarkable number of social processes by means of which the individual is integrated or identified with the collective whole. In the absence of such rituals, one group is likely to separate out in opposition to another group from which it is too widely differentiated." (page 540)

They point out that the company ran a club, the Hawthorne Club, which served as a very important integrating factor.: "A large number of these integrating factors were to be found in the activities sponsored by the Hawthorne Club. This club, whose membership comprised every employee and which was run by the employees themselves, engaged in a wide variety of activities. It sponsored eight different clubs, withbregularly elected officers, and twelve kinds of athletics, in addition to informal parties, dances, and entertainment programs. These activities interested a large number of employees of all ranks and served to create personal relations of great variety and endurance outside of the immediate work situation." (page 540)

It is further pointed out that the games played are participated in by people of all ranks, supervisory and nonsupervisory alike: "The supervisory organization, on these occasions, was in effect collapsed and all, irrespective of rank or title, participated alike. Thus it can be seen that all these games and social activities were, from a sociological standpoint, important integrating processes. They served to cut across the differentiating factors previously mentioned and to identify the employee with a larger group, the company." (page 541)

Two other important integrating factors are mentioned. "Another important integrating factor was service or seniority. The peculiarity of seniority is that it is acquired not by ability, education, personality, rank, or nationality, but through time. It is simply age with the company. It is the one basis upon which men are differentiated by an impartial process, a process free from human contrivance or feelings of prejudice." (page 541)

Finally they consider the integrative action of the company's various social benefit schemes: "Another group of important integrating factors included the thrift program, sickness, accident, and death benefit funds, pension funds, hospital care, financial and legal service, and so on. These actigities were begun by the company through necessity and may be looked upon as the taking over by the company of social functions not adequately performed by society. They reflect, in some measure, the breakdown of the social milieu in a concentrated industrial population. The effect upon the industrial establishment is to make it an important source of stability. It becomes a highly complex and comprehensive social institution. The employees find within the company itself not only a source of income but also, and to a marked extent, a source of advice, friendship, and aid as well as a source of amusement and recreation." (pages 541-542)

The next major point discussed by Roethlisberger and Dickson is the relation between the worker and his job and here they emphasize the social significance and the social status that attaches to the job: "As has been shown,/

shown, the worker's social status in the company depends in large part upon his job. Also, a given job carries with it many related factors which have social significance. Wages, for example, vary with occupations, and these wage differentials frequently serve to reinforce occupational stratifications. The results of the interviewing program show that the worker was quite as much concerned with these differentials, that is, the relation of his wages to the wages of other workmen, as with the absolute amount of wages. In short, the job and all the factors connected with it, such as the pay, the method of payment, working conditions, and privileges, together serve to define the social position of the worker." (page 543)

They go on to point out: "That jobs are socially ordered is a fact of the greatest importance. For it will be seen that, in so far as this holds true, any change in the job may very likely alter the existing routine relations between the person whose job it is and other people within the factory. This process is thrown into high relief when a person is promoted to supervisory rank. Such a change modifies his relations with other people within the plant whether he wants it to or not and may even carry over into his social life outside the factory." (page 544)

Next they study the relations between the technologist and the worker. They have the following to say of the technologist: "Having indicated the social significance of the job to the worker, let us now examine the relation between the technologist and the worker. Modern industry has found it necessary to employ a large number of specialists. The primary function of these specialists is to make improvements in machines, technical processes, methods, and products. The indirect result of this activity is a high incidence of change in jobs and related conditions of work." (page 545)

Of the changes introduced by technologists and their impact upon the workers they state the following: "frequently plans which are intended to promote efficiency have consequences other than their logical ones, and these unforeseen consequences tend to defeat the logical purposes of the plan as conceived. Let us consider some of these possible nonlogical consequences. "First, technical innovations make for changes in the worker's job and through the job may have profound consequences to the employee. For in so far as his job is changed, his position in the social organization, his interpersonal relations, his traditions of craftsmanship, and his social codes which regulate his relations to other people may also be affected."

"Secondly, the worker must frequently accommodate himself to changes which he does not initiate. Many of the systems introduced to improve his efficiency and to control his behavior do not take into account his sentiments. Because of his position in the company structure, at the bottom level of a well-stratified organization, he cannot hold to the same degree the sentiments of those who are instituting the changes."

"Thirdly, many of these same systems tend to subordinate the worker still further in the company's social structure. For instance, some of the incentive schemes and the procedures connected with them - job analysis,/

analysis, time and motion studies - apply for the most part only to the shop worker." (page 546)

The position is summed up as follows: "Thus it is seen that the technologist may be unwittingly a source of interference and constraint. Resistance to such interference was the chief external function of the bank wiremen's informal organisation." (pages 546-547)

The last factor to be considered by Roethlisberger and Dickson is the relation of the supervisor to the worker. They state: "To attribute the formation of the bank wiremen's informal organisation solely to the indirect, social consequences of the activity of technical specialists would clearly be an oversimplification. The relation between the supervisory group and the worker must also be considered."

"Unlike the technologist, the supervisor is related to the worker in a direct, personal, face-to-face way. He has disciplinary authority over the worker. To say that one person has disciplinary authority over another is a shorthand way of saying that one person is under the obligation of seeing that another person's conduct is in accord with certain generally accepted norms... The criterion in terms of which the supervisor must exercise discipline is not the convention of ordinary social living but a logic of efficiency. His duty is to see that the worker's behavior corresponds to rules of efficient conduct. It is this insistence upon a logic of efficiency, this continual attempt to force the human organisation into logical molds, that creates constraint."(page 547)

The authors then go on to point out that the rules the supervisors have to enforce on behalf of the management conflict with the social sentiments of the men: "It was seen that most of the problems encountered by the supervisors were problems of inducing the workmen to conform to the rules of the technical organisation. The worker's conduct was considered right or wrong in so far as it corresponded to these rules. The supervisor's success was evaluated by his superiors in terms of how well he succeeded in achieving this objective. Theoretically, these rules were supposed to promote efficiency, and adherence to them was supposed to redound to the worker's advantage. From the point of view of the worker's sentiments, however, many of them were annoying and seemingly functioned only as subordinating or differentiating mechanisms."

"Consider, for example, the unwritten rule that wiremen should not help one another to wire. This rule received its sanction from the belief that employees could turn out more work by working only on the equipments to which they were assigned. There would be less opportunity for talking, less likelihood of their getting in one another's way, and less likelihood of their delaying the solderman and the inspector. There was, in other words, no logical reason why the workmen should want to help one another in this fashion. To the wiremen, however, this was just another arbitrary rule. Many of them preferred to work together occasionally. It was one of the ways in which they expressed their solidarity; it was one of the integrative mechanisms in their internal organisation. Furthermore, they knew that working together did not necessitate slowing down. In fact, the evidence/

evidence showed that sometimes when they were refused the privilege of helping one another, they became less efficient." (pages 547-548)

Roethlisberger and Dickson conclude from this evidence that the rules of the company, what they call "the logic of efficiency" do not take into account the social sentiments of the workers. And, that the workers, as a result, seek to satisfy these sentiments within informal groups.

"It can be seen that one of the chief sources of constraint in a working group can be a logic which does not take into account the worker's sentiments. Any activity not strictly in accordance with such a logic (and sometimes this means most forms of social activity) may be judged 'wrong'. As a result, such activity can only be indulged in openly within the protection of an informal group, which, in turn, may become organised in opposition to the effective purpose of the total organisation." (page 548)

They summarise their findings as follows: "In the studies reported it has been shown that in certain departments at the Hawthorne plant there existed informal employee organisation resulting in problems such as have been described. An attempt has been made to point out that to state such problems in terms of 'restriction', 'faulty supervision', or 'mismanagement' is to mistake symptoms for causes and to neglect the social factors involved."

"The significant problem for investigation appeared to be that of specifying the factors which gave rise to such informal organisations. In attempting to answer this question, the external function of one group, the bank wiremen, was examined. This function could be characterised as that of resisting change. Following this lead, the position of the Bank Wiring Observation Room group in relation to the total company structure was then examined. This analysis led to the general conclusion that the informal organisation of the bank wiring group resulted primarily from the position of that group in the total company structure and its consequent relations with other groups within the company." (page 548)

In their final conclusions the authors develop this theme: "Some parts of the system can change more rapidly than others. The technical organisation can change more rapidly than the social organisation; the formal organisation can change more rapidly than the informal; the systems of beliefs and ideas can change more rapidly than the patterns of interaction and associated sentiments, of which these beliefs and ideas are an expression. In the disparity in the rates of change possible there exists a precondition for unbalance which may manifest itself in many forms."

"In their studies the investigators identified two such possibilities of unbalance. One was the disparity in the rates of change possible in the technical organisation, on the one hand, and the social organisation on the other. This condition was manifested in the workers' behavior by distrust and resistance to change. This resistance was expressed whenever changes were introduced too rapidly, or without sufficient consideration of their social/

social implications; in other words, whenever the workers were being asked to adjust themselves to new methods or systems which seemed to them to deprive their work of its customary social significance. In such situations it was evident that the social codes, customs, and routines of the worker could not be accommodated to the technical innovations introduced as quickly as the innovations themselves, in the form of new machines and processes, could be made. The codes, customs, and traditions of the worker are not the product of logic but are based on deeply rooted sentiments. Not only is any alteration of the existing social organisation to which the worker has grown accustomed likely to produce sentiments of resistance to the change, but too rapid interference is likely to lead to feelings of frustration and an irrational exasperation with technical change in any form." (pages 567-568)

They conclude: "It became clear to the investigators that the limits of human collaboration are determined far more by the informal than by the formal organisation of the plant. Collaboration is not wholly a matter of logical organisation. It presupposes social codes, conventions, traditions, and routine or customary ways of responding to situations. Without such basic codes or conventions, effective work relations are not possible. In the chapters that follow, the implications of this point of view for management and personnel practice will be considered." (page 568)

Having reached this conclusion Roethlisberger and Dickson turn back to some of their earlier research in the Hawthorne plant and point out the social significance of certain factors which had formerly only been studied from a purely physical point of view. Thus theystress the social importance of rest pauses: "Once the social meaning to the worker of his environment was appreciated, it became clear that the beneficial effects of rest pauses could be explained equally well in terms of their social functions. From this point of view, it could be seen that the introduction of rest pauses reflected an interest on the part of management in the health and well-being of its workers. Moreover, rest pauses allowed the workers to get together and to converse. They offered relaxation and relief from tension. For the time being, at least, the 'logic of efficiency' was in abeyance and the workers were permitted normal social interaction." (page 571)

On the physical conditions of work they point out that complaints about these conditions are often social in origin: "Further study showed that the likes and dislikes of employees often have to be treated as symptoms or indicators of a personal or social situation which must be studied further to be understood. They found that expressionsof sentiment have properties different from those of facts. Strictly speaking, they are neither true nor false. They refer to the significant personal and social situation of the individual, and apart from such a context they are meaningless." (page 573)

Similarly they say of "complaints and grievances" that these often had a social origin: "Where social conditions of work are such as to make it difficult for the employee to identify his task with a socially meaningful function, he is liable to obsessive response and diminished capacity for work." (page 575)

Of wage incentive systems they point out that these too are related to social factors: "Conclusions about/

about the efficacy of a wage incentive drawn from it, unrelated to the basic social situation, would have been entirely misleading." (page 577)

It can be seen from this that Roethlisberger and Dickson look upon the social factor as being dominant over the factor of interest. I will summarise their argument briefly in order to simplify future discussion. Roethlisberger and Dickson take the question of restriction of output as being the key to the behaviour of the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives, and study the reasons for this restriction of output. They reject the possibility that restriction is due to their economic interests, giving six reasons: (i) The operatives feared that if output went too high "something might happen", but they had no clear of what this something might be and their answers were contradictory; e.g. some said the "bogey" might be raised, the rate might be raised, the rate might be lowered, or someone might be laid off. (ii) None of the workers had experienced any of the things they were guarding against. (iii) The workers wanted the rates to remain fixed, yet, from an economic point of view, they should have wanted them flexible so that they could increase to meet improvements in individual efficiency and increases in the cost of living. (iv) If the factor of economic interest had been predominant every worker would have made the maximum permissible output of 6,600 connections per day, neither more or less, but in actual fact they did not do so. (v) The economic argument is false because workers cannot effectively maintain piece rates by restricting output; in fact greater productivity lowers unit costs and could lead to higher piece rates; lower productivity increases unit costs and could lead to lower piece rates. (vi) This is an extension of the argument of (v), Roethlisberger and Dickson claim that "workers cannot control the actions of management by acting in certain ways." In particular they point out that changes in piece rates lie outside the control of workers, and even of management in many cases.

Hence, Roethlisberger and Dickson conclude, the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives, and for that matter workers generally, cannot be motivated primarily by economic interests. They then advance their own explanation for this restriction of output, which, they believe, is based upon resistance to management rules which do not take into account the social sentiments of the workers: rules, that is, which interfere with the social activities of the workers and deprive them of social satisfactions in their work. Roethlisberger and Dickson state clearly that they believe social motivations to be more important than economic or other interests, and they re-interpret some of their earlier research in the light of this: thus, they point out that many complaints and grievances about physical conditions of work may, in reality, originate in social rather than physical dissatisfactions.

THE RELATIONSHIP OF ROETHLISBERGER AND DICKSON'S WORK TO THAT OF THE REST OF THE MAYO SCHOOL.

So far we have been considering Roethlisberger and Dickson only, and the next point that remains to be discussed is: how far are any criticisms we may make of their conclusions valid as criticisms of the Mayo "school" generally? To put the problem in another form, how far do Mayo and his followers accept the conclusions of Roethlisberger and Dickson and incorporate them in their own work?

Let us first examine the connection between Roethlisberger and Dickson - and - Elton Mayo, the founder of the school. As Landsberger points out Roethlisberger and Dickson are undoubtedly members of the Mayo school: "The fact that 'Management and the Worker' belongs to the genre is undeniable since Mayo's help and guidance is explicitly acknowledged in several places (e.g. footnote, p. 272)." *

Mayo in turn acknowledges that he accepts and uses the findings of Roethlisberger and Dickson. In "The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilisation" **, Chapters III, IV, and V, are made up of the findings of the Hawthorne researches and on page 106 he acknowledges his indebtedness to Roethlisberger and Dickson. In Chapter V, "The Meaning of Morale", he discusses the restrictive practices found in the Bank Wiring Observation Room and follows Roethlisberger and Dickson in explaining these in terms of social sentiments. In "The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilisation" *** Mayo acknowledges his indebtedness to the findings of Roethlisberger and Dickson as reported in "Management and the Worker" on pages 38, 62, and 135.

Finally, Landsberger, who attempted in his book "Hawthorne Revisited" to show that many of the criticisms which have been levelled against Mayo do not apply to "Management and the Worker". Landsberger acknowledges in Chapters IV and V of his study that, on the particular issues discussed in this thesis - the importance of social sentiments as against conflicts of interests - Roethlisberger and Dickson do share the theories of Mayo, although their own research findings point to other conclusions: i.e. conflicts of interests.

Thus it appears that the remarks made above concerning the conclusions of Roethlisberger and Dickson are equally applicable to the theories of Mayo since Mayo accepts and uses their conclusions.

Two other important members of the Mayo school who merit consideration here are T.N.Whitehead and G.C.Homans. Whitehead in "Leadership in a Free Society", a book dedicated/

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* Footnote: Landsberger, op.cit. p. 47.

** Footnote: "The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilisation", Elton Mayo, op. cit.

*** Footnote: "The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilisation", Elton Mayo, op. cit.

dedicated to Elton Mayo,* devotes two chapters to the Hawthorne researches. In Chapter III he described the Relay Test group, in Chapter IV the Bank Wiring Observation Room group. The descriptions are taken from the, at that time, still unpublished manuscript of "Management and the Worker" and Whitehead accepts their conclusions in full. On the matters relevant to this discussion, on pages 64 and 66 he specifically accepts the view of Roethlisberger and Dickson that the restrictive practices and social behaviour patterns of the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives are caused by social sentiments, and he bases much of his subsequent theorising on this conclusion.

Lastly Homans' book "The Human Group" **. In this book Chapters III to VI inclusive, are drawn directly from "Management and the Worker" *** they consist of a detailed description and analysis of the research on the Bank Wiring Observation Room group and Homans indicates his approval of the findings of Roethlisberger and Dickson. On pages 153-155 Homans shows himself to be in complete agreement with Roethlisberger and Dickson and acknowledges that the restrictive practices and group behaviour patterns were entirely due to the social sentiments of the operatives, the factor of interest being rejected.

Thus the criticisms made below of the conclusions of Roethlisberger and Dickson are equally applicable to the relevant parts of the theories of Elton Mayo and the principal members of his school, since they have accepted the conclusions of Roethlisberger and Dickson regarding the reasons for social behaviour at the place of work, and have incorporated these conclusions into their own theories.

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* Footnote: "Leadership in a Free Society", T.N. Whitehead, op. cit.

** Footnote: George C. Homans, "The Human Group", Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1951.

*** Footnote: Homans acknowledges his indebtedness to Roethlisberger and Dickson on page 49 of "The Human Group".

Examination of the Conclusions of Roethlisberger and Dickson.

The conclusion, common to all the Mayo "school", that social motivations are predominant over interest motivations, is directly contrary to the findings from the research as described in this thesis. It was shown on pages 268-293 of this thesis that the interests and values of the printers, clerks, and navvies studied proceeded from their reaction to the employers, and that the group relations of all three followed from their interests and values. Thus it was found that: "The common interests of the printers cause strong and coherent interest and informal groups. The lack of common interests among the clerks and the navvies means that they have no common interest groups and also causes them to have either weak informal groups or no informal groups at all. This in spite of the fact that the conditions of work of the clerks and navvies are far more conducive to social intercourse than are those of the printers. Hence it was found that "common interests are vital to the formation of even informal social groups within the place of work."

This finding is thus directly contrary to that of Roethlisberger and Dickson, and it would appear that one must be wrong. However, I see no reason to modify the findings which I have described at length above. On the other hand I do feel that the reasons given by Roethlisberger and Dickson for rejecting the idea that workers are primarily motivated by economic interests are unsatisfactory. I propose, therefore, to re-examine their findings to see whether they will stand up to closer scrutiny.

It was seen that Roethlisberger and Dickson base their rejection of the idea that workers are primarily actuated by economic motives on their finding that restriction of output in the Bank Wiring Observation Room was not due to the economic interests of the operatives. They gave six reasons for this finding, let us submit these to critical examination.

(i) The first reason given by Roethlisberger and Dickson was that the operatives were not clear what would happen if production went up. They admit that the workers believed that if production went up rates would be cut, but state that the workers were "confused": "In talking about 'rates', for example, many of the employees were not clear as to whether they were talking about piece rates, hourly rates, or rates of working. The consequences of changing a rate would vary depending upon which rate was changed; yet the operators did not discriminate. Again, raising the bogey would have none of the consequences they feared. If it induced them to increase their output, the effect would be to increase their earnings; otherwise there would be no effect whatsoever. The result would be the opposite of cutting a piece rate; yet some of the operators felt that the result would be the same. It is clear, therefore, that their reactions were not based upon a logical appraisal of their work situation." (Roethlisberger and Dickson, page 532).

Workers generally express themselves in vague terms and use the term "rate" to refer to several different things, but this does not mean to say that they do not/

not know which sense of the word "rate" they mean in any given context. Workers in Britain as well as in the U.S.A. use the term "rate" in reference to "piece rates, hourly rates and rates of working." Nevertheless, the operatives in the Bank Wiring Observation Room were quite clear that by "rate cutting" they meant something to their detriment. The term "rate cutting" is the accepted standard term applied to the reduction of piece rates used by workers and trade unions in both Britain and the U.S.A., and it is hard to believe that the operatives in the Bank Wiring Observation Room meant it in any other sense however vaguely they may have spoken of it. The fear of rate cutting is so widely spread among industrial workers, as I will show later, that the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives would appear to be unique in their ignorance, if they were ignorant.

However, as the Hawthorne research was conducted in the U.S.A. let us examine other evidence from the U.S.A. on this point. In the United States in 1945 a nation wide survey was carried out by the Opinion Research Corporation for the Journal "Factory", it was found that 40% of the workers questioned stated that a worker should "turn out the average amount" for his particular job, neither more nor less. When asked "What do you think would happen if he turned out MORE than the average?", 30% replied that the management would raise production quotas; 23% that it would be unpopular with other workers; 11% that piece rates would be reduced; 8% that the worker would break down physically; 7% replied that the worker would not make more money; and 7% that it would cause unemployment.* It will be noted that these beliefs about what will happen if production is increased are substantially the same as those expressed by the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives.

Vitoles has pointed out that: "For many years unions have established a frank policy of controlling output in order to increase their power; to stretch out available work as a means of curtailing layoffs; to avoid reduction in piece rates, and to protect the worker from an undue expenditure of energy." **

This is true not only of unionised labour, for the classic study of restriction of output in the U.S.A. is Mathewson's "Restriction of Output among Unorganised Workers". In it Mathewson has shown how widespread restriction of output is in American industry; he found evidence of restriction in 105 establishments in 47 localities, representing 39 industries. His conclusion was that "Restriction is a widespread institution, deeply entrenched in the working habits of American labouring people." *** Mathewson also found that the main reason for restrictive practices was the fear that/

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* Footnote: "What the Factory Worker really thinks about productivity, nationalisation of industry, and labor in politics." FACTORY, 1946. Vol. 104. No. I pages 80-88.

** Footnote: "Motivation and Morale in Industry,", Morris S.Vitoles, Staples Press, London, 1954, p.53. This is an American book and refers to American practices.

*** Footnote: S.B.Mathewson, "Restriction of Output Among Unorganised Workers". The Viking Press, New York, 1931, page 146.

that piece rates would be cut if individual production and earnings rose above a certain level.

A later study of restrictive practices in America is that of Donald Roy: "Quota Restriction and Gold Bricking in a Machine Shop". Roy gathered his information by participant observation, working as a machine operator. He found that systematic restriction of output was practised by his fellow workers, and that they watched his work and insisted that he limit his output. The explanation they gave for this was that if earnings over exceeded a certain level the job would be retimed. He believed that whenever a man's output and earnings exceeded a set level the management and the work study department would find some excuse for cutting the piece rate. *

Further confirmation is to be found in an article by W. Hard who states: "Management sends a time-study man to observe a worker at a machine. This lofty character has a watch which divides a minute not merely into 60 parts but into a hundred. With its help he decides the exact length of time required for a certain operation. So the worker gets to work. He 'speeds up'. He beats the time-study man's time. He climbs, let us say, to $1.50 an hour. Then management cuts the number of cents per operation till the worker is earning no more going fast than he used to earn going slow.

"This has happened to a million workers in American industry. To my knowledge, it has happened repeatedly ever since the war began. It makes workers wary. It makes them hold back. It causes great masses of them habitually to work way below their productive power. Here is the greatest single loss of human energy in American life." **

Other studies which support this point of view are "Human Relations in Industry" by Gardner and Moore, in which the authors state: "Workers believe, too, that if their earnings are too high, their rates will eventually be cut. This is quite consistently believed, even when management has assured them that no rate will be cut without definite change in method. Even where there are union contracts protecting them against rate cutting, workers still cling to this belief; and almost every experienced worker can tell of cases from his own/

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* Footnote: Donald Roy, "Quota Restriction and Gold Bricking in a Machine Shop". American Journal of Sociology, Vol. XVII, 1951-52, pages 427-42.

** Footnote: W. Hard, "Incentive Pay: for more war production; for more peace prosperity". Readers Digest, 1943 (August), p. 11-15, quoted by Viteles, op. cit.

own experience when rates have been cut. *

Aspley in "The Handbook of Employee Relations" and Schneider in "Industrial Sociology" lend further confirmation. **

In view of the evidence from those studies it appears strange that the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives were "confused" about what would happen if they did not restrict output. However, whether confused or not, the basic fact remains that, as Roethlisberger and Dickson admit, they restricted output because they believed that if production increased the management would take some action that would affect them adversely. They believed that this action would take the form of a cut in rates which would lower their earnings in relation to the amount of work done. This does not, of course, rule out the possibility of a deeper, underlying motive but at this point Roethlisberger and Dickson do not suggest there is such a motive, they simply claim that the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives were confused. The evidence from American industry detailed above suggests that, however confused and illogical their statements may have seemed to Roethlisberger and Dickson, the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives share with American workers generally a clear-cut belief that by restricting output they are forwarding their economic interests. Certainly, there is nothing in this first point to upset the well-established and generally accepted belief that workers restrict output to prevent rate cutting and to lessen the risk of unemployment.

(ii) The second point raised by Roethlisberger and Dickson is that none of the operatives in the Bank Wiring Observation Room had experienced any of the conditions - cuts in piece rates, etc. - that they were guarding against. Roethlisberger and Dickson do not explain the significance they attach to this, but the only interpretation that makes sense is that they are claiming that the real object of the restriction of output cannot be the avowed one of preventing rate cutting, because none of the men concerned had any actual experience of rate cutting.

There are two points on which this argument can be questioned. The first is that there is some evidence to suggest that in actual fact the workers at Hawthorne had experience of rate cutting. Roethlisberger and Dickson claim that it was not the policy of the Western Electric Company to cut piece rates. But John Mills, a former member of the Personnel Staff of the Bell Telephone Company states: "Reward is supposed to be in direct proportion to production. Well, I remember the first time I ever got behind that fiction. I was visiting the Western Electric Company, which had a reputation of never cutting a piece rate. It never did; if/

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* Footnote: "Human Relations in Industry". B.B.Gardner and D.G.Moore, Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, p. 181.

** Footnote: "The Handbook of Employee Relations", John Cameron Aspley, Dartnell Corp.Chicago,1955, p. 673.
"Industrial Sociology", Eugene V.Schneider, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1957, pages 197-201.
See also "Personnel Administration" by Paul Pigors and Charles A. Myers, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1956, p.301, and Peter F.Drucker, "The New Society", Wm.Heinemann Ltd., London, 1951, p.65.

if some manufacturing process was found to pay more than seemed right for the class of labor employed on it - if, in other words, the rate-setters had misjudged - that particular part was referred back to the engineers for redesign, and then a new rate was set on the new part." * This suggests that the workers at Hawthorne were not as inexperienced on rate cutting as Roethlisberger and Dickson would have us believe.

The second point is the claim of Roethlisberger and Dickson that men cannot fear conditions of which they have no direct experience. This view is untenable. Many of the workers studied by Roy and Mathewson had no actual experience of rate cutting yet they believed it would happen if output went up. Since the war rate cutting has been rare both in Britain and America, nevertheless the fear of rate cutting remains. As Pigors and Myers point out: "The fear of a rate cut and 'speed-up' if good earnings are made after a rate is established. Sometimes this belief is held even though workers can cite no actual instance when it has occurred; they have just 'heard about' it. Yet the statement that 'they'll cut your rate' is a powerful deterrent to increased output and a justification in workers' eyes for restriction of output by pegging it at some fixed figure." ** On pages 57-65 of this thesis I have described various methods of restricting output practices by printers, yet none of the printers had any direct experience of rates being cut. Industrial workers are often actuated by ideas and beliefs which are not related to their own experience and which may, in fact, be directly contrary to that experience.*** In saying that the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives cannot fear conditions of which they have no experience Roethlisberger and Dickson are making an assertion which is contrary to the evidence of many other researches, and making it without producing any supporting evidence of their own. Thus I claim that this second point is completely valueless as evidence that the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives were not actuated by economic motives: i.e. were not restricting output from a fear that rates would be cut if production increased.

(iii) The third point raised by Roethlisberger and Dickson is that the operatives should, economically, have wanted flexible rates or pay: "From a logical standpoint the operators should have wanted hourly rates to be flexible. They should have wanted them raised or lowered depending upon changes in the levels of an individual's efficiency, for only in that way could earnings be made to correspond with output. Yet all of them, the highest and lowest alike, were opposed to a lowering of hourly rates." ****

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* Footnote: John Mills, "The Engineer in Society". D. Van Nostrand Co., New York, 1946. p.93

** Footnote: Pigors and Myers, op. cit. p. 301.

*** Footnote: On this subject see for example "Changing Workers' Attitudes", A.J.M.Sykes, in "Research", Vol.11 (June,1958) pp.236-239.

**** Footnote: Roethlisberger and Dickson, pp. 532-533.

The point of this statement is that the hourly rates were based upon the output of the individual, so that an individual with high output would have a high hourly rate, and one with low output a low hourly rate. The Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives were on a system of group piecework, the earnings of any one individual being affected by the output of every other member in the group, so that the wages of an individual worker who turned out an unusually large amount of work, in comparison with the output of other workers, would be only slightly higher than if he had not increased his output at all. To minimise the effect of this the hourly rates of each worker were adjusted according to the average hourly output of the operator. Thus differences in the earnings of different operatives depended upon differences in individual hourly rates.

In short Roethlisberger and Dickson are claiming that if economic interests had been predominant the operatives would have wanted the rates to be flexible so that the hourly rates of those who worked hardest could be increased, while the hourly rates of those whose production was low could have been reduced. In this way reward would have been related to individual effort.

Once again Roethlisberger and Dickson are over-simplifying the problem: the economic interest is again being treated in the narrowest possible sense. It is true that it is in the immediate economic interests of the more productive workers to have their hourly rates of pay related to their individual production - but it is not necessarily in their long term economic interests. Thus, workers generally are opposed to any cutting of rates, no matter what the reason, in case this establishes a precedent. If the employer can cut the hourly rates of the less productive workers at will, then he has established the principle that he can cut rates on his own initiative and without consulting the workers. A major part of industrial relations is concerned with creating, or preventing the other side creating, such precedents. Hence it is natural that the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives should be opposed to the cutting of rates even where these appear to be in their immediate economic interest.

It has been shown in this thesis, in Sections 8 and 9 that many of the printers studied also operated practices which were against their immediate economic interests. For instance, the practice of pooling production so that all workers earned the same pay irrespective of their individual production. It was shown that the reason for these practices was to preserve the unity of the workers against the employer. Not, as Roethlisberger and Dickson would have it, for social reasons, but because the printers believed that the employers have interests which are opposed to their own: in particular, that there is a clash between the economic interests of the employer and those of the printers. Thus, what happens is that an immediate economic interest is sacrificed in favour of what is believed to be a more important long term economic interest - that of preserving unity against the employer for the purposes of collective bargaining. In the same way the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives are sacrificing an immediate economic interest but they apparently believe, according to Roethlisberger/

Roethlisberger and Dickson,* that it is in their long term interests to prevent all cutting of rates.

Thus the fact that the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives - or any other workers for that matter since Roethlisberger and Dickson apply this finding generally - disregard an immediate economic interest is no evidence that the operatives are not dominated by economic interests, unless it can also be shown that they have no other economic interests in view. Roethlisberger and Dickson have made no attempt to prove that the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives had no other such interests. Workers often have to choose between one or other of their economic interests, the fact that in choosing one they must disregard the other economic interest cannot be taken as evidence that they are disregarding all economic interests.

(iv) Roethlisberger and Dickson anticipated that there might be objections to the third point and try to cover these by raising a fourth point: "Let us suppose that the piece rate was endangered if their output exceeded their concept of a day's work. Then what would follow from this if we assume that they were motivated primarily by economic interest? It would seem that each and every worker would push his output up to 6,600 connections per day and then hold it at that point. If all of them maintained that level of output consistently, they would be securing the maximum of earnings possible without endangering the piece rate. The facts are, however, that there were wide differences in the outputs of different individuals and that some of the operators were far short of 6,600 connections per day. If earnings had been their chief concern, differences in output levels should not have existed unless the operators were working at top capacity and that was far from being the case. Furthermore, in these terms it would be impossible to account for the amount of daywork claimed. Had they been chiefly concerned with earnings, they would have seen to it that there was very little daywork. It follows that this group of operators could not be said to be acting in accordance with their economic interests even if we assume that the reasons they gave for their actions were supportable by experimental evidence, which, of course, was not the case." **

Once again Roethlisberger and Dickson have tried to prove their case by putting the narrowest possible interpretation on the term "economic interest". They admit that the operatives deliberately restricted their output but claim that because they did not consistently make the maximum permissible output of 6,600 connections per day they could not be "primarily actuated by economic interest". This is an astonishing claim to put forward on such slender evidence. Few industrial workers are known to stick rigidly to the maximum permissible output. In the cases described by Mathewson and Roy output varied considerably, sometimes it was well below the permissible maximum, sometimes it exceeded the maximum. The same is true of the cases observed during the course of my own research. The reason given by many of the workers for this variation in output is a very obvious one./

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* Footnote: See Roethlisberger and Dickson op.cit. pages 523-534.

** Footnote: Roethlisberger and Dickson, p. 533

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one. In most cases the workers believe that these restrictive practices are secret and that the maintenance of an exactly equal output at all times, and for all workers, would soon reveal the existence of restriction to the management. Gardner and Moore cite an example in "Human Relations in Industry", speaking of one works they say: "However, the work shown in the daily reports was never quite what was accounted for by the inspection. While they approximated a straight-line output record, they were careful not to show the same earnings day after day. They said that the foreman knew that no one could work at a perfectly even pace on that job: so if they maintained a perfectly even straight-line record, he would know that they were making it 'with the pencil' or controlling it in other ways. For that reason they always saw to it that their reports fluctuated slightly from day to day in order to 'give the boss what he wanted'." * It is significant that in the Bank Wiring Observation Room the existence of restrictions on output had been kept a secret from the management until it was disclosed by the research study. Hence they had good reason not to work to the exactly even output that Roethlisberger and Dickson seem to expect. There are other reasons. Physical for instance, days when men feel like working, days when they don't: they may be effected by the weather, the way they spent the previous night, the state of their health. The strength of the economic incentive may very between different individuals or, at different times, in the same individual. There are innumerable reasons for variations in output but the important point is that they do consistently limit output. It is most unreasonable to assume, as Roethlisberger and Dickson do, that because there are minor variations in output, and because other factors - physical, social, etc - may affect output, that the operatives are not acting in accordance with their economic interests. Roethlisberger and Dickson are saying in effect that because the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives do not <u>invariably</u> act in accordance with their economic interests they are not "acting in accordance with their economic interests" <u>at all</u>. This is a completely inconsequent argument.

On the question of "daywork" - what we in Britain call "time rate" to distinguish it from "piece rate" - the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives received payment at the hourly rate of pay during periods when it was not possible for them to do productive work on a piece rate basis. Roethlisberger and Dickson again miss a very obvious point when they say that to work on daywork was not in the economic interest of the operatives. Daywork can be used to limit output as the worker on daywork is earning without actually producing anything - or while producing at a very low rate. It can also be used to <u>increase</u> earnings without increasing output. Thus, in one works in which I did research it was standard practice for the workers to claim eight hours production as being seven hours work and also claim one hours "waiting time" at time rate to make up their eight hour shift. In this way they received an extra hour's pay without increasing their actual output. Such uses of daywork are common practice in industry and Roethlisberger and Dickson ought to have known about them, in fact/

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* <u>Footnote</u>: "Human Relations in Industry", B.B.Gardner and D.G.Moore, op. cit. p. 136.

fact it is hard to understand how any industrial research worker could avoid knowing of them. To say that this use of daywork was against the economic interest of the operatives once again raises the point that Roethlisberger and Dickson are referring only to their immediate economic interests and ignoring their long term economic interests.

On the other point raised by Roethlisberger and Dickson, that the reasons the operatives gave for their actions were not "supportable by experimental evidence", all I would say here is that, on the points we have examined so far, they have completely failed to disprove the assertions of the operatives that they were actuated by fear of rate cutting.

(v) Roethlisberger and Dickson claim that the restriction of output in order to prevent cuts in the piece rate is not justifiable on economic grounds. "The justification of the fixed piece rate, however, is not so much economic as social. From a strictly economic viewpoint, it is to the advantage of the workers to have piece rates change with changes in the cost of living. The firm that takes pride in piece rates of long standing in the belief that it is thereby protecting the economic interests of the workers may be misplacing its emphasis. What it is really doing may lie more in the social than in the economic area." (Roethlisberger and Dickson, p. 534)

Thus Roethlisberger and Dickson are assuming that the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives wanted "a fixed, unchanging piece rate", one that would not be changed either upwards or downwards. Once again Roethlisberger and Dickson are acting on the narrowest possible interpretation of a term: in this case the term "fixed". Again it is necessary to refer to what is standard practice among American and British workers. It is normal to demand that piece rates must be "fixed", by this is meant that the rates must not be reduced through unilateral action by the employer: there is certainly no idea that piece rates should not increase. What the workers fear is a reduction of rates, by a fixed rate they mean one that will not be lowered. In the past the workers have usually been on the defensive against the employers, trying to safeguard the rates they had won. This was particularly true of the Depression period when the Hawthorne researches were carried out, a period when rates were normally cut, rarely raised. Hence the stress laid upon "fixing" rates.

That workers do not believe that rates should be "fixed" against upward as well as against downward movements can be shown by numerous instances. Thus, in the article "Quota Restriction and Gold Bricking in a Machine Shop", referred to above, two restrictive practices are described, one to maintain piece rates, one to increase them. Roy describes "quota restriction", which is a restriction of output in order to ensure that a piece rate which the workers consider to be a good one is not cut; and also "gold bricking" which is a more stringent restriction of output used to force management to increase rates which the workers consider to be too low. When "gold bricking", a worker makes no attempt to earn a living wage, holding back production to demonstrate that the rate is so low that it is unworkable. It is clear from these practices that the workers concerned wanted piece rates fixed against possible reduction, not against possible/

possible increases.

Among the printing workers I studied a "fixed" rate meant one thing only, a rate fixed against a decrease. Trade unions when making agreements on piece rates, both in America and in Britain, normally attempt to obtain guarantees from the employer against the reduction of piece rates; while at the same time stipulating that should the cost of living or hourly rates of pay increase, then piece rates will be raised correspondingly. This is standard practice among industrial workers * and the claim of Roethlisberger and Dickson that the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives wanted "fixed" rates which would be neither raised nor lowered seems to be based on a complete misunderstanding of what workers generally mean by the term "a fixed piece rate."

(vi) The sixth point raised by Roethlisberger and Dickson is as follows: "The other fallacy lies in the assumption that the worker can effectively control the actions of management by acting in certain ways. Changes in piece rates, hours of work, number of people employed, and so on, frequently lie completely outside the control of the worker and even of management. Furthermore, changes in piece rates at the Western Electric Company, for example, are not based upon the earnings of the worker. The company's policy is that piece rates will not be changed unless there is a change in the manufacturing process. Changes in process are made by engineers whose duty it is to reduce unit cost wherever the savings will be sufficient to justify the change. In certain instances such changes may be made irrespective of direct labor cost per unit. Again, where labor is a substantial element, increased output tends to lower unit cost and thus tends to obviate the need for a change in process. Restriction works precisely opposite. Restriction tends to increase unit costs and, instead of warding off a change in the piece rate as the worker believes, may actually induce one." (Roethlisberger and Dickson, p.534)

In making this statement Roethlisberger and Dickson are assuming that workers and managers are both strictly governed by logic. They assume that workers know that they cannot control piece rates, hours of work, and the number of people employed, and therefore cannot believe that restriction of output is really in their economic interests. Secondly, Roethlisberger and Dickson assume that managers act logically and do not attempt to cut rates because they know that increased production means cheaper labour costs: this assumption that management are always governed by logic is one of the basic fallacies in "Management and the Worker."

Neither of these assumptions is correct. I have already shown by numerous quotations that American workers do/

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* Footnote: On this question of clauses in agreements allowing for automatic increases in wages to meet increases in the cost of living, "escalator clauses" as they are termed in America, see Pigors and Myers, op. cit. p. 283. For specific examples of clauses increasing piece rates as the cost of living increases see the "Agreement between General Motors Corporation and the United Automobile Workers of America", reprinted by the Labor Information Service, United States Information Service, 1959, p. 25.

do assume that they can control piece rates, hours of work, and the number of people employed, by restricting output. The workers can believe this even if it is illogical. But it is illogical only if it can be shown that employers never try to cut piece rates, and it is clear that Roethlisberger and Dickson do assume that rates are never cut. Yet they offer no evidence to support this assumption. They ignore the fact that restrictions on output in industry have grown out of the fact that employers generally have cut rates. On the Western Electric Company Roethlisberger and Dickson say: "The company's policy is that piece rates will not be changed unless there is a change in the manufacturing process." But we have already seen the testimony of Mills which I will quote again here as it is relevant to the argument: "I was visiting the Western Electric Company, which had a reputation of never cutting a piece rate. It never did; if some manufacturing process was found to pay more than seemed right for the class of labor employed on it - if, in other words, the rate-setters had misjudged - that particular part was referred back to the engineers for redesign, and then a new rate was set on the new part." *

The whole argument depends on the assumption that workers and managers alike have complete knowledge and understanding of the facts of the situation, and that their behaviour must inevitably proceed logically from this knowledge, a remarkably naive view of human behaviour.

Thus the six points which, according to Roethlisberger and Dickson, refute the claim that restriction of output is due to economic reasons are found to do nothing of the kind. There is nothing in the evidence they advance to disprove the generally accepted view that workers in both America and Britain restrict output because they believe it to be in their economic interests. And it would appear that Roethlisberger and Dickson in claiming that social factors are more important than interests, particularly economic interests, in governing the behaviour of workers have seriously misinterpreted the industrial situation.

In support of this I would quote various authorities who have studied the conclusions of Roethlisberger and Dickson. Viteles writes of the conclusions in "Management and the Worker": "Social considerations, according to the Hawthorne investigators, also outweigh economic ones in determining workers' feelings and attitudes, and thereby in determining the nature of individual satisfactions and grievances in the working situation."

"Objections can be raised to these generalisations, particularly to the implication that financial incentives cannot have a direct and independent influence upon output. As suggested earlier, data from the Hawthorne studies which are interpreted as revealing the effect of group sentiments can be interpreted as showing the immediate and definite influence of a change in the wage plan. Certainly, the findings of the Hawthorne studies cannot be accepted, as has apparently been done in some quarters, as demonstrating that the worker is not concerned with the size of his pay envelope except as an outward symbol of the social value of his job, and that he will ordinarily not respond directly with increased effort/

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* Footnote: Mills op. cit., p. 93.

effort to an enhancement of the financial incentive." *

Roy examined the conclusions of Roethlisberger and Dickson in the light of his own research in a machine shop. He denies the validity of their conclusions and believes that the workers restricted production because they feared cuts in the piece rates. In his opinion the motives of workers are primarily economic and writing of the machine shop he studied, he stated: "The operators in my shop made noises like economic men. Their talk indicated that they were canny calculators and that the dollar sign fluttered at the masthead of every machine." **

Miller and Form contend that Roethlisberger and Dickson failed completely to see the existence of a conflict of interests between employers and workers: "The implication that emerges, whether intended or not, is that managers are guided by a logic of reason whereas workers are largely creatures of feelings and emotions. From the test room to the interviewing program and on to the bank wiring observation room the researchers are amazed that workers have feelings and emotions that contradict the logics of management - namely, cost and efficiency. It is implied that they are acting on sentiment; management men on logic. It does not seem to appear to Mayo and his colleagues that the social organisation of a factory contains diverse and conflicting interests and that real differences in 'logic' are held with as cold rationale among workers as among managers. Indeed, as Miss Gilson stated, the area of conflicting interest is so completely skirted that almost nothing appears anywhere to indicate the workers ever considered or even talked about a labor organisation! ---- All conflict, including war, can only be seen as the absence of social skills. Again Mayo's inability to see a conflict of interest in a dynamic society involves him in a limited perspective." ***

Schneider rejects the explanation that Roethlisberger and Dickson give for restriction of output stating: "Thus it seems possible to account for many restrictive practices without resorting to explanations which reduce the worker to a hedonistically calculating machine, or a nonlogically acting organism, or an unconscious respondent to states of morals. On the contrary, we would hold that the worker is capable of surprisingly logical calculation - given his experiences, aspirations, and values on the one hand, and the realities of the role he plays, on the other. If, in fact, his efforts to achieve security by these means are doomed to failure, if his strength is puny compared to the forces which control him, his ignorance or his weakness should be blamed; but one should never make the mistake of denying that the worker has the power of rationality or other attributes of humanity." ****

Landsberger has made a detailed study of "Management and the Worker" and of the criticisms made of it. In his/

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* Footnote: Viteles, op. cit., p. 205.

** Footnote: Roy, op. cit., p. 430.

*** Footnote: Miller and Form, op. cit., p. 79

**** Footnote: Schneider, op. cit., p. 202.

his book "Hawthorne Revisited" he absolves Roethlisberger and Dickson from many of the criticisms made of their work but admits that they failed to understand the conflict of interests between employers and workers that exists in industry. Because this is the most important study of the Hawthorne Experiment as yet published I will quote from it at some length.

Landsberger points out that failure to understand the causes of industrial unrest is the most common criticism of the Hawthorne research: "The accusation that the Mayo school has failed to analyse properly the causes of industrial unrest has - as we have seen - been the most basic criticism leveled against it. To whatever school the critics have in their turn belonged, they have regarded the industrial scene as inadequately portrayed by the Harvard group....."

"No simple refutation of this, the central and most serious point in the critics' array, will be attempted. None is possible in the context of a re-review of 'Management and the Worker' in view of the dated, unique, and therefore limited nature of the book. But at the outset it is important to make three distinctions: between the fact of conflict and the particular forms which it may take, between the description of conflict and an analysis of its causes, and between more proximate and more ultimate causes. The distinction between the fact of conflict and its form is important because it makes clear that the absence of organised labor-management conflict at Hawthorne does not imply, either for the reader of the book or for its authors, that a state of conflict did not exist. It implies only that this conflict did not exist in the form which has become the most notable one since then, that is between organised labor and management. The Mayo school described conflict at Hawthorne in terms of tensions between informally organised groups. It is strange that the school's critics should have interpreted this analysis as theoretically at variance with an analysis of conflict as it takes place between formally organised groups. The two are not all contradictory - they are simply different forms of the same phenomenon."

"At the same time it must be recognised that the authors committed a well-nigh incredible sin of omission by not recognising in 1939 that the conditions which they had observed some eight years earlier were precisely the ones which accounted for the rise of formal unionism in the intervening years. Their own analysis would have been fullyecongruent with such a conclusion. The authors - by wittingly or unwittingly failing to recognise this and state it - have done the field of human relations in industry an amount of harm which, in retrospect, appears to be almost irreparable." *

Later, on page 70, Landsberger writes: "The authors' analysis,therefore, ends at the brink. It does not deny the existence of conflict even though, because of the realities of the situation, the informally organised manifestations of conflict were described rather than its manifestations via unions and overt strikes. Nor, in their explanatory theory, do the authors attribute much importance to what might be termed mere 'frictional' causes of conflict, such as insensitive supervisory behavior. The authors' major explanatory variable is constant/

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* Footnote: "Hawthorne Revisited": 'Management and the Worker', its Critics, and Developments in Human Relations in Industry." op. cit., pp. 63-64.

constant technological change, and the disquieting effects of such change on occupational prestige groupings. Whatever 'skills' may be demanded of management to avert conflict, they are definitely not merely interpersonal skills. After all, the authors specifically talk about management skills, not about supervisory skills, as being of crucial importance, and managers do not have face-to-face contact with working operatives. The only concrete example of the successful application of 'managerial skill' contained in the book was of a group who were assured, and in the end almost convinced, that management really meant business when it promised not to introduce changes which would affect the stability of the group. No other specific examples were offered. The determining variable toward which their investigation had led was clearly not the kind which would respond to simple treatment. It had pushed the authors beyond the confines of the small group, and it would very likely lead them further - into a broader social investigation. Unfortunately, instead of following up the logic implicit in their analysis, the authors saw fit to add to the description of their empirical studies a set of recommendations to management in the form of the counselling program." *

Landsberger is making the point that the fault of Roethlisberger and Dickson is largely one of misinterpretation: there is nothing wrong with their findings, only with the interpretation they placed on these findings. They found the existence of conflict but interpreted it "in terms of tensions between informally organised groups", instead of in terms of the basic conflict of interests between employers and employed. With this view I agree entirely. The situation described by Roethlisberger and Dickson can readily be explained in terms of the conflict of interests between employers and employed. There is nothing in this thesis which conflicts with the actual research findings of Roethlisberger and Dickson, in fact much confirms it. The contradictions arise only in the conclusions Roethlisberger and Dickson have drawn from their research findings.

Landsberger later extends this point by discussing "Management and the Worker" and what he calls: "The Interest-Group Approach". Long familiar to political scientists and to sociologists interested in community structure and political processes, the interest-group approach is another approach to which increasing attention has recently had to be paid in the analysis of social data from industry. It has, of course, always been a much favored approach to the understanding of union-management relations." **

He goes on to state: "It cannot be claimed that "Management and the Worker" did, in fact, inspire later researchers to utilise this approach in the same way as, for example, it directly inspired research into small-group leadership. What can be legitimately be said, however, is that the book's failure to provide such inspiration was less its fault than that of its readers. The data on the formation of groups presented by the authors, and their analysis of that data in Chapter XXIII, invited an interest-group explanation as much as any/

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* Footnote: Landsberger, op. cit., p. 70

** Footnote: Landsberger, op. cit., p. 108

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any other (as we were at pains to point out in the previous chapter). The authors' presentation is analytically less clear-cut than if they had sought to establish this approach above all others. Yet their unpointed description of how the interests of one group may be harmed by the actions of another in pursuit of its interests, gains in retrospect just because it enables us to see how much a clash of interests is often obscured by other, more obvious aspects of the situation (such as overt dislike of an unpopular supervisor)." *

Thus the weight of these authorities supports the claim put forward in this thesis that the social behaviour patterns of workers at the place of work are ultimately decided by the reactions of the workers to their employers: these reactions being determined by the degree to which the interests of the workers conflict with the interests of the employers.

The question now arises, why should the conclusions of this thesis, which are supported by the authorities quoted above, directly contradict the conclusions of Roethlisberger and Dickson?

In answering this question it must be emphasised once again that the differences do not lie in the actual findings from the researches but only in the conclusions drawn from these researches. Thus the findings from the printing research are remarkably similar to those from the Bank Wiring Observation Room study. There are very similar restrictive practices carried out in a similar way, and, if the reasons given by the workers themselves are accepted, for the same reasons. There is also the same group solidarity, enforced when necessary by similar social sanctions. **

It would appear, logically, that if the explanation put forward by Roethlisberger and Dickson that the behaviour of the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives was caused by their "social sentiments" and not by their economic interests, were correct, it would be equally applicable to the printers. However, the existence of strong trade unions based upon the open recognition of a conflict of interests, mainly economic, between employers and employed makes it obvious that such an explanation would be inadequate.

On the other hand it is possible to apply the conclusions concerning a conflict of interests between employers and employed arrived at in this thesis to the researches of Roethlisberger and Dickson. To repeat the quotation from Landsberger given above: "The data on the formation of groups presented by the authors, and their analysis of that data in Chapter XXIII, invited an interest-group explanation as much as any other." ***

The explanation of the differences between the conclusions of Roethlisberger and Dickson on the one hand, and those given in this thesis and by the authorities cited above on the other, seems to lie in the point raised/

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* Footnote: Landsberger, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

** Footnote: See Chapter 8, p. 56 et. seq. of this thesis, and A.J.M.Sykes, "Trade Union Workshop Organisation in the Printing Trade - the Chapel", in "Human Relations", Vol.13, No.1, April,1960.

*** Footnote: Landsberger, op. cit., p. 109.

raised by Landsberger that: "The authors' analysis, therefore, ends at the brink. It does not deny the existence of conflict even though, because of the realities of the situation, the informally organised manifestations of conflict were described rather than its manifestations via unions and overt strikes." *

What Landsberger is, in fact, saying is that Roethlisberger and Dickson only partly solved the problem: their research revealed the existence of conflicts of interests but they stopped short of recognising these conflicts. This is a point of view with which I am in entire agreement. The conclusions they arrived at were not wrong in themselves but they offered only a partial, not a complete explanation. It was correct to attribute the restrictive practices and the social behaviour patterns of the Bank Wiring Observation Room operatives to their social sentiments: it would have been equally correct to have attributed the restrictive practices and the social behaviour patterns of the printers, clerks, or navvies, to social sentiments. Where Roethlisberger and Dickson were at fault was in stopping at this point and making no attempt to look for any possible reasons for the social sentiments.

As I have stated above the existence of trade unions among the printers made it necessary for me to examine the conflicts of interest upon which the social groups in the works were based. Having thus discovered the importance of conflicts of interest I looked for them in my researches on the clerks and navvies, and there too they were found to effect social behaviour. In the absence of the trade unions, which would have given them a clue to the conflict of interests, Roethlisberger and Dickson were content to rest on their theory of social sentiments, satisfied that this offered a complete explanation of the operatives' behaviour.

On this evidence I would claim, therefore, that the conclusions of Roethlisberger and Dickson are not false but are incomplete. They give an explanation of the <u>immediate</u> reasons for the social behaviour patterns of workers, their social sentiments, but they do not give the <u>ultimate</u> reasons - which lie in the conflict of interests between employers and employed, and, sometimes, between different groups of workers.

In this question of the <u>ultimate</u> as against the <u>immediate</u> reasons for the social behaviour patterns of workers lies the fundamental difference between my own conclusions and those of Roethlisberger and Dickson. In order to clarify this point I will conclude by summarising and comparing the two sets of conclusions.

Roethlisberger and Dickson concluded that the <u>ultimate</u>, as well as the <u>immediate</u>, explanation of the social behaviour patterns of workers lay in the social sentiments that arise spontaneously among workers who are in face-to-face contact. Having decided that this was indeed the <u>ultimate</u> reason they went on to assume that the values and interests of the workers must, in consequence, arise out of the social sentiments and be secondary to them. Hence they assumed that interests, including/

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* <u>Footnote</u>: Landsberger, op. cit., p. 70

including economic interests, must always be of lesser importance than social sentiments in determining behaviour.

In my own researches I went much further in an attempt to find the ultimate explanation for the behaviour of the workers studied, my findings were as follows:

(i) That the social behaviour patterns of the groups studied were determined by the interests and values held by each group: not as Roethlisberger and Dickson believe, that social sentiments determine interests and values.

(ii) It was found that the interests and values of each group arose out of the ideology of that group, being in fact part of the ideology.

(iii) The ideology of each group was found to be determined by its reaction to the employer and to the employer's ideology.

Thus the ultimate explanation for the social behaviour of the groups lay not in their social sentiments but in differences of interests between each group and its employer, these differences of interest being caused by differences in ideology between employers and employed. The social sentiments of the workers were not the cause of their social behaviour but were merely symptoms of the real causes - the underlying differences of interest arising from differences in ideology.

APPENDIX "A".

Methods.

The first question which is asked of any research worker is - "How do you reach your conclusions?" A statement of methods if therefore an essential preliminary to any report of this nature. Any successful scientific work depends on two things:-

A. The gathering of adequate facts.

B. Analysing and generalising upon these facts,* or as I shall call it the Processing of these facts.

A. The Gathering of Facts.

Facts are gathered by observations; which are of two kinds -

i. Direct Observation, when the research worker observes his subjects himself.

ii. Indirect Observation or Interviewing, when the research worker relies on the observations of others and gathers these by interviewing people who have themselves observed directly. The efficiency of indirect observation depends upon the acumen and integrity of those who supply the observations and the nature of the interviews at which the researcher elicits them.

iii. Gaining Acceptance.

The first problem the researcher has to face is that of gaining acceptance by the people he studies, so that his techniques can be applied successfully. As it is part of the wider problem of gathering facts I include it under that heading.

The scheme under which I will discuss methods is as follows:-

A. The Gathering of Facts.

i. Direct Observation.

ii. Interviewing.

iii. Gaining Acceptance.

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* Footnote: What Nadel termed "Description" and "Explanation". S.F.Nadel "The Foundations of Social Anthropology". London, Cohen and West, 1951, p. 20.

Gathering Facts.

We are setting out to gather facts, facts about human behaviour, and we are going to do this by observation, direct and indirect (interviewing). What kind of observation are we to use? What kinds are there to use? *Miller and Form have distinguished four "levels" as follows:-

1. "The first level might be called common-sense observation. The observer looks around in areas where he believes he may find events which will serve as evidence. He takes with him the everyday concepts of folk language and records what he sees in 'simple' language."

2. "A second level or degree of rigorousness is achieved by systematic or conceptual observation. The observer asks in advance how his observations may be most meaningfully discerned and recorded. He defines explicitly the units of observation in such a way that other observers may be able to use them with a high degree of reliability and validity."

3. "A third level may be described as measured observation. The observer uses mathematical language to aid him in making precise quantitative measurements of his observations. He usually develops or uses a standardised sociometric scale or he may utilise carefully defined units of measurement such as have been constructed for observation in human ecology, sociometry or public opinion analysis."

4. "The most rigorous level of observation is the social experiment conducted under strictly controlled conditions. The objective of the social experiment is to observe the effect of one or more independent variables upon a dependent variable or criterion."

The question is - which of these "levels" of observation is the most useful for our purpose?

1. is the method of the "practical man" who may have the desire but rarely has the time for systematic study. It can be useful within limits, but it gives one information which is imprecise and difficult to verify and interpret.

3. has the usual advantages and disadvantages of things mathematical. It permits precise measurement of items which lead themselves to mathematical treatment, e.g., questions of quantity. But it is useless for things which cannot be measured mathematically, e.g., questions of quality. Its scope is too limited for our present research.

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* Footnote: D.C.Miller & W.H.Form "Industrial Sociology". Harper Bros., New York, 1951, pp. 88-9.

4. is a very difficult and expensive method and can only be applied to very small groups under very special circumstances.

This leaves us with method 2. I have kept this to the last in order to discuss it more fully as it is the method I used. It entails the use of "systematic" or "conceptual observation", which means that facts are gathered in accordance with a system, and classified or summarised under certain concepts. *

This systematising and conceptualising is not something which is done on the gathered facts alone; it also governs the actual gathering of facts. To gather all the facts is impossible and in any case a haphazard aggregation of facts is of little use. What is required are significant facts, facts which are significant in terms of the research being undertaken. The research worker is, or should be, trained to recognise what are significant facts in these terms, but, in addition, when tackling a particular piece of research he must first learn a good deal about the social background of those whom he studies in a particular context.

This background knowledge is needed for three reasons:

(a) To enable the research worker, as interviewer, to establish rapport with his subjects.

(b) To help him to interpret the things he observes, or is told, in terms of his subject's social context, so that he may avoid the common mistake of interpreting them in terms of his own social context.

(c) To assist him in identifying the different elements in his subjects' behaviour.

To process this background of knowledge the interviewer must be familiar with the social environment of his subjects and with the major social groups to which they belong, and must be familiar with the values and behaviour patterns obtaining in these groups.

What, then, are these major social groups? They are of two kinds, those based on locality and those based on common interest. The local groups include those based on the nations, regions and localities to which people belong. Common interest groups include groups based on religion, industry, trade, trade union, and the social classes people belong to, or think they belong to. As members of local groups the clerks in Stewarts & Lloyds' Office are members of a Scottish regional and a Glasgow locality group and as such they have the values and behaviour patterns of Scotsmen and Glaswegians. As members of interest groups they are members of a particular occupation - e.g. clerks; members of a particular firm - Stewarts/

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* Footnote: As Nadel puts it "We can, however, specify the processes whereby we impart meaning to the relations between phenomena or express the fitness of the laws governing them. We do so by conceptualising the relations, that is, by constructing for them a single summarising concept and its appropriate linguistic (or other symbolic) expression." Nadel, p.203.

Stewarts & Lloyds; and of a particular office in that firm.

The researcher's job is to discover any behaviour patterns which may be particular to that firm and that particular office, but until he knows what behaviour patterns are found in the wider groups he cannot begin to do this as he would not be able to distinguish between behaviour characteristic of all offices, or of Scotland, or Glasgow as a whole, and those peculiar to a particular office.

Direct Observation.

The first questions to be answered are - Why use direct observation at all? What advantages are to be gained from it? The answer to this is threefold:-

i. Direct observation gives one a means of checking the accuracy of information received from other sources. Attempts to mislead the research worker may easily succeed if he is dependent on information received from interviews. A man or group of men may successfully mislead one and hide their real opinions during interviews: it is difficult but it can be done. To conceal behaviour from an observer over a period of time is much more difficult. For example, one department in the Office was very proud of its solidarity and wished to impress on me that there were no "misfits" in the department. For nearly a month they maintained this fiction during interviews, although, by watching their behaviour, it became clear on the very first day that one man was disliked and distrusted by the rest.

ii. It enables the research worker to study real as opposed to ideal behaviour. Research workers have consistently found that when they ask a person what is done in a certain social situation they are told not what is done but what the interviewee feels ought to be done. In other words, the ideal of behaviour in that situation - the norm.

This often happens in research; an informant takes the easy way out which usually means describing the norm. This is useful as it tells us what ideal behaviour is, but it is essential that we should also know what the reality is, and this is best discovered by direct observation.

iii. The difficulty with interviewing is that the person interviewed does not know what is significant to the interviewer. Hence, a great deal of important information is missed because the subject does not think it important and never discusses it. Direct observation gives the research worker an opportunity to find this information for himself. Having done so, he can formulate questions on it which will elicit further information during interviews.

Sometimes information is deliberately repressed by an informant because it may reflect unfavourably on him or his group; again this can be discovered by direct observation. The person interviewed may - with the best intentions - seek to interpret the reasons for the things he described to the research worker. These interpretations are simply the speculations of an individual, but they may easily be believed to be the interpretations generally accepted by all the people studied. Direct observation often indicates whether these interpretations are true or false, generally accepted or purely individual.

The next question to be answered is: How do we observe? First, I must assume two things, (i) that the research worker has a system of concepts by which he can classify whathe observes, which we have already discussed; and/

and (ii) that he has gained the acceptance of the people he is to study - a matter which I will discuss in detail later. Granted these two conditions, the research worker may appear outwardly to have little to do but observe behaviour. He has to try and be at the right place when things of interest are happening, or are about to happen, but when he achieves this he can only watch and record what happens. Inwardly, however, the observer is very busy; he not only records what happens, he must be constantly asking himself questions about it.

The research worker must note who is involved, watch how they behave and see what differences occur in their behaviour as the situation changes. If a clerk approaches his manager, the research worker wants to know, for example, how he addresses him. Does he call him "Sir," or "Mr.", or does he use his Christian name? Do all clerks address him in the same way? If some do not, then who are they; what mode of address do these exceptions use, and why? Is the manager addressed in the same way outside the Office - at department social outings for example? Do clerks vary in the number of times they approach their manager, and if so why? And do the different modes of address and frequencies of approach signify personal idiosyncrasies or standardised patterns of behaviour among members of different social or working categories?

The research worker must be formulating such questions constantly in order to reveal the significance of what he is seeing. Nothing can be accepted at its face value; everything must be questioned to see what is its significance.

To take an example. The clerks in the Office send round "a sheet" when people are married or retire; that is, they send round a paper asking for contributions. Anyone who wishes to contribute puts down his name and the amount contributed on the sheet of paper sent round. This is a very common practice - I have seen a similar practice in every works I have been in - nevertheless it had to be questioned. On examining a sheet I found that the amounts subscribed were not random but fall into distinct categories: on examining the categories I found that the people subscribing in each category were of equal status in the Office and that there was a difference in status between the people in different categories. I examined several other sheets and found the same. It was clear that in subscribing to the sheets people in the Office were careful to pay the accepted amount for the status level to which they belonged, or thought they belonged. Thus through questioning the apparently commonplace subscription sheet I had found a useful index to status, an index whereby people classified themselves.

Thus it can be seen that direct observation is not simply a passive observation of behaviour but depends on the observer constantly questioning and probing everything he sees, in an attempt to classify facts and to sort the significant from the insignificant.

Interviewing.

The first question to be answered is: Why interview at all - why not just observe? Interviewing is necessary for two reasons:-

a. It enables the research worker to ascertain mental states that are sometimes difficult, sometimes impossible, to ascertain from observed behaviour.

b. It allows the research worker to extend the limits which time and space set on the range of his own observation. Such an extension in time and space is necessary if he is to know whether the behaviour he sees himself is normal or abnormal, frequent or infrequent, general or particular.

Types of Interview.

Having decided to interview, and having acquired the necessary background knowledge, the next step is to decide on the kind of interview to be used. In deciding this, it is necessary to choose the kind best suited to the aims of the research, which we defined as being to study "standardised behaviour patterns". There are many types of interviewing technique which can be divided into two broad categories:

a. Direct Question Interviews. In these the interviewer has a list of questions which he wants answered. The interviewer puts direct questions to the subject and records the answers he receives. Conversation between interviewer and subject is normally restricted to these questions and answers.

b. Indirect, or, as they are usually known, Non-Directive Interviews. In these the aim is to keep direct questioning to a minimum and the person interviewed is encouraged to talk freely about his work and his views on it (I am here assuming that his work is the subject of study). These interviews take the form of a free conversation and no limits - within reason - are set on the range of discussion.

In the event I rejected the Direct Question Interview for the following reasons:-

i. It is too restrictive since it limits the information received to that given in answers to questions. In other words, the interviewer only hears about the things he asks about. To formulate questions about any subject implies some degree of knowledge of that subject; given that knowledge one can formulate questions the answers to which will increase one's knowledge. On the other hand, if one knows nothing about a subject, questions cannot be formulated and the subject remains unknown. Thus direct questioning may increase one's knowledge of things which are known but it does not readily reveal things which are unknown. This is a serious objection to the use of the Direct Question method in a project such as the present research, in which I had no pre-knowledge of what I was likely to find in the way of standardised behaviour.

ii./

ii. It is a quick method, but it leads to shortened answers since it tends to elicit simple "yes" or "no" answers to all questions, regardless of whether or not they can be answered adequately in these terms.

iii. It is too rigid and does not allow the subject freedom to develop his answers. For example, he may be suspicious at first and give a misleading answer. Once that answer has been given and recorded it is very difficult for the subject to retract it later, should he wish to do so. On the other hand, in non-directive interviewing subjects frequently change their stories as their confidence in the interviewer grows. This type of interview leaves them free to do this as they have not committed themselves to a definite answer to a specific question.

iv. It can easily become superficial and lead to stereotyped answers which do not represent the interviewee's real feelings in the matter.

v. Direct questions may elicit opinions on topics which are important to the interviewer but which the subject has never thought of before, and to which he is prepared to give any answer which suggests itself as expedient.

vi. Direct questioning does not allow for the effect the interview may have on his subject. Most people interviewed try to discover the interviewer's motives and values, and very often try to raise their status with him by living up to these values, or, less frequently, try to annoy him by being "bloody-minded" about them.

The reaction is somewhat similar to that shown to the "Quizzes" which appear in the popular press that require "yes" or "no" answers to twenty questions, anyone having over fifteen "yes's" being classed as having a "pleasing personality", or being a "good mixer", and so on. Many people strive to answer "yes" as often as possible, and manipulate the truth to gain a good score, or, if "bloody-minded" about the "quiz", to make a bad score. Let me illustrate this by example from "The Government of British Trade Unions" where the author describes a schedule he used in interviewing, which he called "Schedule for Interviewing Inactive Members of a Trade Union Branch".*

One of the questions in this Schedule is - "Do you read the Transport and General Workers Union Record (the official Journal of the union)? a) every month; b) every other month; c) less than six times a year; d) not at all."

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* Footnote: Joseph Goldstein "The Government of British Trade Unions", London. Allen and Unwin, 1952. pp. 289-290.

Let us see how this kind of thing works in practice. During my research into the trade unions of the Printing Industry, I used to ask men and women if they read the monthly journal of their trade union. The men invariably answered with an emphatic "yes". In actual fact, few of them ever looked at it, for I found in later discussions about trade union matters that few of them knew anything about the information contained in the journal.

The reason why they claimed to have read it was that I had official permission from the trade unions to do my research and trade union officials were seen to be friendly towards me, consequently the men assumed that I was a keen orthodox trade unionist. They also tried to impress on me that they were good trade unionists - by my assumed standards - hence they claimed to read the journal regularly. I discovered the falsity of their answers only because my direct question was supplemented by a general talk with them on trade union matters. Had I relied on the direct question alone I should have been completely misled.

It is clear then that there are serious objections to the use of the Direct Question interview; the question is - what is there to be said for the Non-Directive Interview?

The Non-Directive Interview.

The non-directive interview takes a considerable time, a day, sometimes days, as against the hour or so by the Direct Question method, but it has great advantages to offset this, which are:-

i. In a non-directive interview one can gradually build up the confidence of the person interviewed until he is willing to go beyond merely superficial answers and divulge his real, basic opinions. During my printing trade research, for example, it was possible to predict accurately what a man would say at first since there was a simple pattern of "export only" opinions and attitudes about work and about trade unionism that all used in discussion with outsiders. After people had gained confidence, however, they would begin to divulge their real opinions which were often very different.

ii. In the course of the interview the subject often tells us things indirectly which he could not tell directly because he simply does not see their significance; or, if he does, he cannot explain it briefly. To take another example from my printing research; I discovered that the printers operated many restrictive practices, which, though restrictive in effect, were not restrictive in intent, their aim being to protect the weaker members of the work group against the employer, and the fact that they restricted production was incidental. Such practices could not have been discovered by asking about practices which restrict production because they were not thought of as restrictive in this way. In fact they could not have been elicited/

elicited by direct questioning at all, for the men who operate such practices often do so as a routine matter and without ever analysing the reasons for them.

This often happens: many practices in industry are maintained for reasons which have never been thought out and so cannot be expressed directly; the only way in which they can be communicated is through long-winded descriptions of what people do. The clerks in the Office deny that restrictive practices exist, but they will describe at length how certain clerks disrupt and delay the work because they make a practice of keeping certain vital information about the work as a personal secret. Such information is vital in this kind of research and it simply cannot be obtained except by non-directive interviewing.

iii. Non-directive interviewing reveals the significance of what people say. In reply to direct questions a man may reply, "Yes, I like my wife", and "Yes, I like the canteen tea." We are left to guess the relative degree to which he likes them both. On the other hand, if a man is left to discuss these subjects we will soon see the significance each has for him.

To take an example: in reply to a direct question "Does your firm give you any chance of promotion?", both the printers of my previous research and the clerks in the Office would answer "no". Further, both would say - and have said - that this is unfair. Nevertheless there is a great difference in their respective attitudes to promotion. The printer is not interested in it; he does not want it; his main interest lies in raising trade union rates. I have never known a printer raise the subject voluntarily but, if asked, he will complain that he has no prospects. The clerks, on the other hand, lay the greatest significance on it, and it is the subject they always raise, and the one which they discuss the longest. To them it is clearly the vital issue.

Only non-directive interviewing reveals these significant differences of attitude.

The Actual Interview.

I shall describe the method of interviewing and gaining acceptance as related to the clerks in the office only. I have done this in order to preserve clarity and continuity of description. My method of interviewing and gaining acceptance remained basically the same in all three researches and what I have to say below about following up interviews and gaining the confidence of the clerks applies to all three. The exception is that my research on the civil engineering navvies was done covertly and so my interviewing of them was done very informally in course of my normal conversations with them. In spite of this these interviews, informal as they were, followed the basic principles laid down below.

Place of Interview.

The clerks were normally interviewed sitting at their own desks in the department to which they belonged. This was done for two reasons: (a) in order to give the clerks confidence; and (b) so that I could watch their behaviour and that of the rest of the department at the same time. As the interviews were lengthy - lasting from half a day to several days - I did not demand the subject's whole attention for that time, but allowed him to do any pressing work which turned up and deal with other clerks who wished to see him. I did this because I wanted to see the subject at work and dealing with other clerks.

Note-taking.

I took notes during the interview, but I made these very brief as I did not like to be writing continually - as if from dictation. I felt that writing things down inhibited the subject's flow of talk, especially on controversial matters, and so I kept it to the necessary minimum, keeping the interview as much like an ordinary conversation as possible, and making records of what had happened when opportunity offered.

The Interview Proper.

I began to interview by explaining who I was and what I was doing, a process which I shall deal with later. I then went on to ask certain direct questions which covered:-

A. The clerk's educational background.

B. Where had he worked besides his present company, and what did he do?

* C. What departments had he worked in within the Office and what jobs had he done?

D. Whether he was in the services, and, if so, what did he do?

E. Did he attend, or had he attended, night-school?

F. Why did he join his present company.

Footnote: This question was omitted in the printing research. I asked the navvies the same questions with the exceptions of C & E, but put them informally.

I did not expect brief direct answers to these questions but let the subject expand on them as he liked. I had two reasons for this use of direct questioning:-

(a) It gave me useful background knowledge about the subject.

(b) It "loosened up" the subject, who was usually nervous and found it difficult to talk at first. If left unprompted he tended to "dry up"; but by getting him to talk about himself he was given an easy and interesting subject to talk about, and while doing so he gained confidence and lost his fear of the interviewer. This was the main reason for the questions; to get me over the "awkward" period which usually occurs at the beginning of an interview.

After these initial questions, I encouraged the subject to go on talking freely about his work, the Office, and his opinions on them. So far as was possible I allowed him to choose his own topics, but there were certain things I wanted discussed and if he did not touch on these I would raise them myself as topics for discussion, but I did not question him directly on them if I could avoid it. Similarly, if the conversation showed signs of petering out I would raise fresh topics for discussion.

One difficulty I found was that many of the clerks were afraid of being the first to express a grievance or mention a controversial issue. Sometimes the difficulty solved itself as the bolder clerks raised the controversial points and told the others they had done so. In other cases I myself mentioned - though without expressing any opinion - that I knew of the existence of certain controversial points and grievances and had heard them discussed by other clerks. This reassured the clerks and caused them to talk freely. It was clear that their objection was not to discussing things which I already knew but to telling me things I did not know. Once they discovered that I did in fact know of these issues this objection was removed and they had no hesitation in discussing them.

It may be argued that this is not non-directive interviewing, but I cannot agree with this view. In a perfect non-directive interview the interviewer would not speak at all, but this of course is an impossible ideal. There are times when the interviewer has to hint at topics; times, even, when he has to ask direct questions; but, so long as these are kept to a minimum, we have what is in fact a non-directive interview.

"Follow-up" Interviews.

I continued each interview until I felt that - for the time being at least - the subject had no further useful information to contribute. This was not my last contact with him however. In these first interviews I built up my knowledge of the Office and the people in it, and learned where the unofficial lines of communication lay and who controlled them. I followed these up by returning to the person interviewed several times for further/

further talks during which I obtained more information. These "follow-up" interviews were very informal and I did not carry a notebook or make written notes during them. I made frequent but irregular visits to those departments I had already worked in, and during these visits I would pause to talk to some of the clerks. The length of time I spent with a clerk on these visits depended on what he had to tell me; it might be only a few minutes or it might take over an hour. Sometimes matters relevant to the research would not come up at all and we would talk briefly about sport, holidays or general social matters.

The frequency with which I revisited individual clerks depended on their value as informants. These men who had "their ears to the ground" and who were very good informants I revisited very frequently, at least once a week. The poor informants I revisited much less frequently.

Value of the "Follow-up" Interviews.

What was the value of the "follow-up" interviews? These interviews were valuable for the following reasons:-

1. It takes time for people to get accustomed to one and to acquire complete confidence. My first interview only put me into contact with a clerk for a short time, but the "follow-up" interviews kept me in touch with him over several months, and, as time went on, confidence in me increased and I was constantly being told things which had been kept from me at first. I learned of many things which I would never have discovered if I had restricted my interviews to one per clerk.

2. The first interview only allowed me to hear a clerk's opinions at one particular time, but the use of "follow-up" interviews allowed me to keep him under constant observation and to study his reactions to the various events which occurred during the time I was in the Office.

Conclusions.

The aim of interviewing is to gather information and from this point of view the methods used were highly successful. The first interviews gave me background knowledge of the Office, revealed its unofficial lines of communication and, through my contacts, enabled me to create my own. The "follow-up" interviews allowed me to extend andmaintain my own lines of communication and ensured a steady flow of information on current events in the Office.

Gaining Acceptance.

The first problem to be faced was that of gaining acceptance by the people in the Office. This is the problem of establishing a situation where I could observe and interview without unduly affecting the behaviour of the people studied. The difficulty is that the arrival of an investigator - whether independent or appointed by management - at once creates suspicion and affects behaviour. Only when people have come to accept the investigator does suspicion decline and behaviour return to normal. *

In previous research I overcame this difficulty by going in as an ordinary worker doing normal work. In this way I was able to keep people under observation without arousing suspicion or causing any break in normal behaviour. In the Office it was impossible to follow this method unless I was prepared to restrict my research to a very small area - a single department - the reason being that the ordinary clerks, especially the new clerks undergoing training, have a very limited range of contacts and these are mainly in their own department. Working as a clerk my movements would have been equally restricted. In view of these difficulties I decided, as an experiment, to go into the Office openly as a research worker and to interview each clerk at his own desk.

New clerks and trainees are taught the work by "sitting-in" with a clerk, watching him work, and asking him questions. By similarly "sitting-in" with a clerk my outward behaviour at least was not unusual and did not emphasise the fact that I was doing research. Interviewing the clerk at his desk gave me an opportunity to watch the department while at work and its social behaviour during breaks from work. It also allowed me to observe the behaviour of the man interviewed in his dealings with other clerks.

These interviews took some time - several weeks in fact - and so the clerks in the department had ample opportunity to get used to me and, through interacting with me socially, to accept me. As this happened the clerks gained confidence in their interviews with me and talked more freely - both individually and as a group - in front of me - in other words I was allowed to become a member of "the listening group" in which open discussion took place.

Experiments with this method proved it so successful that I retained it for the rest of the research. I did some interviewing in a private room, but these were all interviews of managers or of clerks from departments which I had not time to enter for a full scale investigation. My observation and formal interviews in departments were supplemented by observation and informal interviews - in the form of discussions and conversations - in departments, in the Canteen, in the corridors and washrooms, and with groups of clerks in public houses after working hours.

Gaining the Confidence of the Clerks.

At first I found that I was regarded with deep suspicion and as a "management spy". Later, when I had gained/

gained their confidence, clerks told me how they had made agreements with their friends on what they would tell me and what they would keep secret, and of how in some departments at first I was referred to as "creeping Jesus". Obviously my first steps had to be aimed at overcoming this suspicion and gaining the confidence of the clerks.

i. Most of the men interviewed wanted to know what I was doing and whether any information they gave me would be treated as confidential or would be conveyed to the management. In all cases, whether asked or not, I explained what I was doing and gave illustrations from my previous work to show that my research in the Office was not unique and confined to that Office and Company but was part of a more general scheme of research in industry.

I told the clerks that any information they gave me might be used in my Report and might even be published, but I made it clear that this would be done only after names, and details which might identify any particular individual, had been suppressed. In nearly all cases this was accepted as satisfactory.

A very important point was simply letting the clerks get used to me. During my first days in a department interest was concentrated on me and what I said and did was carefully noted, and so, in my first interviews, I proceeded very slowly and kept off all controversial topics. After the first few days suspicion declined and confidence grew so that interviews normally grew progressively easier the longer I stayed in a department.

ii. I made every attempt to interact socially with the clerks - told jokes, entered into their arguments and discussions and generally behaved as a member of the social group. This too reduced suspicion and often clerks became confidential quite voluntarily even before I had begun to interview them. This acting as a member of the social group is very important as it frees the clerks from constraint and ensures that the behaviour one sees is normal.

The time when one is accepted can be easily judged, for, when that times comes, it is possible to enter a room without attracting any attention.

The important point about this social intereaction is that it must be done as an equal; any attempt to create a higher status for oneself will make interaction more difficult.

iii. I have said that as people get used to me their suspicion declines. This of course is true only so long as one does not give cause for suspicion. I made every attempt to win the confidence of the clerks. I deliberately avoided obtaining information by trickery of any kind.*

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* Footnote: Naturally this could not apply to the navvies.

iii.(contd.)

I tried to get people to give information because they had confidence in me; if they had not enough I left them alone for the time being and usually found that I was given information later when they knew me better.

I only found two people - out of nearly a hundred interviewed - who remained so suspicious as to be valueless as informants. Both men were described as secretive by their own workmates. One, who carefully gave me opinions the exact opposite to those I found he expressed to his friends, was quite exceptionally suspicious, a fact attributable to some extent to his experiences as a Japanese prisoner of war.